Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Justin Parr appealed his conviction following a superior court bench trial on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant argued the superior court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his felon in possession of a firearm indictment because, in his view, RSA 159:3, I(a) did not prohibit felons from possessing antique pistols and revolvers. Defendant also argued that several provisions of RSA chapter 159 were unconstitutionally vague in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the term “other firearm” in RSA 159:3, I(a) applied to any weapon from which a shot could be discharged by gunpowder, including antique firearms. The Court further concluded RSA 159:3, I(a) was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to felons in possession of antique firearms. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Parr" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dianna Rudder appealed a superior court order upholding the administrative suspension of her driver’s license by the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV). Petitioner’s suspension was upheld on grounds that she was “in actual physical control of a vehicle upon the ways of this state” while intoxicated. She argued the trial court should have overturned the suspension of her license because the hearing examiner erred when he applied the definition of “way” contained in RSA 259:125, II (2014). Petitioner was sitting in her vehicle, parked with the engine running in a private church parking lot. A police officer observed petitioner exit the vehicle, retrieve a bottle of alcohol from the trunk, and return to the driver’s seat. The officer approached petitioner, who informed him that she was sober when she arrived at the church and that, before leaving, she intended to wait until she was sober or call for a ride. The officer administered a field sobriety test, which petitioner failed. The officer arrested the petitioner for driving under the influence. On appeal, petitioner argued that the officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe petitioner was in control of a vehicle “upon the ways of this state:” the church parking lot where she was arrested was not a “way” within the meaning of the statute. To this the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed and reversed judgment. View "Rudder v. Director, New Hampshire Div. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Defendant Roger Dana was convicted by jury of first degree murder, for which he received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence, and by failing to give the false-exculpatory-statement jury instruction that the defendant requested. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "New Hampshire v. Dana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff B&C Management (B&C) appealed a superior court order ruling that 911 audio recordings were exempt from disclosure under the New Hampshire Right-to-Know Law, and denying its request for equitable discovery of a 911 audio recording in the possession of defendant New Hampshire Division of Emergency Services and Communications (the Division). On June 16, 2019, a 911 call was placed to the Division, reporting that a guest was injured in a trip-and-fall incident at B&C’s Fireside Inn in Nashua. Subsequently, the guest’s attorney sent a letter to B&C indicating an intent to investigate the fall. This letter did not demand a sum for settlement, and the guest had not filed a lawsuit. B&C submitted a request to the Division under the Right-to-Know Law for the audio recording of the 911 call. The Division denied this request. Then, B&C filed an action in the superior court seeking to compel the release of the 911 audio recording pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law, or, in the alternative, pursuant to the court’s equitable powers. After a hearing on the merits, the trial court denied B&C’s requests. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded B&C did not demonstrate the trial court erred by ruling that it was not entitled to the 911 recording under the Right-to-Know Law. Further, the Supreme Court concurred with the trial court that B&C failed to show why the trial court should have granted its request for equitable discovery. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "B&C Management v. New Hampshire Division of Emergency Services" on Justia Law

Respondent Kelly Routhier (wife) appealed a circuit court's final decree in her divorce from petitioner Matthew Routhier (husband). Wife argued the circuit court erred by: (1) concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to divide the husband’s interest in real property that he owned jointly with his parents; (2) deviating from the child support guidelines without providing adequate justification; (3) denying her request for alimony without providing adequate justification; and (4) declining to rule on her proposed findings of fact and rulings of law. Husband cross-appealed the final divorce decree as well as the circuit court’s final parenting plan, arguing the circuit court erred by: (1) ordering the parties’ child to attend public school in the district serving the wife’s residence; (2) improperly distributing the parties’ firearms; (3) preventing one of his witnesses from testifying at the final hearing; and (4) barring the court-appointed guardian ad litem from attending part of the final hearing. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the circuit court's written findings were insufficient to justify its downward deviation from the child support guidelines, and with regard to its alimony decision. Judgment was reversed in part and the matter remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the circuit court in all other respects. View "In the Matter of Matthew & Kelly Routhier" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Hampshire Supreme Court arose from the New Hampshire Division of State Police's decision to terminate State Trooper Thomas Owens after an internal investigation. The Trooper appealed his termination to the New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (PAB), which reinstated him. The Division appealed, arguing that the PAB’s reinstatement of the Trooper was unjust and unreasonable because he was no longer qualified to be a state trooper. It also argued that the PAB erred as a matter of law when it reinstated the employee in contravention of public policy. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the PAB. View "Appeal of New Hampshire Division of State Police" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Keene School District appealed a superior court decision denying the School District’s petition to modify, correct or vacate an arbitrator’s award. The arbitration arose from grievances lodged by two teachers claiming that the School District’s 120-day delay in paying early retirement benefits violated the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the School District and the defendant, Keene Education Association (Association). The arbitrator concluded that the School District’s delay violated the CBA. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Keene School District v. Keene Education Association, NEA-NH" on Justia Law

Respondent, C.R. (ward) appealed a circuit court order appointing a guardian over her person, arguing that petitioner New Hampshire Hospital (NHH) failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was incapacitated. She also argued the trial court’s findings of incapacity exceeded the scope of the pleadings and evidence at trial, thereby depriving her of notice and an opportunity to be heard. The ward suffered from schizoaffective disorder, and, in November 2020, was involuntarily admitted to NHH for a two-year period. NHH obtained emergency treatment authorization to provide the ward with psychiatric medication without her consent, and although her condition improved, the medication caused side effects that required a reduction in dosage. The ward declined to take any medication to treat the side effects or any alternative medication that would not cause the side effects. The emergency treatment authorization expired on January 4, 2021. In the two weeks before the February 2021 guardianship proceeding, the ward started exhibiting worsening thoughts that people were trying to target her, and her mood fluctuated more, spurring concerns that the current medication was insufficient. NHH filed the guardianship petition at issue here, alleging that, the guardianship was necessary. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the trial court to have found the ward “is likely to suffer substantial harm due to an inability to provide for [her] personal needs for food, clothing, shelter, health care or safety or an inability to manage . . . her property or financial affairs.” Further, the Court found there was support in the record for the trial court's finding that guardianship was the least restrictive intervention for the ward. The Court found that the guardianship petition informed the ward the trial court could “impose additional orders as a result of the hearing,” but it did not inform her that NHH was asking the court to find her incapable of exercising her rights to marry or divorce, make a will or waive a will’s provisions, hold or obtain a motor vehicle operator’s license, initiate/defend/settle lawsuits, or make decisions concerning educational matters or training. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the ward did not receive the notice contemplated by RSA 464-A:5, I, as to those rights. Therefore, the Court vacated the guardianship order to the extent that it deprived her of those rights. The Court otherwise affirmed the order appointing a guardian over the person of the ward and remanded. View "In re Guardianship of C.R." on Justia Law

The State of New Hampshire petitioned in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction for review of certain protective orders against defendants Nicholas Fuchs, Jacob Johnson, and Jeffrey Hallock-Saucier. This petition for arose from three separate criminal cases, each against one of the defendants. In each case, the State determined that it was required to provide the defendant with information from one or more police officer’s personnel files because the information was potentially exculpatory. Citing the court’s authority under New Hampshire Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(8), the State filed a motion for a protective order of discovery materials in each case, seeking an order that would prohibit “Defense Counsel . . . from sharing or further disseminating these confidential documents and the confidential information contained therein with anyone other than Defense Counsel’s staff and the Defendant.” Counsel for each defendant assented to the proposed protective order appended to the State’s motion although, after the court denied those motions, Johnson filed a notice that “he no longer assents to the State’s motions for protective orders.” In the cases against Fuchs and Johnson, the court denied the motions, by margin order, without prejudice. In each case, the court opined that the material may constitute public records subject to disclosure under the Right- to-Know Law unless, for specific or particularized reasons, their disclosure would result in an invasion of privacy. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in its interpretation of RSA 105:13-b. The Court also concluded the trial court erred in failing to find good cause for the issuance of protective orders in these cases. Given the confidentiality accorded police personnel files by RSA 105:13-b, the Supreme Court held the State has shown good cause, as a matter of law, for the issuance of protective orders in the cases at issue here. View "Petition of the State of New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Defendant Justin Gunnip was convicted by jury on one count of falsifying physical evidence, and one count of conspiracy to commit assault. In August 2019, defendant was an inmate at the Sullivan County House of Corrections. On August 17, 2019, another inmate at the facility was assaulted. The room in which the assault occurred was monitored by surveillance cameras capable of capturing video footage of the entire room. The digital recording was saved to a server, which was inaccessible to inmates. The footage from the day of the assault showed the victim sitting on a bench watching television when defendant and several other inmates entered the room. Defendant approached one of the cameras and held paper in front of the lens, obstructing the camera’s view of the room. When defendant removed the paper, the victim was injured and lying on the floor. The State appealed the trial court’s order setting aside defendant’s falsifying physical evidence conviction, arguing the trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding that defendant did not violate RSA 641:6, I, when he held the paper in front of the camera. In reaching its decision, the trial court interpreted the word “thing” in RSA 641:6, I, as synonymous with “physical evidence” and determined that, under the statute, the “thing” at issue “must exist” in order for the defendant to falsify it. Concluding that the “thing” at issue here was “the recording maintained on the server in the facility’s data room,” the court further determined that “[t]here was no evidence the recording was altered and, in fact, the State used [the recording] as an exhibit to prove [defendant’s] role as a conspirator precisely because it accurately portrayed his conduct in connection with the assault.” Thus, the court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed the recording in violation of the statute. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Gunnip" on Justia Law