Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Nahla Abounaja appealed a district court order that awarded petitioner Myla Randall, $18,000 in damages because of the respondent's willful failure to provide heat to the petitioner's apartment for eighteen days. Petitioner rented an apartment from the respondent in Rochester. At some point before March 23, 2011, petitioner complained to the city's plumbing and health inspector that her apartment lacked heat. An inspector came to the premises and discovered that there was no heat in the petitioner's master bedroom because neither the radiator nor the electric heater worked. The inspector called respondent about this issue and met with her two days later. The inspector then sent a letter to the respondent about this problem, giving her fourteen days to remedy it. The respondent did not respond to the letter, nor did she return the inspector's subsequent telephone calls. Petitioner then filed suit on April 12, and the trial court issued a temporary order requiring respondent "to immediately restore and maintain all utility services" to the petitioner's apartment. Following the hearing on the petition, the trial court found that the respondent was aware that the heating units did not work and that she failed to have them repaired until April 18, and that her actions were willful. In her brief, respondent argued that her conduct was not "wil[l]ful" because she did not cause the petitioner's apartment to lack heat in the first instance. She argued that, at most, she merely "allow[ed]" the heating service to be interrupted; she did not "cause" the interruption itself. Her merely "negligent omission" did not constitute a willful act. Based upon the evidence at trial, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court reasonably found that the respondent's failure to have the units repaired was intentional, and, therefore, willful. However, because the trial court committed plain error when it awarded the petitioner $1,000 per day for at least some days that the respondent's violation of RSA 540-A:3, I, the Court vacated $17,000 of the damage award and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court was tasked with determining whether respondent willfully violated RSA 540-A:3, I after April 12, and, if so, the court was instructed to award petitioner $1,000 per day for each day that the respondent's violation continued. View "Randall v. Abounaja" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kevin P. Sheehan appealed a superior court order in favor of Respondent New Hampshire Department of Resources and Economic Development (DRED) on his request for declaratory, injunctive, and other relief. In 2008, Petitioner purchased property in Derry which abuts Jackman Road, a class VI town road and not in good condition. The Property is connected to Warner Hill Road by a .44 mile tract of land that is under DRED’s control as part of its statewide trail system. Before purchasing the Property, Petitioner understood that the State claimed ownership of a small corridor adjacent to his land and that a gate blocked non-recreational motor vehicle access. After purchasing the property, Petitioner filed this equity action seeking to bar DRED from prohibiting or interfering with non-recreational motor vehicle access over the portion of the corridor separating his property from Warner Hill Road. Ultimately the superior court determined that the State had acquired title in fee simple to the corridor through a highway layout and that the portion of the corridor abutting the property was not a "public road" because the State has never "constructed" on it. On appeal, Petitioner contended that the trial court erred when it determined that the State owned the corridor in fee simple and when it found that the corridor was not a public road. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that DRED did not bar Petitioner’s access over the corridor. Rather, DRED prohibited one form of access, non-recreational motor vehicle travel. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court did not err in concluding that DRED has not limited "the public’s right to pass over existing public roads" pursuant to state law. View "Sheehan v. New Hampshire Dept. of Resources & Economic Dev." on Justia Law

Respondent William Rines appealed a superior court order that enjoined him from excavating on certain real property until he obtained a local use variance from Petitioner Town of Carroll (Town), and that imposed civil penalties and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the respondent did not challenge the trial court’s determination that both types of excavation are exempt from the permitting requirements of RSA chapter 155-E. He argued, however, that the trial court erred when it determined that RSA chapter 155-E did not preempt the zoning ordinance provisions applicable to both types of excavation. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in finding that the requirements of Section VI of the Town’s zoning ordinance were not preempted by RSA chapter 155-E. Given its conclusion, the Court did not reach the other issues raised in the respondent’s appeal. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Town of Carroll v. Rines" on Justia Law

Respondent Richard Townsend, appealed a superior court order that: (1) granted summary judgment in favor of the petitioner, Town of Barrington (Town), on its claims that respondent used his property as a campground and his barn as a dwelling without proper Town approvals; and (2) awarded attorney's fees to the Town. In September 2008, the motor home in which the respondent had been living sustained damage from an electrical fire rendering it uninhabitable. Following the fire, he moved into his barn, which he described as "adequate for emergency living quarters." The barn is a two-story structure with a workshop on the lower level and the respondent's office on the upper level. The barn has insulation, sheetrock, carpet, electricity, plumbing, two heating systems, and central air conditioning. The second floor also has restaurant kitchen equipment, a sink, a bed, a futon, a game table, and massage and fitness equipment. In March 2009, the Town sent the respondent a notice of zoning violation/cease and desist order. The respondent replied that although he had not yet completed the repairs to his fire-damaged RV, he would "move the unfinished home from the barn to appease the town." He asserted that he had moved out of the barn by April 1, 2009. The Town asserted that it sent a second letter to the respondent in May 2009, "reiterating the violations and notifying [him] that court action would be taken if he failed to come into compliance." It commenced that action in July for preliminary and permanent injunctions, civil penalties, and attorney's fees. The respondent brought a number of counterclaims alleging, among other things, bad faith by the Town's code enforcement officer and police chief. The Town moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Town's motion. On appeal, the respondent argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the code violation issues because "[m]aterial issues of fact existed regarding [his] use of his property and barn." He also argued that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to the Town. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Town of Barrington v. Townsend" on Justia Law

Petitioners J.K.S. Realty, LLC and L.J.J. Realty, LLC, appealed a superior court ruling that Respondent City of Nashua did not take their property by inverse condemnation. Petitioners are two trusts that owned as tenants-in-common a 26.8 acre parcel of land that was originally purchased in 1980 for development purposes. The northern section of the property was in the area of a planned "Board Street Parkway." In 1983, Petitioners successfully petitioned to have the property rezoned to prepare the property for sale to a developer. Since 1998, they made numerous unsuccessful attempts to sell the property or any portion thereof. The last purchase and sale agreement was entered into in 2002, for sale of the entire property with a closing in April 2004. At some point, the buyer learned that the City was unsure whether it would take the property for the parkway and asked the petitioners for an extension until he learned what the City intended to do. The petitioners decided to keep the property until it was resolved whether the City was going to take the property and, as a result, the sale did not go through. Since 2004, the petitioners have not marketed the property. However, they have harvested timber on the property for a profit and there was testimony that, unless prohibited by zoning regulations, the petitioners "would have been able to undertake" building "single-family residences, . . . conservation subdivisions, modular homes, manufactured homes, elderly housing, commercial uses, and multi-family developments." In 2009, the petitioners filed a petition for inverse condemnation, requesting that the trial court rule that the City took the property by inverse condemnation in 2004, and sought damages, including but not limited to, the fair market value of the property on that date. They alleged that the delays and continuing uncertainty regarding the parkway deprived them of all economically viable use of their property as of April 2004, when the last purchase and sale agreement fell through. Finding that the trial court properly declined to rule that the property was taken by inverse condemnation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "J.K.S. Realty, LLC v. City of Nashua " on Justia Law

The respondents, Malborn Realty Trust and its trustee, Daniel Osborn, appealed a superior court order that enjoined Osborn from occupying property in Atkinson because he lacked an occupancy permit and that imposed a civil penalty for this violation. Petitioner Town of Atkinson cross-appealed the trial court’s failure to award it attorney’s fees. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s issuance of the injunction, modified its imposition of civil penalties, reversed its denial of attorney’s fees, and remanded. View "Town of Atkinson v. Malborn Realty Trust" on Justia Law

In this declaratory judgment proceeding, the defendant, Citizens Insurance Company of America, appealed a superior court order which ruled in favor of the plaintiff, The Barking Dog, Ltd., which operates a dog kennel and grooming business at several locations in New Hampshire. The court ruled that an insurance policy issued by the defendant provided coverage for damage to the plaintiff’s septic system and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $20,000, the agreed upon damage amount. The court also ruled that the defendant was not prejudiced by the plaintiff’s failure to disclose its expert’s report in a timely manner or its failure to disclose its expert’s curriculum vitae and, accordingly, permitted the plaintiff’s expert to testify at trial. The defendant argued that both rulings were error. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "The Barking Dog, Ltd. v. Citizens Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal of a superior court order that denied a motion to dismiss filed by the Town of Sugar Hill (Town). The superior court transferred the following issue for the Court's review: Whether RSA 76:16 requires all landowners to sign and certify their applications for abatement, in whichever form such applications take; that they have a "good faith basis and the facts in the application are true" before they may appeal any assessment decision of a municipality to the superior court or to the BTLA [Board of Tax and Land Appeals], especially when the facts show a knowing and purposeful choice not to sign said application. Upon review of the facts and record of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that, although the Town lawfully denied the petitioner's application based upon its lack of signature and certification, the superior court may nevertheless review the Town's denial to determine whether review by the Town on the merits is appropriate in the circumstances. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Henderson Holdings at Sugar Hill, LLC v. Town of Sugar Hill" on Justia Law

Petitioner Tracy Walbridge appealed a superior court order that denied her petition to establish her homestead right exempt from the mortgage held by Respondents the Estate of Raymond Beaudoin, Jr. and its co-administrators Steven Beaudoin and Raymond Beaudoin, III. Petitioner owned property in Rochester that she purchased with her then-husband. At that time, it was undeveloped land. Petitioner executed a mortgage on the property and released her homestead rights to that property. Allegedly unbeknownst to Petitioner, her husband executed a mortgage deed and promissory note on the property in favor of the decedent Raymond Beaudoin once a home was built there. The mortgage on the property did not list it as part of the homestead of the mortgagor. Petitioner and her husband divorced, and pursuant to the divorce decree, she was awarded all right, title and interest in the property. The property was foreclosed upon. Petitioner filed a petition to establish that her homestead right to the property was exempt from Respondents' mortgage. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found that her homestead right in the property was not established until she actually, physically occupied it. She contended that her "obvious intention of present and immediate occupancy of the home . . . followed by [her] actual occupancy within a reasonable time, was equivalent to actual occupancy." The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court. View "Walbridge v. The Estate of Raymond A. Beaudoin, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner Merriam Farm, Inc. appealed a superior court's decision to uphold the denial of its application for a building permit by the zoning board of adjustment (ZBA) of the Town of Surry. In 2009, Merriam Farm applied for a permit to construct a single-family home on a three-acre parcel of land. Under the Town's zoning ordinance, 200 feet of frontage on a public street was required to build. The ZBA determined that the frontage to the property had been closed since 1971 "subject to gates and bars for the purpose of preventing development in this area." Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the ZBA's nor the superior court's order to deny the building permit, and accordingly affirmed those decisions. View "Merriam Farm, Inc. v. Town of Surry" on Justia Law