Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Luis Lopez was convicted in 2007 on felony child endangerment charges. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to convict him. The child’s mother found sexually suggestive images of her daughter on Defendant’s cell phone and called police. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant requested the child pose for him when the record revealed the child, when at play, liked to imagine herself as a runway model and "pose" for Defendant. The Supreme Court found that a "rational trier of fact" could have concluded that Defendant solicited the child for the suggestive images. The Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Bower Road in Henniker was originally designated a "public highway" in 1797. In 1895, the Town voted to discontinue the road. In 2002, Timothy Hanson purchased a parcel of land in Henniker which could only be accessed by the road. The neighbors disputed Mr. Hanson's use of the road, and he successfully brought suit to establish a right-of-way in the road. In 2009, Plaintiff Russell Forest Management acquired the Hanson property. Plaintiff applied to the Town Board of Selectmen for a building permit to construct a single-family home there. Following a hearing, the Board rejected Plaintiff's application, holding that the discontinued road could not be used as planned. The Board found that Plaintiff's property did not have the required frontage, rather, a simple right-of-way. Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) and the superior court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued that over time, the discontinued "public highway" became a "private road" due to the nature of Mr. Hanson's original use to access his property. As a private road, Plaintiff argued the Board erred in finding that it did not meet the statutory requirements for frontage to the proposed single-family house. The Supreme Court found that the "road" indeed did not meet the Town's requirements of a private road nor as frontage to the property. Furthermore, the Court found that the "road" did not meet the criteria for being a qualified easement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's and the ZBA's decisions to deny Plaintiff its building permit. View "Russell Forest Management, LLC v. Town of Henniker" on Justia Law

"Homes by George," run by Adelaide and Rick George, developed residential real estate known as "Esther's Estates" in Newton. Homes by George entered into a written contract with Defendant Al Hoyt & Sons, Inc., in which Defendant agreed to perform certain work in connection with the development. Defendant was paid but did not complete the work. Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and claimed that Defendant violated the State Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Defendant counter-claimed that Plaintiff failed to pay amounts due in accordance with the contract. The trial court bifurcated the proceedings to allow a jury to first determine liability claims. A second trial was held on the contract claims. Plaintiffs won on all liability claims in the first trial, and received damages on its breach of contract and CPA claims at the second. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs challenged the amounts of damages they were awarded by the trial court. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in its finding of violations under the CPA, and in its damages awarded to Plaintiffs. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the grant of damages was appropriate in light of the terms of the contract, the state case law, and the evidence presented at trial. However, the Court questioned how the trial court arrived at the amount of damages. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings on its damages award to Plaintiffs. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other aspects of its decision.

Respondent, the New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration (DRA), appealed a Superior Court ruling. Money distributions from the Lyme Timber Company (Lyme) paid to limited partners that lived in New Hampshire were not considered taxable income under the state tax code. The court reasoned that the Lyme partners' interests were not "transferable shares" within the meaning of the tax code, and therefore not taxable. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the DRA argued that the trial court misinterpreted and misapplied the tax regulations, and failed to consider portions of the Lyme partnership agreement. In its review, the Supreme Court engaged in defining the pertinent terms of the tax code and the Lyme partnership agreement. The Court concluded that the trial court did misinterpret many of the pertinent terms that were the basis of this appeal. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioners Matthew Kennedy and the Hinsdale Federation of Teachers appealed the decision of the New Hampshire Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) that denied their unfair labor practice claims against Respondent, the Hinsdale School District (District). Mr. Kennedy was a music teacher for about ten years and a member of the teachers' union. The District and Union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that contained a grievance procedure that provided for binding arbitration. The only matters excluded from the grievance procedure were management prerogatives and teacher non-renewals. Citing a lack of student participation, the District notified Mr. Kennedy that it would not renew his contract. Before the 2009-2010 school year, the District eliminated the Hinsdale band program and entered into an agreement with Brattleboro High School where interested students from Hinsdale could participate in Brattleboro's music offerings. Petitioners filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the PELRB alleging multiple violations of the CBA. The PELRB dismissed Petitioners' claims. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioners argued that the District illegally outsourced its band program to Brattleboro, and challenged the District's reasons for its "reduction-in-force" claim. The Supreme Court could not conclude that the PELRB's decision was erroneous or that it was unjust or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the PELRB's decision to dismiss Petitioners' complaint.

Respondent Judith McGann was terminated as superintendent of Petitioner School Administrative Unit #44 (SAU). During the evidentiary portion of the SAU Board's termination hearing, SAU called an expert witness. Ms. McGann requested access to the expert's file. The moderator of the hearing denied Ms. McGann's request. Following the hearing, the Board voted to terminate Ms. McGann. On appeal to the Board of Education, Ms. McGann argued that the SAU violated her due process rights by denying her access to the expert's records. The Board ordered SAU to produce the expert's work file, and recommended that the SAU's decision be vacated and remanded for a new hearing. The SAU sought review of the State Board of Education's decision ordering it to produce the expert's file. The Supreme Court noted that due process requirements for binding administrative procedures are quite different from those binding judicial procedures. The Court did not find that the SAU Board violated Ms. McGann's constitutional due process rights in the course of the termination hearing. The Court found that the Board gave Ms. McGann "extensive opportunity" to meaningfully cross-examine the expert despite not having his file. The Court dismissed Ms. McGann's appeal, reversed the Board's order to produce the expert's file, and affirmed the SAU's decision to terminate Ms. McGann's employment as superintendent.

Petitioner Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford) appealed orders of the Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) that denied it recovery from the State Special Fund for Second Injuries for injuries to Claire Hamel and John Rygiel. Ms. Hamel worked as an assembly person for a motor manufacturing company. She was temporarily disabled for psychiatric reasons. She continued to work until her second injury for degenerative disc disease. Mr. Rygiel worked as a truck driver for a mobile MRI unit. Mr. Rygiel had Type II diabetes that required medication. Mr. Rygiel sustained an employment-related injury to his wrist. In both Ms. Hamel and Mr. Rygiel's cases, Hartford applied for and was denied reimbursement from the second injury fund. Hartford appealed both the Hamel and Rygiel decisions by CAB. The issue from both cases centered on whether state law allowed the CAB to consider an employee's past job performance as evidence that his or her preexisting impairment would not be a hindrance to obtaining employment if that employee became unemployed. The Supreme Court concluded that the employee's ability to perform his or her existing job is not determinative of whether the preexisting impairment was a hindrance to obtaining employment. The Court found that the CAB erroneously relied on the employee's ability when it denied Hartford's claims for reimbursement. Accordingly, the Court vacated the CAB's decisions in both the Hamel and Rygiel cases and remanded the cases for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Darlene Gray appealed an order of the Superior Court that dismissed her complaint against Defendant Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company. In 2003, Plaintiff and her sister, in their capacity as trustees of the Ocean Estates Realty Trust, received a quitclaim deed from the Triple P Ranch Realty Trust. Ocean Estates paid $80,000 for the parcel and recorded the deed. Later that year, Ocean Estates conveyed a warranty deed for the land to Plaintiff. At the time she received the deed, Plaintiff obtained a construction loan, granted a mortgage, and purchased title insurance from Commonwealth. The title insurance provided $328,000 in coverage against a title defect. In 2006, Plaintiff learned that Triple P Ranch Realty Trust never acquired title to the property and that the State legally owned it. The land was appraised at $15,000, and the insurer paid the mortgage lender the amount of the appraisal. Plaintiff sued Commonwealth for breach of contract, arguing that Commonwealth's policy should reimburse her for all expenses she incurred prior to learning of the title defect. When the Superior Court denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, she appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court found that trial court properly determined the measure of damages for Plaintiff's claim. Without finding errors in the trial court's findings of fact, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision dismissing Plaintiff's complaint.

Defendant James Mello appealed his conviction on four counts of delivering child pornography. On appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued that the Superior Court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence derived from a search warrant issued by the district court which authorized a search for information held by his Internet service provider. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the district court exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction by issuing the warrant. Furthermore, he argued that the warrant violated his state and federal constitutional rights. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not exceed its jurisdiction, and that Defendant had no expectation of privacy in the Internet information. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

In July 2009, a grand jury indicted Defendant Richard MacDonald on one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault for having sex with a person whom he knew to be âmentally defective.â At trial, Defendant filed a motion seeking in camera review of the victimâs medical and mental health records. The State did not object. The court received over two thousand pages of the victimâs medical records. The court assumed without review, that the records were probably relevant, and allowed the documents to be produced âfor Counselâs eyes only.â The State objected to the courtâs lack-of-review, arguing that the point of in camera review was for the court to decide which documents were appropriate. Defendant objected, and the State applied for a writ of certiorari to compel the trial court to determine the disclosure of the appropriate records. The Supreme Court granted the writ, and held that the lower courtâs failure to review the records was an error. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for an in camera review of the medical records.