Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner James Britton appealed two circuit court orders denying his request to terminate alimony, and granting the requests of respondent Patricia Britton for contempt for nonpayment of alimony and renewal of alimony. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found: (1) an obligation to pay alimony under the applicable statute automatically expired after three years unless renewed, modified, or extended; (2) a stipulation providing for a term of alimony beyond the three-year limit does not override the statutory expiration of the alimony obligation; (3) the original alimony award was first entered in 1985, and petitioner’s alimony obligations expired in 1988; (4) a court order approving a 2016 stipulation did not serve to renew or extend the 1985 alimony award. Therefore the trial court erred in finding petitioner in contempt of the 2016 stipulation and order. Petitioner did not have an obligation to pay alimony after the alimony award expired in 1988; as a result, the amounts petitioner paid in error based on the mistaken belief that the 1985 alimony order remained in effect were not required and were, therefore, voluntary. Absent fraud, “money voluntarily paid under a mistake of law cannot be recovered.” Accordingly, the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in declining to order reimbursement or credit of sums paid between 1988 and 2018. View "In the Matter of Britton" on Justia Law

Defendant Carter Community Building Association appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff Carter Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), on CCCI's petition to quiet title to a parcel of property in Lebanon, New Hampshire. Defendant also appealed the denial of its motion to amend its counterclaim to add a claim for declaratory relief. In 1986, CCCI conveyed the property at issue to the Trustee of the Farnum Hill Trust by deed. In December 1986, CCCI conveyed by deed the rights it reserved in the Farnum Hill deed to defendant. In November 1989, the property was conveyed to a private corporation. In September 1990, the corporation brought an action to quiet title, naming as defendants CCCI’s shareholders; defendant moved to intervene. In September 1991, a superior court issued an order declaring that the corporation’s title was “free and clear of all rights or interests” of CCCI’s shareholders, and ordering that any issues pertaining to the defendant’s motion to intervene would be addressed in further proceedings. The litigation settled without resolving the issue before the New Hampshire Supreme Court here, whether defendant had an interest in the property. At some point thereafter, the plaintiff took title to the property. In August 2018, the plaintiff brought an action to quiet title, naming the defendant as a party and claiming that the conveyance of CCCI’s future interest in the property to the defendant was void. The plaintiff’s theory was that the Farnum Hill deed created a right of reentry retained by CCCI, which, the plaintiff contended, was not freely transferable. The plaintiff also argued that the defendant’s interest in the property, if any, violated the rule against perpetuities and was an unreasonable restraint on alienation. The defendant counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that it had an enforceable future interest in the property. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, notwithstanding that CCCI had an inalienable right of reentry, defendant may have the right to enforce a golf-course restriction as a restrictive covenant. Judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carter Country Club, Inc. v. Carter Community Building Association" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Patricia Crowe appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment to defendant Appalachian Stitching Company, LLC (Appalachian), on Crowe’s claim that Appalachian violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and RSA chapter 354-A by refusing to accommodate her sciatica. Crowe worked at Appalachian as an assembler, which required her to have the ability to bend, lift and turn freely. After a trip to the emergency room, Crowe returned to work and informed her supervisor she had been diagnosed with sciatica. Crowe requested the ability to sit until her pain subsided and she could resume standing. Appalachian requested a doctor’s note explaining her condition; she obliged with the emergency room discharge instructions that stated, “NO LIFTING, BENDING OR STOOPING FOR 1 WEEK.” After reviewing the discharge instructions, Appalachian sent Crowe home until she was released to work by her doctor. On June 1, 2017, after Crowe missed work for eight days without providing an update on her condition, Appalachian determined that she had voluntarily quit. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appalachian on the ground that Crowe had not established she was a “qualified individual” under the ADA or RSA chapter 354-A. On appeal, Crowe argued that she could have performed the essential functions of her job if Appalachian had not sent her home and, instead, continued to allow her to sit as requested. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that an employer, did not need to provide futile or ineffective accommodations. "Once Crowe was on leave, Appalachian was entitled to rely on the doctor’s evaluation that Crowe was unable to return to work. ... although a request for leave can, in some circumstances, trigger an employer’s obligation to make reasonable accommodations under the ADA, Crowe’s doctor’s inquiry about the availability of FMLA was not such a request." Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly determined that Appalachian was entitled to summary judgment on Crowe’s ADA and RSA chapter 354-A claims. View "Crowe v. Appalachian Stitching Company, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant Daswan Jette appealed his conviction by jury on one count of reckless manslaughter. Defendant argued the trial court: (1) erred by excluding evidence that, more than one month before her death, the victim sold drugs to an individual who paid her with counterfeit money; and (2) may have erred by failing to order the disclosure of certain records submitted for in camera review. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, even if the victim’s prior drug sale was relevant to defendant’s self-defense claim, the trial court properly excluded evidence of the previous sale pursuant to New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 403. Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err by withholding certain records that it reviewed in camera. View "New Hampshire v. Jette" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire (ACLU) and the Concord Monitor, appealed a superior court order which ruled that portions of a contract between an equipment vendor and defendant City of Concord, for the purchase of “covert communications equipment,” were exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. Plaintiffs argued the City failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that redacted portions of the contract were exempt from disclosure, and that the trial court erred when it held an ex parte in camera hearing, during which the City presented evidence supporting exemption. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err when it conducted the hearing, and that it properly determined that most of the redacted information was exempt from disclosure. However, the Court also concluded that it erred by not disclosing one provision of the agreement. That provision was ordered disclosed on remand. View "American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire & a. v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Maia Magee (tenant) appealed a circuit court order in favor of defendant Vita Cooper (landlord) on the tenant’s claim that the landlord willfully violated her right to quiet enjoyment of residential property. Tenant alleged that in retaliation for the August 4 continuance of an eviction proceeding, the landlord: (1) played “loud” rock music on an outdoor stereo system early in the morning and during the day from 8:30 a.m. on Friday, August 7 until 8:30 p.m. on Sunday, August 9, and “for several hours” after 6:00 p.m. on Monday, August 10; (2) yelled “GET OUT OF MY HOME!” loudly from her property on August 10; (3) either shot a gun or ignited firecrackers during the evening of August 9 and between 7:00 a.m. and 8:30 p.m. on August 10; and (4) had an unknown and unidentified man, carrying a camera, trespass on the leased property on August 9. Additionally, Tenant alleged that the landlord breached a term of her lease prohibiting the tenant from playing a “musical instrument, radio, television, or other like device in the leased premises in a manner offensive to other occupants of the building” or during certain hours. She assertet that, in finding to the contrary, the trial court improperly failed to consider the timing of the alleged “bad actions,” and misconstrued and mischaracterized certain items of evidence. Furthermore, Tenant contended the trial court erred by: (1) considering each of the landlord’s alleged “bad actions” individually, rather than considering whether, collectively, such actions violated her right to quiet enjoyment; (2) not considering whether the landlord’s alleged “bad actions” violated the parties’ lease; and (3) relying upon Tenant’s failure to submit evidence of a local sound ordinance. Finding that Tenant failed to meet her burden to establish that there was a question of law warranting reversal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Magee v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Defendant Carley Williams appealed a circuit court decision to impose a portion of her suspended sentence. In 2016, defendant reported to police that a customer at work had exposed himself to her. This report was false, and, in 2017, she pleaded guilty to unsworn falsification and making a false report to law enforcement. For these offenses, the defendant received a 12-month correctional sentence, deferred for one year on the condition of good behavior, and then suspended for one year on the same terms. In April 2019, defendant was arrested for theft by unauthorized taking. She was later convicted on this charge, and there was no dispute that her conviction violated the terms of her suspended sentence. In June 2019, the State moved to impose the 12-month suspended sentence. At a November hearing on the motion, defendant claimed to be her brother’s primary caretaker and argued that imposition of the 12-month suspended sentence would deprive him of necessary care. As a result, the trial court imposed only 10 days of the 12-month sentence. The State moved to reconsider that decision, arguing that defendant had lied to the court about the extent of her brother’s medical problems and her role caring for him. Defendant subsequently filed a police report claiming that, on November 4, M.P., the daughter of her brother’s girlfriend, had stolen from her. Later, defendant called the Milford Police Department, posing as M.P., and asked whether there was a warrant for M.P.’s arrest. In February 2020, the State filed a second motion to impose, asserting that defendant committed identity fraud by “posing as another individual in an attempt to obtain confidential information.” Following a multi-day, in-person, evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found defendant violated the suspended sentence’s condition of good behavior, in part, by committing identity fraud, and that the violation warranted imposing “a reasonable portion of the suspended sentence.” On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by finding that she committed identity fraud and by holding the hearing telephonically, at which it imposed 70 days (less 10 days of time served) of the 12-month suspended sentence. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "New Hampshire v. Williams" on Justia Law

Petitioner appeals a circuit court order denying her petition for guardianship of her great-nephew, a minor child, pursuant to RSA chapter 463 (2018 & Supp. 2020). On appeal, petitioner challenged the circuit court’s determination that she could not obtain guardianship because the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) already had legal custody of the child as a result of ongoing abuse and neglect proceedings. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that an award of legal custody pursuant to RSA chapter 169-C did not preclude the appointment of a guardian pursuant to RSA chapter 463. Accordingly, judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of B.C." on Justia Law

Defendant Roger Roy appealed his convictions after a jury found him guilty on one count of felony domestic violence–criminal threatening with a deadly weapon, and four counts of misdemeanor domestic violence–simple assault. On appeal, defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to convict him of felony domestic violence, and that the trial court erred by precluding him from questioning the victim about sexually explicit text messages and by redacting the sexually explicit content from the messages before publishing them to the jury. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Roy" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Davis appealed his conviction for one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, challenging a superior court order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless entry into the enclosed porch of his residence and subsequent warrantless entry into the interior. He also argued the trial court erred when it did not suppress evidence seized during a subsequent search of his residence pursuant to a search warrant because the warrant was predicated upon evidence obtained during the two prior unlawful intrusions. The State contended that both entries were lawful and, therefore, the later warrant search of the defendant’s residence was also lawful. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with defendant that the evidence obtained during the two warrantless entries was unlawfully acquired, and that the search warrant’s reliance on that evidence renders it invalid, it reversed and remanded. View "New Hampshire v. Davis" on Justia Law