Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Robert and Mary Morris, a married couple, owned homes in both Connecticut and New Hampshire. In 2017, they took several steps indicating a possible move to New Hampshire, including obtaining New Hampshire driver’s licenses, registering to vote there, and using their New Hampshire address on tax documents. They also made significant estimated tax payments to New Hampshire. However, they maintained strong ties to Connecticut, such as keeping important possessions there, using Connecticut professionals, and spending substantial time at their Connecticut home. Ultimately, they did not relocate to New Hampshire and filed Connecticut resident tax returns for 2017.After an audit, the New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration (DRA) determined that the Morrises were New Hampshire residents from June 16 to December 31, 2017, and assessed interest and dividends taxes, penalties, and interest for that period. The Morrises challenged the assessment, first through a petition for redetermination with the DRA, which was denied, and then by appealing to the Superior Court of New Hampshire. The superior court denied their motion for summary judgment and, after a bench trial, upheld the DRA’s determination, finding that the Morrises’ actions demonstrated an intent to establish New Hampshire residency.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the relevant statute and administrative rule were properly applied, and that the Morrises’ conduct evidenced an intent to make New Hampshire their principal place of physical presence for the indefinite future. The court also held that New Hampshire’s tax scheme did not violate the state or federal constitutions, that the Morrises were not entitled to credits for taxes paid to Connecticut, and that the trial court did not err in declining to abate penalties, interest, or award attorney’s fees. The judgment of the superior court was affirmed. View "Morris v. Comm'r, N.H. Dep't of Revenue Admin." on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who was charged with multiple offenses, including second degree assault – domestic violence, kidnapping – domestic violence, criminal threatening, and simple assault – domestic violence, following an incident with his spouse in August 2020. The couple had a tumultuous relationship marked by financial disputes and prior altercations. During the charged incident, the defendant physically assaulted and threatened the complainant, leading her to obtain a restraining order the next day. While incarcerated, the defendant later attempted to contact the complainant in violation of that order.Before trial in the Superior Court, the State sought to introduce evidence of a prior assault by the defendant in July 2020, the complainant’s acquisition of a restraining order, and the defendant’s subsequent violation of that order. The defendant objected, but the Superior Court (Schulman, J.) admitted all three pieces of evidence, reasoning they were relevant to the defendant’s intent and the context of the relationship. At trial, the jury acquitted the defendant on one count of simple assault but convicted him on all other charges.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in admitting the evidence under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b). The Supreme Court held that the probative value of the July 2020 incident was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and that the evidence of the restraining order and its violation improperly relied on propensity inferences. The Court further found that these errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given their potential impact on the jury’s assessment of the complainant’s credibility. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Moses" on Justia Law

A newspaper requested records from a school district related to an investigation into allegations that a long-time employee had sexually harassed other employees. The district hired a law firm to conduct a Title IX investigation, which resulted in a report. The district and the employee entered into a settlement agreement ending his employment, with the district paying him a lump sum and a portion of his health insurance. The newspaper sought all documents related to the investigation and settlement, but the district repeatedly denied the requests, citing statutory exemptions for confidential and personnel records.The Superior Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case after the newspaper filed suit. The court granted the district’s request for in camera review of the records, conducted the review without counsel present, and ordered redacted records to be distributed. It found that some records were protected by attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine and exempt under RSA 91-A:5, XII. The court also found that the remaining records, including the settlement agreement, were exempt as confidential or personnel files under RSA 91-A:5, IV. The court denied the newspaper’s request for attorney’s fees and costs, concluding the district had satisfied its obligations regarding records of payments to the employee.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that in camera review without counsel present is permissible when disclosure may cause an invasion of privacy. It affirmed that records protected by attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine are exempt from disclosure without a balancing test. However, it found the lower court erred in applying the exemption for confidential and personnel files, holding that the public interest in disclosure outweighed privacy concerns if identifying information was redacted. The court also held that the district must disclose unaltered records of payments made to the employee and awarded attorney’s fees and costs for that violation. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Keene Publ'g Corp. v. Fall Mountain Reg'l Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault and sexual assault based on conduct that occurred when the victim was between fifteen and seventeen years old. The defendant, who was significantly older than the victim, met her when she was nine and became a father figure and religious leader in her life, especially as her relationship with her biological father became distant. The victim spent considerable time with the defendant and his family, referred to him as “dad,” and worked for him. The alleged assaults occurred over several years in various locations, but the charges did not include an initial incident in Manchester when the victim was fifteen.In the Superior Court, the defendant moved to prevent the State from arguing that his roles as a father figure and religious leader constituted a “position of authority” under the relevant statute, and to exclude evidence of the uncharged Manchester incident. The court denied both motions, allowing the State to present its arguments and evidence. After a twelve-day jury trial with twenty-one witnesses, the jury found the defendant guilty on nine counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault and eight counts of sexual assault.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that the statutory term “position of authority” does not require a formal or official relationship, and that roles such as father figure or religious leader can qualify. The court found sufficient evidence that the defendant’s role as a father figure gave him authority over the victim, which he used to coerce her. Even assuming error in admitting evidence of the Manchester incident or in allowing arguments about religious authority, the court concluded any such error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt based on the father figure relationship. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

The defendant, a visiting nurse, was charged with two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and four counts of misdemeanor sexual assault (MSA) based on events that allegedly occurred while he was providing care to the victim. The charges included allegations under RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) (sexual assault by medical provider) and I(i) (sexual assault by surprise). The victim was over the age of 13 at the time of the alleged assaults.The defendant notified the court of his intention to assert a consent defense under RSA 626:6, I. The State moved to preclude this defense, leading to substantial pre-trial litigation. The trial court directed the parties to prepare an interlocutory appeal statement, which was approved and transferred to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed three questions: whether consent is a defense under RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1); whether RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; and whether consent is a defense under RSA 632-A:2, I(i). The court held that consent is not a defense under RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) because the Nurse Practice Act (NPA) prohibits sexual conduct between nurses and patients, making such conduct professionally unethical or unacceptable. The court also found that RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) is not unconstitutionally vague.Regarding RSA 632-A:2, I(i), the court concluded that consent cannot be a legal defense because if the defendant admitted to causing sexual contact through concealment or surprise, it would inherently mean the victim did not consent. However, the defendant may present evidence of the victim's consent to support his theory of the case, allowing the factfinder to evaluate the credibility of the evidence.The court answered all three questions in the negative and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Allore" on Justia Law

Tyrese Harris was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder, one count of falsifying evidence, and one count of reckless conduct. The incident occurred on October 29, 2022, when Harris, driving with his fiancée, had a confrontation with the victim, a truck driver. After a traffic altercation, the victim approached Harris's vehicle aggressively, and Harris shot him in the head, resulting in the victim's death. Harris then fled the scene, drove erratically, and later hid at a friend's apartment. The police did not recover the firearm used in the shooting.The Superior Court admitted a recorded phone call between Harris and his mother, where Harris discussed the incident, and instructed the jury on the reasonable necessity of Harris's use of deadly force. Harris's motion to dismiss the falsifying evidence charge for insufficient evidence was denied. The jury convicted Harris on all charges.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court upheld the trial court's decision to admit the recorded phone call, finding it highly probative of Harris's state of mind and not unfairly prejudicial. The court also upheld the jury instruction on the reasonable necessity of using deadly force, aligning with the common law requirement that such force must be reasonably necessary.However, the court found insufficient evidence to support the conviction for falsifying physical evidence. The State's circumstantial evidence did not exclude all reasonable conclusions other than Harris's guilt, as the firearm was never recovered, and there was no direct evidence that Harris concealed or destroyed it. Consequently, the court reversed the conviction for falsifying evidence but affirmed the other convictions. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

The defendant, Matthew Raymond, was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court on four counts of second-degree assault, six counts of simple assault-domestic violence, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of misdemeanor criminal mischief. The incidents occurred in May and June 2022, but the victim did not report them until August 2022. The defendant was subsequently charged with these offenses.Before the trial, the State intended to call Dr. Scott Hampton, an expert in intimate partner violence, to testify. The defendant moved to exclude Hampton’s testimony, arguing it was unreliable under RSA 516:29-a. The State countered that Hampton would provide general education on domestic violence dynamics without discussing the specific facts of the case. The Trial Court held an evidentiary hearing and found Hampton qualified to offer expert opinions in the field of intimate partner violence, allowing his testimony with limitations. The jury trial proceeded, and the defendant was convicted on most charges, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and upheld the trial court’s decision to admit Hampton’s testimony. The court found that Hampton’s extensive experience and specialized knowledge in domestic violence met the reliability standards under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702 and RSA 516:29-a. The court noted that Hampton’s testimony was based on his experience with thousands of domestic violence victims and offenders over two decades, which provided a sufficient basis for his general education testimony. The court also distinguished this case from State v. Keller, where the expert’s methodology was applied to the specific facts of the case. Here, Hampton’s testimony was general and not case-specific, making the RSA 516:29-a, II(a) factors less applicable. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, finding no reversible error. View "State v. Raymond" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the State of New Hampshire's funding for public education. The plaintiffs, which include several school districts and individuals, argue that the amount of base adequacy aid provided under RSA 198:40-a, II(a) is insufficient to cover the cost of providing a constitutionally adequate education as defined by RSA 193-E:2-a. They seek a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to increase the funding.The Superior Court (Ruoff, J.) ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring RSA 198:40-a, II(a) unconstitutional on its face. The court found that the current funding level of $4,100 per pupil was significantly below the amount necessary to provide an adequate education. The court determined a conservative minimum threshold of $7,356.01 per pupil, which it found to be the minimum amount that base adequacy aid must exceed. The court also directed the State to immediately increase base adequacy aid payments to this threshold amount pending further legislative action.The State appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, arguing that the trial court erred in its findings and that the immediate payment directive violated the separation of powers doctrine. The State contended that the trial court should have considered the total funding provided under RSA 198:40-a, including differentiated aid, rather than focusing solely on base adequacy aid.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the trial court's rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony, the declaration that RSA 198:40-a, II(a) is facially unconstitutional, and the determination of a conservative minimum threshold for base adequacy aid. However, the court reversed the trial court's immediate payment directive, finding that it failed to properly weigh separation of powers concerns and the history of school funding litigation. The court emphasized the need for the legislative and executive branches to act expeditiously to remedy the constitutional deficiency in funding public education. View "Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist. v. State" on Justia Law

Carol Wagner, the plaintiff, claims entitlement to a surviving spousal share from the estate of John Chislett, her former husband. She seeks to rescind a quitclaim deed she granted to the decedent, alleging it was obtained through fraud. Additionally, she challenges the validity of a 1974 Dominican Republic divorce decree obtained by the decedent, asserting it is invalid under New Hampshire law. The defendants, Sally Chislett, Kevin Chislett, and Wai Kwan Chislett, contest her claims.The Circuit Court (Kissinger, J.) ruled against the plaintiff, determining that her rescission action was barred by the statute of limitations and that her challenge to the divorce decree was barred by laches due to her forty-seven-year delay in raising the issue. Consequently, the court dismissed her claims.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court upheld the lower court's decision, affirming that the statute of limitations for actions involving real property, RSA 508:2, applied to the plaintiff's rescission claim, which had expired. The court also agreed with the lower court's application of the doctrine of laches, finding that the plaintiff's delay in challenging the divorce decree was unreasonable and prejudicial to the defendants. The court noted that the plaintiff had remarried in reliance on the divorce decree and waited nearly five decades to contest its validity, during which time both her second husband and the decedent had died.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims, concluding that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court's decision effectively barred the plaintiff from claiming a surviving spousal share from the decedent's estate. View "Wagner v. Chislett" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, property owners in New Hampshire, challenged the administration of the Statewide Education Property Tax (SWEPT), arguing that it violated the state constitution by allowing property-wealthy towns to retain excess funds and by setting negative local education tax rates in certain unincorporated places. They sought a permanent injunction to discontinue this funding scheme, claiming it resulted in disproportionate tax rates.The Superior Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, finding that allowing communities to retain excess SWEPT funds and setting negative local education tax rates violated Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution. The court enjoined the state from permitting these practices and treated its order as a final decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It concluded that the legislature's decision to allow communities to retain excess SWEPT funds was an exercise of its spending power and did not violate the constitution. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's ruling on this issue. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that setting negative local education tax rates in certain unincorporated places violated Part II, Article 5, and affirmed this part of the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's injunction remedy, stating that resolving the constitutional issue of setting negative local tax rates is the responsibility of the other branches of government. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision. View "Rand v. State" on Justia Law