Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, the New Hampshire Housing Finance Authority (NHHFA), appealed a superior court decision to grant summary judgment in favor of respondent Pinewood Estates Condominium Association (Pinewood), and to award attorney’s fees to Pinewood. The trial court ruled that, pursuant to Pinewood’s condominium declaration, NHHFA was responsible for paying condominium assessments that were accrued by the previous owner of a unit NHHFA purchased at a foreclosure sale, and that Pinewood was not obligated to provide common services to the unit until all assessments were paid. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the Condominium Act, RSA chapter 356-B (2009 & Supp. 2015), operated to bar Pinewood’s claim for unpaid pre-foreclosure condominium assessments, it reversed and remanded. View "New Hampshire Housing Finance Authority v. Pinewood Estates Condominium Association" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Maher Mahmoud appealed a superior court order granting defendants Winwin Properties, LLC (Winwin), Gary T. Shulman, Anita S. Shulman, Aaron Katz, and Jeremy Gavin's motion for summary judgment, and denying plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff acquired title to an approximately 17-acre parcel of land in Thornton, and subsequently received subdivision approval from the Thornton Planning Board to create Lot 1, a 1.06-acre parcel; he recorded the subdivision as Plan 11808 at the Grafton County Registry of Deeds (registry of deeds). In July 2006, plaintiff mortgaged Lot 1 to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) by mortgage deed, recorded in the registry of deeds. The mortgage deed described the property as Lot 1 as depicted on Plan 11808. Plaintiff received approval from the Thornton Planning Board to further subdivide the 17-acre parcel into a total of eight lots; he recorded the subdivision as Plan 12600 at the registry of deeds. As part of this subdivision approval, the southerly boundary of Lot 1 was relocated. Plan 12600 showed both the original Lot 1 lot line and the new southerly lot line, and shows Lot 1 as consisting of 2.40 acres. Plaintiff ultimately defaulted on his loan, and MERS foreclosed on Lot 1. MERS conveyed Lot 1, pursuant to a foreclosure deed under power of sale to defendant Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificate Holders CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-15 (Bank of New York). Then Bank of New York conveyed Lot 1 to Winwin by quitclaim deed. The deed from the Bank of New York to Winwin included the same description as that contained in the mortgage deed, with the additional phrase, “[s]ubject to any and all matters, including setbacks if any, as shown on Plan No. 11808 and Plan No. 12600 recorded in [the registry of deeds].” Winwin conveyed the property in May 2009 to defendants Gary and Anita Shulman, and the Shulmans conveyed the property in April 2014 to defendants Aaron Katz and Jeremy Gavin. In 2015, plaintiff sued defendants, asserting several claims relating to the size of Lot 1. Winwin moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s petition to quiet title to Lot 1, asserting that it had previously held record title to the lot, which included the approximately 1.34 acres added to Lot 1 by the lot line adjustment (the disputed land), because the description of the property in the mortgage deed included any additions to the land. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found no reversible error in the superior court's grant of defendants' summary judgment, and affirmed. View "Mahmoud v. Town of Thornton" on Justia Law

This case centered on defendants’ alleged entitlement to travel across several properties in Salem in order to access Route 28. Defendants owned the property located at 16 Garabedian Drive, and claimed to have a deeded right-of-way to travel from their property eastward, across State-owned railroad tracks and continuing across the southernmost section of two parcels of land owned by Cumberland Farms, Inc. and 392 South Broadway, LLC respectively. The Cumberland Farms property abutted the railroad on its western boundary and 392 South Broadway’s property to the southeast. 392 South Broadway’s property was bounded on the north and west by the Cumberland Farms property and Route 28 on the east. Travel across these properties is known as Cuomo Drive. Plaintiffs 412 South Broadway Realty, LLC and Salem Rockingham, LLC, which owned property located just to the south of Cuomo Drive, filed suit against defendants and Cumberland Farms. Defendants appealed multiple superior court orders ruling that their property was not benefited by a deeded right-of-way over several other properties and finding them liable for abuse of process. Third-party defendant, Emmett Horgan, Trustee of the FUN Trust (FUN Trust), cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that defendants had not committed slander of title and in calculating the damages award for the trust’s abuse of process claim. After review, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment on FUN Trust’s abuse of process claim and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment was affirmed. View "412 South Broadway Realty, LLC v. Wolters" on Justia Law

Seventeen of the 20 plaintiffs to this case were Somali Bantu refugees who were resettled to the United States in 2004. Three of the plaintiffs were born in the United States to Somali Bantu refugees. Plaintiffs lived in the defendants’ apartments during 2005-2006, and those apartments were contaminated by lead paint, a known health hazard. Plaintiffs had elevated levels of lead in their blood. In their complaints, which were consolidated for discovery and trial, plaintiffs, through their parents, alleged that they were injured by their exposure to lead paint while living in defendants’ apartments. In this interlocutory appeal, plaintiffs challenged a superior court order granting the motion to exclude the expert testimony of Peter Isquith, Ph.D. After evaluating the 20 plaintiffs, Isquith, a clinical neuropsychologist, determined that 17 of them suffered from neurological deficits and opined that lead exposure was, more likely than not, a substantial factor in causing those deficits. The superior court excluded Isquith’s testimony based upon its determination that his testimony was not “the product of reliable principles and methods,” and its finding that he did not apply “the principles and methods reliably to the facts” of this case. The superior court certified a question to the Supreme Court: whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the expert's testimony. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's order, and affirmed. View "Osman v. Lin" on Justia Law

Defendant Eugene Dowgiert appealed a superior court order dismissing his plea of title, which he filed in response to a possessory action brought in the circuit court by plaintiff Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the superior court erred in ruling that the plea was time-barred under RSA 479:25, II (Supp. 2015) and RSA 479:25, II-a (2013). After review, the Court held that it did not, and, accordingly, affirmed. View "The Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee v. Dowgiert" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Paul and Sara Lynn, appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment to defendant Wentworth By The Sea Master Association (association), and denying summary judgment to plaintiffs. The parties disputed the validity of an easement on the plaintiffs’ property that provided members of the association beach access. Because the Supreme Court concluded that an easement was validly created, it affirmed. View "Lynn v. Wentworth By The Sea Master Association" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Kathleen Nawn-Benoit and Thomas Benoit appealed a superior court order granting the summary judgment motion filed by defendants Ronald and Rita Delude, and denying plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment. In July 2014, over the objections of several lot owners in the parties' subdivision, plaintiffs obtained a variance to build a single-family residence on property designated as Common Land in their original 1974 plans. A "Declaration of Covenants" was recorded with the development plan, making all lots in the development subject to the Declaration, and the intention of the Developer to create "open spaces and other common facilities for the benefit of [that] community." In January 2015, plaintiffs brought a petition against the residents of the subdivision seeking: (1) a declaratory judgment that the Declaration was unenforceable; (2) an order that they acquired title to the Common Land “free and clear of the Declaration through adverse possession”; and (3) to the extent that the Declaration was deemed enforceable, an order requiring defendants to form a homeowners' association, purchase the Common Land from plaintiffs “at its fair market value,” and reimburse them for their “out-of-pocket expenses . . . , including real estate taxes.” The trial court concluded that “[b]ecause the undisputed material facts and the applicable law apply equally to the [plaintiffs’] claims asserted against all of the other [defendant]-lot owners, they are likewise entitled to summary judgment.” The court subsequently denied the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Benoit v. Cerasaro" on Justia Law

Respondent Steven Allen appealed a superior court order granting a petition to partition real property and for other equitable relief filed by petitioner Renee Brooks, and denying respondent’s cross-petition to partition. Petitioner and respondent lived together for approximately twenty years from 1993 to 2013, except for an 18-month period of separation in 2006-2007. From 1998 through early 2013, the parties lived together in a home in Atkinson. In 2003, the parties, as joint borrowers, entered into a home equity credit agreement secured by a mortgage on the Atkinson property. The November 1998 mortgage in respondent’s name alone was discharged. Under the terms of the credit agreement, each party was individually liable for the full amount of the credit line. Respondent, however, was in control of the credit line and he alone withdrew funds from it. In 2007, the parties, as joint tenants, purchased a property in Northwood, New Hampshire. Respondent obtained a mortgage on the property in his name only. The parties refinanced the Northwood property several times. In 2013, petitioner moved out of the Atkinson property when she received a letter from respondent’s attorney notifying her that if she did not leave she would be evicted. Upon the advice of his attorney, respondent withdrew the remaining balance of approximately $59,000 on the 2012 Atkinson credit line so that petitioner could not access those funds. In March 2013, petitioner filed a two-count petition to partition. In count one, petitioner requested that the trial court order that the Northwood property be sold and that the net proceeds from the sale be distributed equally between the parties. In count two, petitioner requested, among other things, that the trial court “[e]quitably determine” each party’s interest and rights in the Atkinson property, each party’s liability for any debts or loans jointly entered into, and each party’s liability for any debts or loans entered into by the petitioner, whose funds were used by the respondent “individually, or by the parties jointly, to invest in or maintain real estate.” Respondent cross-petitioned, requesting that the trial court assign the Northwood property to him, and dismiss count two of petitioner’s petition. After review of the superior court's order, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Brooks v. Allen" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from two consolidated actions brought by plaintiffs Kelly Sanborn, Trustee of the 428 Lafayette, LLC Realty Trust, Donald and Rosemarie Folk, Heather Hancock, and Andrew Cotrupi, against defendants, 428 Lafayette, LLC and John Roberge, relating to their respective ownership of condominium units at Village Square of Hampton Condominium. Defendants appealed superior court rulings that: (1) Village Square of Hampton Condominium Association was governed by RSA chapter 292 (Voluntary Corporations Act), rather than RSA chapter 356-B (the "Condominium Act"); and (2) Cotrupi had the right to use certain commercial parking spaces at the Condominium. In affirming in part and reversing in part the superior court's order, the Supreme Court found: neither the Condominium Act nor the Voluntary Corporations Act contained language making it the exclusive Act governing condominium associations that incorporate. Because neither Act contained exclusivity language, the Court concluded that condominium associations that voluntarily incorporate, as here, were subject to both Acts, including on matters of governance. "Regardless of the provisions of the bylaws, however, the bylaws cannot negate the applicability of the Voluntary Corporations Act." The trial court erred in ruling that the Association was governed solely by the Voluntary Corporations Act. Because the court issued specific governance-related orders concerning the election of directors and voting allocation based upon its conclusion that only the Voluntary Corporations Act applied, those orders were vacated and the case remanded for consideration of issues raised by the parties pertaining to both Acts. The trial court did not err when it ruled that Cotrupi had the right to use his exclusively owned commercial parking spaces and the right to shared use of the remaining commercial parking spaces on the condominium property. View "Sanborn v. 428 Lafayette, LLC" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit certified two questions of New Hampshire law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In April 2007, plaintiff Joseph Castagnaro executed a promissory note in favor of Regency Mortgage Corporation and a mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for Regency (the lender) and Regency’s successors and assigns. From that point forward, the mortgage and the note traveled different routes. MERS assigned the mortgage to BAC Home Loan Servicing. BAC subsequently assigned the mortgage to defendant, The Bank of New York Mellon (Bank). The record contained two versions of the note. The first showed an undated indorsement from Regency to American Residential Mortgage, and the second included an undated assignment from Regency to American, an undated indorsement from American to Countrywide Bank FSB, an undated assignment from Countrywide Bank FSB to Countrywide Home Loans, and an undated indorsement in blank. After plaintiff failed to make certain mortgage payments, the Bank sought to foreclose. Once in federal court, the plaintiff amended his complaint, and the Bank moved to dismiss it. The federal district court granted the Bank’s motion, concluding that the parties’ intent to separate the mortgage and note at the outset of the transaction trumped any common law rule requiring unity. The federal district court ruled that because the Bank was the mortgagee, it could proceed with the foreclosure under RSA 479:25, which authorized a “mortgagee” to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure when, as in this case, the mortgage contained a clause allowing it. Plaintiff appealed to the First Circuit and requested that the First Circuit certify questions of law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. The First Circuit asked whether New Hampshire common law and/or RSA 479:25 required a foreclosing entity to hold both the mortgage and note at the time of a nonjudicial foreclosure. If so, could an agency relationship between the note holder and the mortgage holder meet that requirement, and did language in the mortgage naming the mortgagee “nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns” suffice on its own to show an adequate agency relationship? In addition, assuming that the common law and/or RSA 479:25 required a unity of the mortgage and note at the time of a nonjudicial foreclosure, and that an agency relationship between the note holder and the mortgage holder did not satisfy such a requirement, could the parties’ intent to separate the two overcome the unity rule? The New Hampshire Court determined it did not have to answer whether New Hampshire common law or RSA 479:25 (2013) (amended 2015) required a foreclosing entity to hold both the mortgage and note at the time of a non-judicial foreclosure because an agency relationship between the noteholder and the mortgage holder met any such requirement and language in the mortgage naming the mortgagee “nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns” sufficed on its own to show an adequate agency relationship. View "Castagnaro v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law