Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Michael Smith appealed a superior court order that imposed previously suspended sentences for felony convictions. In February 2008, Defendant was charged with six class A misdemeanors. Subsequently, in March and April 2008, Defendant was indicted on six felony charges. In January 2010, Defendant pled guilty to the six misdemeanor charges and was sentenced to concurrent terms of six months in jail, these sentences also running concurrently with his felony sentences. On three of the felony charges, Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of between two and seven years at the state prison, with six months of the minimum and all of the maximum terms suspended for seven years. On the other three felony charges, Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of between two and five years at the state prison, all suspended for a period of five years from release from his stand-committed prison sentences. While incarcerated, Defedant attempted to contact a woman whom he was forbidden to contact under the terms of his misdemeanor sentence. Although the prison’s system blocked his call, the State moved to impose the suspended sentences of all six felony convictions, arguing that the attempted call violated the condition of good behavior in those sentences. The superior court agreed that the call violated the good behavior condition, and imposed six months of the minimum and one year of the maximum sentences leaving the other sentences suspended. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the evidence supported the superior court's decision and affirmed it. View "New Hampshire v. Smith " on Justia Law

Defendant, Robert Towle, appealed his conviction on four counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault and and four counts of criminal liability for the conduct of another all stemming from inappropriate and illegal contact between he and his wife with their minor son. On appeal, Defendant argued that the superior court erred by denying his motion to proceed pro se. Defendant believed his counsel and he had a conflict of interest because his counsel was a candidate for municipal office. In the middle of a pre-trial conference, Defendant asked, when the court gave the opportuity, to proceed pro se. The court denied this request, and Defendant "moved" to correct the court's understanding of his request. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the superior court indeed disregarded Defendant's constitutional right when he "knowingly, intelligently" and with "awareness of the dangers of self-representation" requested to represent himself. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Towle " on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher D'Errico appealed the recommendation of the Marital Master that granted a protection order to Plaintiff Linda Thompson. Plaintiff filed a domestic violence petition in April, 2011. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that almost every day Defendant sent Plaintiff text messages using "extraordinarily foul language." The court further found that Defendant told Plaintiff not to come near his house because he had a loaded shot gun, and that in the past Defendant was stopped by a family friend from putting his hands around Plaintiff's neck. The court concluded that Defendant's conduct constituted a present threat to Plaintiff's safety and issued a final order of protection. On appeal, Defendant argued that: (1) his non-threatening foul language is protected by the First Amendment; (2) there is no evidence to support Plaintiff's allegations against him; (3) the text messages might have been sent by a third party having access to his phone; (4) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of certain text messages; and (5) the evidence did not support the finding of a credible present threat to Plaintiff's safety. Finding no merit to any of the issues Defendant raised on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Master's final order. View "Thompson v. D'Errico " on Justia Law

Defendant Adam Mentus appealed his conviction on manslaughter charges. In 2008, he took a Lorcin handgun home to show his brother. In the car, he placed a full clip of ammuitio in the gun, and placed it in his pocket. Reaching in to move the gun from him pocket to underneath the car seat, it discharged, puncturing front-seat passenger Diedre Bydzyna's lung through the back of the seat. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred: (1) by providing him with only $1,200 of the $3,000 he requested to hire a firearms expert, and (2) by overruling his objection to the State's closing argument. At a hearing, the trial judge said, "[T]hese are hard economic times. I’m not going to just easily approve $3,000 for a firearms expert." Based upon this statement, Defendant argued the judge denied his “request solely because of concerns about the source of funding" and that this amounted to reversible error. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the denial of funds did not substantially prejudice him at trial. Furthermore, the Court found that the prosecutor made no impermissible statements. Accordingly, the Cout held that the trial judge's overruling of Defendant's objections was not an abuse of discretion, and affirmed his conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Mentus " on Justia Law

Defendant Jon French appealed a superior court order that suspended his deferred sentence. In 1996, Defendant pled guilty to two counts of felonious sexual assault. Deferral of Defendant's sentence was conditioned upon his compliance "with a structured, residential program with 24 hour per day supervision." In 2010, Defendant moved to terminate his deferred sentence. The court held a hearing, at which the State presented the testimony of a clinical consultant to Defendant's treatment facility, who had been providing services to Defendant since he was in high school. The expert testified that while Defendant had the "potential" to be a danger to himself or to society "[t]he real issue here [was] his impulse to drift off that ... course of treatment, to do things that he knows that should be considered to be inappropriate." The trial court issued an order suspending Defendant's deferred sentence for a period of seven years "subject to the terms and conditions set out in the original mittimus of 1996." On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's decision to suspend his sentence for an additional seven years violated his right to due process. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that under the language of the 1996 sentencing order the court retained only the authority to impose or terminate Defendant's deferred sentence. Thus, the court lacked authority to suspend sua sponte Defendant's deferred sentence. The Court reversed the superior court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. French " on Justia Law

Defendants Sedo, Inc. ad its founder, president and sole shareholder Goran Lucic, appealed a district court ruling that held both the company and Mr. Lucic liable to Plaitiff Holloway Automotive Group d/b/a Holloway Motor Cars of Manchester for breach of contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's enforcement of a liquidated damages provision in the parties' contract, but concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to "pierce the corporate veil." Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's award against Lucic as well as the award of attorney's fees. View "Holloway Automotive Group v. Lucic" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ellen St. Louis appealed the decision of the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES) Appellate Board (board) that denied her claim for unemployment benefits. Early 2009, Petitioner received a disciplinary notice stating that her conduct was not in line with company policy because she appeared to be asleep at work and was argumentative when her trainer instructed her regarding her faulty soldering work. Subsequently, Petitioner informed a human resources representative that she was having difficulties breathing and that she was depressed. The human resources representative recommended she take medical leave. Petitioner claims that when she returned to work she could no longer perform soldering work because the fumes caused headaches, and caused her to shake, cough, and have difficulty breathing. The record indicated that she never provided Insight Technology with any medical records or doctor's instructions regarding her breathing problems or opinions regarding her inability to do soldering work. Petitioner was ultimately terminated for poor work performance. She applied for unemployment benefits but was denied. After an unsuccessful appeal to the Board, Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found that the record supported the determination that Petitioner was terminated for misconduct, and that there was no error in the Board's decision. View "Appeal of Ellen St. Louis " on Justia Law

Petitioners Residents of Green View Drive appealed a superior court order that: (1) found no "occasion" to lay out Green View Drive as a class V public highway; (2) partially granted and partially denied the petition to quiet title filed by The Ledges Golf Links, Inc. (The Ledges) against Defendant Claire Crowley; and (3) ruled that Ms. Crowley was responsible for the continued maintenance of Green View Drive and could recover road maintenance costs from the Residents. Green View Drive is located in Loudon and provides access to a portion of the golf course operated by The Ledges and to homes owned by the Residents. The Town classified Green View Drive as a private roadway. In 1997, before Green View Drive was built, the golf course property, then owned by Ms. Crowley and her husband William, was sold to the Loudon Country Club, Inc. In December 1999, the country club sold the golf course property to The Ledges. At some point, while constructing Green View Drive, Mr. Crowley mistakenly located a portion of the road on golf course property. As a result, he entered into a settlement agreement with The Ledges and others to resolve this issue. The settlement agreement provided that Mr. Crowley would "grant to the Ledges an easement for the Ledges to have use of [Green View Drive] for all golf course purposes." After Mr. Crowley died, Ms. Crowley petitioned the Town’s board of selectmen to accept Green View Drive as a town road. Her petition was denied. Ms. Crowley again petitioned the Town to accept Green View Drive as a public road; the Residents joined in this request. The Town denied the petition. The trial court construed August 2000 and September 2001 agreements as granting The Ledges an easement to use Green View Drive for the purpose of golf cart travel. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed portions of the superior court's order, finding that the court erred in finding the road was part of the golf course's "infrastructure." Furthermore, the Supreme Court vacated that portion of the superior court's order pertaining to the maintenance of the road. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Crowley v. Town of Loudon" on Justia Law

Defendant Town of Madison Planning Board appealed and Plaintiffs Thomas and Margaret Ettinger cross-appealed a superior court's decision which held that a private session of the Board violated the state's Right-to-Know Law (RTK) and denied Plaintiffs' request for attorney fees. In June 2009, the Pomeroy Limited Partnership (Pomeroy) received conditional approval from the Board to convert the buildings on its property to a condominium ownership form and to convey part of the property to the Nature Conservancy. In January 2010, Plaintiffs, whose property abuts the Pomeroy property, requested a public hearing to allow them to challenge the approval of the condominium plan. The Board scheduled a public hearing for March 3, 2010, to consider whether to grant final approval of the Pomeroy application. Plaintiffs' attorney appeared at that hearing. At the scheduled time of the hearing, the Board went into a private session for thirty minutes in which they read emails from the Board's attorney, a memorandum that summarized legal advice and letters from Plaintiffs' attorney. The Board then reopened the hearing and then after hearing Plaintiffs' attorney on the matter, granted final approval of the Pomeroy application. Plaintiffs sued alleging the Board violated the RTK law. The superior court agreed that the private session violated the RTK law, but refused to invalidate the Board's approval of the Pomeroy application. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that while the Board's written communications from its counsel may be protected from disclosure under the RTK law, the meeting itself need not have been closed to the public. Further, the Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' attorney fees: "[w]e cannot find that … the Board should have known that the nonpublic session violated the Right-to-Know Law" to therefore entitle them to fees. View "Ettinger v. Town of Madison Planning Board " on Justia Law

Petitioners Thomas Morrissey, Dorothy Sears, Reginald Rogers, John Quimby, Michael O’Donnell, Jonathan Chamberlain, Patricia Reynolds, Richard and Barbara Sanders, Margaret Russell, and Robert and Judith Dupuis, appealed a superior court order that granted motions to dismiss filed by Respondents New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services and New Hampshire Fish and Game Department (collectively referred to as the State), and Town of Lyme (Town). Post Pond is in Lyme, held in trust by the State for public use. Petitioners own properties with frontage on Post Pond and the west side of the Clay Brook wetlands. The Town owns property on the east side of the Clay Brook wetlands as well as a contiguous parcel with frontage on Post Pond, which consists of a recreation area. In May 2009, Petitioners filed a petition in equity and writ of mandamus alleging that the Town's removal of beaver dams in the Pond that controlled the natural mean high water mark adversely affected their properties and disrupted the entire Clay Brook wetlands ecosystem. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioners' writ allegations were insufficient to state a claim for taking or nuisance against the Town, and that the trial court did not err in dismissing their claims. Further, the Court concluded that Petitioners failed to plead a claim entitling them to declaratory relief. View "Morrissey v. Town of Lyme" on Justia Law