Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant, a visiting nurse, was charged with two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and four counts of misdemeanor sexual assault (MSA) based on events that allegedly occurred while he was providing care to the victim. The charges included allegations under RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) (sexual assault by medical provider) and I(i) (sexual assault by surprise). The victim was over the age of 13 at the time of the alleged assaults.The defendant notified the court of his intention to assert a consent defense under RSA 626:6, I. The State moved to preclude this defense, leading to substantial pre-trial litigation. The trial court directed the parties to prepare an interlocutory appeal statement, which was approved and transferred to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed three questions: whether consent is a defense under RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1); whether RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; and whether consent is a defense under RSA 632-A:2, I(i). The court held that consent is not a defense under RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) because the Nurse Practice Act (NPA) prohibits sexual conduct between nurses and patients, making such conduct professionally unethical or unacceptable. The court also found that RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) is not unconstitutionally vague.Regarding RSA 632-A:2, I(i), the court concluded that consent cannot be a legal defense because if the defendant admitted to causing sexual contact through concealment or surprise, it would inherently mean the victim did not consent. However, the defendant may present evidence of the victim's consent to support his theory of the case, allowing the factfinder to evaluate the credibility of the evidence.The court answered all three questions in the negative and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Allore" on Justia Law

Tyrese Harris was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder, one count of falsifying evidence, and one count of reckless conduct. The incident occurred on October 29, 2022, when Harris, driving with his fiancée, had a confrontation with the victim, a truck driver. After a traffic altercation, the victim approached Harris's vehicle aggressively, and Harris shot him in the head, resulting in the victim's death. Harris then fled the scene, drove erratically, and later hid at a friend's apartment. The police did not recover the firearm used in the shooting.The Superior Court admitted a recorded phone call between Harris and his mother, where Harris discussed the incident, and instructed the jury on the reasonable necessity of Harris's use of deadly force. Harris's motion to dismiss the falsifying evidence charge for insufficient evidence was denied. The jury convicted Harris on all charges.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court upheld the trial court's decision to admit the recorded phone call, finding it highly probative of Harris's state of mind and not unfairly prejudicial. The court also upheld the jury instruction on the reasonable necessity of using deadly force, aligning with the common law requirement that such force must be reasonably necessary.However, the court found insufficient evidence to support the conviction for falsifying physical evidence. The State's circumstantial evidence did not exclude all reasonable conclusions other than Harris's guilt, as the firearm was never recovered, and there was no direct evidence that Harris concealed or destroyed it. Consequently, the court reversed the conviction for falsifying evidence but affirmed the other convictions. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

The defendant, Matthew Raymond, was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court on four counts of second-degree assault, six counts of simple assault-domestic violence, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of misdemeanor criminal mischief. The incidents occurred in May and June 2022, but the victim did not report them until August 2022. The defendant was subsequently charged with these offenses.Before the trial, the State intended to call Dr. Scott Hampton, an expert in intimate partner violence, to testify. The defendant moved to exclude Hampton’s testimony, arguing it was unreliable under RSA 516:29-a. The State countered that Hampton would provide general education on domestic violence dynamics without discussing the specific facts of the case. The Trial Court held an evidentiary hearing and found Hampton qualified to offer expert opinions in the field of intimate partner violence, allowing his testimony with limitations. The jury trial proceeded, and the defendant was convicted on most charges, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and upheld the trial court’s decision to admit Hampton’s testimony. The court found that Hampton’s extensive experience and specialized knowledge in domestic violence met the reliability standards under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702 and RSA 516:29-a. The court noted that Hampton’s testimony was based on his experience with thousands of domestic violence victims and offenders over two decades, which provided a sufficient basis for his general education testimony. The court also distinguished this case from State v. Keller, where the expert’s methodology was applied to the specific facts of the case. Here, Hampton’s testimony was general and not case-specific, making the RSA 516:29-a, II(a) factors less applicable. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, finding no reversible error. View "State v. Raymond" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the State of New Hampshire's funding for public education. The plaintiffs, which include several school districts and individuals, argue that the amount of base adequacy aid provided under RSA 198:40-a, II(a) is insufficient to cover the cost of providing a constitutionally adequate education as defined by RSA 193-E:2-a. They seek a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to increase the funding.The Superior Court (Ruoff, J.) ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring RSA 198:40-a, II(a) unconstitutional on its face. The court found that the current funding level of $4,100 per pupil was significantly below the amount necessary to provide an adequate education. The court determined a conservative minimum threshold of $7,356.01 per pupil, which it found to be the minimum amount that base adequacy aid must exceed. The court also directed the State to immediately increase base adequacy aid payments to this threshold amount pending further legislative action.The State appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, arguing that the trial court erred in its findings and that the immediate payment directive violated the separation of powers doctrine. The State contended that the trial court should have considered the total funding provided under RSA 198:40-a, including differentiated aid, rather than focusing solely on base adequacy aid.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the trial court's rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony, the declaration that RSA 198:40-a, II(a) is facially unconstitutional, and the determination of a conservative minimum threshold for base adequacy aid. However, the court reversed the trial court's immediate payment directive, finding that it failed to properly weigh separation of powers concerns and the history of school funding litigation. The court emphasized the need for the legislative and executive branches to act expeditiously to remedy the constitutional deficiency in funding public education. View "Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist. v. State" on Justia Law

Carol Wagner, the plaintiff, claims entitlement to a surviving spousal share from the estate of John Chislett, her former husband. She seeks to rescind a quitclaim deed she granted to the decedent, alleging it was obtained through fraud. Additionally, she challenges the validity of a 1974 Dominican Republic divorce decree obtained by the decedent, asserting it is invalid under New Hampshire law. The defendants, Sally Chislett, Kevin Chislett, and Wai Kwan Chislett, contest her claims.The Circuit Court (Kissinger, J.) ruled against the plaintiff, determining that her rescission action was barred by the statute of limitations and that her challenge to the divorce decree was barred by laches due to her forty-seven-year delay in raising the issue. Consequently, the court dismissed her claims.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court upheld the lower court's decision, affirming that the statute of limitations for actions involving real property, RSA 508:2, applied to the plaintiff's rescission claim, which had expired. The court also agreed with the lower court's application of the doctrine of laches, finding that the plaintiff's delay in challenging the divorce decree was unreasonable and prejudicial to the defendants. The court noted that the plaintiff had remarried in reliance on the divorce decree and waited nearly five decades to contest its validity, during which time both her second husband and the decedent had died.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims, concluding that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court's decision effectively barred the plaintiff from claiming a surviving spousal share from the decedent's estate. View "Wagner v. Chislett" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, property owners in New Hampshire, challenged the administration of the Statewide Education Property Tax (SWEPT), arguing that it violated the state constitution by allowing property-wealthy towns to retain excess funds and by setting negative local education tax rates in certain unincorporated places. They sought a permanent injunction to discontinue this funding scheme, claiming it resulted in disproportionate tax rates.The Superior Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, finding that allowing communities to retain excess SWEPT funds and setting negative local education tax rates violated Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution. The court enjoined the state from permitting these practices and treated its order as a final decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It concluded that the legislature's decision to allow communities to retain excess SWEPT funds was an exercise of its spending power and did not violate the constitution. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's ruling on this issue. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that setting negative local education tax rates in certain unincorporated places violated Part II, Article 5, and affirmed this part of the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's injunction remedy, stating that resolving the constitutional issue of setting negative local tax rates is the responsibility of the other branches of government. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision. View "Rand v. State" on Justia Law

James Dunbar was serving a suspended sentence for criminal mischief and was on probation for being a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon. A protection order prohibited him from contacting the victim in any form. Despite this, Dunbar posted messages on his public Facebook page that referred to the victim and her deceased husband using aliases similar to their names. Some posts included threats and were intended to notify the victim. Facebook users saw these posts and informed the victim, who then viewed them.Dunbar was arrested and charged with violating the protection order and stalking. He was found not guilty on all charges. However, his probation officer alleged that these actions violated the terms of his probation, and the State moved to impose his suspended sentence. The Superior Court found that Dunbar's Facebook posts violated the protection order, thus violating his probation and suspended sentence terms. The court imposed a portion of his suspended sentence and sentenced him to twelve months in the house of corrections, all suspended, for the probation violation. Dunbar's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court held that Dunbar's Facebook posts constituted indirect contact with the victim, violating the protection order. The court also determined that the posts were true threats and not protected by the First Amendment. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court's decision that Dunbar violated the terms of his probation and suspended sentence, and upheld the imposed punishments. View "State v. Dunbar" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Kristen Trombly and Christopher Patria, purchased a used vehicle from City Cars, LLC. Shortly after the purchase, they experienced issues with the vehicle's transmission. They contacted the dealership, which directed them to a repair shop that added transmission fluid. Despite this, the transmission problems persisted, and another dealership recommended replacing the transmission at a significant cost. The plaintiffs acknowledged buying the car "as is" but sought assistance from the defendant, who offered a partial refund, which the plaintiffs rejected, demanding a full refund or repair.The plaintiffs filed a complaint in July 2022, alleging a violation of the implied warranty of merchantability under New Hampshire's Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The Circuit Court (Ryan, J.) found in favor of the plaintiffs, determining that the vehicle was not merchantable and that the implied warranty had not been disclaimed. The court awarded damages to the plaintiffs.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The defendant argued that the trial court erred by assessing the vehicle's merchantability based on its condition after the sale rather than at the time of sale. The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant, stating that the implied warranty of merchantability applies to the condition of the goods at the time of sale. The court found that the plaintiffs did not provide evidence that the transmission was faulty when the vehicle was sold. Consequently, the trial court's finding of non-merchantability was deemed erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. View "Trombly v. City Cars, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2018, the City of Nashua approved a bond resolution to construct a performing arts center. Due to financing complications, the City formed two non-profit corporations to take advantage of a federal tax credit. In 2020, NPAC Corp., a private, for-profit corporation, was formed to aid in the tax credit process. NPAC is wholly owned by one of the non-profits, which is owned by the City. Laurie Ortolano requested NPAC's public records related to the center, but NPAC claimed it was not subject to the Right-to-Know Law (RSA chapter 91-A). Ortolano then filed a complaint seeking access to these records.The Superior Court dismissed Ortolano's complaint, agreeing with NPAC that it was not a public entity subject to RSA chapter 91-A. The court also dismissed the claims against the City, reasoning that the relief sought was derivative of the claim against NPAC. Additionally, the court denied Ortolano's motion to amend her complaint to allege constitutional violations because she failed to attach a proposed amended complaint.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the City, finding that Ortolano's complaint did not state an independent claim against the City. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the claims against NPAC, ruling that the trial court erred by not applying the "government function" test to determine if NPAC was a "public body" under RSA chapter 91-A. The court also upheld the trial court's denial of Ortolano's motion to amend her complaint, as the proposed amendment did not cure the defect in the original pleading.The case was remanded for the trial court to apply the "government function" test to determine whether NPAC is subject to the Right-to-Know Law. View "Ortolano v. City of Nashua" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorce between Clayton LeGault, Jr. (Husband) and Lisa LeGault (Wife). The key issue is the division of marital assets, specifically the treatment of Husband's defined benefit pension plan, which he had been contributing to for six years before the marriage. The parties separated in May 2022, and both filed for divorce. Wife proposed a division of assets that included her receiving 100% of her 401(k) and Husband's deferred compensation plan, as well as 50% of the marital portion of Husband's pension. She also sought an offset of other assets to account for the premarital portion of Husband's pension.The Circuit Court (Manchester) divided Wife's 401(k) and Husband's deferred compensation plan equally and applied the Hodgins formula to divide Husband's pension. The court acknowledged Wife's argument that RSA 458:16-a, I, which includes all property acquired prior to the marriage as subject to distribution, might conflict with the Hodgins formula. However, the court felt bound by precedent and did not separate the premarital portion of the pension for division or offset by other marital assets. The court's final decree awarded Wife a significant portion of the marital estate, including half of the marital portion of Husband's pension.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court clarified that RSA 458:16-a, I, includes all property, including premarital portions of pensions, as subject to equitable distribution. The court held that Hodgins provides a default rule for pensions earned entirely during the marriage but does not address pensions with premarital portions. The court vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to ensure the premarital portion of Husband's pension is considered in the equitable distribution of assets. View "In the Matter of LeGault & LeGault" on Justia Law