Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Joel Harrington appealed a superior court order in favor of Respondent Metropolis Property Management Group, Inc. (Metropolis). On May 27, 2005, Petitioner entered into a residential lease for an apartment at Hollis Commons Apartments in Concord. The lease agreement required the petitioner to pay a security deposit of $875 to be held "until the termination of Lessee's occupancy." Petitioner entered into two lease renewals, the first in May 2006 renewing the lease for one year, and another in June 2007. The second renewal called for a term commencing on July 1, 2007, and ending "60 days after written notice has been given." The original lease agreement and both lease renewals identified "Hollis Commons Apartments, LLC" as the lessor. The parties had a dispute over the lease agreement and return of the security deposit. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in finding that Metropolis was not a party to the lease agreement, and in dismissing his contract claims. Although the lease agreement and renewals all show "Hollis Commons Apartments, LLC" as the lessor and either Petitioner or the Petitioner and his wife as the lessees, Petitioner contended that Metropolis must be considered a party to the agreement. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss Petitioner's case. View "Harrington v. Metropolis Property Management Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Limited Editions Properties, Inc., appealed a superior court order upholding a decision to deny Petitioner's subdivision application by the planning board of Respondent Town of Hebron (Town). Petitioner owned 112.5 acres of property in Hebron on the northwest end of Newfound Lake with frontage on West Shore Road. A portion of the lot lay within the Hebron lake district, and the remainder lay within the rural district. In an earlier decision, the Board determined that because Petitioner had materially revised its plan for the property, it was required to submit a new application to develop it. Petitioner sued, and the Board was reversed. When the Board resumed consideration of the application, Petitioner requested that it grant preliminary conditional approval of the plan's overall concept before Petitioner sought the required state and federal permits. Petitioner acknowledged that the plan would not meet then-current state regulations; it intended to revise the plan to obtain the necessary permits after the Board granted preliminary approval. Once it obtained the permits, Petitioner intended to return to the Board for consideration of any necessary changes to the plan. However, the Board determined that it would not approve the subdivision application in stages; rather, it would either conditionally approve the application or deny it. After holding several hearings on the application, a motion to deny the application was introduced and seconded, and after further discussion, three of the five members of the Board voted to deny the application. Petitioner subsequently appealed to the superior court, which upheld the Board's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Petitioner failed to establish that the trial court erred in affirming the Board's decision. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Limited Editions Properties, Inc. v. Town of Hebron" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Carleton, LLC appealed a superior court order finding that the Defendants' notice of intention to adopt articles of dissolution was timely filed. In 1995, Bukk Carleton and Defendant Richard Balagur formed defendant MTS Corporation (MTS) for the purpose of purchasing land and operating as a real estate holding company. In 2004, Carelton brought an action agains MTS and Richard Balagur to dissolve MTS, obtain payment of rent due MTS, and to remove Richard Balagur as an officer and director of MTS. Richard Balagur brought an action to compel MTS to transfer certain real estate to him, and to pay him certain funds. Adrienne Balagur, Richard's mother and a shareholder in MTS, successfully moved for leave to file an election to purchase shares in lieu of dissolving MTS pursuant to state law. The parties sued over how to value the shares in MTS. Concluding that the trial court did not err in its determination of the terms and conditions of purchase of the shares, the Supreme Court appointed a commissioner to sell MTS' real estate holdings should Mrs. Balagur not comply with the Court's order. One month after the Supreme Court issued its holding, the Balagurs and MTS filed a notice of intention to adopt articles of dissolution. Carelton objected, contending that the notice was not timely filed. The trial court held that the notice was timely filed and Carelton appealed. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the notice of intent to adopt articles of dissolution was timely filed. View "Carleton, LLC v. Balagur" on Justia Law

Respondent Parade Residence Hotel, LLC (Parade) appealed and Petitioner Harborside Associates, L.P. (Harborside) cross-appealed a superior court decision that partially affirmed and partially reversed the decision of the Portsmouth Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) to grant Parade variances to install two parapet and two marquee signs on its hotel and conference center site. Upon review, the Supreme Court found evidence in the record to support the ZBA’s factual findings: "[b]ecause the ZBA used the correct test to determine whether the public interest and spirit of the ordinance factors were met and because there is evidence to support the ZBA’s findings on these factors, to the extent that the trial court ruled that the ZBA acted unlawfully when it found that the factors were met, the trial court erred." Further, the Court found there was evidence in the record supporting the ZBA’s finding that the signs would not "negatively impact surrounding property values ... the ZBA was also entitled to rely upon its own knowledge, experience and observations." The Court partially affirmed and partially reversed the superior court's decision, and remanded the case back for further proceedings. View "Harborside Associates, L.P. v. Parade Residence Hotel, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondent Ruth Chevion appealed and Petitioners Aaron and Katie Boissy cross-appealed a superior court order that partly granted and partly denied Petitioners' petition to quiet title. The trial court ruled that Respondent lacked an easement to use a certain well on Petitioners' property, but that she had a deeded right-of-way over the property to access a former ice pond. The parties owned neighboring parcels of land in Hopkinton. Petitioners owned three lots, one of which adjoined Respondent's lot. Petitioners brought action to quiet title to two easements Respondent claimed to have on their property. The first easement allegedly gave Respondent the right to pipe water to her house from a well on one of Petitioners' three lots. The second easement allegedly gave Respondent a right-of-way over Petitioners' property to access the pond. The trial court rejected Petitioners' assertion that Respondent's well easement was extinguished by abandonment, but that the easement was extinguished nonetheless because its purpose (to allow use of a certain well on Petitioners' property) was impossible to accomplish. Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Boissy v. Chevion" on Justia Law

Defendants Scott and Christina Lees appealed a trial court decision that found in favor of Plaintiff Stephen Wyle on his claim of negligent misrepresentation. In 2002, Defendants purchased a two-unit apartment building. Defendants wished to expand the building, and approached a contractor to add a third apartment to the back of the property. Conditional approval for the site plan was granted in November 2003 and final approval was obtained in January 2004. However, Defendants did not obtain the proper permits prior to building or occupying the unit. As a result, the town's building inspector never inspected the unit. The Lees again hired the contractor both to complete a second addition to the property. Defendants again failed to secure the necessary building permits. After the completion of construction, town officials visited the property a number of times in 2006 and 2007. The town informed Defendants that "[s]ave for acceptable field changes[,] the site plan requirements have been satisfied." Defendants listed the property for sale in 2007. After entering into the agreement, Plaintiff had a comprehensive home inspection performed and sent a list of specific concerns regarding the property to Defendants. The concerns were either remedied by the Defendants or waived by Plaintiff prior to closing. Approximately six weeks after closing, the entire property was inspected by the town building inspector and fire chief which revealed numerous building and life safety code violations. Plaintiff was ordered not to occupy the unit until he corrected the violations and made the site compliant with site plan regulations. After correcting the violations, Plaintiff then brought a single claim against Defendants for negligent misrepresentation. Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court issued an order awarding damages to the Plaintiff. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the evidence at trial established that Defendants negligently misrepresented that the premises were licensed for immediate occupancy and that they had obtained all the necessary permits. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial record supported the decision in favor of Plaintiff, and the grant of damages. View "Wyle v. Lees" on Justia Law

Respondents Ravenna Investment Associates and its successor-in-interest, Access Road, LLC (collectively referred to as Ravenna), appealed a superior court order following a bench trial which granted a petition for injunctive and declaratory relief filed by Petitioner Appletree Mall Associates, LLC (Appletree), ordering Ravenna to restore two fifteen-foot drainage easements allowing water to discharge from Appletree’s site to Route 102 in Londonderry. Appletree sought a declaration that, as owner of 'Lot 2,' it was entitled to drainage easements over Lots 6, 7 and 10, and an order requiring Ravenna to remove any obstructions to those easements. In its order, the trial court found that Ravenna’s development of Lots 6, 7 and 10 unreasonably interfered with Appletree’s alleged drainage easements. Specifically, the court found that Ravenna impermissibly relocated the easements unilaterally by routing the water over a different part of its land, instead of within the bounds of Appletree’s easements. Under all of these circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded in its review of the matter that the plain language of Appletree's 1984 deed, together with the circumstances surrounding it, did not express an affirmative intent to create new drainage easements on Lots 7 and 10 for the benefit of Lot 2. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Appletree Mall Associates, LLC v. Ravenna Investment Associates " on Justia Law

Petitioners David, James and Carolyn Austin and Robert Guinto appealed a superior court order that denied their petition to quiet title and ruling that Respondents Lester and Sophie Silver had a deeded right-of-way over the petitioners' lot. On appeal, Petitioners argued that the trial court erred when it determined that certain deeds were ambiguous. They contended that based upon the plain language of the deeds at issue, Respondents never obtained a right-of-way to cross their land. Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s determination based upon the language of the pertinent deeds as well as its factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the relevant conveyances, Respondents had a deeded right-of-way over Petitioner's lots. View "Austin v. Silver" on Justia Law

Defendant-Tenant Wendy Wilson appealed a district court ruling that she breached her lease with Plaintiff Nashua Housing Authority. She rented an apartment in a public housing development. The lease provided that tenants "shall not engage in any drug related criminal activity on or off NHA property." Breach of that clause is cause for eviction from the leased unit. After reading a newspaper article about Defendant's arrest, the landlord sent her an eviction notice and subsequently brought a possessory action against Defendant for breach of the lease. At the eviction proceeding, the landlord introduced three criminal drug complaints that alleged Defendant "unlawfully dispensed and sold a certain narcotic drug, to wit: morphine." Defendant contended on appeal that the criminal complaints were not sufficient to prove she breached her lease. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the criminal complaints were not sufficient to prove that Defendant had actually engaged in the alleged activity. As such, the Court reversed the eviction court's decision to the contrary. View "Nashua Housing Authority v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Winecellar Farm ("Winecellar") appealed a superior court order that found it was not entitled to: (1) a decree pro confesso awarding it specific performance to purchase the Bedard Farm ("Bedard"); (2) specific performance to purchase the farm under the part performance doctrine; and (3) continued haying in perpetuity under a lease agreement. Craig and Jennifer Rief purchased Winecellar, a working farm adjacent to the Bedard Farm. Bedard was owned by two siblings who until 2006, had lived there all their lives. The Riefs had enjoyed a close, friendly relationship with the Bedards until the Bedards died in 2006. The Riefs informed the Bedards on multiple occasions of their interest in buying the Bedard Farm when the Bedards were ready to sell. Until that time, the Riefs were content with farming the two properties together. In 2004, the Riefs and the Bedards signed a "memorandum of understanding" to harvest hay. In exchange, Winecellar/Riefs would maintain certain access ways and roadways to a shared driveway. In 2004, the Riefs wanted to lease the Bedard land to raise a small herd of buffalo to which the Bedards declined. In January 2006, the Bedards acquiesced to the Riefs' proposal to lease the land for buffalo. They drafted a "letter of understanding" for which the Riefs would lease the land, and later be given the opportunity to purchase the land should the Bedards sell. When the Bedards died, the land passed to their family. The Riefs filed a preliminary injunction in an attempt to preclude the Bedards' estate from evicting its buffalo and removing fencing equipment maintained on two leased pastures. Although the Bedard heirs filed responses in the case, their answer was untimely. The Riefs moved for a decree pro confesso for the right to purchase the Bedard land. The trial court denied the motion, but ordered a voluntary nonsuit as to the Bedard estate. On appeal, the Riefs argued that the sum of the various memoranda/letters of understanding constituted contracts for which specific performance was the only remedy. According to the Riefs, the monthly lease payments were in consideration for the right to purchase the land. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the record adequately supported the trial court's decisions to deny the Riefs specific performance for the Bedard Farm. Additionally, the Court found that the haying arrangement between the parties was not sufficient to constitute an "interest in land" consistent with "the ultimate intent that Winecellar Farm would own the Bedard Farm." As such, the Court affirmed the lower court's decisions. View "Winecellar Farm, Inc. v. Hibbard" on Justia Law