Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Lynn Dion was convicted by jury of negligent homicide. She appealed her conviction arguing: (1) using a cell phone while driving does not constitute the requisite wrongful conduct to establish the culpable mental state for criminal negligence, and therefore the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her conviction; and (2) the trial court erred in denying her motion in limine to exclude certain cell phone records admitted into evidence. The State introduced at trial over defendant's objection her cell phone records that revealed defendant made and received a number of calls in a thirty-seven minute car ride, "sometimes using the 'call waiting' feature to switch back and forth between conversations." At the close of the State's case, defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that her use of the cell phone while driving was not illegal, and that was the only conduct the jury could attribute to her. Finding that "although talking on a [cell] phone would not establish as a matter of law, it is at least some evidence from which a jury could infer that the driver was not devoting her full time and attention to her driving. . . that she was not exercising reasonable care under the circumstances," the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Dion" on Justia Law

Petitioner Laconia Patrolman Association appealed a Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) finding that respondent the Laconia Police Commission did not commit certain unfair labor practices. The matter stemmed from negotiations the parties engaged in with regard to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that expired in June, 2010. As a tentative agreement was presented to the Laconia City Council for approval, the city manager said she could no longer support the tentative agreement. The Association filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the Commission violated state law when it failed to ensure that the city council voted on cost items in the CBA within thirty days of presentation. It further alleged that the Council interfered with the negotiations of the CBA, and that the Commission's acquiescence to the Council's interference amounted to a failure to bargain in good faith. The PELRB ruled that the Council's failure to vote was not an unfair labor practice, and that claims that the Council improperly interfered with the Commission's bargaining power could not be brought against the commission: the record was insufficient to establish the Council improperly usurped the Commission's authority. Upon review of the PELRB ruling on appeal by the Association, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding no unfair labor practices. View "Appeal of Laconia Patrolman Association" on Justia Law

Respondent William Rines appealed a superior court order that enjoined him from excavating on his property until he obtained a local use variance from Petitioner Town of Carroll. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that respondent's excavation was exempt from the permitting requirements, the Town's zoning ordinance required the variance before respondent began excavating, and that state law did not preempt the local zoning ordinance. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's injunction, but remanded the case with respect to the calculation of attorney's fees. View "Town of Carroll v. Rines" on Justia Law

In an appeal from a final divorce decree, respondent William Muller challenged the trial court's rulings apportioning the equity in the marital home and imputing $68,000 in annual income to him for child support. Upon review, the Supreme Court partly affirmed, partly vacated, and remanded the case for further proceedings: "[b]ecause the mortgage interest at issue here belongs to a third party, the family division lacked the jurisdiction to invalidate it. Our holding today does not imply that the family division lacks jurisdiction to divide an encumbered asset . . . However, when dividing such property pursuant to RSA 458:16-a, the family division does not have the jurisdiction to disregard or invalidate a third party's claim of interest in marital property." Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's order for the sale of, and distribution of the equity in, the marital home. With regard to the child support issue raised by respondent, the Court found his arguments unpersuasive, and affirmed the trial court's order with respect to that issue. View "In the Matter of Gabrielle Muller and William Muller" on Justia Law

Petitioner Julie Shelton, trustee of the Elizabeth M. Tamposi Trusts (the EMT trusts), appealed a "lengthy and detailed" order of the Hillsborough County Probate Court that dismissed the complaint filed by: (1) Shelton, in her capacity as trustee of the EMT Trusts; and Elizabeth M. Tamposi. Shelton argued that the trial court erred in: (1) construing the governing trust instrument; (2) ruling that, by filing the complaint, Elizabeth Tamposi violated the in terrorem clause; (3) ordering Shelton to pay the attorneys' fees "of both the Respondents and the voluntary Intervenors"; and (4) removing Shelton from her position as trustee. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the lower court's decision, and affirmed with respect to all issues raised by Petitioner. View "Shelton v. Tamposi" on Justia Law

Respondent Nahla Abounaja appealed a district court order that awarded petitioner Myla Randall, $18,000 in damages because of the respondent's willful failure to provide heat to the petitioner's apartment for eighteen days. Petitioner rented an apartment from the respondent in Rochester. At some point before March 23, 2011, petitioner complained to the city's plumbing and health inspector that her apartment lacked heat. An inspector came to the premises and discovered that there was no heat in the petitioner's master bedroom because neither the radiator nor the electric heater worked. The inspector called respondent about this issue and met with her two days later. The inspector then sent a letter to the respondent about this problem, giving her fourteen days to remedy it. The respondent did not respond to the letter, nor did she return the inspector's subsequent telephone calls. Petitioner then filed suit on April 12, and the trial court issued a temporary order requiring respondent "to immediately restore and maintain all utility services" to the petitioner's apartment. Following the hearing on the petition, the trial court found that the respondent was aware that the heating units did not work and that she failed to have them repaired until April 18, and that her actions were willful. In her brief, respondent argued that her conduct was not "wil[l]ful" because she did not cause the petitioner's apartment to lack heat in the first instance. She argued that, at most, she merely "allow[ed]" the heating service to be interrupted; she did not "cause" the interruption itself. Her merely "negligent omission" did not constitute a willful act. Based upon the evidence at trial, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court reasonably found that the respondent's failure to have the units repaired was intentional, and, therefore, willful. However, because the trial court committed plain error when it awarded the petitioner $1,000 per day for at least some days that the respondent's violation of RSA 540-A:3, I, the Court vacated $17,000 of the damage award and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court was tasked with determining whether respondent willfully violated RSA 540-A:3, I after April 12, and, if so, the court was instructed to award petitioner $1,000 per day for each day that the respondent's violation continued. View "Randall v. Abounaja" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Thompson appealed his conviction of driving while intoxicated (DWI) for which he was sentenced to enhanced penalties for a third offense. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in sentencing him for a third DWI because the State failed to submit evidence of his two prior convictions in its case-in-chief. Finding no merit to Defendant's argument, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant Thavone Souksamrane appealed his convictions for criminal threatening and being a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in permitting the State to question him about the veracity of other witnesses. The State conceded that the questioning in this case was improper. However, because of the "overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt," the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Souksamrane" on Justia Law

Defendant Alan Lathrop appealed his conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI). On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in finding that Alderberry Lane in Moultonborough, where the accident took place that ultimately resulted in his arrest, was a "way" (and therefore not open for public use) for purposes of the DWI statute; because only members, guests and a loose category of invitees are permitted to use the road, it is not "open." After review of the statutory authority, the Supreme Court rejected Defendant's contention: " it would be contrary to legislative intent to construe the statute to provide that a private road in a lakeside community that is used by residents…. Is a DWI-free zone." The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Lathrop" on Justia Law

Defendant Peter Gibbs appealed his convictions on two counts of criminal restraint and one count of being an armed career criminal. On appeal, Defendant argued that: (1) his right against double jeopardy was violated when he was twice convicted of a single criminal restraint; (2) his right to effective assistance of counsel was violated; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of being an armed career criminal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the facts of this case demonstrated that the victim was continuously confined from the time he was tied in the basement until the point at which he was able to free himself and, therefore, the defendant engaged in only one episode of criminal restraint. Accordingly, one of the two criminal restraint convictions and sentences must be vacated. The Court vacated one count of Defendant's conviction, but affirmed in all other respects. View "New Hampshire v. Gibbs, Jr." on Justia Law