Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Martin Mason appealed a circuit court order which found that his wife Robin's obligation to pay 50% of his federal income taxes was automatically discharged in her proceedings for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. On appeal, Martin argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found that Robin's obligation to pay 50% of his 2006 federal income taxes had been discharged in bankruptcy because he failed to make a showing before the bankruptcy court that her obligation was non-dischargeable. Martin also argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law and unsustainably exercised its discretion when it declined to award him attorney's fees and costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found that Robin's obligation to pay Martin's 2006 federal income taxes had been discharged in bankruptcy. In light of the Court's reversal of the trial court's order on the merits, Martin became the prevailing party and, therefore, may be entitled to recover costs. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the trial court to address this issue. View "In the Matter of Robin Mason & Martin Mason" on Justia Law

The petitioners, Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Inc., Dixville Telephone Company, Dunbarton Telephone Company, Inc., and Granite State Telephone, Inc., four exempt incumbent rural local exchange carriers (RLECs), appealed an order of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that denied their motion to rescind or declare null and void registrations of competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) authorized by the PUC to engage in business as telephone utilities in the service territories of RLECs. Citing RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22-g, among other statutes, the petitioners alleged that the PUC, before issuing the registrations, had failed to provide notice, hold hearings, and determine whether allowing such competition would be consistent with the public good. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Appeal of Union Tel. Co.," the petitioners specifically argued that federal law did not preempt these requirements. The PUC ultimately denied the petitioners' request and ruled that section 253(a) of the Telecommunications Act preempted RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22-g, II. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that section 253(a) preempted state and local laws, regulations, and requirements that "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." View "Appeal of Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Kevin P. Sheehan appealed a superior court order in favor of Respondent New Hampshire Department of Resources and Economic Development (DRED) on his request for declaratory, injunctive, and other relief. In 2008, Petitioner purchased property in Derry which abuts Jackman Road, a class VI town road and not in good condition. The Property is connected to Warner Hill Road by a .44 mile tract of land that is under DRED’s control as part of its statewide trail system. Before purchasing the Property, Petitioner understood that the State claimed ownership of a small corridor adjacent to his land and that a gate blocked non-recreational motor vehicle access. After purchasing the property, Petitioner filed this equity action seeking to bar DRED from prohibiting or interfering with non-recreational motor vehicle access over the portion of the corridor separating his property from Warner Hill Road. Ultimately the superior court determined that the State had acquired title in fee simple to the corridor through a highway layout and that the portion of the corridor abutting the property was not a "public road" because the State has never "constructed" on it. On appeal, Petitioner contended that the trial court erred when it determined that the State owned the corridor in fee simple and when it found that the corridor was not a public road. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that DRED did not bar Petitioner’s access over the corridor. Rather, DRED prohibited one form of access, non-recreational motor vehicle travel. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court did not err in concluding that DRED has not limited "the public’s right to pass over existing public roads" pursuant to state law. View "Sheehan v. New Hampshire Dept. of Resources & Economic Dev." on Justia Law

Respondent William Rines appealed a superior court order that enjoined him from excavating on certain real property until he obtained a local use variance from Petitioner Town of Carroll (Town), and that imposed civil penalties and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the respondent did not challenge the trial court’s determination that both types of excavation are exempt from the permitting requirements of RSA chapter 155-E. He argued, however, that the trial court erred when it determined that RSA chapter 155-E did not preempt the zoning ordinance provisions applicable to both types of excavation. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in finding that the requirements of Section VI of the Town’s zoning ordinance were not preempted by RSA chapter 155-E. Given its conclusion, the Court did not reach the other issues raised in the respondent’s appeal. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Town of Carroll v. Rines" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial in Superior Court, Defendant Dianna Saunders appealed her convictions for being an accomplice to first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, theft by unauthorized taking, and theft by misapplication of property. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred when it: (1) instructed the jury that where a case involves both direct and circumstantial evidence, the evidence does not have to exclude all rational conclusions other than the defendant’s guilt; (2) found that the defendant consented to a general rather than a limited search of her home; and (3) did not address the constitutionality of the warrant to search the home. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Saunders" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kenneth Heinrich appealed the final decree entered by the circuit court in his divorce from Respondent Dorothy Heinrich. He argued that the trial court erred when it determined that his lump sum workers’ compensation settlement was property subject to equitable distribution. Alternatively, he contended that the trial court’s division of this award is inequitable. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of Kenneth Heinrich & Dorothy Heinrich" on Justia Law

Respondent Veronica Goudreau (mother) appealed a circuit court order which granted a request by Petitioners Maurice and Gisele Lemieux, parents and next friendd of Andrew Lemieux (father) to change the name of the mother and father's child. Father and mother conceived while both were still in high school. According to Mother, Father reacted negatively to the pregnancy and told her she was crazy for wanting to keep the child. Mother had a boy, naming him Alexander Bailey Goudreau. Almost immediately after the child's birth, the petitioners filed a parenting petition and an ex parte motion for parenting time with Alexander. The motion contended that "[father] ha[d] been adjusting emotionally to the reality of being a father at the age of 15, and [wa]s prepared, through the assistance of his parents, to accept responsibility and parent his child." The court granted the motion. When Alexander was approximately fourteen months old, as the parties prepared for a hearing on a final parenting plan, the petitioners filed a petition to change Alexander's full name from Alexander Bailey Goudreau to Alexander Bailey Lemieux. At a hearing on the petition, mother testified that she had carried Alexander for nine months, loved him very much, and "deserve[d] just as much as [father] to have [Alexander] have [her] name." Father testified that he was conflicted about becoming a father, but that he was "very satisfied with the road [he] chose, really getting to know [his] son." After the hearing, the court granted the petition in part, ordering that the child's name be changed from Alexander Bailey Goudreau to Alexander Goudreau Lemieux. Mother appealed the trial court's decision. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Name Change of Alexander Goudreau" on Justia Law

Respondent Meagan Carter (Mother), appealed a Family Division decision that awarded primary parenting responsibility of her minor child (Daughter) jointly to the petitioner, Matthew Bordalo (Father), and the intervenors, John and Karen Bordalo, the Father's parents. Finding no "substantial" relationship between the child and her grandparents, the Supreme Court concluded that the first of four factors in the "Broderick" test were not met. The Court further concluded that the trial court's order awarding joint custody did not meet the fourth Broderick criterion either. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Matthew Bordalo and Meagan Carter" on Justia Law

Respondent Grant E. Woolsey appealed Family Division order modifying his child support obligation to the petitioner, Nancy E. Woolsey. Respondent is a self-employed truck driver, and the issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in calculating Respondent's income when the petitioner questioned many of the business deductions petitioner took to reach the income figure used to calculate the support obligation. The court found "that the [r]espondent's claims of financial hardship [were] not credible." The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's use of petitioner's gross income from his business in order to calculate his child support obligation. Finding that the deductions were ordinary and reasonable deductions for the operation of his business, the Supreme Court remanded the case for recalculation of petitioner's support obligations. View "In the Matter of Nancy E. Woolsey and Grant E. Woolsey" on Justia Law

In this petition for original jurisdiction, defendants Southern New Hampshire Medical Center (SNHMC) and Bernard Bettencourt, Jr., D.O., sought review of a superior court's decision that three provisions of the statute governing medical injury screening panels (RSA 519-B:8-:10 (2007)), violated the Separation of Powers Clause of the State Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that in so ruling, the trial court erred. Nonetheless, the Court affirmed portions of the trial court's decision on alternative grounds. View "Petition of Southern New Hampshire Medical Center" on Justia Law