Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Consolidated cases were brought before the Supreme Court on interlocutory transfer without a ruling from the superior court. Petitioners are New Hampshire voters and the towns and municipalities in which some of them live. They sought a declaration that Laws 2012 Chapter 9 violated the State Constitution. After thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court determined that the petitioners did not meet their burden of proving that the redistricting plan in Laws 2012 Chapter 9 violated the State Constitution, therefore, they were not entitled to the declaration they sought. View "City of Manchester v. Secretary of State " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Susan Jeffery appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant City of Nashua on her wrongful discharge and breach of contract claims. Plaintiff worked for the City since 1977 in the payroll department. She became the City's risk manager in 1998. n 2004, Plaintiff became concerned that her direct supervisor, Maureen Lemieux, did not understand the budgetary process because "she wanted to level fund the health line items" in the City’s 2005 fiscal year budget. Plaintiff raised her concerns with Lemieux "dozens of times," but Lemieux responded that "she was comfortable with her numbers." In April 2005, the City discovered that the health insurance line item was underfunded. Consequently, the Board of Aldermen convened an ad hoc health care budget committee to investigate the circumstances leading up to the shortfall. Plaintiff alleged that between her two interviews with the committee, she was summoned to a meeting with the mayor, at which he asked her whether she, as department manager, should be held responsible for the budget shortfall. Plaintiff refused to accept responsibility, explaining that she had tried to prevent the error by raising her concerns with Lemieux and others. Further, Plaintiff alleged that on a separate occasion, the mayor suggested that they "all share the blame," but she refused his suggestion. Subsequently, Plaintiff started receiving poor performance evaluations and later received disciplinary actions. She would later be demoted. Shortly after her demotion, Plaintiff took a leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act; while still on leave, Plaintiff resigned her position, stating she wished to retire early. Three years after her resignation, Plaintiff sued the City alleging constructive discharge and breach of contract. Finding that Plaintiff's suit fell outside the statute of limitations, and that Plaintiff had no enforceable employment contract with the City, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment granted in favor of the City. View "Jeffery v. City of Nashua " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lebanon Hangar Associates, Ltd. (LHA) appealed a superior court decision that vacated an arbitrator's decision that it was not required to pay taxes under a lease agreement with Defendant City of Lebanon. LHA leased property at the City's airport. Although the terms of the lease require LHA to pay "taxes . . . lawfully levied or assessed, "between 1991 and the first half of 2006, the City did not tax LHA on the value of the land itself, limiting its assessment of taxes to the value of the buildings. In October 2006, the City assessed a tax upon the value of the land, thereby increasing the total valuation subject to taxation. After unsuccessfully requesting an abatement from the City, LHA petitioned the superior court, pursuant to RSA 76:17 (2003), to rule that the leasehold is not taxable. LHA subsequently moved to amend its petition to add a claim that the City breached the lease by demanding the payment of taxes. In response, the City invoked an arbitration clause in the lease. In April 2009, the arbitrator issued the first of two decisions, concluding that, while the written lease unambiguously allows the City to assess a tax upon the value of LHA’s leased land, other evidence submitted by LHA could serve as the basis for reforming the lease based upon mutual mistake. At the next hearing, LHA asserted its reformation argument over the objections of the City, which contended that the arbitrator’s authority was limited to deciding the meaning of the four corners of the lease agreement. After reviewing the evidence, the arbitrator issued a second, and final, decision in March 2010, concluding that LHA "is not and has not been obligated to pay real estate taxes to the City" under the lease. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority by reforming the lease based upon mutual mistake. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with LHA that the arbitrator did not exceed the scope of his authority in this case, and reversed the superior court's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lebanon Hangar Associates, Ltd. v. City of Lebanon " on Justia Law

Petitioner Edeltraud Elter-Nodvin appealed a superior court order that dismissed her claims against Respondents (her daughters) Leah and Madeline Nodvin. The claims sought to impose a constructive trust on insurance and retirement account proceeds that would otherwise pass to her daughters. Petitioner was married to Stephen Nodvin in 1986, and had Respondents. In 2009, Stephen filed for divorce, the couple separated, and Petitioner moved abroad. In October of that year, the family division issued an anti-hypothecation order instructing the parties to refrain from, among other things, disposing of marital property while proceedings were pending. Sometime thereafter, Stephen changed the beneficiaries of certain life insurance policies and retirement accounts from Petitioner to the couple’s daughters. After changing the beneficiaries, Stephen died. In 2011, Petitioner sued her daughters for the insurance and retirement account proceeds. She argued that the circumstances under which her husband changed his beneficiaries justified the imposition of a constructive trust. The daughters, one of whom was still a minor and represented by guardians, moved to dismiss the petition. They argued that Stephen’s change of beneficiaries did not violate the anti-hypothecation order, and, therefore, their status as the named beneficiaries entitled them to the proceeds of their father’s insurance policies and retirement accounts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Stephen's action did not violate the plain language of the anti-hypothecation order. Further, the Court held that the superior court properly dismissed Petitioner's breach of contract and constructive trust claim because she failed to allege facts to establish a contract or a confidential relationship at the time Stephen changed beneficiaries: "while the divorce action was pending, Petitioner could not rely upon Stephen to provide for her based on a spousal obligation. Rather, if she wished to remain beneficiary of the insurance policies, she should have asked the court to order Stephen not to alter them." View "Elter-Nodvin v. Nodvin" on Justia Law

Petitioner Town of Seabrook appealed an order of the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) which granted Respondent NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (NextEra), several tax exemptions under RSA 72:12-a (Supp. 2011). Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the record supported DES' decisions except for one: the Court found no evidence in the record to support an increase in a percentage allocation allowed under the statute. Accordingly, the Court partly affirmed, partly reversed the DES' decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Town of Seabrook " on Justia Law

Defendant Steven Forest, appealed a superior court decision that denied his request for pretrial confinement on his sentences for conspiracy to commit burglary and accomplice liability for burglary. In 2007, Defendant was arrested on a parole violation warrant for various parole violations unrelated to the burglary charges. At the time of his arrest, he was also a suspect in a burglary at the A-1 Gas Station in Goffstown. That same day or shortly thereafter, he was formally arrested on charges arising out of the burglary and he was unable to post bail. A month later, a second parole violation warrant was issued in relation to the burglary charges. Defendant waived his right to a preliminary parole violation hearing pending resolution of the burglary charges. Following his arrest, Defendant was initially housed at the Hillsborough County House of Corrections; however, at some point, he was transferred to the New Hampshire State Prison as a result of the parole violation warrants. The burglary charges were not adjudicated until September 9, 2010. Defendant had been incarcerated for 1,154 days. Defendant filed a motion seeking pretrial confinement credit toward any sentence on the burglary charges for the entire period of his incarceration following his arrest in 2007. Defendant argued that since he had not yet had a parole revocation hearing, his parole had not been revoked and, thus, the entire period of his incarceration constituted pretrial confinement on the burglary charges rather than any other sentence of confinement. That same day, Defendant pled guilty to the charges in this case as part of a plea agreement. Under the plea agreement, Defendant was sentenced on each charge to three and a half to seven years, stand committed, with all but six months of the minimum sentence suspended. The sentences ran concurrent with one another but consecutive to any “parole setback.” This appeal followed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant waived his rights and chose to wait for the burglary charges to be resolved before having a hearing before the parole board on the parole violation charges. "Had Defendant chosen to have a parole revocation hearing within forty-five days, he may have received a punishment for violating parole that he could have served pending resolution of the burglary charges. Any remaining time spent incarcerated before resolving the burglary charges would then have been allotted as pretrial confinement credit." The Court denied any pretrial credit and affirmed the superior court's order. View "New Hampshire v. Forest " on Justia Law

Petitioner Liberty Assembly of God (Assembly) appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) which upheld a 2008 decision of Respondent City of Concord (City), denying the Assembly's request for a religious use tax exemption. Assembly owns 26.13 acres of land in Concord; approximately twenty acres are in "current use." The undeveloped land is used primarily for agricultural or forestry purposes, although there is a "prayer trail" around its perimeter. From 1994, when Assembly acquired its property, until 2008, the City granted Assembly a religious use tax exemption on all of its property. However, in 2008, the City granted Assembly an exemption on only forty percent of its property, concluding that sixty percent of the property was not used and occupied for religious training or other religious purposes, and was therefore taxable. The City subsequently revised its determination and exempted sixty percent of the property. The City considered the entire second floor of the main building taxable as not being used for religious purposes. Following appeal, the BTLA upheld the City’s apportionment for tax year 2008. Assembly asserted that the BTLA’s ruling was erroneous on three interrelated grounds: (1) the City and the BTLA misinterpreted RSA 72:23, III because it should be read as fully exempting houses of worship from taxation; (2) the City’s inquiries into the religious uses and purposes of each room within the church building unconstitutionally “entangled” the government with religion; and (3) even if the statute and constitution permit parsing taxable from exempt space within a house of worship, all of Assembly's space should be exempt as serving a religious purpose. Having decided that the City’s methodology was not flawed, the Supreme Court deferred to the BTLA’s judgment in determining the weight to be given evidence: "Because Assembly has not demonstrated by a clear preponderance of the evidence that the second-floor restroom was "owned, used and occupied directly for religious training or for other religious purposes," the Court could find error in the BTLA's finding such space taxable. View "Appeal of Liberty Assembly of God" on Justia Law

Petitioner 38 Endicott Street North, LLC appealed a superior court order that dismissed its petition under the Right-to-Know Law and denied its request for attorney’s fees. In 2011, Petitioner sent Respondent the State Fire Marshal, head of the New Hampshire Division of Fire Safety a letter requesting to inspect all records, information, and documents related to a September 17, 2010 fire that took place on its property and the "investigation thereof." Petitioner did not receive a response, and on May 3, 2011, sent a second letter demanding a response. On May 5, 2011, the Fire Marshal replied, disclosing the Incident Initiation Report and its supplement, but withholding all other materials because the investigation was ongoing. On May 6, 2011, Petitioner filed a sought an injunction to direct the Fire Marshal to produce the undisclosed materials pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law. Petitioner also requested attorney’s fees and costs. The Fire Marshal responded that the undisclosed materials are excluded from the Right-to-Know Law under the exemption for records “compiled for law enforcement purposes.” After a hearing, the trial court ruled that the withheld records were exempt from the Right-to-Know Law, denied the petition, and also denied Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the materials were compiled for law enforcement purposes and that disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with law enforcement proceedings. Petitioner also argued that the trial court erred in denying its requests for an in camera review of the materials or the compilation of a Vaughn index, as well as in denying its motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Finding no error, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's judgment. View "38 Endicott Street North, LLC v. New Hampshire Fire Marshall" on Justia Law

Free Bail Bonds appealed a district court's order that forfeited bonds guaranteeing the court appearance of Defendant Sean McGurk. Approximately one month before Defendant's scheduled appearance, he was arrested in Vermont and held in custody by the Vermont Department of Corrections pending trial there for offenses allegedly committed after the New Hampshire bonds were issued. The surety's representative then moved to revoke Defendant's bail. The trial court did not rule on this motion until Defendant's ongoing incarceration prevented him from appearing as scheduled. At that point, it forfeited bail over Defendant's objection. The surety moved to vacate the forfeiture order and, when its motion was denied, filed two motions to reconsider, both of which were also denied. The principal issue in this case concerned the forefeiture order and the denial of the surety's request for an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court rejected the surety's argument that the trial court treated the bonds as performance rather than appearance bonds. Although the court noted that Defendant's failure to appear resulted from his decision to travel to Vermont and commit crimes, the court's order made clear that it forfeited the bonds because Defendant failed to appear, not because of his criminal activity. The bonds guaranteed Defendant’s appearance, so the Court concluded forfeiture was entirely appropriate. View "New Hampshire v. McGurk " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Regina Mbahaba, individually and as next friend of her minor daughter, Benita Nahimana, appealed a superior court order that dismissed her direct claims against Defendant Thomas Morgan, and granted him summary judgment in her action seeking to pierce the limited-liability veil of the company he managed. Defendant owned Property Management Services a/k/a Property Services Company, a limited liability company that managed an apartment building where Plaintiff and her family rented an apartment from 2005-2006. Plaintiff’s daughter, Benita, was poisoned by lead while living in the apartment, prompting an inspection by the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, which revealed "lead exposure hazards" in the home. As a result of the alleged injury to Benita caused by the lead contamination, Plaintiff filed lawsuits against Defendant and Biren Properties. Shortly after Plaintiff filed Suit, Defendant formed another property management LLC, which Plaintiff alleged he created in an attempt to avoid liability from her suit. Defendant moved to dismiss the action against him personally, arguing that, because he supervised the property on behalf of the LLC, he could not be "held personally liable for the debts or actions of the company." Ultimately, the claims against Defendant individually were dismissed, but the trial court allowed the plaintiff’s claims against the LLC to proceed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant's management of the apartment and his superior knowledge of its hazardous condition suffice to established an individual tort duty to avoid "exposing [the plaintiff] to an unreasonable risk of harm." Thus, because these allegations stated facts entitling Plaintiff to relief, her negligence claim survived Defendant’s motion to dismiss. With regard to Plaintiff's attempt to disregard Defendant's LLC to hold him liable, the Court concluded that Defendant correctly argued that he had every right to establish a new LLC and to transfer the original LLC’s clients to it. "However, that Defendant made this 'fresh start' when his company remained a party to this case, could permit a finding that the limited-liability identity was used to promote an injustice upon the plaintiff. Thus, based upon our review of the depositions and other evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we cannot conclude that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part the trial court's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mbahaba v. Morgan" on Justia Law