Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Christopher Ruel, a licensed real estate appraiser, appealed a superior court order that remanded his case to the New Hampshire Real Estate Appraiser Board for a new disciplinary hearing. In the spring of 2007, Kenneth Frederick hired Petitioner to appraise his property in Kingston. The New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT) sought to take Frederick's property by eminent domain and Frederick used Petitioner's appraisal in negotiating a settlement with DOT. DOT performed its own appraisal and valued the property at approximately fifty thousand dollars less than did Petitioner. After finalizing the settlement, a DOT appraisal supervisor reviewed Petitioner's appraisal and filed a grievance against him with the Board. In April 2010, four members of the Board voted to order Petitioner to pay a $500 fine and attend two appraisal courses. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the superior court should have dismissed the Board proceedings against him because: (1) the DOT lacked standing to file the initial grievance and, therefore, the case should never have been heard; (2) the Board violated its governing statute by taking more than two years to dispose of his case; (3) the Board's delay materially prejudiced him; and (4) the Board's determination to continue with the hearing and render a final decision without a quorum violated his due process rights. Upon careful review of the Board's hearing record, the Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's arguments on appeal. View "Ruel v. New Hampshire Real Estate App. Bd. " on Justia Law

Petitioners Residents of Green View Drive appealed a superior court order that: (1) found no "occasion" to lay out Green View Drive as a class V public highway; (2) partially granted and partially denied the petition to quiet title filed by The Ledges Golf Links, Inc. (The Ledges) against Defendant Claire Crowley; and (3) ruled that Ms. Crowley was responsible for the continued maintenance of Green View Drive and could recover road maintenance costs from the Residents. Green View Drive is located in Loudon and provides access to a portion of the golf course operated by The Ledges and to homes owned by the Residents. The Town classified Green View Drive as a private roadway. In 1997, before Green View Drive was built, the golf course property, then owned by Ms. Crowley and her husband William, was sold to the Loudon Country Club, Inc. In December 1999, the country club sold the golf course property to The Ledges. At some point, while constructing Green View Drive, Mr. Crowley mistakenly located a portion of the road on golf course property. As a result, he entered into a settlement agreement with The Ledges and others to resolve this issue. The settlement agreement provided that Mr. Crowley would "grant to the Ledges an easement for the Ledges to have use of [Green View Drive] for all golf course purposes." After Mr. Crowley died, Ms. Crowley petitioned the Town’s board of selectmen to accept Green View Drive as a town road. Her petition was denied. Ms. Crowley again petitioned the Town to accept Green View Drive as a public road; the Residents joined in this request. The Town denied the petition. The trial court construed August 2000 and September 2001 agreements as granting The Ledges an easement to use Green View Drive for the purpose of golf cart travel. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed portions of the superior court's order, finding that the court erred in finding the road was part of the golf course's "infrastructure." Furthermore, the Supreme Court vacated that portion of the superior court's order pertaining to the maintenance of the road. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Crowley v. Town of Loudon" on Justia Law

Defendant Town of Madison Planning Board appealed and Plaintiffs Thomas and Margaret Ettinger cross-appealed a superior court's decision which held that a private session of the Board violated the state's Right-to-Know Law (RTK) and denied Plaintiffs' request for attorney fees. In June 2009, the Pomeroy Limited Partnership (Pomeroy) received conditional approval from the Board to convert the buildings on its property to a condominium ownership form and to convey part of the property to the Nature Conservancy. In January 2010, Plaintiffs, whose property abuts the Pomeroy property, requested a public hearing to allow them to challenge the approval of the condominium plan. The Board scheduled a public hearing for March 3, 2010, to consider whether to grant final approval of the Pomeroy application. Plaintiffs' attorney appeared at that hearing. At the scheduled time of the hearing, the Board went into a private session for thirty minutes in which they read emails from the Board's attorney, a memorandum that summarized legal advice and letters from Plaintiffs' attorney. The Board then reopened the hearing and then after hearing Plaintiffs' attorney on the matter, granted final approval of the Pomeroy application. Plaintiffs sued alleging the Board violated the RTK law. The superior court agreed that the private session violated the RTK law, but refused to invalidate the Board's approval of the Pomeroy application. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that while the Board's written communications from its counsel may be protected from disclosure under the RTK law, the meeting itself need not have been closed to the public. Further, the Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' attorney fees: "[w]e cannot find that … the Board should have known that the nonpublic session violated the Right-to-Know Law" to therefore entitle them to fees. View "Ettinger v. Town of Madison Planning Board " on Justia Law

Petitioners Thomas Morrissey, Dorothy Sears, Reginald Rogers, John Quimby, Michael O’Donnell, Jonathan Chamberlain, Patricia Reynolds, Richard and Barbara Sanders, Margaret Russell, and Robert and Judith Dupuis, appealed a superior court order that granted motions to dismiss filed by Respondents New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services and New Hampshire Fish and Game Department (collectively referred to as the State), and Town of Lyme (Town). Post Pond is in Lyme, held in trust by the State for public use. Petitioners own properties with frontage on Post Pond and the west side of the Clay Brook wetlands. The Town owns property on the east side of the Clay Brook wetlands as well as a contiguous parcel with frontage on Post Pond, which consists of a recreation area. In May 2009, Petitioners filed a petition in equity and writ of mandamus alleging that the Town's removal of beaver dams in the Pond that controlled the natural mean high water mark adversely affected their properties and disrupted the entire Clay Brook wetlands ecosystem. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioners' writ allegations were insufficient to state a claim for taking or nuisance against the Town, and that the trial court did not err in dismissing their claims. Further, the Court concluded that Petitioners failed to plead a claim entitling them to declaratory relief. View "Morrissey v. Town of Lyme" on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Hayes appealed a superior court order that denied his petition to enjoin a sheriff's sale and found a prejudgment attachment by Appellee Southern New Hampshire Medical Center (SNHMC or Hospital) valid and executable. In 2006, Appellant's wife Karen was admitted to the SNMHC for medical treatment stemming from alcoholism. SNHMC filed suit in superior court against Appellant for his wife's unpaid medical bills. At the same time, the hospital petitioned to attach a portion of the couple's real estate owned as a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. During the pendancy of the attachment proceedings, the Hayses divorced. Under the terms of their separation agreement, each was responsible for their own medical expenses not covered by insurance. Mrs. Hayes quitclaimed her interest in the real estate. Shortly thereafter, she died. SNHMC obtained a limited probate administration in order to proceed with the sheriff's sale of the properties. The trial court found that Mrs. Hayes' interests in the subject properties remained valid and that SNHMC was entitled to execute its judgment against them. On appeal, Appellant contended that, because Mrs. Hayes quitclaimed her interest in the property prior to entry of final judgment against her, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it failed to find that her death terminated SNHMC’s prejudgment attachment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that SNHMC’s prejudgment attachment was obtained and recorded during Mrs. Hayes' lifetime and while she held the property jointly with her husband. As such the hospital's judgment remained valid. The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the hospital. View "Hayes v. So. New Hampshire Medical Ctr" on Justia Law

Petitioner Town of Newington appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to the State through the the Pease Development Authority (PDA) and the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES). Before land from the former Pease Air Force Base was deeded to the PDA, the United States Air Force engaged in a series of environmental impact analyses required by federal law. Following several iterations of environmental documents and deed restrictions, PDA accepted title to the Pease AFB land in three title transfers between 1999 and 2005. Shortly thereafter, the Town began the process of designating prime wetlands within its borders pursuant to state law. Six wetlands were located within the former Pease base. DES initially "approved" the Town's request, but later clarified that it "did not purport to 'approve' the legality of the Town's designation of prime wetlands located within PDA boundaries, nor would the agency have statutory authority to do so." Several months later, as part of a proposed construction project on PDA land to expand an existing office building, an alteration of terrain permit application was filed with DES. The Town rejected, asserting that it involved fill within 100 feet of wetlands that the Town had designated as "prime" and, therefore, required a wetlands permit. DES disagreed. After the Wetlands Council dismissed its appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the Town filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief in superior court. The trial court concluded that PDA was not required to comply with the Town’s prime wetlands designations and, therefore, granted PDA and DES’s motion for summary judgment. Upon careful consideration of the superior court records and the deeds of the wetlands in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the DES' reservation when first 'approving' the six wetlands within the PDA did not confer the Town with standing to challenge any subsequent development. As such, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment. View "Town of Newington v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Defendants Robin Colburn and Ronald and Richard Tennant appealed a superior court order that denied their motion to dismiss this action by Plaintiffs Richard and Cheryl Fellows and Benjamin Bellerose. Plaintiffs were successors-in-interest to property once owned by Defendants' parents. The property was subject to a 1996 lead paint abatement order. Defendants' parents sold the property to Jesus and Eileen Guzman who were not aware of the abatement order when they sold the property to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then brought suit upon discovery of the abatement order. Defendants argued that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over them because despite being administrators of their parents' estate, none of the Defendants actually lived in New Hampshire. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs failed to plead facts suffiient to justify the court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over Defendants as either successor trustees or beneficiaries. Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not plead facts sufficient for the court to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's judgment. View "Fellows v. Colburn" on Justia Law

Petitioners Curtis and Deborah Avery appealed a superior court order that dismissed their petition for a declaratory judgment for pertaining to a lot size waiver that was granted to Respondent Concord School District (District) by Respondent New Hampshire Department of Education (DOE). In 2009, the School Board for the District voted to demolish and rebuild Kimball School. The lot size for the proposed new building did not meet the minimum lot size requirements in the state Administrative Rules. As a result, the District applied for a waiver of the lot size requirements with the DOE. Petitioners owned rental property adjacent to the school lot. In 2010, they sought a declaratory judgment that the waiver was "invalid and void." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's ruling that Petitioners lacked standing to challenge the waiver was correct. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss Petitioner's case. View "Avery & New Hampshire Dept. of Education" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Alfred and Susan Marshall appealed a superior court's order that granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Plaintiffs' claim to a prescriptive easement over defendants' beach front property (the “Beach Lot”) Plaintiffs' and defendants' lots were originally part of a parcel acquired by Francis Lord in 1871. Lord sold several beachfront lots (but not the Beach Lot) during his lifetime. After Lord’s death, his heirs continued to sell parcels from his land, including several non-waterfront back lots. The Town of Ossipee (Town) acquired title to the Beach Lot by a tax collector’s deed in 1987. The Town conveyed the Beach Lot by quitclaim deed in 1993. In June 2010, Plaintiffs filed this action for the court's determination that they held prescriptive rights to use the Beach Lot. Plaintiffs claimed that, prior to the Town’s acquisition of the Beach Lot by tax deed in 1987, they and their predecessors had made more than twenty years of open, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted use of the Beach Lot to access Lake Ossipee, thus giving them a prescriptive easement over that lot. The defendants challenged Plaintiffs’ claim on five grounds, one being that any prescriptive easement to use the Beach Lot, which may have existed prior to 1987, was extinguished by the Town’s acquisition of the property by tax deed in that year. Without deciding whether Plaintiffs actually had an easement prior to 1987, the court held that even assuming such easement existed, the tax deed cut off even ripened prescriptive rights as a matter of law. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that that the trial court erred in determining any easement they might have had prior to the tax deed was extinguished by that deed. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Plaintiffs, and reversed the superior court's decision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Marshall & Burke" on Justia Law

Petitioner Brandt Development Company of New Hampshire, LLC (Brandt) appealed a Superior Court order that upheld a decision of Respondent City of Somersworth’s (City) zoning board of adjustment (ZBA). The ZBA denied its application for a variance. Brandt owned a house and attached barn in the residential multi-family district of the City. In November 1994, Brandt applied for a variance from size and frontage requirements to convert the property, then being used as a duplex, into four dwelling units. The ZBA denied the application after finding that the property failed to satisfy the five criteria for a variance. From 1995 to 1997, Brandt added four bedrooms to the upstairs unit after receiving permits to do so. In December 2009, Brandt again sought to convert the property into a four-unit dwelling, and again applied to the ZBA for a variance from the City’s area, frontage, and setback requirements. The ZBA declined to consider the merits of the variance application on the basis that “circumstances [had] not changed sufficiently to warrant acceptance of the application.” The superior court affirmed the ZBA’s decision in August 2010. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the legal criteria the ZBA used in making its determination were not "discreet and unrelated criteria, but interrelated concepts that aim to ensure a proper balance between the legitimate aims of municipal planning and the hardship that may sometimes result from a literal enforcement of zoning ordinances." As such, the Court found that the ZBA's denial of Brandt's variance application was not reasonable in light of state law, and it reversed the ZBA's and Superior Court's decisions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Brandt Development Company of New Hampshire, LLC v. City of Somersworth " on Justia Law