Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Kilnwood on Kanasatka Condominium Unit Association, Inc. (Association) appealed a superior court's decision that dismissed its petition to change the ownership form of twenty-nine units in a residential subdivision from condominiums to single-family simple lots. In 2010, the Association members considered reforming the Declaration to convert it from a condominium association to single-family homes, but they could not reach the unanimous vote required by the Declaration to do so. Unable to reach an accommodation with the minority members, Perry Smith, Andy and Jill Belliveau, and Rob and Candy Baker, the Association petitioned the superior court to reform the Declaration. The minority members, who are the respondents in this case, cross-petitioned the court to declare that Kilnwood remain a condominium association, and moved to dismiss. The Association argued that the Declaration should have been reformed because it was not intended to create a condominium, but rather a subdivision of single-family residential lots. Finding that the fact that large majority of the Association’s members no longer found it desirable to own their property as condominiums did not alter the underlying contractual requirement contained in the Declaration, that any amendment to “matters . . . adjudicating the ownership interest in common areas” must be approved by unanimous vote. The failure of one local realtor to list the homes for sale in Kilnwood as condominiums was irrelevant to the inquiry into the intent of the Developer when it created Kilnwood as a condominium association or when Association members purchased condominium units within Kilnwood. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court in dismissing the Association's petition. View "Kilnwood on Kanasatka Condominium Unit Association, Inc. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Respondent Mostafa El-Sherif, DMD appealed a divorce degree recommended by the Marital Master. He argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it adopted an appraisal valuing his business at $1.2 million for the purposes of the final distribution of property. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of Cottrell & El-Sherif" on Justia Law

Petitioner Nicholas Bosonetto appealed a superior court decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Respondent Town of Richmond. The decision dismissed his appeal of a decision made by the Town's Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA). Petitioner and his wife own property in Richmond upon which are several mobile homes. Petitioner submitted a building permit application to replace one of the mobile homes with a new three-bedroom structure at a different location on the property. The Board of Selectman (BOS) denied the application based on the fact that the property is on a private road, and the Town did not have provisions for building permits on private roads. At its deliberation, the ZBA determined that Petitioner had a vested right to use the existing structures because building permits were issued for them, but that right did not permit him to replace one of the existing structures with a different "footprint" and at a different location on the property. Petitioner filed a declaratory action at the superior court, and requested a statutory appeal of the ZBA decision. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Petitioner's case. View "Bosonetto v. Town of Richmond " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Phaneuf Funeral Home appealed a superior court order that granted motions for summary judgment in favor of Defendants Little Giant Pump Company, Boyer Interior Design, Leviton Manufacturing Company and The Elegant Earth, Inc. Phaneuf hired Boyer to do interior design and light renovation work in the basement and adjacent hallway of the funeral home. In the hallway, Boyer installed a wall-mounted water fountain that it purchased from Elegant, an Alabama-based household goods retailer. Defendant Leviton supplied the fountain’s power cord to Little Giant, which manufactured the fountain. A fire broke out at the funeral home. Alleging that the water fountain’s defective pump and power cord caused the fire, Phaneuf brought negligence and strict product liability claims against each defendant, although it later withdrew its negligence claim against Boyer. Each defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Phaneuf’s claims were time-barred by RSA 508:4-b, I (2010), the statute of repose for “Damages From Construction.” The superior court agreed, and granted each motion. Upon review of the facts in the superior court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment as to Boyer, but reversed as to the remaining defendants. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Phaneuf Funeral Home v. Little Giant Pump Co." on Justia Law

Consolidated cases were brought before the Supreme Court on interlocutory transfer without a ruling from the superior court. Petitioners are New Hampshire voters and the towns and municipalities in which some of them live. They sought a declaration that Laws 2012 Chapter 9 violated the State Constitution. After thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court determined that the petitioners did not meet their burden of proving that the redistricting plan in Laws 2012 Chapter 9 violated the State Constitution, therefore, they were not entitled to the declaration they sought. View "City of Manchester v. Secretary of State " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Susan Jeffery appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant City of Nashua on her wrongful discharge and breach of contract claims. Plaintiff worked for the City since 1977 in the payroll department. She became the City's risk manager in 1998. n 2004, Plaintiff became concerned that her direct supervisor, Maureen Lemieux, did not understand the budgetary process because "she wanted to level fund the health line items" in the City’s 2005 fiscal year budget. Plaintiff raised her concerns with Lemieux "dozens of times," but Lemieux responded that "she was comfortable with her numbers." In April 2005, the City discovered that the health insurance line item was underfunded. Consequently, the Board of Aldermen convened an ad hoc health care budget committee to investigate the circumstances leading up to the shortfall. Plaintiff alleged that between her two interviews with the committee, she was summoned to a meeting with the mayor, at which he asked her whether she, as department manager, should be held responsible for the budget shortfall. Plaintiff refused to accept responsibility, explaining that she had tried to prevent the error by raising her concerns with Lemieux and others. Further, Plaintiff alleged that on a separate occasion, the mayor suggested that they "all share the blame," but she refused his suggestion. Subsequently, Plaintiff started receiving poor performance evaluations and later received disciplinary actions. She would later be demoted. Shortly after her demotion, Plaintiff took a leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act; while still on leave, Plaintiff resigned her position, stating she wished to retire early. Three years after her resignation, Plaintiff sued the City alleging constructive discharge and breach of contract. Finding that Plaintiff's suit fell outside the statute of limitations, and that Plaintiff had no enforceable employment contract with the City, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment granted in favor of the City. View "Jeffery v. City of Nashua " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lebanon Hangar Associates, Ltd. (LHA) appealed a superior court decision that vacated an arbitrator's decision that it was not required to pay taxes under a lease agreement with Defendant City of Lebanon. LHA leased property at the City's airport. Although the terms of the lease require LHA to pay "taxes . . . lawfully levied or assessed, "between 1991 and the first half of 2006, the City did not tax LHA on the value of the land itself, limiting its assessment of taxes to the value of the buildings. In October 2006, the City assessed a tax upon the value of the land, thereby increasing the total valuation subject to taxation. After unsuccessfully requesting an abatement from the City, LHA petitioned the superior court, pursuant to RSA 76:17 (2003), to rule that the leasehold is not taxable. LHA subsequently moved to amend its petition to add a claim that the City breached the lease by demanding the payment of taxes. In response, the City invoked an arbitration clause in the lease. In April 2009, the arbitrator issued the first of two decisions, concluding that, while the written lease unambiguously allows the City to assess a tax upon the value of LHA’s leased land, other evidence submitted by LHA could serve as the basis for reforming the lease based upon mutual mistake. At the next hearing, LHA asserted its reformation argument over the objections of the City, which contended that the arbitrator’s authority was limited to deciding the meaning of the four corners of the lease agreement. After reviewing the evidence, the arbitrator issued a second, and final, decision in March 2010, concluding that LHA "is not and has not been obligated to pay real estate taxes to the City" under the lease. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority by reforming the lease based upon mutual mistake. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with LHA that the arbitrator did not exceed the scope of his authority in this case, and reversed the superior court's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lebanon Hangar Associates, Ltd. v. City of Lebanon " on Justia Law

Petitioner Edeltraud Elter-Nodvin appealed a superior court order that dismissed her claims against Respondents (her daughters) Leah and Madeline Nodvin. The claims sought to impose a constructive trust on insurance and retirement account proceeds that would otherwise pass to her daughters. Petitioner was married to Stephen Nodvin in 1986, and had Respondents. In 2009, Stephen filed for divorce, the couple separated, and Petitioner moved abroad. In October of that year, the family division issued an anti-hypothecation order instructing the parties to refrain from, among other things, disposing of marital property while proceedings were pending. Sometime thereafter, Stephen changed the beneficiaries of certain life insurance policies and retirement accounts from Petitioner to the couple’s daughters. After changing the beneficiaries, Stephen died. In 2011, Petitioner sued her daughters for the insurance and retirement account proceeds. She argued that the circumstances under which her husband changed his beneficiaries justified the imposition of a constructive trust. The daughters, one of whom was still a minor and represented by guardians, moved to dismiss the petition. They argued that Stephen’s change of beneficiaries did not violate the anti-hypothecation order, and, therefore, their status as the named beneficiaries entitled them to the proceeds of their father’s insurance policies and retirement accounts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Stephen's action did not violate the plain language of the anti-hypothecation order. Further, the Court held that the superior court properly dismissed Petitioner's breach of contract and constructive trust claim because she failed to allege facts to establish a contract or a confidential relationship at the time Stephen changed beneficiaries: "while the divorce action was pending, Petitioner could not rely upon Stephen to provide for her based on a spousal obligation. Rather, if she wished to remain beneficiary of the insurance policies, she should have asked the court to order Stephen not to alter them." View "Elter-Nodvin v. Nodvin" on Justia Law

Petitioner Town of Seabrook appealed an order of the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) which granted Respondent NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (NextEra), several tax exemptions under RSA 72:12-a (Supp. 2011). Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the record supported DES' decisions except for one: the Court found no evidence in the record to support an increase in a percentage allocation allowed under the statute. Accordingly, the Court partly affirmed, partly reversed the DES' decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Town of Seabrook " on Justia Law

Defendant Steven Forest, appealed a superior court decision that denied his request for pretrial confinement on his sentences for conspiracy to commit burglary and accomplice liability for burglary. In 2007, Defendant was arrested on a parole violation warrant for various parole violations unrelated to the burglary charges. At the time of his arrest, he was also a suspect in a burglary at the A-1 Gas Station in Goffstown. That same day or shortly thereafter, he was formally arrested on charges arising out of the burglary and he was unable to post bail. A month later, a second parole violation warrant was issued in relation to the burglary charges. Defendant waived his right to a preliminary parole violation hearing pending resolution of the burglary charges. Following his arrest, Defendant was initially housed at the Hillsborough County House of Corrections; however, at some point, he was transferred to the New Hampshire State Prison as a result of the parole violation warrants. The burglary charges were not adjudicated until September 9, 2010. Defendant had been incarcerated for 1,154 days. Defendant filed a motion seeking pretrial confinement credit toward any sentence on the burglary charges for the entire period of his incarceration following his arrest in 2007. Defendant argued that since he had not yet had a parole revocation hearing, his parole had not been revoked and, thus, the entire period of his incarceration constituted pretrial confinement on the burglary charges rather than any other sentence of confinement. That same day, Defendant pled guilty to the charges in this case as part of a plea agreement. Under the plea agreement, Defendant was sentenced on each charge to three and a half to seven years, stand committed, with all but six months of the minimum sentence suspended. The sentences ran concurrent with one another but consecutive to any “parole setback.” This appeal followed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant waived his rights and chose to wait for the burglary charges to be resolved before having a hearing before the parole board on the parole violation charges. "Had Defendant chosen to have a parole revocation hearing within forty-five days, he may have received a punishment for violating parole that he could have served pending resolution of the burglary charges. Any remaining time spent incarcerated before resolving the burglary charges would then have been allotted as pretrial confinement credit." The Court denied any pretrial credit and affirmed the superior court's order. View "New Hampshire v. Forest " on Justia Law