Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State appealed a superior court order that dismissed charges filed against Defendant Burton Hollenbeck, Jr. because it determined that the statute upon which they were based violated Defendant's state and federal substantive due process rights. Defendant was a licensed psychologist who provided services to the complainant in 2007. Less than a year after the therapy ended, the two became sexually involved. In April 2010, defendant was charged with thirty counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) for engaging in sexual penetration with the complainant between February 1, 2008, and December 9, 2008. The indictments alleged that by engaging in sexual penetration with the complainant "within one year of the termination of their therapeutic relationship," defendant "act[ed] in a manner which is not professionally recognized as ethical," thereby violating RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1). In December 2010, defendant moved to dismiss the indictments, arguing, inter alia, that RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) violated his state and federal rights to substantive due process because it "criminalizes the private sexual conduct of consenting adults." The trial court agreed, and this appeal followed. Because defendant did not meet his burden of proving that RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose in all circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded after its review of the case that his facial challenge failed. The Court reached the same result under the Federal Constitution as it did under the State Constitution because the Federal Constitution offers the defendant no greater protection than does the State Constitution under these circumstances. View "New Hampshire v. Hollenbeck, Jr." on Justia Law

Respondent George W. LaRocque (Father) appealed a circuit court order that found in contempt for failure to pay child support, calculating his arrearages to be $102,845.52 as of December 20, 2010, and modifying his child support obligation with an effective date of January 7, 2011. The Father and Petitioner Mary Beth LaRocque (Mother) divorced in February 2000. The divorce decree incorporated their permanent stipulation and uniform support order, and required the Father to pay child support for their two children, alimony for six years, and continue to provide medical coverage for the children. The Mother was awarded the marital homestead, but was required to execute a promissory note and a mortgage in favor of the Father to be paid upon sale of the property or the youngest child reaching age twenty-two. The Father subsequently remarried and his second wife died in October 2010. Following her death, he received $500,000 in life insurance proceeds. On November 8, 2010, the Mother filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the Father had failed to pay the full child support ordered, and had unilaterally reduced his child support payment when their oldest child turned eighteen. The Father objected, arguing that the parties had agreed to waive child support arrearages and to modify child support. He also moved to modify his child support obligation. After a hearing, the trial court found that the parties never entered into such an agreement and held the Father in contempt. An issue on appeal was the characterization of the insurance proceeds Father received, and whether that money could be considered income when determining future modifications of child support. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded the case for a determination as to how the receipt of the life insurance proceeds affected the Father's support and arrearage obligations. View "In the Matter of LaRocque " on Justia Law

Petitioners the City of Concord, the County of Belknap, and Mascenic Regional School District, appealed superior court order that denied their motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the State. The New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS) is a tax qualified pension trust for certain public employees. The petitioners, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated municipalities, counties, and school districts, filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages in superior court, naming the State of New Hampshire and NHRS as respondents. The petition alleged that section 52 was an unfunded mandate that violates Part I, Article 28-a of the New Hampshire Constitution. Both the petitioners and the State moved for summary judgment. NHRS took no position on the constitutionality of section 52, but filed a separate motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was an improper party and that the New Hampshire Constitution and RSA 100-A:15, I, forbid it from using NHRS trust funds as the source of any monetary compensation to the petitioners. The trial court denied the petitioners' motion for summary judgment, granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the merits, and, accordingly, did not reach NHRS's motion. The petitioners appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion for summary judgment, and maintaining that section 52 is an unconstitutional unfunded mandate. The Supreme Court affirmed: "[t]here is also no indication that the amendment was designed to delegate to local governments effective control over the establishment of the state budget and appropriations. Indeed, to interpret the amendment in such fashion would bring it into conflict with Part II, Article 2 of the State Constitution, which confers 'the supreme legislative power' of the State on the House of Representatives and the Senate. Without a far more explicit indication that the people intended such a substantial alteration of fundamental legislative power, we decline to read Article 28-a in this fashion." View "City of Concord v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Defendant Saad Moussa appealed his convictions, and sentences on three counts of stalking entered following a jury trial in Superior Court. In 2005, the Rockingham County grand jury returned three indictments against the defendant, each alleging a separate incident of stalking the victim, to whom he had been married for approximately eleven years. According to the victim's testimony, they were divorced at the time of trial. Each charged incident involved the defendant allegedly sending a letter to the victim "after having been served with or otherwise provided notice of a protective order issued by the Salem Family Court on 12/10/04, that prohibited him from having contact with [her]." The defendant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in: (1) requiring him to choose between self-representation and representation by a lawyer he wanted to dismiss; (2) making certain evidentiary rulings; (3) denying his request for counsel at sentencing; and (4) imposing felony sentences. Finding no error in the Superior Court record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Moussa" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Aspen Contracting NE, LLC (Aspen), appealed the decisions of the Administrative Hearing Committee (Committee) and the Appeal Tribunal for the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES), as both were sustained by the DES Appellate Board, finding the claimants to be employees and Aspen to be an employer in New Hampshire subject to RSA chapter 282-A. Upon review of the Committee's and the Appeal Tribunal's administrative records, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Aspen Contracting NE, LLC" on Justia Law

This was an interlocutory appeal from a Superior Court order that certified a class represented by the plaintiff, Karen L. Lawrence, consisting of "all individuals who purchased Marlboro Lights cigarettes in New Hampshire from January 1, 1995, until the date of trial." The superior court transferred a single question for the Supreme Court's review: :Did the Superior Court err in its application of New Hampshire law when it granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification?" The Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative and reversed the trial court’s certification order. View "Lawrence v. Philip Morris USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Casey B. Moore appealed a decision of the appeal tribunal (tribunal), as affirmed by the appellate board, of the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES) finding him ineligible for unemployment benefits because he voluntarily left his job without good cause. Moore began working as an arborist in 2008 for Guillemette Tree Services (GTS), a small business owned by Ken Guillemette. He worked part-time at a rate of $31.25 per hour, sometimes getting paid as an employee of GTS and sometimes as an independent contractor. Moore and Guillemette had a dispute about when Moore would be paid for work he had previously performed. The following Saturday, Moore met with Guillemette to collect his wages, which Guillemette paid partially by cash and partially by check. He also issued Moore a written warning for failing to show up at work on the previous day. Moore, however, claimed he was unaware that he had been required to work that day. The next Monday, Moore arrived at Guillemette’s house early in the morning to begin that day’s work. Before they started work, however, Moore told Guillemette that he wanted to "finish our conversation from Saturday," and stated that he wished to continue working for GTS as a subcontractor for $51.25 per hour. Guillemette expressed frustration and said, "I’ll have to think about it." He then asked Moore, "So what’s going on for today?" Moore responded that he would work as soon as Guillemette hired him as a subcontractor. Moore then left, and there was no further contact between them. In this case, the Supreme Court found that Moore’s own testimony established that he voluntarily quit working for GTS, and that Moore presented no evidence to support his claim that Guillemette fired him: "to the contrary, Moore admitted that Guillemette was 'frustrated' and 'all ticked off' when faced with the choice of either acceding to Moore’s request for a significant pay raise or losing him as an employee altogether." View "Appeal of Moore" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was the appeal of a circuit court order which found Respondent John P. Nicholson (Father), to be $28,556, plus interest, in arrears on child support obligations to Petitioner, Kimberly J. Nicholson (Mother). In April 2011, the Mother filed a motion for contempt arguing, among other things, that the Father had unilaterally reduced the amount of support when their oldest child graduated from high school in May 2007 and that he has paid no support at all since April 16, 2009. The Father objected and argued that the final decree entitled him to reduce his child support payments as each child became emancipated because the decree states that child support "shall continue until the children reach the age of 18 or graduates [sic] from high school, whichever shall last occur." He argued that "[t]he parties understood this to mean that the child support would be reduced by $82.00 as each child graduated from high school or reached age 18 years, whichever was later." The Father also argued that the Mother had agreed to this reduction. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "pursuant to the plain language of the SO, in calculating the support arrearage, the trial court was obligated to retrospectively recalculate child support as of the dates upon which each of the two older children became emancipated. That the parents failed to obtain a court order modifying the support obligation when each child’s status changed is of no consequence; RSA 458:35-c permits the trial court’s order to specify differently, and it did so." View "In the Matter of Nicholson" on Justia Law

The respondents, Malborn Realty Trust and its trustee, Daniel Osborn, appealed a superior court order that enjoined Osborn from occupying property in Atkinson because he lacked an occupancy permit and that imposed a civil penalty for this violation. Petitioner Town of Atkinson cross-appealed the trial court’s failure to award it attorney’s fees. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s issuance of the injunction, modified its imposition of civil penalties, reversed its denial of attorney’s fees, and remanded. View "Town of Atkinson v. Malborn Realty Trust" on Justia Law

In this declaratory judgment proceeding, the defendant, Citizens Insurance Company of America, appealed a superior court order which ruled in favor of the plaintiff, The Barking Dog, Ltd., which operates a dog kennel and grooming business at several locations in New Hampshire. The court ruled that an insurance policy issued by the defendant provided coverage for damage to the plaintiff’s septic system and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $20,000, the agreed upon damage amount. The court also ruled that the defendant was not prejudiced by the plaintiff’s failure to disclose its expert’s report in a timely manner or its failure to disclose its expert’s curriculum vitae and, accordingly, permitted the plaintiff’s expert to testify at trial. The defendant argued that both rulings were error. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "The Barking Dog, Ltd. v. Citizens Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law