Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

THI is a subsidiary of THI of New Hampshire, LLC, itself a subsidiary of a parent company that owns nursing home operators throughout the country. In approximately 2003, THI purchased and began operating a nursing home, Pleasant Valley Nursing Center (Pleasant Valley), in Derry. In 2012, THI had an opportunity to expand when Exeter Healthcare, Inc. closed its nursing home in Exeter and offered to sell its 109 licensed nursing beds. THI and Exeter Healthcare entered into a purchase and sale agreement for the beds in 2013, and THI made deposit payments to Exeter Healthcare in accordance with the agreement. The following month, THI requested that the Board grant approval for the transfer of the beds from Exeter Healthcare to THI. Because the Pleasant Valley building would not accommodate all of the beds to be transferred, THI also requested permission to apply for a Certificate of Need (CON) to construct a new building to house the beds in a different location. THI selected a site in Londonderry for the new building, which it planned to operate under the name Traditions at Londonderry. In its application, THI explained that the transfer would occur in the same nursing home region in Rockingham County, such that the number of beds in the region would not increase. THI also informed the Board that its contract conditioned its obligation to buy the beds from Exeter Healthcare upon the Board’s approval of the CON for Traditions at Londonderry. In this appeal of the Health Services Planning and Review Board's (Board) order, THI argued that the Board incorrectly interpreted RSA 151-C:4, III(a) as preventing the Board from granting a certificate of need (CON) to THI for the construction of the Pleasant Valley nursing home. Although the Board found that THI’s proposed facility would satisfy regulatory requirements for services offered, quality of care, and financial feasibility, among other criteria, the Board nevertheless denied THI’s application because the Pleasant Valley facility was not an “existing facility.” Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision. View "Appeal of THI of New Hampshire at Derry, LLC " on Justia Law

Petitioner Merriam Farm, Inc. appealed a superior court decision dismissing its appeal of a Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) decision of the respondent, Town of Surry (Town), on the basis that the appeal was barred by claim preclusion. Under the Town's zoning ordinance, to build on its property, petitioner had to establish that the property has at least 200 feet of frontage on a public street, which was defined, in pertinent part, as a Class V or better road. In 2009, petitioner applied to the Town's selectboard for a building permit to construct a single-family home on its property. The selectboard denied the application because the property lacked frontage on a Class V or better road. In 2013, petitioner applied to the ZBA for a variance from the frontage requirement in the Town's zoning ordinance in order to build a single-family residence on the property. The ZBA denied the application. After unsuccessfully moving for rehearing, the petitioner appealed to the trial court. The Town asserted, among other things, that petitioner's application for a variance was barred by the doctrines of claim preclusion and preemption. Petitioner argued, among other things, that the Town waived its claim preclusion argument and that the ZBA improperly applied the statutory criteria governing variances under RSA 674:33, I(b). "If, based upon res judicata, we were to bar a subsequent application for a variance after the denial of a building permit application, we would, as the petitioner notes, effectively require landowners to simultaneously apply for all potentially necessary land use permits, variances, and exceptions. Such would be costly and inefficient, and burden the zoning process by adding complexity to an already complicated process." Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the denial of petitioner's application for a building permit gave rise to a cause of action different from the denial of its variance application, and, thus, res judicata did not preclude petitioner's variance application. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's ruling. View "Merriam Farm, Inc. v. Town of Surry " on Justia Law

Defendant Edward C. Furlong, III appealed a circuit court order awarding judgment in favor of plaintiff the Town of Bartlett (Town) in a zoning enforcement action. Defendant's primary argument on appeal was that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by imposing a fine in excess of $25,000, but he also raised various collateral claims of error. Finding his arguments lacking in merit, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Town of Bartlett v. Furlong" on Justia Law

Respondent Town of Derry appealed a Superior Court decision granting the motion for summary judgment filed by petitioners, Accurate Transport, Inc. and 41 Ashleigh Drive, LLC (Ashleigh Drive), on the basis that an abutter’s appeal to the Derry Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) was untimely. In November 2012, Accurate Transport submitted a preliminary site plan application to the Derry Planning Board for approval to operate a “Dumpster Depot” business on property owned by Ashleigh Drive. The property is located within the Town’s Industrial III zoning district, which permits, among other uses, contractor’s yards and freight and trucking terminals. The Technical Review Committee (TRC) held a meeting to evaluate the proposed site plan and approved the proposed plan. Thereafter, petitioners filed a formal site plan application with the Planning Board. After numerous public meetings, the Planning Board ultimately approved the plan application. Several months later, an abutter to the property at issue, John O'Connor, appealed Planning Board's approval a few weeks after the Board's decision was issued. district, The ZBA concluded that the Town’s zoning ordinance did not permit the proposed use under any classification. After unsuccessfully moving for rehearing, petitioners appealed to the trial court and, subsequently, moved for summary judgment. Both parties moved for reconsideration, agreeing that the court erred by misapplying the time standards contained in the Town’s zoning ordinance. Observing that the written decision of the Planning Board was released on August 28, the court noted that O’Connor’s appeal (filed September 13) would be timely if he was appealing the final Planning Board site plan approval. However, the court concluded that O’Connor’s appeal did not challenge the Planning Board’s approval. Rather, the court found that O’Connor’s appeal challenged only the code enforcement officer’s determination that the proposed use of the subject property was permitted as a contractor’s yard. The court decided that the Planning Board accepted the code enforcement officer’s interpretation on June 19 when it voted to accept jurisdiction of the appeal. Because that vote was published on July 19, the court concluded that O’Connor had 20 days from July 19 to appeal to the ZBA. Given that his appeal was filed in September, the court determined that it was untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the ZBA did not err by treating O’Connor’s appeal as an appeal of the August 21 decision. The trial court found, and the parties did not dispute, that the zoning ordinance provided a 20-day appeal period that began on the date of a written decision. Accordingly, the 20-day appeal period as to the August 21 decision began to run upon the issuance of the written decision on August 28. Because O’Connor’s appeal was filed September 13, it was within 20 days of August 28 and was, thus, timely. View "Accurate Transport, Inc. v. Town of Derry" on Justia Law

Petitioner Stephen Forster, d/b/a Forster's Christmas Tree Farm & Gift Shoppe, appealed a superior court decision to uphold a zoning board of adjustment (ZBA) determination in favor of respondent the Town of Henniker that "weddings [and] like events are not accessory uses" to the petitioner's farm, and that hosting such events was not a permitted use in the farm's zoning district. Because the Supreme Court concluded that petitioner has not established, as he argued, that he had a right to conduct commercial weddings and similar events on his farm, without obtaining either a special exception or a variance, it affirmed. View "Forster v. Town of Henniker" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kingston Place, LLC appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment to respondent New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT) on petitioner's claims that the DOT's long delay in taking a portion of the subject property by eminent domain created a cloud on petitioner's title violated RSA 498-A:4, III(a) (2010) and RSA 230:17 (2009), and constituted a taking by inverse condemnation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kingston Place, LLC v. New Hampshire Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Petitioners Daryl and Marcy Dembiec appealed a superior court order dismissing their petition for equitable relief. In October 2011, petitioners obtained a permit from the respondent, the Town of Holderness to construct a single family home. Before the permit was issued, the only structure on the property was a two-story boathouse with living quarters on the second floor. In April 2012, when construction of the home was substantially completed, the Town's compliance officer advised the petitioners that he would not issue a certificate of compliance for their new home because the existing boathouse contained a dwelling unit, and the applicable zoning ordinance allowed two dwellings on a lot only when they are in the same structure, such as in a duplex. The compliance officer informed petitioners that, before he could issue a certificate of compliance, they would need either to obtain a variance or remove "all plumbing" from the boathouse. Petitioners then applied to the zoning board of adjustment for an equitable waiver from the ordinance. Two intervenors objected to the petitioners' request. The board originally granted the waiver, but on rehearing, denied it. Petitioners later sought a variance. The board denied their application. The superior court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitioners' municipal estoppel claim because they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Petitioners argued that the trial court had jurisdiction over their claim because they were not required to first raise it before the zoning board of adjustment. The Supreme Court was persuaded that appealing the compliance officer's decision to the zoning board would have been useless because the zoning board lacked the authority to grant the requested relief. Thus, exhaustion is not required. "The plain language of the pertinent statutes does not confer general equitable jurisdiction upon a zoning board. Nor could the zoning board have granted any relief to the petitioners under the applicable statutes or the Town's ordinance because their new home violated the ordinance, and they failed to meet the requirements for either a variance or an equitable waiver from dimensional requirements. Under those circumstances, we conclude that further pursuit of administrative remedies would have been futile, and, therefore, exhaustion of remedies is not required." Accordingly, petitioners' assertion of a municipal estoppel claim for the first time in the trial court was not barred by the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. The superior court's decision was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Dembiec v. Town of Holderness" on Justia Law

Plaintiff J. Albert Lynch, Trustee of FIN-LYN Trust, appealed a superior court order granting a motion to dismiss his action seeking to enforce restrictive covenants contained in a deed between the Trustee and the Town of Pelham. The trial court ruled that the covenants at issue are appurtenant and personal, and that the Trustee lacked standing to enforce them. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the covenants at issue were gross and enforceable by the Trustee, and that the record established that he had a legitimate interest in enforcing them on behalf of the Trust. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lynch v. Town of Pelham" on Justia Law

The Town of Charlestown appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) dismissing its petition for reclassification of current use parcels owned by taxpayer TransCanada Hydro Northeast, Inc. The Town asserted that, "[b]ecause the three parcels are part of a development involving land use for the purpose of generating electricity, they have been improperly classified as open space land under" RSA chapter 79-A. As a result, the Town requested that the BTLA revoke the current use status of the three parcels and require the Town's assessing officials to reclassify the parcels. The Town further requested that the BTLA issue an order requiring the assessing officials to reassess taxes for tax years 2007 through 2012. TransCanada objected, arguing that the three parcels were not improperly classified as open space land. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the BTLA did not err in dismissing the Town's petition for reclassification on the ground that the Town could unilaterally reclassify the land. As the Town agreed at oral argument, the Court did not address whether the Town could apply the reclassification retrospectively. View "Appeal of Town of Charlestown" on Justia Law

Respondents Steven and Philomena Landrigan appealed a Superior Court order finding that they unlawfully subdivided their property and granting petitioner Town of Newbury's request for injunctive relief and the imposition of a $2,000 fine. Respondents argued that the trial court erred in finding that their conduct and that of their predecessors had merged two non-conforming parcels into a single lot. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Town of Newbury v. Landrigan" on Justia Law