Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Three retired New Hampshire State Police troopers challenged their inclusion on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES), claiming their placement was based on outdated and misinterpreted conduct. Approximately twenty years ago, the troopers inflated traffic stop records in their activity logs to meet mandated quotas. An internal investigation led to their discipline but not termination. Initially placed on the "Laurie List," their names were later removed, only to be reinstated on the EES over a decade later.The Superior Court dismissed the troopers' complaint, finding their conduct potentially exculpatory and their placement on the EES appropriate. The court also ruled that the troopers had received adequate due process. The troopers appealed, arguing that their conduct was not fraudulent and that the age of the conduct diminished its relevance.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case, focusing on whether the troopers' conduct was "potentially exculpatory" under RSA 105:13-d. The court noted that "potentially exculpatory evidence" includes evidence that could be material to guilt or punishment, including impeachment evidence. The court emphasized that factors such as the age and nature of the conduct should be considered in determining its relevance.The court concluded that the limited record did not establish whether the troopers' conduct was potentially exculpatory, as it could have been a result of a mistaken interpretation of reporting requirements rather than dishonesty. Therefore, the court reversed the Superior Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the potential exculpatory nature of the conduct, considering its admissibility and relevance in future criminal cases. View "Doe v. N.H. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Daniel Richards, filed a complaint against Union Leader Corporation and Robert Azzi, alleging defamation and invasion of privacy — false light. Richards, a father of two children in the Hanover School District, opposed the district's curricular changes focused on equity and anti-racism. He supported legislation (HB 544) prohibiting New Hampshire schools from teaching that children are inherently racist, sexist, or oppressive. Azzi wrote an op-ed in the Union Leader, labeling Richards and others as disseminators of white supremacist ideology and accusing them of favoring the suppression of rights and history.The Superior Court dismissed Richards' complaint, concluding that the statements in the op-ed were non-actionable opinions rather than defamatory facts. The court found that the statements were hyperbolic and did not imply undisclosed defamatory facts. It also declined to recognize the tort of false light invasion of privacy, ruling that even if such a tort were recognized, Richards' claim would fail because the statements were opinions, not factual assertions.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the Superior Court's decision. It agreed that the op-ed's statements were non-actionable opinions and did not imply undisclosed defamatory facts. The court also declined to recognize the tort of false light invasion of privacy, noting that it is largely duplicative of existing defamation law and should be addressed by the legislature if deemed necessary. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in its analysis and upheld the dismissal of Richards' complaint. View "Richards v. Union Leader Corp." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Jane Doe, challenged the Manchester School District's policy regarding transgender and gender non-conforming students. The policy allowed students to keep their transgender status private and required school personnel to use a student's preferred name and pronouns, without disclosing this information to parents unless legally required or authorized by the student. Jane Doe, the parent of a minor child (M.C.) in the district, discovered that M.C. had asked to be called by a different name and pronouns. She requested the school to use M.C.'s birth name and pronouns, but the school adhered to the district policy.The Superior Court dismissed Jane Doe's claims, finding that the policy did not infringe upon a fundamental right and thus did not warrant strict scrutiny. The court applied the rational basis test and concluded that the policy was constitutional. The court also found that the policy was not ultra vires and did not violate federal laws such as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) or the Protection of Pupil Rights Act (PPRA).The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the policy did not directly interfere with the fundamental right to parent, as it did not prevent parents from obtaining information from other sources or restrict their ability to parent their child. The court agreed that the policy did not infringe on a fundamental right and thus was subject to rational basis review, which it survived. The court did not find it necessary to address the plaintiff's facial and as-applied challenges separately, as the policy was found to be constitutional under the rational basis test. View "Doe v. Manchester School District" on Justia Law

On August 2, 2021, the defendant drove through a red light at high speed in Manchester, New Hampshire, hitting three vehicles and causing significant damage. His car flipped over and landed on another vehicle, leading to a multi-car collision. A paramedic found the defendant unconscious with symptoms suggesting opioid use and administered Narcan. At the hospital, a police officer observed the defendant's lethargy and pinpoint pupils, indicative of opioid influence.The defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including second-degree assault and reckless conduct. Before trial, he moved to exclude testimony from a paramedic and a victim about signs of opioid use, arguing it was inadmissible expert testimony. The Superior Court allowed the testimony, provided it was based on the witnesses' observations. The jury convicted the defendant on five counts of reckless conduct but acquitted him of disobeying a police officer. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to merge the reckless conduct charges for sentencing, resulting in five separate sentences.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that any error in admitting lay witness testimony about opioid use was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's reckless conduct. The court also found that the defendant's argument against the State's closing argument references to opioid use was not preserved for appeal. However, the court agreed with the defendant that the reckless conduct charges should be merged for sentencing, as the statute focuses on the defendant's conduct rather than the number of persons endangered. The court affirmed the convictions but reversed the trial court's decision on sentencing and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Van Uden" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of three counts of domestic violence simple assault following a jury trial. The incidents occurred during two altercations between the defendant and the complainant on October 12 and October 15, 2019. The complainant recorded a video of the October 12 altercation on her cell phone. The defendant moved to exclude excerpts of this video, arguing that he had not received the entire video despite multiple discovery requests. The trial court granted this motion.Before the trial began, the State intended to have a detective testify about the content of the excluded video excerpts. The defendant objected, arguing that this would undermine the court’s prior ruling. The trial court allowed the detective’s testimony and instructed the jury that it could consider the absence of the rest of the video in determining whether the State had met its burden of proof. The jury convicted the defendant on the October 12 charges but acquitted him on the October 15 charge.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in admitting the detective’s testimony about the excluded video excerpts. The court held that this ruling was inconsistent with the trial court’s prior decision to exclude the video excerpts and that the inconsistency prejudiced the defendant’s case. The court noted that the detective’s testimony corroborated the complainant’s account and bolstered her credibility, which was crucial in a case that hinged on the complainant’s credibility.The Supreme Court concluded that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the erroneously admitted testimony likely influenced the jury’s verdict. Therefore, the court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Voight" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of five counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) involving a minor, including two counts of cunnilingus, two counts of vaginal intercourse, and one count of a pattern of sexual assaults causing severe mental anguish or trauma. The assaults occurred between December 2017 and December 2020, and the victim disclosed them in April 2021. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for the pattern sexual assault charge and errors in the trial court's handling of certain records.The Superior Court conducted a jury trial in November 2022. The trial court reviewed the victim's DCYF and counseling records in camera, disclosing some DCYF records but none of the counseling records. The defendant's motion to dismiss the indictments for insufficient evidence was denied, and the jury found him guilty on all counts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court first addressed the sufficiency of the evidence, particularly regarding the "extreme mental anguish or trauma" element of the pattern AFSA charge. The court found that the victim's testimony about her emotional distress, nightmares, and difficulty trusting people, along with her demeanor during testimony and interviews, provided sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find extreme mental anguish or trauma. Thus, the court concluded there was no plain error.The court also reviewed the trial court's handling of the in camera review of the victim's records. It determined that the trial court applied the correct standard and that its decisions regarding the disclosure of the records were not clearly unreasonable or untenable. Consequently, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the trial court's decisions and the defendant's convictions. View "State v. Hodges" on Justia Law

The defendant, Otto Keller, was involved in a car accident after falling asleep while driving, resulting in a collision with an unoccupied car and a house. He admitted to using heroin and being involved in a methadone clinic. A blood test revealed multiple drugs in his system. Keller was charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated (ADWI) for causing a collision resulting in serious bodily injury, specifically a broken right humerus.The Superior Court denied Keller's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Colleen Scarneo, the State’s expert in human performance forensic toxicology, and his motion to dismiss the ADWI charge for insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury. The court found Scarneo’s methodology reliable under RSA 516:29-a and Daubert standards. At trial, Scarneo testified that Keller exhibited signs of impairment consistent with the drugs found in his system. The jury found Keller guilty of ADWI.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in admitting Scarneo’s testimony because her methodology was not sufficiently reliable. The court found that her methodology had not been tested, subjected to peer review, had no known error rate, and was not generally accepted in the scientific community. Additionally, the court determined that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Keller’s broken arm constituted a serious bodily injury as defined by RSA 625:11, VI.The Supreme Court reversed Keller’s ADWI conviction due to insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury and the prejudicial admission of unreliable expert testimony. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion, specifically for a new trial on the lesser-included charge of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol (DWI). View "State v. Keller" on Justia Law

Gail Andersen appealed a decision rejecting her challenges to her mother Barbara Colanton's will and trust. Barbara had two daughters, Andersen and Brenda Grant, who had a falling out after their father's death in 2000. Barbara revised her estate plan multiple times, with significant changes in 2015 that favored Grant. Andersen alleged that Barbara was cognitively impaired and that Grant exercised undue influence over her when the 2015 revisions were made.The Circuit Court (Weaver, J.) found that Barbara had the legal capacity to execute the will and trust documents. It also determined that Grant, being in a fiduciary relationship with Barbara, had the burden to show a lack of undue influence. The court applied the preponderance of the evidence standard, concluding that Grant met her burden. However, it also noted that Grant did not meet the burden by clear and convincing evidence, anticipating a possible appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard instead of the clear and convincing evidence standard. The court held that the preponderance of the evidence standard was appropriate, aligning the burden of proof for undue influence with that for testamentary capacity. The court reasoned that this standard strikes a balance between respecting the decedent’s wishes and protecting against undue influence. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, noting that the legislature could establish a different burden of proof if it disagreed with this standard. View "In re Estate of Colanton" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorce proceeding between Gregory Landgraf (husband) and Natasha Landgraf (wife), who have two minor children. The wife challenges the Circuit Court's determination of the husband's temporary child support obligation, specifically regarding whether the husband's irregular income should be considered for child support purposes. The husband receives irregular income from New England Industries (NEI), a subchapter S corporation, to offset his shareholder tax liability and for succession insurance premiums.Initially, the trial court issued a final divorce decree in 2018, which included a child support award. The wife appealed, and the higher court vacated and remanded the trial court's determination regarding the husband's irregular income. On remand in 2020, the circuit court issued a new temporary child support order, requiring the husband to pay a percentage of his irregular income, which was less than the applicable percentage set forth in the child support formula. Both parties moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. The court treated NEI's distributions to the husband as "gross income" and invited the parties to prepare an interlocutory appeal statement.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court addressed two questions: whether cash distributions received by a corporate shareholder to pay personal tax liability and distributions for succession insurance premiums are available for child support purposes. The court answered both questions affirmatively, concluding that these distributions are dividends and bonuses, respectively, and are available for child support purposes. The court also clarified that "net income" for child support purposes is calculated using standard deductions published by the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, regardless of actual employer withholding.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Landgraf" on Justia Law

The defendant, Benjamin Sargent, was the chief of the Litchfield Police Department (LPD) and was convicted of official oppression for violating the sexual harassment policies of LPD and the Town of Litchfield. The conviction stemmed from his communications with a probationary police officer on December 31, 2021, and January 1, 2022, during which he made suggestive comments, expressed romantic interest, and implied that she could advance in her career if she "stuck with him."The Circuit Court (Derby, J.) found Sargent guilty, concluding that he sought to benefit himself by obtaining emotional support and validation from the complainant. The court also denied Sargent's motion to dismiss, which argued that the statute was void for vagueness and overbreadth.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the trial court had interpreted the phrase "to benefit himself" too broadly. The Supreme Court concluded that the term should be understood to mean seeking a specific advantage or gain, rather than a momentary personal, emotional, or psychological benefit. The court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sargent sought such a specific benefit in his communications with the complainant.As a result, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court's interpretation of "to benefit himself" was incorrect and that the evidence did not support the conclusion that Sargent acted with the purpose of obtaining a specific benefit as required by RSA 643:1. View "State v. Sargent" on Justia Law