Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jeremy Miller appealed a superior court order that found in favor of plaintiffs, Lakes Region Gaming, LLC and three of its members on their claims that Defendant breached his fiduciary duties to them. The claim arose from the purchase of the Lakes Region Greyhound Park. The transaction to purchase the race track never closed because a New Hampshire grand jury indicted a dozen people involved with the track, which caused the members of Lakes Region Gaming to reconsider buying the track. The members decided to try and sell the right to purchase the track so that they could recoup their expenses. If they sold the rights at a profit, it would have been split according to each member's interest in the company. Unbeknownst to plaintiffs, Defendant had been negotiating the right to purchase the track with a number of potential buyers. As a result, a buyer surfaced and paid $5 million for the track, resulting with a net profit of $898,998. Also unbeknownst to plaintiffs, an agreement was reached with the seller's attorney to extend the due diligence period of the sale in exchange for Defendant paying the attorney $50,000. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Defendant breached his fiduciary duties to plaintiffs by holding a portion of the net profits from the sale of the purchase rights for himself. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to reconsider the trial court's decision, arguing that: (1) he did not owe plaintiffs a duty because Lakes Region Gaming abandoned its "contemplated dealings;" and (2) the trial court's order failed to consider a clause in Lakes Region Gaming's operating agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Defendant's arguments on appeal to be without merit. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's order. View "Lakes Region Gaming v. Miller" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by jury of attempted kidnapping and attempted aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal of his conviction, he argued that : (1) he was denied a unanimous jury verdict on the attempted aggravated sexual assault charge; and (2) he was entitled to a dismissal of the attempted kidnapping charged based on merger. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with defendant's argument that the jury instruction delivered by the trial court allowed the jury to convict him without being unanimous as to the elements constituting attempted AFSA because the two variants of AFSA require different elements. The Court concluded that defendant's attempt to confine his victim was incidental and inseparable from his attempt to commit AFSA. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the kidnapping charged based on merger. View "New Hampshire v. Casanova" on Justia Law

Petitioner Signal Aviation Services, Inc. appealed a superior court order which granted a motion to dismiss filed by the City of Lebanon. The City entered into a twenty year lease with HL Leasing for certain municipal airport lands. HL Leasing assigned its rights to Sierra Nevada Helicopters, which then assigned the rights to its affiliate, Signal. In the lease, the City agreed it would not allow any other provider of commercial aeronautical services to operate at the airport under terms more favorable than those set forth in the lease. In 2006, the City increased the assessed value of Signal's leased land. Signal claimed that the city assessed its land disproportionately as compared to other entities operating and leasing land at the airport. Signal was unsuccessful in seeking an abatement of its 2006 and 2007 taxes. The New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) dismissed Signal's appeals, holding that Signal failed to present any evidence of the market value of its property. Signal did not appeal the BTLA's decision nor did it contest the City's 2008 and 2009 assessments. Signal then filed suit in superior court to challenge all of the assessments. The trial court concluded that though Signal's petition was styled as a breach of contract, but that it was actually a request for tax abatement and outside the court's jurisdiction. The trial court then dismissed Signal's petition for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision insofar as it related to Signal's allegations of "disproportionate taxation." However, to the extent that Signal's breach of contract claim sought relief from "unequal treatment," specifically with respect to the amount of taxable land the City attributed to Signal and to other airport tenants with which the City contracts, Signal could pursue this claim without complying with the tax abatement statutory process. View "Signal Aviation Services, Inc. v. City of Lebanon" on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court order which granted defendant Patrick Eschenbrenner a new trial on three counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault based on the court's conclusion that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, the State argued that defendant's trial attorneys were not ineffective for failing to object to certain testimony presented at trial, and that no reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the trial court excluded the testimony in question. Upon review of the trial court record and the testimony at issue, the Supreme Court agreed with the State's argument, concluding defendant did not suffer actual prejudice at trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's conclusion. View "New Hampshire v. Eschenbrenner" on Justia Law

Defendant Lynn Dion was convicted by jury of negligent homicide. She appealed her conviction arguing: (1) using a cell phone while driving does not constitute the requisite wrongful conduct to establish the culpable mental state for criminal negligence, and therefore the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her conviction; and (2) the trial court erred in denying her motion in limine to exclude certain cell phone records admitted into evidence. The State introduced at trial over defendant's objection her cell phone records that revealed defendant made and received a number of calls in a thirty-seven minute car ride, "sometimes using the 'call waiting' feature to switch back and forth between conversations." At the close of the State's case, defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that her use of the cell phone while driving was not illegal, and that was the only conduct the jury could attribute to her. Finding that "although talking on a [cell] phone would not establish as a matter of law, it is at least some evidence from which a jury could infer that the driver was not devoting her full time and attention to her driving. . . that she was not exercising reasonable care under the circumstances," the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Dion" on Justia Law

Petitioner Laconia Patrolman Association appealed a Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) finding that respondent the Laconia Police Commission did not commit certain unfair labor practices. The matter stemmed from negotiations the parties engaged in with regard to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that expired in June, 2010. As a tentative agreement was presented to the Laconia City Council for approval, the city manager said she could no longer support the tentative agreement. The Association filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the Commission violated state law when it failed to ensure that the city council voted on cost items in the CBA within thirty days of presentation. It further alleged that the Council interfered with the negotiations of the CBA, and that the Commission's acquiescence to the Council's interference amounted to a failure to bargain in good faith. The PELRB ruled that the Council's failure to vote was not an unfair labor practice, and that claims that the Council improperly interfered with the Commission's bargaining power could not be brought against the commission: the record was insufficient to establish the Council improperly usurped the Commission's authority. Upon review of the PELRB ruling on appeal by the Association, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding no unfair labor practices. View "Appeal of Laconia Patrolman Association" on Justia Law

Respondent William Rines appealed a superior court order that enjoined him from excavating on his property until he obtained a local use variance from Petitioner Town of Carroll. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that respondent's excavation was exempt from the permitting requirements, the Town's zoning ordinance required the variance before respondent began excavating, and that state law did not preempt the local zoning ordinance. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's injunction, but remanded the case with respect to the calculation of attorney's fees. View "Town of Carroll v. Rines" on Justia Law

In an appeal from a final divorce decree, respondent William Muller challenged the trial court's rulings apportioning the equity in the marital home and imputing $68,000 in annual income to him for child support. Upon review, the Supreme Court partly affirmed, partly vacated, and remanded the case for further proceedings: "[b]ecause the mortgage interest at issue here belongs to a third party, the family division lacked the jurisdiction to invalidate it. Our holding today does not imply that the family division lacks jurisdiction to divide an encumbered asset . . . However, when dividing such property pursuant to RSA 458:16-a, the family division does not have the jurisdiction to disregard or invalidate a third party's claim of interest in marital property." Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's order for the sale of, and distribution of the equity in, the marital home. With regard to the child support issue raised by respondent, the Court found his arguments unpersuasive, and affirmed the trial court's order with respect to that issue. View "In the Matter of Gabrielle Muller and William Muller" on Justia Law

Petitioner Julie Shelton, trustee of the Elizabeth M. Tamposi Trusts (the EMT trusts), appealed a "lengthy and detailed" order of the Hillsborough County Probate Court that dismissed the complaint filed by: (1) Shelton, in her capacity as trustee of the EMT Trusts; and Elizabeth M. Tamposi. Shelton argued that the trial court erred in: (1) construing the governing trust instrument; (2) ruling that, by filing the complaint, Elizabeth Tamposi violated the in terrorem clause; (3) ordering Shelton to pay the attorneys' fees "of both the Respondents and the voluntary Intervenors"; and (4) removing Shelton from her position as trustee. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the lower court's decision, and affirmed with respect to all issues raised by Petitioner. View "Shelton v. Tamposi" on Justia Law

Respondent Nahla Abounaja appealed a district court order that awarded petitioner Myla Randall, $18,000 in damages because of the respondent's willful failure to provide heat to the petitioner's apartment for eighteen days. Petitioner rented an apartment from the respondent in Rochester. At some point before March 23, 2011, petitioner complained to the city's plumbing and health inspector that her apartment lacked heat. An inspector came to the premises and discovered that there was no heat in the petitioner's master bedroom because neither the radiator nor the electric heater worked. The inspector called respondent about this issue and met with her two days later. The inspector then sent a letter to the respondent about this problem, giving her fourteen days to remedy it. The respondent did not respond to the letter, nor did she return the inspector's subsequent telephone calls. Petitioner then filed suit on April 12, and the trial court issued a temporary order requiring respondent "to immediately restore and maintain all utility services" to the petitioner's apartment. Following the hearing on the petition, the trial court found that the respondent was aware that the heating units did not work and that she failed to have them repaired until April 18, and that her actions were willful. In her brief, respondent argued that her conduct was not "wil[l]ful" because she did not cause the petitioner's apartment to lack heat in the first instance. She argued that, at most, she merely "allow[ed]" the heating service to be interrupted; she did not "cause" the interruption itself. Her merely "negligent omission" did not constitute a willful act. Based upon the evidence at trial, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court reasonably found that the respondent's failure to have the units repaired was intentional, and, therefore, willful. However, because the trial court committed plain error when it awarded the petitioner $1,000 per day for at least some days that the respondent's violation of RSA 540-A:3, I, the Court vacated $17,000 of the damage award and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court was tasked with determining whether respondent willfully violated RSA 540-A:3, I after April 12, and, if so, the court was instructed to award petitioner $1,000 per day for each day that the respondent's violation continued. View "Randall v. Abounaja" on Justia Law