Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Merriam Farm, Inc. appealed a superior court's decision to uphold the denial of its application for a building permit by the zoning board of adjustment (ZBA) of the Town of Surry. In 2009, Merriam Farm applied for a permit to construct a single-family home on a three-acre parcel of land. Under the Town's zoning ordinance, 200 feet of frontage on a public street was required to build. The ZBA determined that the frontage to the property had been closed since 1971 "subject to gates and bars for the purpose of preventing development in this area." Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the ZBA's nor the superior court's order to deny the building permit, and accordingly affirmed those decisions. View "Merriam Farm, Inc. v. Town of Surry" on Justia Law

Respondent Steven Regan (father) appealed an order recommended by a Marital Master (and approved by the circuit court) that among other things: (1) declined to modify his obligations to carry life insurance and pay half of his minor daughter's uninsured medical expenses even though paying these amounts reduced his monthly income below the statutory self-support reserve; and (2) required him to exchange custody of his daughter at a police station, rather than at the parties' homes. Although the court found that the father's reduction in income required reducing his child support obligation, it found "no basis to modify" the father's obligation to pay for half of his daughter's orthodontic expenses, and similarly declined to reduce the amount of life insurance he was obliged to carry. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that payment of the daughter's uninsured medical expenses necessarily reduced the father's income below the self-support reserve and therefore, the trial court's order insofar as it required such payments, erred by ordering the father pay. With regard to the life insurance, because the parties stipulated that the payments were not child support, the trial court "sustainably exercised" its discretion in finding that the monthly insurance payment would not unduly burden the father's ability to support himself. Furthermore, with regard to the custody exchange: the Court concluded that making the exchange at a police station was in the daughter's best interest. View "In the Matter of Susan J. Regan and Steven S. Regan" on Justia Law

Respondent City of Concord appealed a superior court order that denied it summary judgment in favor of Petitioner EnergyNorth National Gas (d/b/a National Grid NH, or "National Grid"). The City argued that the trial court erroneously determined that RSA 231:185 (2009) and RSA 236:11 (2009) preempted the City's ordinance authorizing it to charge certain roadway fees. The issue between the parties arose from National Grid's desire to excavate certain streets to install, maintain or replace its underground pipes that delivered natural gas. The fees covered damage for damages arising from the excavation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that granting summary judgment in favor of National Grid was in error. The City argued that its roadway fees are consistent with the pertinent statutes because they "cover[ ] maintenance costs to repair the roadway after it has been initially patched, which [are] used to restore the excavated roadway to the condition that existed prior to the excavation." The Court was not persuaded that when the legislature enacted the statutes at issue, it made any assumption or finding, implied or otherwise, as to whether repaving a paved excavated roadway restored the roadway's original life expectancy. The Court was thus left with a factual dispute whether patching an excavated roadway with new pavement diminished or restored its original life expectancy. Because of that "genuine issue of material fact," the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court from an interlocutory transfer without ruling from the superior court on the following question: "Does the Due Process Clause of the New Hampshire Constitution (Part I, Articles 2 and 15) or the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution require the appointment of counsel for an indigent parent from whom the State seeks to take custody of a minor child based on allegations of neglect or abuse?" Parents Larry and Sonia M. were served with petitions by which the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) sought custody of their two minor children C.M and A.M. DCYF alleged that the parents were neglecting their children by failing to provide a safe and sanitary home and adequate supervision and by exposing them to domestic violence in the form of threatening and intimidating behaviors by the father. An adjudicatory hearing was held at which the parents were represented by appointed counsel. The court issued an order maintaining legal custody of the children with DCYF and directing the parents to undertake certain measures before the children might be safely returned to them. Each parent filed an appeal to superior court contending that without appointed counsel, their protected liberty interest in raising their children was threatened. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that while due process did not require that counsel be appointed for indigent parents in every proceeding (such as the proceeding at issue in this case), a determination of whether appointed counsel is necessary to adequately reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation should be made on a case-by-case basis in the first instance by the trial court. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the superior court to make that determination. View "In re C.M." on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order entered by the United States Supreme Court vacating the judgment in "New Hampshire v. Dilboy," (160 N.H. 135 (2010)) (Dilboy I), and remanding for further consideration in light of "Bullcoming v. New Mexico," (131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011)). On remand, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reconsidered only its holding on the Confrontation Clause issue. As to the other five issues, the Court's prior decision in Dilboy I remained unchanged. In Dilboy I, the Court affirmed the conviction of Defendant Anthony Dilboy, on two counts of manslaughter and two alternative counts of negligent homicide. The relevant issue before the Court in Dilboy I was whether the admission of certain evidence at trial violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On appeal in Dilboy I, Defendant did not challenge the admission of certain blood evidence on "transmittal slips." Rather, he contended that the trial court erred in ruling that the blood test results were non-testimonial, and, accordingly, that an expert's testimony at trial about the test results violated the Confrontation Clause. In its reconsideration, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that though the transmittal slips were admitted into evidence, the Court declined to address Defendant’s Confrontation Clause arguments because Defendant did not address the issue in his brief in Dilboy I. "Indeed, the defendant did not even brief the issue after the Supreme Court vacated Dilboy I, but rather raises the issue for the first time in a supplemental brief filed in response to an order issued by this court." After reconsidering its decision in light of "Bullcoming" and thoroughly reviewing the record, the Court affirmed its prior holding. View "New Hampshire v. Dilboy " on Justia Law

Petitioner Property Portfolio Group, LLC (PPG) appealed a superior court order which upheld a decision of the planning board of Respondent Town of Derry to grant applicant MTM Realty, LLC a waiver from a provision of the town's site plan regulations. Pursuant to the town’s site plan regulations, solid waste storage areas are required to be at least twenty-five feet from any property boundary. In 2010, as part of an application for further site plan determination, MTM submitted a request for a waiver from this requirement, seeking permission to move its dumpsters closer to its boundary with PPG which was ultimately granted. PPG and another abutter appealed to superior court. Finding no error in the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision, concluding "no extended consideration" of this case was required. View "Property Portfolio Group, LLC v. Town of Derry" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kilnwood on Kanasatka Condominium Unit Association, Inc. (Association) appealed a superior court's decision that dismissed its petition to change the ownership form of twenty-nine units in a residential subdivision from condominiums to single-family simple lots. In 2010, the Association members considered reforming the Declaration to convert it from a condominium association to single-family homes, but they could not reach the unanimous vote required by the Declaration to do so. Unable to reach an accommodation with the minority members, Perry Smith, Andy and Jill Belliveau, and Rob and Candy Baker, the Association petitioned the superior court to reform the Declaration. The minority members, who are the respondents in this case, cross-petitioned the court to declare that Kilnwood remain a condominium association, and moved to dismiss. The Association argued that the Declaration should have been reformed because it was not intended to create a condominium, but rather a subdivision of single-family residential lots. Finding that the fact that large majority of the Association’s members no longer found it desirable to own their property as condominiums did not alter the underlying contractual requirement contained in the Declaration, that any amendment to “matters . . . adjudicating the ownership interest in common areas” must be approved by unanimous vote. The failure of one local realtor to list the homes for sale in Kilnwood as condominiums was irrelevant to the inquiry into the intent of the Developer when it created Kilnwood as a condominium association or when Association members purchased condominium units within Kilnwood. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court in dismissing the Association's petition. View "Kilnwood on Kanasatka Condominium Unit Association, Inc. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Respondent Mostafa El-Sherif, DMD appealed a divorce degree recommended by the Marital Master. He argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it adopted an appraisal valuing his business at $1.2 million for the purposes of the final distribution of property. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of Cottrell & El-Sherif" on Justia Law

Petitioner Nicholas Bosonetto appealed a superior court decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Respondent Town of Richmond. The decision dismissed his appeal of a decision made by the Town's Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA). Petitioner and his wife own property in Richmond upon which are several mobile homes. Petitioner submitted a building permit application to replace one of the mobile homes with a new three-bedroom structure at a different location on the property. The Board of Selectman (BOS) denied the application based on the fact that the property is on a private road, and the Town did not have provisions for building permits on private roads. At its deliberation, the ZBA determined that Petitioner had a vested right to use the existing structures because building permits were issued for them, but that right did not permit him to replace one of the existing structures with a different "footprint" and at a different location on the property. Petitioner filed a declaratory action at the superior court, and requested a statutory appeal of the ZBA decision. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Petitioner's case. View "Bosonetto v. Town of Richmond " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Phaneuf Funeral Home appealed a superior court order that granted motions for summary judgment in favor of Defendants Little Giant Pump Company, Boyer Interior Design, Leviton Manufacturing Company and The Elegant Earth, Inc. Phaneuf hired Boyer to do interior design and light renovation work in the basement and adjacent hallway of the funeral home. In the hallway, Boyer installed a wall-mounted water fountain that it purchased from Elegant, an Alabama-based household goods retailer. Defendant Leviton supplied the fountain’s power cord to Little Giant, which manufactured the fountain. A fire broke out at the funeral home. Alleging that the water fountain’s defective pump and power cord caused the fire, Phaneuf brought negligence and strict product liability claims against each defendant, although it later withdrew its negligence claim against Boyer. Each defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Phaneuf’s claims were time-barred by RSA 508:4-b, I (2010), the statute of repose for “Damages From Construction.” The superior court agreed, and granted each motion. Upon review of the facts in the superior court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment as to Boyer, but reversed as to the remaining defendants. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Phaneuf Funeral Home v. Little Giant Pump Co." on Justia Law