Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Christina Smith appealed her conviction for driving while intoxicated. She argued the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the State failed to establish that the arresting officer had a reasonable suspicion that she had violated the law when he stopped her. Upon review of the district court record, the Supreme Court found the district court did not err in issuing its decision, and affirmed the court's ruling. View "New Hampshire v. Smith " on Justia Law

James McClammer, Jr., Trustee of the Profit Sharing Plan of the Connecticut Valley Environmental Services, Inc., appealed a superior court order that ruled in favor of Michael and Marie O'Hearne on the parties' crosspetitions to quiet title and for injunctive relief. The parties owned adjoining lots in the vicinity of the Little Sugar River in North Charlestown. Historically, both lots were part of a larger parcel bisected by the river, which generally ran in an east-west direction at that point. McClammer acquired title to his lot in 1999 from the estate of Louise Hinchliffe, who had acquired her title upon the intestate deaths, in 1944 and 1957, of the grantees of a 1929 deed. The property description in McClammer’s deed was identical to the description in the 1929 deed. The dispute in this case arose when McClammer began removing trees from the strip of land lying to the north of several monuments and to the south of the river. The O'Hearnes filed a petition to enjoin McClammer from trespassing on their land, asserting that the parties' common boundary was established by the monuments. McClammer, in turn, filed his own petition to quiet title, claiming that his title ran either to the "so-called thread or center of the river," or to its low water mark on "the south side of [its] main northerly channel." McClammer later amended his petition, asserting that his title extended to the high water mark on the northern bank of the river, and included a 0.15 acre piece of land to the north of the river where, he claimed, the "mill spot" referenced in a 1790 deed was located. In their answers to McClammer’s petition and amended petition, the O'Hearnes claimed not only that they had record title to the areas in dispute, but that they had also acquired title by adverse possession and the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The trial court consolidated the matters, and following a trial on the merits, ruled in favor of the O'Hearnes. McClammer moved for reconsideration, arguing that the trial court had improperly raised the statute of limitations sua sponte. Additionally, he challenged the trial court's rulings on the merits, arguing that it had erroneously found that the O'Hearne chain of title referenced the monuments, that it improperly construed the relevant deeds, and that it ignored other evidence inconsistent with a finding of adverse possession. The trial court denied the motion, and McClammer timely appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "[t]o the extent the trial court incorrectly found that the O'Hearne chain of title referenced the monuments, this finding cannot have affected the outcome of the case since the trial court's findings and rulings relative to Hinchliffe's acquiescence in the boundary are supported by the record and compel the result reached by the trial court." View "O'Hearne v. McClammer, Jr." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals from a decision of the New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (board), Petitioner Timothy Alexander appealed the Board's affirmance of his dismissal from employment with the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the State appealed the board's reinstatement of William Harris to his employment with HHS. In 2009, Alexander and Harris were involved in the restraint of a resident at the Sununu Youth Services Center (SYSC). Alexander was employed as a Youth Counselor III and Harris was a full-time probationary employee, Youth Counselor I (Trainee). A Center report noted that the resident responded rudely when questioned whether the had permission to sit somewhere other than his assigned table. When told to move, the resident responded "disrespectfully," an altercation ensued. An investigation of the incident resulted in Alexander and Harris losing their jobs for using "excessive force" against the resident. Alexander and Harris appealed their dismissals to the Board. Alexander argued that: (1) the board unlawfully upheld his dismissal on a different factual basis from that stated in his termination letter; (2) the facts found by the board do not warrant termination; (3) he should be reinstated because SYSC failed to comply with the personnel rules; and (4) he is at least entitled to a new hearing because the board violated several statutes and, along with SYSC, violated his rights to due process. The Supreme Court did not "share Alexander's interpretation of the Board's decision." The Court affirmed Alexander's dismissal. As to Harris, the Court concluded the Board should not have "interfered" with HHS's exercise of discretion in terminating Harris's employment. The Court reversed the Board's decision as to Harris. View "Appeal of Alexander" on Justia Law

Intervener Parade Residence Hotel, LLC appealed a superior court order that vacated and remanded a decision of the Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) of the City of Portsmouth that upheld the City Planning Board's approval of Parade's application to amend its previously approved site plan. Parade's property abuts Plaintiff Harborside Associates, LP's property. In 2008, the Board approved Parade's application to construct a five-story building that included a hotel, restaurant and retail space. Parade began construction in 2009. The City adopted a new zoning ordinance later that year to become effective in 2010. The terms of the new ordinance changed those that were in effect when Parade was granted its site plan. When Parade applied for an amendment to its site plan, Harborside objected. Following a hearing, the Board approved the application without requiring Parade to comply with the new ordinance. Harborside appealed to the ZBA, who subsequently denied Harborside's objection. Harborside appealed, and the superior court vacated the ZBA's decision, finding that Parade presented a "major change" in its site plan requiring compliance with the changed ordinance. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err in arriving at its decision, and affirmed. View "Harborside Associates, L.P. v. City of Portsmouth" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration (DRA) appealed a superior court order that reversed its decision assessing a real estate transfer tax against Petitioners Say Pease, LLC and Say Pease IV, LLC. Two International Group, LLC (TIG) is a real estate holding company. It owned a ground lease on property near Pease International Tradeport that it wanted to use to secure a mortgage loan. To obtain the loan, TIG’s prospective lender required that TIG, and all of its members, be "single purpose bankruptcy remote entities." To comply with the lender’s requirement, the members of Say Pease formed Say Pease IV, a new limited liability company (LLC) with the same members. Say Pease IV’s LLC agreement provides that it was "formed for the sole purpose of being a Managing Member and Member of [TIG]" and was not authorized "to engage in any other activity[,] business or undertaking so long as [TIG] shall be indebted under any mortgage or other securitized loan." Say Pease’s interest in TIG was transferred to Say Pease IV, and Say Pease IV replaced Say Pease as TIG’s managing member. As a result of these transactions, Say Pease IV owned a 47.5% interest in TIG as a sole purpose remote bankruptcy entity, Say Pease held no interest in TIG, and TIG obtained the loan. Based upon this transfer, DRA issued notices assessing the real estate transfer tax against Say Pease and Say Pease IV. After appealing unsuccessfully through DRA’s administrative appeal process, Say Pease and Say Pease IV appealed to the superior court. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court reversed DRA's order, ruling that the transfer at issue was not a "[c]ontractual transfer," RSA 78-B:1-a, II (2003), and, therefore, the real estate transfer tax did not apply. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the parties did not employ a business entity as a shield for an otherwise taxable exchange of value for an interest in property. Instead, those that executed Say Pease IV’s LLC agreement sought to maintain TIG’s original ownership while placing it in a suitable financing vehicle; the promises exchanged related to the creation of the financing vehicle, Say Pease IV, not the subsequent property transfer. Thus, the substance of the transaction here failed to create a bargained-for exchange because there was no "exchange of money, or other property and services, or property or services valued in money for an interest in real estate." View "Say Pease IV, LLC v. New Hampshire Dept. of Rev. Admin. " on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Eaton appealed the denial of his motion for payment of legal fees, arguing that the Cheshire County Probate Court erred in finding that the imposition of a guardianship does not require the proposed ward to pay a good-faith petitioner's attorney's fees. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the probate court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the probate court's decision. View "In re Guardianship of Mary Louise Eaton " on Justia Law

Respondents the Commissioner of the New Hampshire Banking Department and the New Hampshire Banking Department (collectively, the Department), appealed an order of the Superior Court that permanently enjoined the Department from pursuing an administrative proceeding against Petitioner Jeffrey Frost on the ground that the Department lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioners Frost, Chretien/Tillinghast, LLC, and Frost Family, LLC, cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying their request for attorney’s fees. Frost is a member and designated manager of Chretien/Tillinghast, LLC (Chretien), and a member of Frost Family, LLC (Frost Family). Chretien and Frost Family (collectively, the LLCs) are New Hampshire limited liability companies organized for the purpose of real estate acquisition, holding, and development. The underlying dispute arose as the result of two seller-financed real estate transactions, one conducted by Frost Family and the other by Chretien. After both instances of seller-financing, Petitioner submitted a loan originator license application to the Department. At the time the administrative proceedings were initiated, the Department notified Petitioner that he could request a hearing with the Department. Petitioner did not file such a request. Instead, all Petitioners initiated a declaratory judgment proceeding in superior court, which included a request for a temporary restraining order. The petitioners contended that Respondents lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed against Frost and violated the State Constitution's prohibition against retrospective laws by seeking to impose a $25,000 fine for each alleged violation. After a hearing, the trial court granted the preliminary injunction, concluding that "[w]hile the [Department] may have jurisdiction over Frost because he is now a loan originator, it [could] take no action against him based on the September 2008 or the March 2009 transactions." Further, the trial court concluded that since the Department "may not impose any penalties on Frost," it did not need to consider the issue of the retrospective nature of the sanctions. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the Department lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Frost v. New Hampshire Banking Dept. " on Justia Law

The main issue on appeal was whether Defendant's statements to police during an interview were voluntary. A portion of the interview was videotaped. Paramedics were called to the home of Defendant Nicole Belonga when Defendant's twenty-one-month-old child was sick. The child was left in the care of Defendant's boyfriend David Kaley who was living with Defendant at the time. The child suffered a seizure and was admitted to the hospital. She was discovered to have serious brain injuries and later transported to a hospital in Boston with a pediatric intensive care unit. Nashua Police arrived at the hospital and requested Defendant give a statement to them at the station. At first she did not agree to go so that she might be with her daughter in Boston, but Defendant later acquiesced. Detectives made clear that Defendant was at the police station voluntarily, but in her pre-trial motion, Defendant argued that her statements to the detectives were involuntary and the admission of those statements at trial would violate her constitutional rights. After a hearing, the court denied her motion. Her statements were admitted at trial through the videotape and the testimony of the detectives. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's pre-trial motion: "the jury had before it overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The defendant’s description of the incidents in which she used physical force against her daughter closely correspond with the doctors' testimony. The defendant's testimony, together with the doctors' testimony, strongly supports the conclusion that the defendant was caring for her daughter when [the] injuries occurred. The defendant made several statements suggesting she had had used too much physical force against her daughter and that she did something wrong. Also, the defendant's general description of the events paints a picture of a person using unwarranted and dangerous physical force against a very young child. Accordingly, [the Court] concluded that the evidentiary errors at trial were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." View "New Hampshire v. Belonga " on Justia Law

Defendant Roscoe White appealed his convictions by jury of first degree murder and attempted first-degree assault. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress inculpatory statements he made to an informant. He asserted on appeal that the informant's questions about his pending drug charges violated his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, and that his statements about the shooting should have been excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree." He further argued that "[a]llowing the State to intentionally violate the constitutional rights of an accused in order to elicit incriminating statements is fundamentally unfair and violates due process." Finding that use of an informant does not constitute a per se constitutional violation, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of the statements Defendant made to the informant. View "New Hampshire v. White" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dana Chatman appealed a superior court order that dismissed his negligence claims against Defendant Paul Giampa, and his respondeat superior claim against Defendants Strafford County and the Strafford County Department of Corrections. Plaintiff was participating in a work program run by the Corrections Department, under the direct supervision of Giampa. Giampa directed Plaintiff and others to load numerous tables and chairs onto a trailer. The trailer was not yet hitched to another vehicle, and not situated on even ground. Giampa directed Plaintiff and the others to lift the trailer and hitch it to a pickup truck when a weld on the trailer jack/hitch failed, causing the trailer to fall on Plaintiff's left leg and ankle. Plaintiff sustained permanent injury to his leg and ankle. The trial court agreed with the defendants that the plaintiff's claims did not fall within the scope of RSA 507-B:2 because the truck and trailer were not being "operated" at the time of the loading/hitching, and declined to find that RSA 507-B:2 was unconstitutional. Upon review, the Supreme held "that the entire range of activities inherent in the loading and unloading process must be considered to determine whether a vehicle was being operated" and that "[o]peration includes participation in loading and unloading activities." The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Chatman v. Strafford County" on Justia Law