Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner M.P. sought review of a Department of Health and Human Services Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU) decision finding him ineligible to receive developmental disability (DD) services pursuant to RSA chapter 171-A (2022). Petitioner argued that: (1) the AAU’s determination that he did not have a qualifying DD pursuant to RSA 171-A:2, V was an unsustainable exercise of discretion; (2) the AAU erred in admitting certain testimony and considering the petitioner’s Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) status; and (3) the AAU’s failure to timely hold a hearing and issue a decision violated the Medicaid Act and his due process rights under the Federal and New Hampshire Constitutions. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the AAU’s eligibility decision was sustainable and that the contested testimony was immaterial and did not prejudice petitioner. Additionally, despite the significant delay that petitioner experienced waiting for a hearing and a final decision, the delay was largely attributable to the global pandemic and the protective measures imposed in an effort to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. Pursuant to the federal authority relied upon by petitioner, these circumstances constituted an “emergency” beyond the AAU’s control, thereby exempting the AAU from the statute’s scheduling requirement. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Petition of M.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dan Hynes appealed two superior court orders granting in part the motion to dismiss filed by defendants the New Hampshire Democratic Party (NHDP) and Raymond Buckley, and granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff was a New Hampshire attorney. In 2009, plaintiff was convicted of theft by extortion, which was later annulled. As a result of the conviction, plaintiff was temporarily suspended from the practice of law, but not disbarred. In 2018, plaintiff was “the Republican nominee for New Hampshire State Senate District 9.” During the course of plaintiff’s campaign, defendants “contracted with Bridge Communications to prepare mail pieces for certain state senate candidates,” including plaintiff’s opponent for the state senate seat. With the aid of an NHDP staffer, Bridge prepared a political message that was distributed by mail which mentioned plaintiff's extortion conviction, but also held that he was disbarred. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against defendants based on the content of the mailer, claiming that the statements there constituted: (1) defamation per se; (2) defamation per quod; (3) libel; (4) invasion of privacy — false light; and (5) violation of RSA 651:5 (2016). Defendants moved to dismiss, asserting, inter alia, that the statements were “true or substantially true” and were not made “with knowledge of [their] falsity or with reckless disregard of the truth.” Defendants further argued that RSA 651:5 did not create a private right of action and that plaintiff failed to state a claim for invasion of privacy. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in part, dismissing the defamation and libel claims as they related to the statement that plaintiff had been convicted of theft by extortion, and dismissed counts four and five, determining that plaintiff failed to state a claim for false light, and that RSA 651:5 did not create a civil cause of action. It did not, however, dismiss the defamation and libel claims as they related to the statement over plaintiff's disbarrment, finding that whether the statement was substantially true was a question for the jury. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. The flyer did not refer to plaintiff's annulled conviction, nor did it accurately convey he was not disbarred from the practice of law. The Court concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the issues resolved by summary judgment. View "Hynes v. New Hampshire Democratic Party, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Juliana and David Lonergan appealed a superior court order affirming a Town of Sanbornton’s (Town) Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) approval of a special exception for an excavation site for property that intervenor, R.D. Edmunds Land Holdings, LLC, owned. As a threshold matter, the Town and the intervenor argued that the New Hampshire Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based upon plaintiffs’ failure to timely move for rehearing with the ZBA as required by RSA 155-E:9 (2014). To this, the Supreme Court concluded that RSA 155-E:9 applied to plaintiffs’ motion for rehearing to the ZBA and that plaintiffs did not meet the ten-day filing deadline set forth in the statute. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and vacated the superior court’s order. View "Lonergan v. Town of Sanbornton" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Richard and Sanaz Anthony appealed a superior court order affirming a decision of the Town of Plaistow’s (Town) Planning Board granting site plan approval for the development and consolidation of two lots by the intervenor, Milton Real Properties of Massachusetts, LLC. Plaintiffs argued the superior court erred by: (1) ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address plaintiffs’ argument that the proposed use was not permitted in the zoning district; (2) finding that the planning board made a sufficient regional impact determination pursuant to RSA 36:56 (2019); and (3) ruling that the planning board’s decision granting site plan approval was otherwise lawful and reasonable. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not err in dismissing the plaintiffs’ zoning argument, in concluding that the planning board acted reasonably when it implicitly found that the project would not have a regional impact, and in finding that the planning board’s decision was otherwise lawful and reasonable. View "Anthony, et al. v. Town of Plaistow" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, multiple hotel operators challenged a superior court’s orders in a suit against defendants, multiple insurance underwriters, all relating to the denial of coverage during the COVID-19 world health pandemic. Plaintiffs owned and operated twenty-three hotels: four in New Hampshire, eighteen in Massachusetts, and one in New Jersey. Plaintiffs purchased $600 million of insurance coverage from defendants for the policy period from November 1, 2019 to November 1, 2020. With the exception of certain addenda, the relevant language of the policies was identical, stating in part that it “insures against risks of direct physical loss of or damage to property described herein . . . except as hereinafter excluded.” For periods of time, pursuant to governors’ orders, hotels in each of the three states were permitted to provide lodging only to vulnerable populations and to essential workers. These essential workers included healthcare workers, the COVID-19 essential workforce, and other workers responding to the COVID-19 public health emergency. Beginning in June 2020, plaintiffs’ hotels were permitted to reopen with a number of restrictions on their business operations. Plaintiffs, through their insurance broker, provided notice to defendants they were submitting claims in connection with losses stemming from COVID-19. Plaintiffs sued when these claims denied, arguing that the potential presence of the virus triggered business loss provisions in their respective policies. To this, the New Hampshire Supreme Court disagreed, finding that “[w]hile the presence of the virus might affect how people interact with one another, and interact with the property, it does not render the property useless or uninhabitable, nor distinctly and demonstrably altered.” View "Schleicher & Stebbins Hotels, LLC, et al. v. Starr Surplus Lines Insurance Co., et al." on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court’s grant of a motion to suppress statements made by defendant Caleb Marquis. Marquis was charged with several felonies relating t first- and second-degree burns to his girlfriend’s 16-month-old child in his care. The trial court ruled that defendant was subject to custodial interrogation at the time he gave the statements, and, because he was not given Miranda warnings, those statements were obtained in violation of his right against self-incrimination. The State contended that the entire interview should not be suppressed because, even if it became accusatory, it was not accusatory from start to end. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed after review of the record that the first few minutes of the interview were not accusatory and should not have been suppressed. Once an officer told defendant “it looks like you’re trying to be deceitful” and that “it potentially could be a criminal matter,” the interview became sufficiently accusatory that a reasonable person would believe himself to be in custody, and all subsequent statements should have been suppressed. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s suppression order as to the statements made by the defendant prior to these two statements by the officer, but otherwise affirmed the court’s decision. View "New Hampshire v. Marquis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Loik appealed a superior court order dismissing his petition for the partition and sale of real estate. At issue was whether the superior court or the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, under the applicable statute, the circuit court and not the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction, it vacated and direct the superior court to transfer the petition to the circuit court. View "Loik v. Loik" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Granite State Trade School, LLC (GSTS) was a gas training school providing fuel gas fitting training courses and licensing exams in New Hampshire since 2007. GSTS was approved as a gas training school prior to the adoption of the current gas fitting regulatory framework. In 2020, defendant New Hampshire Mechanical Licensing Board (Board) directed GSTS to submit to an audit by producing its curriculum, instructor information, and exam materials. In response, GSTS brought suit seeking a declaration that “GSTS training and testing is grandfathered and exempt from compliance” with the audit request because its programs predated the current regulations. Alternatively, GSTS asked the trial court to find Rules Saf-Mec 308 and 610 “arbitrary and capricious” because the rules failed to protect the “integrity and security of the program education materials, and exams,” and were “overburdensome.” GSTS sought to enjoin the Board from: (1) requiring the production of proprietary materials created by GSTS; (2) terminating its training program; and (3) declining to accept certification from GSTS. The Board moved to dismiss; the trial court granted the Board’s motion. The court ruled that the plain and ordinary meaning of the language contained in Rules Saf-Mec 308 and 610 did not “relieve prior approved programs from their continuing obligations” to comply with the regulatory scheme. The trial court also ruled that Saf-Mec 610 “is a valid exercise of the state’s police power and not arbitrary or capricious” and dismissed GSTS’s claim that Saf-Mec 308 was arbitrary and capricious. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Granite State Trade School, LLC v. New Hampshire Mechanical Licensing Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Town of Conway (Town) appealed a superior court order granting defendant Scott Kudrick's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court ruled that the Conway Zoning Ordinance (2013) (hereinafter, “CZO”) permitted a non-owner-occupied short-term rental (STR) in the Town’s residential districts because such use of a property fell within the CZO’s definition of a “residential/dwelling unit.” The Town argued that the court erroneously interpreted the CZO to allow non-owner-occupied STRs in residential districts. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly interpreted the CZO and held that the CZO permitted non-owner-occupied STRs in the Town’s residential districts. View "Town of Conway v. Kudrick" on Justia Law

Defendant LeeAnn O’Brien was convicted by jury of possession of a narcotic drug and control of a vehicle where a controlled drug was illegally kept. On appeal, she argued the superior court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search of her vehicle following a motor vehicle stop. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the officer unlawfully expanded the scope of the stop for a defective license plate light by requesting the defendant’s consent to search her vehicle for drugs. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and remanded. View "New Hampshire v. O'Brien" on Justia Law