Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Marc and Laurie Brown appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to Defendant Concord Group Insurance Company in their insurance coverage action. In 2005, Plaintiffs purchased a house from then-owner Michael Rogers. Two years later, they discovered water leaking into the house near a sliding glass door. They contacted Eugene Spencer, the person who built the house, to repair the problem. In 2009, Plaintiffs again observed water leaking into the house near the same sliding glass door. This time they contacted Daniel Lewis to repair the problem. Lewis later testified that damage was caused by leaks Spencer did not discover during his repair, but probably would have discovered had he removed all of the siding on the wall. The damage required extensive repair work. Concord Group insured Spencer. His policy did not cover "property damage" to his work "arising out of [his work] or any part of [his work]." Plaintiffs argued that the policy provided coverage because Spencer negligently repaired their house in 2007, and the damage in 2009 would not have occurred but for his negligence. Upon review of the policy in question, the Supreme Court concluded it was error for the trial court to grant Concord Group summary judgment because what caused the damage (either the 2003 or the 2007 work) was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the policy provided coverage in this case. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brown v. Concord Group Ins. Co. " on Justia Law

Petitioners Todd and Trent Bemis appealed a probate court order that dismissed their petition for guardianship over the person and estate of their step-father Dr. Raymond B. More than seven months after Dr. B left an assisted-living facility in Florida, Petitioners filed their petition for guardianship when Dr. B engaged in behavior the Supreme Court "assume[d] was evidence of his legal incapacity at that time." The petition contained no allegations about the doctor’s behavior, and Petitioners had no contact with him after he left Florida. Dr. B objected to a request for a psychological evaluation, and moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that it was "per se defective" because the guardianship statute requires that all evidence of a proposed ward's inability to care for himself "must have occurred within 6 months prior to the filing of the petition and at least one incidence of such behavior must have occurred within 20 days of the filing of the petition." After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition and denied the petitioners' motion for a psychiatric evaluation. The petitioners appealed both decisions. Finding that the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the doctor’s interest in freedom from an unwanted psychological examination outweighed the petitioners' interests in procuring evidence of his alleged incapacity, the Supreme Court affirmed the probate court's decision. View "In re Guardianship of Raymond B." on Justia Law

Defendant Roderick Davidson appealed his conviction by a jury on three counts of simple assault and one count of criminal mischief. He argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) denying his motions in limine to exclude evidence that he "controlled" the complainant; and (2) denying his request for a defense of property instruction. In October 2009, Defendant and the complainant lived together. Consistent with their habit of "br[eaking] up every other day," Defendant broke up with the complainant. They nonetheless drove home together, napped together for about three hours, and then went to dinner together at a restaurant. After dinner, during which they both consumed some alcohol, Defendant drove the couple home, where they began to argue about money. The complainant insisted that they talk, and in an attempt to do so, Defendant grabbed her and threw her into a wall. The complainant ended up on her back at the bottom of the stairs with Defendant above her, and that his hand made contact with her face. The following day, the complainant had a bruised eye, which she tried to conceal with makeup. After speaking with several people, she ultimately decided to go to the police. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts. However, the Court concluded the trial court erred in admitting "unlimited context" evidence as inherently prejudicial. In light of the Court's reversal of Defendant’s convictions for improperly admitted evidence, it did not reach Defendant’s jury instruction argument. View "New Hampshire v. Davidson" on Justia Law

Defendant Derrick DiMaggio appealed a superior court's denial of his motion for pretrial confinement credit for approximately 471 days he participated in the Grafton County Drug Court Sentencing Program. Finding there was no dispute that he was entitled credit for at least sixty-three of those days (for failing to comply with the Program’s rules), the Supreme Court was asked to review whether Defendant was entitled to credit for the days he was at liberty while participating in the Program. The Court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to pretrial confinement credit, and affirmed the superior court’s denial of his motion. View "New Hampshire v. DiMaggio" on Justia Law

Defendant Joshua Guild appealed his conviction on one count of felonious assault and one count of aggravated felonious assault (ASFA) involving the same minor victim. He contended that the superior court erred by: (1) violating New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 615 and RSA 632-A:6, IV (2007) by failing to sequester the minor victim’s mother; (2) erroneously denied his motion to disqualify a juror without first conducting a voir dire of the juror; and (3) erroneously denied his motion to dismiss the AFSA charge. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court held that when, in a criminal trial, a trial court has violated Rule 615 and RSA 626:6, IV by failing to sequester a witness, a new trial is in order unless the State proves that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying that rule to this case, the Court concluded that any presumption of prejudice was rebutted. Furthermore, because Defendant's conviction was supported by other substantial evidence, and because the evidence did not support a conclusion that the victim’s mother tailored her testimony to the victim’s testimony, the Court held that any error in failing to sequester the victim's mother was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. With regard to the denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss the AFSA charge, the Court found Defendant did not preserve the argument for the Supreme Court’s review. Defendant’s convictions were upheld. View "New Hampshire v. Guild" on Justia Law

Defendant Deicy Urena Ortiz appealed a district court's denial of her motion to withdraw her plea and vacate her misdemeanor conviction. On appeal, she contended her plea was not knowing because the court did not advise her of its potential adverse immigration consequences. Defendant had been a lawful resident of the United States since 2002. In 2007, she was charged with the class A misdemeanor of shoplifting. She appeared before the district court and entered a plea of nolo contendere. She was not represented by counsel. Defendant signed a standard acknowledgment and waiver of rights form, which, at the time, contained no acknowledgment of the potential adverse immigration consequences of entering either a guilty or nolo plea. During the plea colloquy, the court did not advise Defendant that her plea could result in adverse immigration consequences. In 2011, the federal government commenced removal proceedings against Defendant, contending that her shoplifting conviction constituted "a crime involving moral turpitude," a deportable offense. In response, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her plea and vacate her conviction. In her motion, she argued that her plea was not “knowing” because: (1) the court failed to inform her "that a conviction could subject her to deportation"; and (2) she "was affirmatively misled (albeit innocently) [by the prosecutor] that there would be no such consequences." The State objected. Acknowledging that it did not advise Defendant of the possible immigration consequences of her plea, the court concluded that Defendant raised a "pure issue of law," and, therefore, there was "no need for a hearing on the factual basis for [her] request." The court was not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that "Padilla v. Kentucky" (130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)) supported her appeal. Accordingly, the court denied the motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because immigration consequences are collateral, the court’s failure here to advise Defendant of them did not render her nolo contendere plea unknowing. View "New Hampshire v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Robert Pelkey appealed a superior court’s decision that granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendant Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc., d/b/a Dan’s City Auto Body. In 2009, Plaintiff brought suit against his landlord and Defendant alleging Defendant towed his car pursuant to a parking policy at his apartment complex. At the time, Plaintiff was confined to bed due to a serious medical condition and did not realize that his car had been towed. Soon thereafter, he was admitted to the hospital for a procedure to amputate his left foot, during which he suffered a heart attack. Plaintiff’s attorney had learned that Defendant had possession of the car and had scheduled to sell it a public auction two days later. After the attorney informed Defendant that his client wished to arranged for the return of the vehicle, Defendant falsely told the attorney that the car had already been sold. Defendant later traded the car to a third party, but Plaintiff received no remuneration for his loss. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit alleging that Defendant violated: (1) the Consumer Protection Act; (2) RSA chapter 262(a statute permitting a towing company to place a lien on a vehicle for reasonable charges incident to towing and storage and prescribing the requirements for collection of those charges by selling the vehicle at auction); and (3) the common law duty of a bailee to exercise reasonable care while in possession of a bailor’s property. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that a provision of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempted Plaintiff’s claims. Finding that Plaintiff’s claims were not preempted, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Defendant and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pelkey v. Dan's City Used Cars, Inc." on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court's ruling that RSA chapter 100-C (Supp. 2011) (the Judicial Retirement Plan) violated Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Petitioner Raymond Cloutier was a retired probate court judge. Six intervenors were retired supreme, superior, probate and district court judges. Petitioner submitted a written request to the Board of Trustees of the New Hampshire Judicial Retirement Plan (board) asserting that his retirement allowance was erroneously calculated pursuant to RSA chapter 100-C, and that he was entitled to benefits under the retirement statutes that were in effect when he was appointed to be a judge. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment for the petitioners, concluding that the application of RSA chapter 100-C to judges who accepted their positions before its enactment results in impairment of contract rights in violation of the New Hampshire Constitution. However, the trial court rejected Petitioner's assertion that the ten percent and one percent salary increases authorized in 2003 and 2005 should be included in calculating their benefits under the prior retirement statutes. The State raised two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in ruling that RSA chapter 100-C violates Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution; and (2) in the event the trial court’s ruling was upheld, whether RSA chapter 100-C is unconstitutional only as applied to judges who met the service and age requirements for retirement as of January 1, 2005. Petitioners cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in ruling that the 2003 and 2005 salary raises are not properly included as "currently effective annual salary" when calculating their retirement benefits. Upon review, the Supreme Court was persuaded by the board’s position that salary adjustments were authorized for the limited purpose of compensating judges for their ten percent earnable compensation contribution required under the new retirement plan. The adjustments may not be characterized as "effective annual salary" for purposes of calculating benefits under the prior retirement statutes. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cloutier v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Defendant Glendon Hill appealed his conviction for aggravated felonious assault on the ground that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. At trial, the State elicited testimony from Defendant's young step-daughter that he subjected her to various types of sexual abuse. Her statements being the only evidence introduced by the State, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictments before putting on a defense, arguing that the mode of questioning was so suggestive that the State had failed "to provide a rational jury with proof beyond a reasonable doubt" that he committed the elements of the charged crimes. The trial court agreed that the direct examination of the child contained leading questions but denied the motion, reasoning that the child's testimony was sufficient to submit the matter to the jury. After calling a single witness to the stand, the defense rested. The jury convicted, and Defendant appealed without making any post-trial motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant did not preserve his challenge to the weight of the evidence. As such, the Court affirmed his conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Hill " on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Matton appealed a superior court order that denied his motion to preclude the State from seeking an extended term of incarceration under RSA 651:6 II(a). In 1998, Defendant was convicted of arson and sentenced to seven and one-half to fifteen years in state prison, all suspended, and five years of probation. In 1999, Defendant was found to have violated the terms of his probation and ordered to serve three and one-half to seven years in prison. In 2002, Defendant was convicted of assault by a prisoner and sentenced to prison for one and one-half to three years. In 2010, Defendant pled guilty to one count of second degree assault. The State, pursuant to a capped plea agreement, indicated its intent to request an extended term of incarceration under RSA 651:6, II(a) (2007) based upon Defendant's prior record. Defendant moved to preclude the application of RSA 651:6, II(a), arguing that he had only one qualifying prior conviction (that for assault by a prisoner) because his imprisonment on the arson charge resulted from a probation violation rather than from the original, suspended, sentence he received on the arson conviction. The superior court denied the motion, ruling that Defendant had served two terms of imprisonment within the meaning of the statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court correctly found that the statutory requirements were satisfied, and properly denied Defendant's motion to preclude. View "New Hampshire v. Matton " on Justia Law