Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State petitioned for certiorari review of an order of a superior court order declining to accept the transfer of a juvenile delinquency case because the superior court concluded that the circuit court erred when it found that the juvenile was competent. The superior court remanded to the circuit court for a new competency determination. The State argued that RSA 169-B:24 (2022) did not authorize the superior court to conduct an appellate review of the circuit court’s competency ruling. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the State that review of competency was outside the scope of the superior court’s appellate authority under RSA 169- B:24, and reversed and remanded the superior court's order. View "Petition of State of New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Father appealed a circuit court order terminating his parental rights over his minor child, G.F., on the ground that he failed to correct, within twelve months, the conditions that led to the court’s finding under RSA chapter 169-C (2022) that G.F. was neglected by G.F.’s mother. In January 2020, father did not attend mother’s adjudicatory or dispositional hearings. Mother entered into a consent agreement acknowledging that neglect occurred due to her drug use. At the dispositional hearing, the circuit court adopted a case plan and dispositional orders, which also applied to father. Father was not served with these documents. At the three-month review hearing, father's counsel received the case plan, dispositional orders and related discovery. Two days after the six-month review hearing, father was arrested for felony second degree assault and other domestic violence charges involving his then girlfriend and her minor child. He pled guilty to at least two of the charges. In September 2020, a nine-month review hearing was held. In January 2021, the trial court held the first permanency hearing in the neglect case while father was incarcerated. The trial court found father was not in compliance with dispositional orders. The trial court changed the permanency plan from reunification to adoption and specified that “DCYF is no longer required to provide reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification between [G.F.] and mother [and] father, but shall make reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan.” In September 2021, the circuit court held a second permanency hearing; again the court found father was not in compliance with the dispositional orders and concluded G.F. could not be safely returned to his care. DCYF filed a new petition to terminate the father’s parental rights in October 2021. In December 2021, the father was released from incarceration. In February 2022, the circuit court granted DCYF’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights. Assuming without deciding that, during the nine months in which DCYF was ordered by the court to make reasonable efforts to reunify G.F. with his father, those efforts were reasonable, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that DCYF failed to meet its burden because the court did not order DCYF to make such efforts for the remaining three months. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order terminating the father’s parental rights over G.F. View "In re G.F." on Justia Law

Petitioner Town of Amherst (Town) appealed Housing Appeals Board (HAB) orders vacating the denial by the Town’s planning board (Board) of subdivision and site plan approval sought by the respondents, Migrela Realty Trust II and GAM Realty Trust (collectively, Applicant). In November 2020, Applicant filed a subdivision/site plan approval application with the Board for 54 age-restricted and unrestricted housing units. Applicant previously had been granted a conditional use permit (CUP) for “an increased project density” of up to 54 units under the Town’s since-repealed Integrated Innovative Housing Ordinance (IIHO). During the review process with respect to the subdivision/site plan application, the project’s density was reduced from 54 to 49 units. The composition of age-restricted and unrestricted units was also modified, with the final plan designating 14 units as age-restricted, 65-and-older units and the remaining 35 units as unrestricted. In April 2021, the Board denied the site plan because: (1) the Board perceived conflicts between the proposed project and federal law; and (2) “the proposed design does not protect and preserve the rural aesthetic the Town has consistently valued, as is required by Section 4.16A of the Zoning Ordinance.” Finding no reversible error in the HAB's orders, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed judgment in favor of Applicant. View "Appeal of Town of Amherst" on Justia Law

Petitioner Marc Mallard appealed a superior court order dismissing his petition for habeas corpus on grounds that it was procedurally defaulted and, even if it were not, that Mallard failed to demonstrate actual prejudice as a result of his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. Mallard was charged with committing acts of domestic violence in 2012 against a romantic partner. Mallard was convicted by jury of second degree assault, attempted second degree assault, simple assault and criminal threatening. When his petition for a new trial was denied, Mallard petitioned for habeas relief, arguing that by describing him as a “big, menacing black guy” during cross-examination of the victim, trial counsel deprived him of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that because Mallard had “already fully litigated” a motion for a new trial based on the ineffectiveness of trial counsel — albeit on different grounds — his habeas petition was procedurally barred. To the New Hampshire Supreme Court, Mallard argued the trial court erred: (1) in finding his habeas petition was procedurally barred; and (2) in finding that he failed to establish “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” The Supreme Court disagreed Mallard's petition was procedurally barred. Trial counsel’s improper appeal to racial bias in Mallard’s criminal case “effectively invited the jury to make a decision based on a characterization of the defendant and not on the evidence of his guilt or innocence.” Accordingly, the Court concluded Mallard established a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of his trial, thereby satisfying that his trial counsel’s deficient performance actually prejudiced the outcome of the case. Judgment was revered and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Mallard v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Laguerre appealed a superior court order denying his motion to amend bail. The court ruled that RSA 597:2, III(a) (Supp. 2022) did not authorize it to consider whether the conditions of confinement endangered defendant’s safety when deciding whether to order preventive detention. Defendant argued that RSA 597:2, III(a) permitted courts to consider the safety of a defendant, including factors pertaining to his or her health and safety while confined, when determining bail. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly interpreted RSA 597:2, III(a) as applied in this case and held that it did not authorize a court to consider the safety of a defendant while detained when deciding whether to grant bail. View "New Hampshire v. Laguerre" on Justia Law

The State of New Hampshire petitioned for original jurisdiction to the New Hampshire Supreme Court to challenge a circuit court order that granted respondent’s motion to dismiss a juvenile delinquency petition. The trial court ruled that the State failed to comply with RSA 169-B:6, IV(b) (2022) because no “manifestation review” had occurred prior to the filing of the delinquency petition. The Supreme Count found the term “manifestation review,” in the context of a juvenile delinquency petition resulting from conduct in a school setting by a student with a disability, referred to a process whereby a school, the student’s parents, and other parties review the student’s individualized education plan (IEP) and other relevant information to determine whether the alleged misconduct stemmed from the student’s disability or the school’s failure to implement the student’s IEP. The Court affirmed and held that whenever a delinquency petition is to be filed pursuant to RSA 169-B:6, IV(b) and the legally liable school district has determined that the child is a child with a disability according to RSA 186-C:2, I, then a manifestation review must be performed prior to the filing of the delinquency petition. "Of course, if the legislature disagrees with our construction of RSA 169-B:6, IV, it is free, within constitutional limits, to amend the statute accordingly." View "Petition of State of New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Cassandra Caron, Brandon Deane, Alison Petrowski, and Aaron Shelton, appealed a superior court order denying their request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief and dismissing their complaint. Plaintiffs sought, pursuant to RSA 282-A:127 (2010), to require defendants, the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (NHES) and its Commissioner, to reinstate Pandemic Unemployment Assistance available under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act. On appeal, they argued the court erred when it construed RSA 282-A:127 as imposing no obligation on defendants to secure Pandemic Unemployment Assistance for New Hampshire citizens and, therefore, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s interpretation of RSA 282-A:127, the judgment was affirm. View "Caron et al. v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff TransFarmations, Inc. appealed a superior court decision to uphold the Town of Amherst Planning Board's (Town) decisions to deny TransFarmations' two successive applications for a conditional use permit (CUP). In May 2019, TransFarmations requested a “Conceptual Meeting” with the Town’s planning board (Board) concerning its proposed development of an approximately 130-acre property known as the Jacobson Farm. It stated that the “development will be designed to meet many of the desired attributes the Town . . . has articulated in [its] Master Plan and [Integrated] Innovative . . . Housing Ordinance (IIHO),” including workforce housing and over-55 housing. TransFarmations subsequently submitted a CUP application under the IIHO for a planned residential development containing 64 residential units. In its challenge to the decisions, TransFarmations argued both that the decisions failed to adequately state the ground for denial and that the Board acted unreasonably because the second CUP application was materially different from the first. The trial court concluded that the Board adequately provided the reason for its first decision on the record because “the Board members discussed, in detail, their reasons for concluding that no material differences [between the first and second applications] existed.” The court also concluded that “the Board acted reasonably and lawfully in reaching [that] decision.” Accordingly, the court affirmed both of the Board’s decisions. TransFarmations contended the trial court erred in affirming the Board’s decision not to accept the second application because TransFarmations submitted that application “at the Board’s invitation and with the information the Board requested.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded TransFarmations’ second application supplying the requested information was “materially different from its predecessor, thus satisfying Fisher.” Because the trial court’s decision concluding otherwise misapplied Fisher v. Dover, it was legally erroneous. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order as to the second CUP decision and remanded. View "TransFarmations, Inc. v. Town of Amherst" on Justia Law

Jeremy Fiske appealed a superior court decision denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner “specifically requested that the [sentencing c]ourt allow him to earn good time credit to reduce his stand-committed sentences if he completed approved programming at the prison.” After hearing argument, the sentencing court denied the request “in light of the egregious nature of [the petitioner’s] crimes.” Approximately five years later, petitioner filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus at issue here, asserting that the sentencing court “exceeded its statutory authority” and “violated his right to due process” by denying the option of earned-time credit. The trial court hearing the petition concluded that whether to grant the opportunity to obtain earned-time credit was within the discretion of the sentencing court and that the court’s decision on that matter was “not arbitrary or capricious.” On appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, petitioner reasserted that the sentencing court exceeded its statutory authority by denying his request during sentencing to grant the option to receive earned-time credit. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Fiske v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison" on Justia Law

Petitioner Louis Lafasciano petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court for review of a decision of respondent, New Hampshire Retirement System Board of Trustees (Board), that rescinded a previously-granted termination of the survivorship benefit of his former spouse, intervenor Margaret Murray, in his state pension. At the time he retired, petitioner named intervenor, then his spouse, as his survivor beneficiary, thereby reducing the amount of the retirement benefit he received during his lifetime. Under the law then in effect, a retired member who designated his or her spouse as survivor beneficiary could terminate that designation during the spouse’s lifetime only if the parties divorced and the spouse remarried. Petitioner and intervenor divorced in 2014. In 2016, the New Hampshire legislature amended RSA 100-A:13 to provide an additional circumstance under which a retired member could terminate a previously-elected spousal survivorship benefit. In November 2016, petitioner requested that intervenor be removed as his primary death beneficiary, stating that the two had been “divorced for two years now, and since the change in state legislation this past August [he] believe[d] that [his] request [could] now be honored.” In July 2020, NHRS informed the petitioner that his 2016 request for termination of his survivor benefit option had been processed in error. It further informed him that NHRS would be “rescinding that termination and reinstituting the 100% joint and survivor option you originally selected for your former spouse” and would be “instituting recoupment proceedings to recover the cumulative pop-up amount that has been paid to you since December 2016.” Petitioner appealed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court found that petitioner did not have a unilateral right to revoke his election of a spousal survivorship benefit. "[A]bsent his former spouse’s remarriage, he may terminate such an election only if his divorce decree 'provides that the former spouse shall renounce any claim to a retirement allowance under RSA 100-A.'" Because the divorce decree here did not require intervenor to renounce her claim to a survivorship benefit, petitioner could not terminate the benefit under the statute. Judgment was thus affirmed. View "Petition of Louis Lafasciano" on Justia Law