Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Carleton, LLC appealed a superior court order finding that the Defendants' notice of intention to adopt articles of dissolution was timely filed. In 1995, Bukk Carleton and Defendant Richard Balagur formed defendant MTS Corporation (MTS) for the purpose of purchasing land and operating as a real estate holding company. In 2004, Carelton brought an action agains MTS and Richard Balagur to dissolve MTS, obtain payment of rent due MTS, and to remove Richard Balagur as an officer and director of MTS. Richard Balagur brought an action to compel MTS to transfer certain real estate to him, and to pay him certain funds. Adrienne Balagur, Richard's mother and a shareholder in MTS, successfully moved for leave to file an election to purchase shares in lieu of dissolving MTS pursuant to state law. The parties sued over how to value the shares in MTS. Concluding that the trial court did not err in its determination of the terms and conditions of purchase of the shares, the Supreme Court appointed a commissioner to sell MTS' real estate holdings should Mrs. Balagur not comply with the Court's order. One month after the Supreme Court issued its holding, the Balagurs and MTS filed a notice of intention to adopt articles of dissolution. Carelton objected, contending that the notice was not timely filed. The trial court held that the notice was timely filed and Carelton appealed. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the notice of intent to adopt articles of dissolution was timely filed. View "Carleton, LLC v. Balagur" on Justia Law

Respondent Parade Residence Hotel, LLC (Parade) appealed and Petitioner Harborside Associates, L.P. (Harborside) cross-appealed a superior court decision that partially affirmed and partially reversed the decision of the Portsmouth Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) to grant Parade variances to install two parapet and two marquee signs on its hotel and conference center site. Upon review, the Supreme Court found evidence in the record to support the ZBA’s factual findings: "[b]ecause the ZBA used the correct test to determine whether the public interest and spirit of the ordinance factors were met and because there is evidence to support the ZBA’s findings on these factors, to the extent that the trial court ruled that the ZBA acted unlawfully when it found that the factors were met, the trial court erred." Further, the Court found there was evidence in the record supporting the ZBA’s finding that the signs would not "negatively impact surrounding property values ... the ZBA was also entitled to rely upon its own knowledge, experience and observations." The Court partially affirmed and partially reversed the superior court's decision, and remanded the case back for further proceedings. View "Harborside Associates, L.P. v. Parade Residence Hotel, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondent Debra D. appealed a family court order that terminated her parental rights over her sons, Michael E. and Andre E., for failing to correct conditions leading to a finding of neglect. The court issued a final dispositional order finding that the Respondent had neglected Michael E. and Andre E. by selling drugs from her home and in their presence. The final order set forth conditions the Respondent had to meet before the children could safely be returned to her. These conditions, which were intended to correct those that led to the finding of neglect, included: (1) refraining from drug and alcohol use; (2) attending individual counseling; (3) working cooperatively with a parent aide; and (4) undergoing a neurological evaluation. Twelve months after the final dispositional order was issued in the neglect case, the court held a permanency hearing and found that Respondent was not in compliance with its order. Accordingly, the court ordered a termination of parental rights petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Respondent's parental rights should have been terminated. The Court affirmed the family court's decision. View "In Re Michael E." on Justia Law

Respondent Ruth Chevion appealed and Petitioners Aaron and Katie Boissy cross-appealed a superior court order that partly granted and partly denied Petitioners' petition to quiet title. The trial court ruled that Respondent lacked an easement to use a certain well on Petitioners' property, but that she had a deeded right-of-way over the property to access a former ice pond. The parties owned neighboring parcels of land in Hopkinton. Petitioners owned three lots, one of which adjoined Respondent's lot. Petitioners brought action to quiet title to two easements Respondent claimed to have on their property. The first easement allegedly gave Respondent the right to pipe water to her house from a well on one of Petitioners' three lots. The second easement allegedly gave Respondent a right-of-way over Petitioners' property to access the pond. The trial court rejected Petitioners' assertion that Respondent's well easement was extinguished by abandonment, but that the easement was extinguished nonetheless because its purpose (to allow use of a certain well on Petitioners' property) was impossible to accomplish. Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Boissy v. Chevion" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Hampsey appealed a final stalking protective order issued against him. Plaintiff Jessie Despres and her three children resided in an apartment for which Defendant’s company was the property manager. She testified that Defendant frequently stopped by or walked into her apartment unexpectedly, and that he made sexual comments and advances toward her. She recounted a specific incident that occurred in March 2010, when she called Defendant because her basement had flooded. After checking the basement, the two went outside. Plaintiff testified that she was in her pajamas and felt uncomfortable, and that Defendant "made comments on how he wished he would have caught [her] in less clothes and then proceeded to kiss [her] in [her] right ear," slam his body into hers, and tell her he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. She told the court that she felt threatened and intimidated by Defendant, and that her "kids [were] intimidated by the constant drive-by's, . . . which [were] . . . followed by either calls or him stopping in." On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to make findings of two or more specific acts that constitute stalking; (2) making findings that are unsupported by the record; (3) failing to weigh the credibility of the witnesses; and (4) issuing a stalking order where "most of [plaintiff's] allegations were too vague and non-specific for [him] to respond to." Upon review, the Supreme Court was unpersuaded by Defendant's arguments on appeal, and affirmed the trial court's decision to issue the protective order against him. View "Despres v. Hampsey" on Justia Law

Petitioners, the Estate of June M. Day (Estate) and Byron and Stephanie Day, appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment to Respondent Hanover Insurance Company, arguing Hanover's consent to settle a claim by Petitioners with the insurer of a third party tortfeasor did not preclude Hanover from contesting its liability to provide the Estate underinsured motorist coverage under its insurance contract with the Estate's decedent. In 2007, June Day was fatally injured in a motor vehicle accident. At the time of the accident, Day's vehicle was insured under an automobile liability policy and a personal umbrella policy issued by Hanover, and both policies provided underinsured motorist coverage. Following the accident, Petitioners made a claim against the third party's insurance company's policy. Hanover agreed that Petitioners could accept the settlement offered "while reserving [Hanover's] right to continue the investigation into liability in this matter," and noting that Hanover had "neither accepted nor denied liability." Petitioners accepted payment and executed a release to the third party and her insurance company. Thereafter Petitioners took the position that, by consenting to the settlement, Hanover was precluded from contesting that Petitioners were "legally entitled to recover" damages from the third party. Ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court rejected Petitioners' position and dismissed the action. Petitioners filed an objection arguing that the court had "misunderstood the essence of the petition." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that "the record supports the trial court's ruling regarding the litigation strategy the petitioners pursued below. . . . insofar as the petitioners complain that Hanover failed to exercise good faith in that it delayed investigating and processing their claim, we note that the petitioners at all times had it within their power under the terms of the policy to address this problem by demanding arbitration of its underinsured motorist claim against Hanover, or, alternatively, by filing a breach of contract action in court." View "Estate of June M. Day v. Hanover Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Defendant Diego Duran appealed his conviction by a jury on one count of being a felon in possession of a deadly weapon. He argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because there was insufficient evidence both that he possessed the weapon and that the weapon was a deadly weapon. In 2009, Defendant, who was an inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison, was showering when another inmate was seen placing a suspicious object in Defendant's shoe. Prison officials asked to see Defendant's shoes, but Defendant ignored the request. In the bathroom, prison officials observed the other inmate throw the item from the shoe into the toilet and then asked the Defendant to flush the toilet. The official ordered Defendant not to flush the toilet, but Defendant flushed anyway. Officials retrieved the object, and "[b]ased upon his eleven years of experience, [the official] determined that the object was likely a 'shank.'" Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision and upheld Defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Duran" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in superior court Defendant Christopher Guay was convicted of three counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), and one count of felonious sexual assault (FSA). On appeal he argued that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to grant his request for a mistrial; (2) failing to dismiss one of the three AFSA counts; and (3) denying him access to all of the victim’s medical and counseling records. The victim was Defendant's biological daughter, who was allegedly assaulted twice in 2008. At trial, Defendant testified in his own defense. During testimony, immediately after he stated that listening to the victim's accusations against him was "heartbreaking," the victim shouted out from the back of the courtroom, "You’re such a freakin’ liar." The trial court denied Defendant’s request for a mistrial but twice issued curative instructions to the jury. The jury found Defendant guilty on all three counts of AFSA and one count of FSA. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant was convicted based upon insufficient evidence of guilt, and "to allow the defendant's conviction to stand would seriously affect the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings." The Court reversed the trial court's decision as it pertained to one AFSA charge. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Guay" on Justia Law

Defendants Scott and Christina Lees appealed a trial court decision that found in favor of Plaintiff Stephen Wyle on his claim of negligent misrepresentation. In 2002, Defendants purchased a two-unit apartment building. Defendants wished to expand the building, and approached a contractor to add a third apartment to the back of the property. Conditional approval for the site plan was granted in November 2003 and final approval was obtained in January 2004. However, Defendants did not obtain the proper permits prior to building or occupying the unit. As a result, the town's building inspector never inspected the unit. The Lees again hired the contractor both to complete a second addition to the property. Defendants again failed to secure the necessary building permits. After the completion of construction, town officials visited the property a number of times in 2006 and 2007. The town informed Defendants that "[s]ave for acceptable field changes[,] the site plan requirements have been satisfied." Defendants listed the property for sale in 2007. After entering into the agreement, Plaintiff had a comprehensive home inspection performed and sent a list of specific concerns regarding the property to Defendants. The concerns were either remedied by the Defendants or waived by Plaintiff prior to closing. Approximately six weeks after closing, the entire property was inspected by the town building inspector and fire chief which revealed numerous building and life safety code violations. Plaintiff was ordered not to occupy the unit until he corrected the violations and made the site compliant with site plan regulations. After correcting the violations, Plaintiff then brought a single claim against Defendants for negligent misrepresentation. Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court issued an order awarding damages to the Plaintiff. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the evidence at trial established that Defendants negligently misrepresented that the premises were licensed for immediate occupancy and that they had obtained all the necessary permits. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial record supported the decision in favor of Plaintiff, and the grant of damages. View "Wyle v. Lees" on Justia Law

Respondents Ravenna Investment Associates and its successor-in-interest, Access Road, LLC (collectively referred to as Ravenna), appealed a superior court order following a bench trial which granted a petition for injunctive and declaratory relief filed by Petitioner Appletree Mall Associates, LLC (Appletree), ordering Ravenna to restore two fifteen-foot drainage easements allowing water to discharge from Appletree’s site to Route 102 in Londonderry. Appletree sought a declaration that, as owner of 'Lot 2,' it was entitled to drainage easements over Lots 6, 7 and 10, and an order requiring Ravenna to remove any obstructions to those easements. In its order, the trial court found that Ravenna’s development of Lots 6, 7 and 10 unreasonably interfered with Appletree’s alleged drainage easements. Specifically, the court found that Ravenna impermissibly relocated the easements unilaterally by routing the water over a different part of its land, instead of within the bounds of Appletree’s easements. Under all of these circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded in its review of the matter that the plain language of Appletree's 1984 deed, together with the circumstances surrounding it, did not express an affirmative intent to create new drainage easements on Lots 7 and 10 for the benefit of Lot 2. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Appletree Mall Associates, LLC v. Ravenna Investment Associates " on Justia Law