Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Alfred and Susan Marshall appealed a superior court's order that granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Plaintiffs' claim to a prescriptive easement over defendants' beach front property (the “Beach Lot”) Plaintiffs' and defendants' lots were originally part of a parcel acquired by Francis Lord in 1871. Lord sold several beachfront lots (but not the Beach Lot) during his lifetime. After Lord’s death, his heirs continued to sell parcels from his land, including several non-waterfront back lots. The Town of Ossipee (Town) acquired title to the Beach Lot by a tax collector’s deed in 1987. The Town conveyed the Beach Lot by quitclaim deed in 1993. In June 2010, Plaintiffs filed this action for the court's determination that they held prescriptive rights to use the Beach Lot. Plaintiffs claimed that, prior to the Town’s acquisition of the Beach Lot by tax deed in 1987, they and their predecessors had made more than twenty years of open, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted use of the Beach Lot to access Lake Ossipee, thus giving them a prescriptive easement over that lot. The defendants challenged Plaintiffs’ claim on five grounds, one being that any prescriptive easement to use the Beach Lot, which may have existed prior to 1987, was extinguished by the Town’s acquisition of the property by tax deed in that year. Without deciding whether Plaintiffs actually had an easement prior to 1987, the court held that even assuming such easement existed, the tax deed cut off even ripened prescriptive rights as a matter of law. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that that the trial court erred in determining any easement they might have had prior to the tax deed was extinguished by that deed. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Plaintiffs, and reversed the superior court's decision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Marshall & Burke" on Justia Law

Petitioner Brandt Development Company of New Hampshire, LLC (Brandt) appealed a Superior Court order that upheld a decision of Respondent City of Somersworth’s (City) zoning board of adjustment (ZBA). The ZBA denied its application for a variance. Brandt owned a house and attached barn in the residential multi-family district of the City. In November 1994, Brandt applied for a variance from size and frontage requirements to convert the property, then being used as a duplex, into four dwelling units. The ZBA denied the application after finding that the property failed to satisfy the five criteria for a variance. From 1995 to 1997, Brandt added four bedrooms to the upstairs unit after receiving permits to do so. In December 2009, Brandt again sought to convert the property into a four-unit dwelling, and again applied to the ZBA for a variance from the City’s area, frontage, and setback requirements. The ZBA declined to consider the merits of the variance application on the basis that “circumstances [had] not changed sufficiently to warrant acceptance of the application.” The superior court affirmed the ZBA’s decision in August 2010. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the legal criteria the ZBA used in making its determination were not "discreet and unrelated criteria, but interrelated concepts that aim to ensure a proper balance between the legitimate aims of municipal planning and the hardship that may sometimes result from a literal enforcement of zoning ordinances." As such, the Court found that the ZBA's denial of Brandt's variance application was not reasonable in light of state law, and it reversed the ZBA's and Superior Court's decisions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Brandt Development Company of New Hampshire, LLC v. City of Somersworth " on Justia Law

Defendant George Quintero appealed his convictions on one count of felonious sexual assault (FSA), and one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA). He argued that the Superior Court erred when it conditioned the giving of a so-called "Williams instruction" (137 N.H. 343 (1993) (requiring the State to prove the charged acts occurred in the time frame alleged in the indictments)) on his agreeing to an amendment of the indictments to conform to the evidence presented at trial. After oral argument, the Supreme Court directed the parties to provide supplemental briefing on whether "Williams" should be overruled. The Court took the arguments under advisement, and affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that the Williams instruction should no longer be given in cases tried after the date of this opinion. View "New Hampshire v. Quintero " on Justia Law

Defendant John Stowe appealed his convictions of making a false report to law enforcement and of unsworn falsification, arguing that the Superior Court erred when it: (1) limited his cross-examination of a crucial State witness; (2) denied his request for a curative instruction on the State's misstatements of law made during closing argument; and (3) denied his motion to dismiss the unsworn falsification complaint. In 2005, John Deere Company was authorized to repossess a tractor that Defendant had financed through it. John Deere was unsuccessful because the tractor was not at the expected location. Defendant claimed that he did not know what happened to the tractor. During a subsequent court hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to file a police report indicating that the tractor had been stolen. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the evidence presented against Defendant at trial was sufficient to support his convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Stowe" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Burke appealed a trial court's decision to deny his motion to dismiss criminal restraint charges against him. On the morning of February 2, 2009, eighty-three-year-old Monna Greenstreet was home alone when she saw Defendant standing in the area between her kitchen and family room. He was holding a knife and demanded $75,000, which he claimed her husband had hidden in the house. Defendant was subsequently charged with burglary, robbery, theft by unauthorized taking, criminal restraint, and obstructing the report of a crime. At the close of the State's case, Defendant moved to dismiss all of the charges. With respect to the criminal restraint charge, he argued that the State had failed to prove that Greenstreet was exposed to "risk of serious bodily injury." Upon review, the Supreme Court held: "[a]lthough we consider this a close case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that [the evidence] was sufficient to establish a risk of serious bodily injury." The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Burke" on Justia Law

In this personal injury case, Plaintiff Alfred Ocasio appealed a judgment entered in favor of Defendant Federal Express Corporation (FedEx). Plaintiff was a mail handler who pulled by hand, large, heavy canisters filled with mail from delivery tractor-trailer trucks. One day as he was pulling canisters from a FedEx tractor-trailer truck, he accidentally stepped into and caught his leg in a gap between the rear of the truck and the loading dock. When a canister he had been pulling continued to roll toward him, the bones of his trapped leg were shattered. He argued on appeal that the Trial Court erred when it allowed the jury to apportion fault to his employer, the United States Postal Service (USPS), and when, despite the jury's $1,445,700 verdict in his favor, it entered judgment for FedEx after comparing the fault allocated to him to the fault allocated to FedEx. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "while it was not error to allow the jury to apportion fault to the USPS, it was error to deny the plaintiff any recovery against FedEx. We, thus, affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand." View "Ocasio v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant Robinson Garcia was certified as an adult and convicted of one count of second-degree murder and one count of riot. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erroneously: (1) denied his motions to suppress; (2) excluded the testimony of a defense witness; and (3) prohibited him from testifying about statements made by the victim. Defendant's convictions arose out of the August 11, 2005 beating of Stephen Raymond in Manchester. After Raymond's death, Defendant was charged with second-degree murder. Defendant was also charged with three alternative theories of felony-level riot, alleging that he assembled with others with the purpose of causing Raymond to suffer serious injuries. The trial court made a number of rulings unfavorable to Defendant. Defendant appealed those rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the evidence presented at trial supported his convictions, and affirmed the trial court's decisions in his case. View "New Hampshire v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Petitioner Joel Harrington appealed a superior court order in favor of Respondent Metropolis Property Management Group, Inc. (Metropolis). On May 27, 2005, Petitioner entered into a residential lease for an apartment at Hollis Commons Apartments in Concord. The lease agreement required the petitioner to pay a security deposit of $875 to be held "until the termination of Lessee's occupancy." Petitioner entered into two lease renewals, the first in May 2006 renewing the lease for one year, and another in June 2007. The second renewal called for a term commencing on July 1, 2007, and ending "60 days after written notice has been given." The original lease agreement and both lease renewals identified "Hollis Commons Apartments, LLC" as the lessor. The parties had a dispute over the lease agreement and return of the security deposit. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in finding that Metropolis was not a party to the lease agreement, and in dismissing his contract claims. Although the lease agreement and renewals all show "Hollis Commons Apartments, LLC" as the lessor and either Petitioner or the Petitioner and his wife as the lessees, Petitioner contended that Metropolis must be considered a party to the agreement. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss Petitioner's case. View "Harrington v. Metropolis Property Management Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Patrick McArdle appealed a family court order that granted a final domestic violence protective order to Plaintiff Lisa McArdle. The day before the hearing on the domestic violence petition, Plaintiff moved to amend the petition with allegations of three prior incidents: (1) Defendant had admitted to "flip[ing] out in a rage type thing" at work, pushing over a three-foot staging and portable bathrooms, and smashing holes in sheetrock; (2) in the summer of 2009, Defendant had thrown a large rock at the back of their son's car, damaging the car; and (3) at some point in their marriage, during an argument between the parties, Defendant had thrust his hand through a window, breaking his finger. The motion to amend the petition was not accompanied by an affidavit attesting to the facts under oath. Defendant objected to Plaintiff's motion to amend the petition on the basis that she had not attested to the factual allegations. The trial court addressed Defendant's objection by having Plaintiff attest to the facts alleged at the commencement of the hearing. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of which he did not have proper notice, basing its final order of protection upon such evidence, and considering evidence of incidents that were too remote in time. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding the evidence presented supported the court's decision to issue the protective order. View "In re McArdle" on Justia Law

Petitioner Limited Editions Properties, Inc., appealed a superior court order upholding a decision to deny Petitioner's subdivision application by the planning board of Respondent Town of Hebron (Town). Petitioner owned 112.5 acres of property in Hebron on the northwest end of Newfound Lake with frontage on West Shore Road. A portion of the lot lay within the Hebron lake district, and the remainder lay within the rural district. In an earlier decision, the Board determined that because Petitioner had materially revised its plan for the property, it was required to submit a new application to develop it. Petitioner sued, and the Board was reversed. When the Board resumed consideration of the application, Petitioner requested that it grant preliminary conditional approval of the plan's overall concept before Petitioner sought the required state and federal permits. Petitioner acknowledged that the plan would not meet then-current state regulations; it intended to revise the plan to obtain the necessary permits after the Board granted preliminary approval. Once it obtained the permits, Petitioner intended to return to the Board for consideration of any necessary changes to the plan. However, the Board determined that it would not approve the subdivision application in stages; rather, it would either conditionally approve the application or deny it. After holding several hearings on the application, a motion to deny the application was introduced and seconded, and after further discussion, three of the five members of the Board voted to deny the application. Petitioner subsequently appealed to the superior court, which upheld the Board's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Petitioner failed to establish that the trial court erred in affirming the Board's decision. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Limited Editions Properties, Inc. v. Town of Hebron" on Justia Law