Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Justin Lamontagne was convicted by jury on four counts of nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images. Defendant and the victim were in a three-year romantic relationship. The relationship ended, but defendant and the victim stayed in contact. During the summer of 2019, defendant learned that the victim was in a relationship with another man. Defendant saw an image on the internet of a naked woman tied in ropes and hanging from a tree (the “bondage image”). The woman’s face was blurred and the image contained no information identifying her. Defendant believed the bondage image depicted the victim. Defendant sent the image to the victim through Facebook Messenger. This interaction led to a discussion of possible sexual activity in which defendant and the victim could engage, including making a video of them having sex. According to defendant, he and the victim formed an agreement whereby if the victim did not break up with her new boyfriend, defendant could send the video to whomever he wished. Defendant and the victim created the video, after this alleged agreement. According to the State, the sexual encounter and the filming of the video were consensual, but there was no agreement for the video’s release. Rather, the State contended that after making the video, defendant indicated that, amongst other things, the victim must see him once a week and end her relationship with her new boyfriend or defendant would release the video. The State contended that every time the victim tried to offer an excuse for why she could not see defendant, he would become angry and threaten to release the video. On August 4, 2019, defendant sent a video to four individuals. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in excluding his proffered testimony that he believed the bondage image depicted the victim. The trial court held, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court concurred, the proffered evidence was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. Judgment was affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Lamontagne" on Justia Law

Appellants (father and mother) challenged multiple circuit court orders finding both parents neglected their children and ordering the children's removal from their home. Appellants were the parents of B.R., S.R., and J.R. Both parents had a significant history with the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), including reports alleging one or both parents were manufacturing or selling methamphetamines in the home with the children present. In March 2021, based on criminal allegations against mother (relating to her purchase and use of methamphetamine), DCYF filed a motion for ex parte removal of the children from the home. The trial court granted the motion and found that mother’s continued involvement in drug trafficking beginning in 2015, and her risk-taking behavior related thereto, “demonstrate that the children’s health or life are in imminent danger if they are allowed to remain in the parents’ home.” The court awarded DCYF protective supervision of the children. In May 2022, following a dispositional hearing, the court found that return of the children to their home would be contrary to their welfare because neither parent had corrected the behavior that led to the children’s initial removal. Father and mother each appealed separately. The New Hampshire Supreme Court accepted the two appeals and consolidated them. Parents argued both findings were unsupported by the evidence. Father also argued that the court’s orders failed to provide specific written findings as required by RSA 169-C:6-b, III (2022). After review of the circuit court orders, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "In re J.R.; In re S.R.; In re B.R." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Clearview Realty Ventures, LLC, JHM HIX Keene, LLC, VIDHI Hospitality, LLC, NAKSH Hospitality, LLC, 298 Queen City Hotel, LLC, ANSHI Hospitality, LLC, 700 Elm, LLC, Bedford-Carnevale, LLC, and Carnevale Holdings, LLC, owned commercial real estate on which they operated hotels, some of which offered restaurant services along with banquet or function facilities. They contended that the COVID-19 pandemic was a “natural disaster” and that their buildings were “damaged” within the meaning of RSA 76:21, I. Plaintiffs sought relief from the New Hampshire municipalities involved: the Cities of Laconia, Keene, and Manchester, and the Town of Bedford. After denial of their applications, they appealed to the superior court in the applicable county. Observing that there were thirteen separate lawsuits pending in six counties, they then filed an assented-to motion for interlocutory transfer without ruling and motion to consolidate to allow the coordinated transfer of the common questions of law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In this interlocutory transfer without ruling, the Supreme Court was asked to determine: (1) whether, for purposes of RSA 76:21, the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a “natural disaster”; and (2) if so, whether the buildings owned by the plaintiffs were “damaged” by COVID-19 such that they were “not able to be used for [their] intended use” within the meaning of RSA 76:21, I. The Court answered the second question in the negative. View "Clearview Realty Ventures, LLC v. City of Laconia; et al." on Justia Law

Defendant David Tufano was convicted by jury for misdemeanor cruelty to animals. In 2019, Richard Roberge was working in his yard at his home in Somersworth. He heard a low, loud moaning noise coming from the defendant’s home across the street and went over to investigate. He saw the defendant with a hose in his hand spraying water into a plastic container. Inside the container was a “Havahart Trap” with a cat in it. He told the defendant to take the trap out of the bucket and open the trap, which the defendant did. The cat then ran off. Roberge did not immediately report the incident to police, but did so later, after other neighbors told him he should. Specifically, after his neighbor Sharon Barry told him about a prior incident in which defendant had placed a trap on his property, Roberge decided to contact the police. At trial, defendant objected to the trial court’s admission of any of Barry’s statements made about his cat trapping. Defendant also filed a motion in limine to allow him to impeach Barry with a prior conviction. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion was an abuse of discretion. “While it was undisputed that the defendant sprayed the trapped cat inside a container, we cannot say that those facts alone ‘clearly constitute mistreatment of the cat that grossly deviates from what a reasonable person would do in the same situation.’” Because the erroneously-admitted evidence of prior cat trapping could have influenced the jury to view the defendant as a person who was “hostile toward cats” and likely to abuse or mistreat one, it could have led the jury to credit Roberge’s testimony over the defendant’s and to convict him of the charged offense. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Tufano" on Justia Law

Petitioner Pamela Smart petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus to order the Governor and Executive Council to reconsider whether to grant a hearing on the substance of her Petition for Commutation. Petitioner was serving a life-without-parole sentence for a conviction as an accomplice for first-degree murder. Petitioner submitted a Petition for Commutation, which requested a hearing before the Executive Council. She asked that her sentence be modified to eliminate the “without the possibility of parole” condition, and commuted to time served. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded petitioner’s challenge to the executive branch’s discretionary exercise of its clemency power sought a ruling on a nonjusticiable question. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Petition of Smart" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Woodburn was convicted by jury on one count of domestic violence, one count of simple assault, and two counts of criminal mischief. On appeal, he challenged only the domestic violence and simple assault convictions, arguing the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the issue of self-defense. He also argued the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of the complainant’s alleged prior acts of aggression against him, arguing that the evidence was admissible under either New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b) or the verbal completeness and opening-the-door doctrines. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with defendant that the court’s failure to give a self-defense instruction was error, it reversed his convictions for domestic violence and simple assault, affirmed his criminal mischief convictions, and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Woodburn" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire certified two questions of law for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's consideration. Plaintiffs, individuals who presently or formerly lived in the Merrimack area, brought tort claims, including negligence, nuisance, trespass, and negligent failure to warn, alleging that defendants’ manufacturing process at its facility in the Town of Merrimack used chemicals that included perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA). They alleged PFOA was a toxic chemical that was released into the air from the Merrimack facility and has contaminated the air, ground, and water in Merrimack and nearby towns. As a result, plaintiffs alleged the wells and other drinking water sources in those places were contaminated, exposing them to PFOA, placing them at risk of developing health problems, including testicular cancer, kidney cancer, immunotoxicity, thyroid disease, high cholesterol, ulcerative colitis, and pregnancy induced hypertension. The first question from the federal circuit court asked whether New Hampshire recognized “a claim for the costs of medical monitoring as a remedy or as a cause of action” in plaintiffs' context. Depending on the answer to the first question, the second question asked, “what are the requirements and elements of a remedy or cause of action for medical monitoring” under New Hampshire law. Because the Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative, it did not address the second question. View "Brown, et al. v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Tycollo Graham appealed a superior court order dismissing his lawsuit against defendants ProCon, Inc. and Eurosim Construction, on res judicata grounds. Plaintiff argued on appeal that his suit in Merrimack County Superior Court was not barred by the Grafton County Superior Court’s prior dismissal of an identical action against the same defendants because the prior dismissal was not a final judgment on the merits. To this, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed: his suit is not barred by res judicata. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court also adopted a prospective rule that a dismissal order resulting from a plaintiff’s violation of a court order or a procedural rule that is silent as to prejudice will be deemed to be without prejudice and, therefore, not “on the merits” for the purposes of res judicata. View "Graham v. Eurosim Construction, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant John Cullen was convicted by jury on two counts of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault and one count of sexual assault. One of the pattern indictments alleged sexual contact; the other alleged sexual penetration. Defendant appealed his convictions on the pattern indictments, arguing that the Superior Court erred when it denied his motions to dismiss the two pattern charges because the State failed to prove that “the acts relevant to each indictment occurred over a period of 2 months or more” and, with respect to the pattern sexual contact charge, that the victim was under the age of 13 when he committed those acts. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Cullen" on Justia Law

Petitioner, the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), petitioned under the New Hampshire Supreme Court's original jurisdiction seeking review of a superior court order denying DCYF’s motion to dismiss a complaint brought against it. In 2019, Respondent filed a complaint as parent and next friend of his children, M.M. and J.M., asserting various claims against both DCYF and the Court Appointed Special Advocates of New Hampshire (CASA). DCYF and CASA moved to dismiss the complaint, with DCYF arguing, inter alia, that the claims were time-barred by RSA 541-B:14, IV. Respondent objected, asserting that RSA 508:8 (2010) tolled the period of limitations in RSA 541-B:14, IV. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court dismissed the claims against CASA as precluded by quasi-judicial immunity, but denied the motion to dismiss the claims against DCYF. In its order, the trial court reasoned that RSA 508:8 operated as a tolling provision and that failing to read the tolling provision into the statute of limitations in RSA 541-B:14, IV would lead to “an absurd, unfair, and unjust result.” In its petition to the Supreme Court, DCYF asked the Court to determine that RSA 508:8 did not apply to claims brought under RSA chapter 541-B. The Supreme Court concurred with Respondent, holding that RSA 508:8 had to be read into RSA 541-B:14, IV in order to comport with the equal protection guarantees afforded to the citizenry under Part I, Articles 2 and 12 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families" on Justia Law