Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Liberty Assembly of God (Assembly) appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) which upheld a 2008 decision of Respondent City of Concord (City), denying the Assembly's request for a religious use tax exemption. Assembly owns 26.13 acres of land in Concord; approximately twenty acres are in "current use." The undeveloped land is used primarily for agricultural or forestry purposes, although there is a "prayer trail" around its perimeter. From 1994, when Assembly acquired its property, until 2008, the City granted Assembly a religious use tax exemption on all of its property. However, in 2008, the City granted Assembly an exemption on only forty percent of its property, concluding that sixty percent of the property was not used and occupied for religious training or other religious purposes, and was therefore taxable. The City subsequently revised its determination and exempted sixty percent of the property. The City considered the entire second floor of the main building taxable as not being used for religious purposes. Following appeal, the BTLA upheld the City’s apportionment for tax year 2008. Assembly asserted that the BTLA’s ruling was erroneous on three interrelated grounds: (1) the City and the BTLA misinterpreted RSA 72:23, III because it should be read as fully exempting houses of worship from taxation; (2) the City’s inquiries into the religious uses and purposes of each room within the church building unconstitutionally “entangled” the government with religion; and (3) even if the statute and constitution permit parsing taxable from exempt space within a house of worship, all of Assembly's space should be exempt as serving a religious purpose. Having decided that the City’s methodology was not flawed, the Supreme Court deferred to the BTLA’s judgment in determining the weight to be given evidence: "Because Assembly has not demonstrated by a clear preponderance of the evidence that the second-floor restroom was "owned, used and occupied directly for religious training or for other religious purposes," the Court could find error in the BTLA's finding such space taxable. View "Appeal of Liberty Assembly of God" on Justia Law

Petitioner 38 Endicott Street North, LLC appealed a superior court order that dismissed its petition under the Right-to-Know Law and denied its request for attorney’s fees. In 2011, Petitioner sent Respondent the State Fire Marshal, head of the New Hampshire Division of Fire Safety a letter requesting to inspect all records, information, and documents related to a September 17, 2010 fire that took place on its property and the "investigation thereof." Petitioner did not receive a response, and on May 3, 2011, sent a second letter demanding a response. On May 5, 2011, the Fire Marshal replied, disclosing the Incident Initiation Report and its supplement, but withholding all other materials because the investigation was ongoing. On May 6, 2011, Petitioner filed a sought an injunction to direct the Fire Marshal to produce the undisclosed materials pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law. Petitioner also requested attorney’s fees and costs. The Fire Marshal responded that the undisclosed materials are excluded from the Right-to-Know Law under the exemption for records “compiled for law enforcement purposes.” After a hearing, the trial court ruled that the withheld records were exempt from the Right-to-Know Law, denied the petition, and also denied Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the materials were compiled for law enforcement purposes and that disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with law enforcement proceedings. Petitioner also argued that the trial court erred in denying its requests for an in camera review of the materials or the compilation of a Vaughn index, as well as in denying its motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Finding no error, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's judgment. View "38 Endicott Street North, LLC v. New Hampshire Fire Marshall" on Justia Law

Free Bail Bonds appealed a district court's order that forfeited bonds guaranteeing the court appearance of Defendant Sean McGurk. Approximately one month before Defendant's scheduled appearance, he was arrested in Vermont and held in custody by the Vermont Department of Corrections pending trial there for offenses allegedly committed after the New Hampshire bonds were issued. The surety's representative then moved to revoke Defendant's bail. The trial court did not rule on this motion until Defendant's ongoing incarceration prevented him from appearing as scheduled. At that point, it forfeited bail over Defendant's objection. The surety moved to vacate the forfeiture order and, when its motion was denied, filed two motions to reconsider, both of which were also denied. The principal issue in this case concerned the forefeiture order and the denial of the surety's request for an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court rejected the surety's argument that the trial court treated the bonds as performance rather than appearance bonds. Although the court noted that Defendant's failure to appear resulted from his decision to travel to Vermont and commit crimes, the court's order made clear that it forfeited the bonds because Defendant failed to appear, not because of his criminal activity. The bonds guaranteed Defendant’s appearance, so the Court concluded forfeiture was entirely appropriate. View "New Hampshire v. McGurk " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Regina Mbahaba, individually and as next friend of her minor daughter, Benita Nahimana, appealed a superior court order that dismissed her direct claims against Defendant Thomas Morgan, and granted him summary judgment in her action seeking to pierce the limited-liability veil of the company he managed. Defendant owned Property Management Services a/k/a Property Services Company, a limited liability company that managed an apartment building where Plaintiff and her family rented an apartment from 2005-2006. Plaintiff’s daughter, Benita, was poisoned by lead while living in the apartment, prompting an inspection by the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, which revealed "lead exposure hazards" in the home. As a result of the alleged injury to Benita caused by the lead contamination, Plaintiff filed lawsuits against Defendant and Biren Properties. Shortly after Plaintiff filed Suit, Defendant formed another property management LLC, which Plaintiff alleged he created in an attempt to avoid liability from her suit. Defendant moved to dismiss the action against him personally, arguing that, because he supervised the property on behalf of the LLC, he could not be "held personally liable for the debts or actions of the company." Ultimately, the claims against Defendant individually were dismissed, but the trial court allowed the plaintiff’s claims against the LLC to proceed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant's management of the apartment and his superior knowledge of its hazardous condition suffice to established an individual tort duty to avoid "exposing [the plaintiff] to an unreasonable risk of harm." Thus, because these allegations stated facts entitling Plaintiff to relief, her negligence claim survived Defendant’s motion to dismiss. With regard to Plaintiff's attempt to disregard Defendant's LLC to hold him liable, the Court concluded that Defendant correctly argued that he had every right to establish a new LLC and to transfer the original LLC’s clients to it. "However, that Defendant made this 'fresh start' when his company remained a party to this case, could permit a finding that the limited-liability identity was used to promote an injustice upon the plaintiff. Thus, based upon our review of the depositions and other evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we cannot conclude that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part the trial court's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mbahaba v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Respondent Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company appealed a superior court order that denied its motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioner Rebecca Rivera. The court ruled that an automobile policy (policy) issued to Rivera’s parents excluded liability coverage but afforded uninsured motorist coverage for injuries Rivera sustained in a single-vehicle accident in Dracut, Massachusetts. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in Petitioner's favor: "the terms of the owned vehicle exclusion appear to remove [Petitioner's vehicle] from the definition of uninsured motor vehicle even though, as to Rivera, there [was] no insurance available. While Liberty Mutual is free to limit the extent of its liability through the use of an exclusion it cannot do so in contravention of statutory provisions or public policy." View "Rivera v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins.Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Professional Fire Fighters of New Hampshire (PFFNH) appealed a superior court order that ruled Defendant The New Hampshire Local Government Center (LGC), was not required to provide certain meeting minutes under the Right-to-Know Law. LGC produced the vast majority of the documents requested by PFFNH, but redacted certain portions under a claim of attorney-client privilege. Dissatisfied with the redacted records, PFFNH moved to compel LGC to produce the unredacted minutes of fourteen meetings that occurred between 2000 and 2009. PFFNH argued that the redacted portions should have been released because the oral communications of LGC’s counsel occurred during meetings that were open to the public under RSA chapter 91-A, thereby defeating any claim of privilege. The superior court disagreed and denied the motion to compel. "As the superior court observed, "the fact that the meeting occurs in a public place does not destroy the privilege, if no one hears the conversation." The Supreme Court concluded that LGC could have reasonably relied on the absence of public attendees to ask for the candid advice of counsel. Had members of the public been present, the conversation could have progressed differently. Thus, because no third persons were present at the meeting, LGC was not required to take any further precautions to ensure the communications were private. View "Professional Fire Fighters of New Hampshire v. The New Hampshire Local Government Center " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lynne DiGaetano, Michael John DiGaetano, Christopher D. DiGaetano, Scott M. DiGaetano, and Shauna Arsenault, appealed a superior court order that granted the motion in limine of Defendant, John M. DiGaetano, to exclude parol evidence. Defendant cross-appealed a prior order of the same court that denied his motion to strike Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal. The matter arose from the distribution of trust proceeds from the death of the parties' parents-grandparents. Paragraph eleven of this trust provided that the trust “may be revoked in its entirety or amended from time to time by an instrument in writing executed by the said Donors jointly or by a surviving Donor.” The patriarch died in 2002, and the matriarch amended the trust in 2003 to establish Defendant as the sole trustee and beneficiary. Following his mother's death in 2006, Defendant sold the trust assets and collected the proceeds. Seeking to establish his right to the proceeds, Defendant petitioned the probate court who concluded that the 2003 amended trust was enforceable, and ruled in Defendant's favor. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that they were entitled to a jury trial on the issues of whether the original trust was a contractual "common plan" and whether the matriarch breached that contract when she amended it. Defendant moved to strike Plaintiffs' notice of appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court's order denying Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiffs' notice of appeal: The Court was not persuaded by Plaintiffs' contention that the original trust was a contract, the existence of which would be evidence to reform the family trust and to impose a constructive trust in their favor. Plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's order denying Defendant's motion and remanded the case to dismiss Plaintiffs' appeal. View "DiGaetano v. DiGaetano " on Justia Law

Petitioner Ronald Brownell appealed the final decree entered by the Plymouth Family Division in his divorce from Respondent Irene Brownell. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred when it: (1) considered his federal veterans’ disability benefits as income for alimony purposes; (2) treated any potential post-divorce distributions from his mother’s trust as marital property subject to distribution; (3) ordered him to pay the respondent $47,000 from his trust distributions, even though he had dissipated most of it before the divorce; and (4) found him in indirect civil contempt for failing to pay temporary alimony to the respondent and for violating the trial court’s anti-hypothecation order. Finding that the family division did not abuse its discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the final decree. View "In the Matter of Ronald Brownell and Irene Brownell " on Justia Law

Respondent Bruce Raybeck appealed a ruling that he was required to continue paying alimony to Petitioner Judith Raybeck. The parties divorced in 2005 after a forty-two year marriage. The divorce decree obligated Respondent to pay Petitioner alimony for ten years, in yearly installments, but would cease should she "cohabitate[...] with an unrelated adult male." Approximately three months before the January 2010 alimony payment was due, Petitioner moved out of her Laconia house and rented it to reduce her expenses. She moved into the upper level of a single family home in Plymouth owned by Paul Sansoucie, a man she had met through an online dating service. Sansoucie lived on the lower level and did not charge Petitioner for rent. She did, however, pay about $300 per month for food and often cooked for him. They also shared living space on the middle level of the house. When the respondent learned that the petitioner lived with another man, he stopped paying alimony. In response, Petitioner asked the family division to enforce the alimony agreement and require the respondent to resume his support payments. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court: "important is the extent of the personal relationship, including evidence of an intimate connection, how the people hold themselves out to others. . . Here too, the age of the couple may be relevant in weighing this factor; for older people, a sexual component to intimacy may not be as significant as it would be for younger couples. In addition, the shared use and enjoyment of personal property is an indication of cohabitation, such as common use of household rooms, appliances, furniture, vehicles, and whether one person maintains personal items, such as toiletries or clothing, at the residence of the other." Because the trial court did not have the benefit of the standard the Court articulated here for determining whether the relationship between Petitioner and Sansoucie amounted to cohabitation, it vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Judith Raybeck and Bruce Raybeck " on Justia Law

Respondent Jeannie Dube, appealed the final decree in the divorce action initiated by Petitioner Eric Dube. She argued that the Derry Family Division erred when it granted Eric a fault-based divorce. In addition, she challenged the trial court’s division of the parties’ property and its denial of her alimony request. Further, she contested the validity of the stipulated parenting plan. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: the record did not support the trial court’s implicit finding that Eric was “the innocent party” when testimony showed Eric committed adultery during the marriage; the record supported the trial court's finding that Jeannie did not need alimony; and the record supported the court's unequal division of the marital assets. The Court declined to address Jeannie's challenge to the parenting plan because she did not raise it at trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part the trial court's final decree. View "In the Matter of Eric J. Dube and Jeannie Dube " on Justia Law