Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Defendant Ryan LaPlaca pled true to a probation violation. As a result, he was sentenced to two-and-one-half to five years in the state prison, with five years suspended. As a condition of his sentence, Defendant agreed to participate in a drug court sentencing program. Defendant waived his rights to any and all subsequent hearings as a condition of his participation in the program. Furthermore, any violation of the terms of the program would result in sanctions. The State moved to impose Defendant's suspended sentence when he pled true to the probation violation. The trial court granted the State's motion without an additional hearing, citing the conditions of Defendant's participation in the drug court program. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by refusing to hold a hearing prior to issuing his sentence. On reversing the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court found that "it would subvert the requirements of due process to uphold the defendant's prospective waiver of his right to a hearing . . .[w]hen the defendant faces the potential imposition of a full sentence of incarceration." Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. LaPlaca" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant Andre Rivera was convicted as an accomplice to reckless second-degree murder. In 2007, he and four others discussed robbing a local drug dealer. The group assailed the dealer, and when the dealer fought back, one of the five shot the dealer to death. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss his indictment for lack of proof that he "acted with the purpose to promote or facilitate the specific actus reus of the principal offense" which was the murder of the drug dealer. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to support Defendant's conviction. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "New Hampshire v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Petitioners Peter Gordon and the Peter Gordon Revocable Trust of 1999 own six oceanfront properties adjacent to and at the end of a road in the Town of Rye. Petitioners unsuccessfully appealed an order from the Town Board of Selectmen that a portion of the road had become public by prescription. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioners argued that the Board’s conclusion was wrong. Central to the Board's conclusion was Petitioner's 1997 request to remove snow from the road. The Board reasoned that if the road was private, the Town would have had no duty to remove the snow. Upon consideration of matter, the Supreme Court found the evidence presented at the Board hearing was insufficient to declare the road a public road by prescription. The Court vacated the Board's decision, and remanded the case to the superior court for further proceedings. View "Gordon v. Town of Rye " on Justia Law

Defendant Luis Lopez was convicted in 2007 on felony child endangerment charges. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to convict him. The child’s mother found sexually suggestive images of her daughter on Defendant’s cell phone and called police. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant requested the child pose for him when the record revealed the child, when at play, liked to imagine herself as a runway model and "pose" for Defendant. The Supreme Court found that a "rational trier of fact" could have concluded that Defendant solicited the child for the suggestive images. The Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Bower Road in Henniker was originally designated a "public highway" in 1797. In 1895, the Town voted to discontinue the road. In 2002, Timothy Hanson purchased a parcel of land in Henniker which could only be accessed by the road. The neighbors disputed Mr. Hanson's use of the road, and he successfully brought suit to establish a right-of-way in the road. In 2009, Plaintiff Russell Forest Management acquired the Hanson property. Plaintiff applied to the Town Board of Selectmen for a building permit to construct a single-family home there. Following a hearing, the Board rejected Plaintiff's application, holding that the discontinued road could not be used as planned. The Board found that Plaintiff's property did not have the required frontage, rather, a simple right-of-way. Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) and the superior court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued that over time, the discontinued "public highway" became a "private road" due to the nature of Mr. Hanson's original use to access his property. As a private road, Plaintiff argued the Board erred in finding that it did not meet the statutory requirements for frontage to the proposed single-family house. The Supreme Court found that the "road" indeed did not meet the Town's requirements of a private road nor as frontage to the property. Furthermore, the Court found that the "road" did not meet the criteria for being a qualified easement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's and the ZBA's decisions to deny Plaintiff its building permit. View "Russell Forest Management, LLC v. Town of Henniker" on Justia Law

"Homes by George," run by Adelaide and Rick George, developed residential real estate known as "Esther's Estates" in Newton. Homes by George entered into a written contract with Defendant Al Hoyt & Sons, Inc., in which Defendant agreed to perform certain work in connection with the development. Defendant was paid but did not complete the work. Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and claimed that Defendant violated the State Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Defendant counter-claimed that Plaintiff failed to pay amounts due in accordance with the contract. The trial court bifurcated the proceedings to allow a jury to first determine liability claims. A second trial was held on the contract claims. Plaintiffs won on all liability claims in the first trial, and received damages on its breach of contract and CPA claims at the second. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs challenged the amounts of damages they were awarded by the trial court. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in its finding of violations under the CPA, and in its damages awarded to Plaintiffs. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the grant of damages was appropriate in light of the terms of the contract, the state case law, and the evidence presented at trial. However, the Court questioned how the trial court arrived at the amount of damages. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings on its damages award to Plaintiffs. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other aspects of its decision.

Respondent, the New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration (DRA), appealed a Superior Court ruling. Money distributions from the Lyme Timber Company (Lyme) paid to limited partners that lived in New Hampshire were not considered taxable income under the state tax code. The court reasoned that the Lyme partners' interests were not "transferable shares" within the meaning of the tax code, and therefore not taxable. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the DRA argued that the trial court misinterpreted and misapplied the tax regulations, and failed to consider portions of the Lyme partnership agreement. In its review, the Supreme Court engaged in defining the pertinent terms of the tax code and the Lyme partnership agreement. The Court concluded that the trial court did misinterpret many of the pertinent terms that were the basis of this appeal. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioners Matthew Kennedy and the Hinsdale Federation of Teachers appealed the decision of the New Hampshire Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) that denied their unfair labor practice claims against Respondent, the Hinsdale School District (District). Mr. Kennedy was a music teacher for about ten years and a member of the teachers' union. The District and Union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that contained a grievance procedure that provided for binding arbitration. The only matters excluded from the grievance procedure were management prerogatives and teacher non-renewals. Citing a lack of student participation, the District notified Mr. Kennedy that it would not renew his contract. Before the 2009-2010 school year, the District eliminated the Hinsdale band program and entered into an agreement with Brattleboro High School where interested students from Hinsdale could participate in Brattleboro's music offerings. Petitioners filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the PELRB alleging multiple violations of the CBA. The PELRB dismissed Petitioners' claims. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioners argued that the District illegally outsourced its band program to Brattleboro, and challenged the District's reasons for its "reduction-in-force" claim. The Supreme Court could not conclude that the PELRB's decision was erroneous or that it was unjust or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the PELRB's decision to dismiss Petitioners' complaint.

Respondent Judith McGann was terminated as superintendent of Petitioner School Administrative Unit #44 (SAU). During the evidentiary portion of the SAU Board's termination hearing, SAU called an expert witness. Ms. McGann requested access to the expert's file. The moderator of the hearing denied Ms. McGann's request. Following the hearing, the Board voted to terminate Ms. McGann. On appeal to the Board of Education, Ms. McGann argued that the SAU violated her due process rights by denying her access to the expert's records. The Board ordered SAU to produce the expert's work file, and recommended that the SAU's decision be vacated and remanded for a new hearing. The SAU sought review of the State Board of Education's decision ordering it to produce the expert's file. The Supreme Court noted that due process requirements for binding administrative procedures are quite different from those binding judicial procedures. The Court did not find that the SAU Board violated Ms. McGann's constitutional due process rights in the course of the termination hearing. The Court found that the Board gave Ms. McGann "extensive opportunity" to meaningfully cross-examine the expert despite not having his file. The Court dismissed Ms. McGann's appeal, reversed the Board's order to produce the expert's file, and affirmed the SAU's decision to terminate Ms. McGann's employment as superintendent.

Petitioner Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford) appealed orders of the Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) that denied it recovery from the State Special Fund for Second Injuries for injuries to Claire Hamel and John Rygiel. Ms. Hamel worked as an assembly person for a motor manufacturing company. She was temporarily disabled for psychiatric reasons. She continued to work until her second injury for degenerative disc disease. Mr. Rygiel worked as a truck driver for a mobile MRI unit. Mr. Rygiel had Type II diabetes that required medication. Mr. Rygiel sustained an employment-related injury to his wrist. In both Ms. Hamel and Mr. Rygiel's cases, Hartford applied for and was denied reimbursement from the second injury fund. Hartford appealed both the Hamel and Rygiel decisions by CAB. The issue from both cases centered on whether state law allowed the CAB to consider an employee's past job performance as evidence that his or her preexisting impairment would not be a hindrance to obtaining employment if that employee became unemployed. The Supreme Court concluded that the employee's ability to perform his or her existing job is not determinative of whether the preexisting impairment was a hindrance to obtaining employment. The Court found that the CAB erroneously relied on the employee's ability when it denied Hartford's claims for reimbursement. Accordingly, the Court vacated the CAB's decisions in both the Hamel and Rygiel cases and remanded the cases for further proceedings.