Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jason Wilmot appealed his convictions on two counts of first-degree assault for recklessly causing serious bodily injury to a person under thirteen years of age. He argued on appeal that the trial court erred in not setting aside the jury's verdict because the evidence could not have supported a conclusion that his statements to police were voluntary, and without those statements the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal standards, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Wilmot " on Justia Law

Defendant Jack Ward was convicted on thirteen counts of possessing child pornography. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress on the grounds that the affidavit supporting the application for a search warrant lacked probable cause to search his residence and his computer. Upon review of the trial court record and applicable legal standard, the Supreme Court found evidence sufficient to support the search of Defendant's residence and computer. The Court therefore affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Ward " on Justia Law

Respondent Thomas Henry appealed the final decree in his divorce from Petitioner Marty Henry. He argued that the Derry Family Division erred when it granted Petitioner a fault-based divorce. He also challenged the trial court's division of the parties' property and its decision to award the petitioner alimony. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the evidence presented at trial supported the trial court's decision to grant a fault-based divorce. Furthermore, the Court concluded trial court did not abuse its discretion in its award of alimony. View "In the Matter of Marty & Thomas Henry " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jonathan Doyle appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to Defendants the Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Resources and Economic Development and the Monadnock State Park Manager (collectively, DRED), and that denied his motion for summary judgment. In 2009, Plaintiff staged a "Bigfoot" sighting (with himself dressed as Bigfoot) on Mount Monadnock. At the top of the mountain, he put on a costume, and filmed conversations he had with other hikers. On his way back down, he encountered two park staff members, and persuaded them to write a note saying there had been a "sighting" on the mountain. To garner publicity for his next appearance, Plaintiff had a friend write a press release for the local paper. Much to their annoyance, Park officials began fielding media calls trying to confirm whether reports of the sighting were true. When Plaintiff returned for more filming, he was confronted by park officials checking whether Plaintiff had a "special-use permit" to continue filming. With none, Plaintiff and his crew were asked to leave the mountain. Plaintiff subsequently brought a declaratory judgment action against DRED, arguing that Res 7306.01(a) violated the right to free speech contained in the New Hampshire Constitution and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. He also sought a permanent injunction, nominal damages, costs and fees. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DRED, ruling that Plaintiff failed to show that Res 7306.01(a) was unconstitutional. On appeal, Plaintiff argued the trial court erred because Res 7306.01(a) was void for vagueness, overbroad on its face and not narrowly tailored, and also overbroad as applied to Plaintiff's small-scale project. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of DRED: "More troubling is that this regulation needlessly stifles political speech, an integral component to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution." View "Doyle v. New Hampshire Dep't of Resources & Econ. Dev." on Justia Law

Petitioner Nilesh D. appealed a probate court order that denied his motion to terminate the guardianship over his minor daughter Reena, which had been previously awarded to his step-mother, Respondent Hasu D. Petitioner was granted guardianship over Reena who was then twenty-months old. Petitioner and his wife sought the guardianship because they were going overseas to start a business, and to visit the wife's family. The court granted a temporary guardianship, and following the hearing, the court appointend Respondent and her husband, Petitioner's father, to be Reena's guardians. In 2003, Petitioner's father died, and Respondent was appointed Reena's sole guardian. In 2003, Petitioner filed a motion to terminate the guardianship, asserting it was no longer necessary because its purpose was fulfilled. A final hearing on the motion to terminate would be held two months after Petitioner submitted an assessment of his alcohol use. In the meantime, the guardianship continued. In 2004, Respondent moved to dismiss the guardianship because Petitioner failed to submit an alcohol use assessment. The trial court denied the motion to terminate without prejudice to its future renewal. Petitioner did not renew his motion until 2007. The trial court held a hearing in 2009, and on the first day of the hearing, Petitioner submitted the assessment. Ultimately the court decided that Petitioner and his wife failed to show that terminating the guardianship would not "adversely affect [their daughter's] psychological well-being." Petitioner appealed the court's decision. Concluding that a "clear and convincing" standard of proof applied to a guardian's burden of proof in a proceeding to terminate a guardianship established by consent, the Supreme Court found that the trial court applied the wrong burden of proof in Petitioner's case. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further consideration under the proper burden of proof. View "In re Guardianship of Reena D. " on Justia Law

Petitioner Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. appealed an award by the Commissioner of the State Banking Department in favor of Respondent Rachel Nicholson based on claims under the Consumer Protection Act. The issue stemmed from Respondent contacting Countrywide in 2005 in order to purchase a house. She spoke with two Countrywide agents who promised that they would "investigate and present her with the best [financing] program." At the hearing before the Commissioner, Respondent testified the agents orally approved her for a 30-year fixed rate mortgage loan at 6% interest. Thereafter, Respondent spoke with agents on a weekly basis regarding the property purchase and loan. The agents did not raise any problems with the loan application until two days before the scheduled closing date. On that day, despite the fact that there were no changes in Respondent's employment status or credit since the application had been filed, the agents informed her that Countrywide would not be able to grant a fixed interest loan for the amount she needed. They informed her that to purchase the home, she would need to apply for two different loans. On the scheduled closing date, as instructed by the agents, Respondent applied for two new loans at higher rates of interest but for shorter durations. After multiple hearings, the Commissioner ultimately entered an order ruling that Countrywide had committed "an unfair or deceptive practice" under state law, and ordered that Countrywide reimburse Respondent for all monies paid prior to, at and after closing, as well as discharge the first mortgage and void the second. Furthermore, Countrywide was ordered to quitclaim the property to Respondent. Finding that the Commissioner should not have granted a hearing on the merits of Respondent's claims, the Supreme Court vacated the award entered in her favor. View "Appeal of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. " on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court considered an order of the superior court which denied Defendant Empire Automotive Group, Inc.'s motion to dismiss two indictments charging with with felony violations of the state Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Defendant was indicted by the grand jury on two counts of violating the CPA by allegedly placing inspection stickers (indicative of having passed inspection) on two automobiles sold to consumers under installment sales contracts when Defendant knew the vehicles had not passed the on-board diagnostic emissions tests required by the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles. Defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that its conduct was exempt from the CPA and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the banking department, and that the department of justice which initiated the criminal proceedings, lacked authority to do so. Finding that the "trade or commerce" involved in this case involved the sale of motor vehicles and clearly brought Defendant's actions well within the scope of the CPA, the Supreme Court held that the trial record reflected substantial evidence to support Defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Empire Automotive Group, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Kristin Ruggiero was convicted on twelve counts of falsifying physical evidence, and on one count of making a false report. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she argued that the trial court erred: (1) in refusing to exclude audio/video recordings as violative of New Hampshire's wiretap statute; (2) in allowing into evidence, without proper authentication, certain e-mail messages she purportedly sent; and (3) in denying her motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence upon which a rational jury could find the defendant guilty of each of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. View "New Hampshire v. Ruggiero " on Justia Law

Defendant Paul McDonald appealed his conviction by a jury of first-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in permitting the State to present certain lay opinion testimony, declining to give his requested self-defense jury instruction, and prohibiting the defense from referring to the aggravated felonious sexual assault statute in its closing argument. Finding that the trial court did not err in its decisions in Defendant's case, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. View "New Hampshire v. McDonald " on Justia Law

Defendant Dickens Etinenne appealed his conviction for the first degree murder of Larry Lemieux. On appeal, he argued that the superior court erred by: (1) incorrectly defining the elements of self-defense or defense of another in its jury instructions; (2) permitting hearsay testimony; (3) failing to order a new trial based upon perjured testimony of a State’s witness and the State’s failure to disclose exculpatory information; and (4) failing to order the State to immunize a witness for the purpose of ascertaining the extent of his perjured testimony. Upon careful consideration of each of Defendant's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err in its decisions. The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Etienne" on Justia Law