Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff J. Albert Lynch, Trustee of FIN-LYN Trust, appealed a superior court order granting a motion to dismiss his action seeking to enforce restrictive covenants contained in a deed between the Trustee and the Town of Pelham. The trial court ruled that the covenants at issue are appurtenant and personal, and that the Trustee lacked standing to enforce them. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the covenants at issue were gross and enforceable by the Trustee, and that the record established that he had a legitimate interest in enforcing them on behalf of the Trust. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lynch v. Town of Pelham" on Justia Law

Respondents Susan and Joseph Traina appealed a Superior Court order which ruled in favor of the petitioners, Ralph and Ruth Gallo, on their petition to quiet title to land that the Gallos used to access their home on Captain's Pond in Salem. In 1986, the Gallos purchased land on Emilio Lane Extension. They tore down the existing structures and, in 1987, built their current home. The next year they built a garage. Since purchasing the property, the Gallos have accessed the garage by using a looped driveway that ended on Emilio Lane Extension. They paved the driveway in May 1989. Before doing so, the Gallos installed a cement retaining wall and a decorative stone wall, planted a "burning bush" inside the stone wall, and planted various flowers and other vegetation along one side of the paved driveway. In 1997, Susan Traina purchased property on Captain's Pond. In 2004, as part of a settlement agreement with her cousin, Ronald Peredna, she became the owner of a strip of land immediately to the east of the Gallos' property, which included a paved area directly in front of the Gallos' walkway to their home and garage, a portion of their retaining wall and decorative stone wall, and a "burning bush." At some point, Peredna had acquired an easement to use a strip of land between the Gallos' property and his own property. The strip of land was then-owned by Dennis Iannalfo and his wife. Peredna later conveyed an easement deed to Susan, purporting to convey the easement to her. The Gallos' paved driveway and plantings were included on the Iannalfo strip of land. This lawsuit stemmed from the long-running dispute between the neighbors that culminated in Susan's threat to build a fence around her property to cut off the Gallos' access to their garage. She also demanded that the Gallos remove the stone wall and plantings. The Gallos sought a declaration that they had a prescriptive easement to use their paved driveway located on the strip of land owned by the Iannalfos and that they had the right, by adverse possession, to maintain their retaining and decorative stone walls and plantings on Susan's land. Susan filed a cross-petition asserting a superior right to use the Iannalfo strip of land. Finding no reversible error, however, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment in favor of the Gallos. View "Gallo v. Traina" on Justia Law

Respondent, the City of Concord (City) appealed a superior court decision granting summary judgment in favor of petitioner Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC d/b/a FairPoint Communications - NNE (FairPoint), in its equal protection challenge to the City’s taxation of FairPoint’s use and occupation of public property, and striking the tax levied against FairPoint. In order to provide telecommunications services throughout the City, FairPoint maintained poles, wires, cables, and other equipment within the City’s public rights-of-way. For the 2000 to 2010 tax years, the City imposed a real estate tax upon FairPoint for its use and occupation of this public property. Prior to 2010, the City did not impose a right-of-way tax upon Comcast, which used the City’s rights-of-way to provide cable services pursuant to a franchise agreement. The City began imposing the tax upon Comcast in 2010 in response to a ruling by the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) that, notwithstanding the franchise agreement, Comcast was subject to the tax. Prior to 2008, the City did not impose the same tax upon Public Service of New Hampshire (PSNH) because it was unaware that PSNH had used and occupied the rights-of-way. Similarly, the City did not tax certain other users of its rights-of-way for their use and occupation of public property during the relevant tax years because it was not aware of their usage. FairPoint brought an action challenging, in relevant part, the constitutionality of the City’s right-of-way tax assessments against it for the 2000 through 2010 tax years. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In granting FairPoint’s motion, and denying the City’s motion, the trial court ruled, as an initial matter, that "intentionality" was not a required element of FairPoint’s equal protection claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that FairPoint’s equal protection claim was one of "selective enforcement," and not an equal protection challenge to the tax scheme itself. Thus, because the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in ruling that the City selectively imposed the tax upon FairPoint, the Court vacated the trial court’s rulings and remanded for further proceedings. View "Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

In 1993, John Houlahan and his wife, Theresa, established the "Theresa M. Houlahan Revocable Trust of 1993" containing the marital home. John was named successor trustee of, and granted certain powers over, the Theresa Trust. Upon the deaths of Theresa and John, the real property was to be distributed to their son, petitioner Thomas Houlahan. Theresa died in 1996. In 1997, John established the "John F. Houlahan 1997 Revocable Trust." John named his daughter (respondent) as successor trustee. In November 2002, John conveyed the real property by deed to himself, as trustee of the John Trust. John died in 2009. Under the terms of the John Trust, "[a]ny interest this trust may have in any real estate" was to be distributed in equal shares to four of his children: petitioner, respondent, John F. Houlahan, Jr., and Terrence B. Houlahan. In 2011, petitioner filed a "Petition for Injunction" seeking, among other things, an order that the property be returned to the Theresa Trust and that respondent, as successor trustee of the John Trust, be enjoined from making any attempt to dispose of the property. In late 2011, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that there was "no genuine issue of material fact" that John's "actions in his capacity as Trustee violated the terms of [the Theresa Trust] and specific provisions of the Uniform Trust Code." Following a hearing, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment, finding that there were many disputed factual issues that could not be decided on the pleadings. On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court erred in granting respondent's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the transfer of the real estate in 2002 effectively terminated the trust and the petitioner's interest in the trust. He asserted that "[w]hen John breached his fiduciary duties, the trust gained an additional asset– a cause of action against John or his estate," and, thus, "[n]either [the petitioner's] beneficial interest nor the trust was terminated by John's conveyance." After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Theresa Trust did not terminate in 2002, and neither did the petitioner's interest therein. The trial court's finding, that there were "many disputed issues of material fact" that could not be decided on the pleadings, was not erroneous. Accordingly, the Court affirmed its denial of petitioner's motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "In re Theresa Houlahan Trust" on Justia Law

The Town of Charlestown appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) dismissing its petition for reclassification of current use parcels owned by taxpayer TransCanada Hydro Northeast, Inc. The Town asserted that, "[b]ecause the three parcels are part of a development involving land use for the purpose of generating electricity, they have been improperly classified as open space land under" RSA chapter 79-A. As a result, the Town requested that the BTLA revoke the current use status of the three parcels and require the Town's assessing officials to reclassify the parcels. The Town further requested that the BTLA issue an order requiring the assessing officials to reassess taxes for tax years 2007 through 2012. TransCanada objected, arguing that the three parcels were not improperly classified as open space land. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the BTLA did not err in dismissing the Town's petition for reclassification on the ground that the Town could unilaterally reclassify the land. As the Town agreed at oral argument, the Court did not address whether the Town could apply the reclassification retrospectively. View "Appeal of Town of Charlestown" on Justia Law

Petitioners Thomas and Margaret Ettinger, and Ettinger Family Holdings, Inc., appealed a Superior Court order denying their summary judgment motion and granting summary judgment to respondents Pomeroy Limited Partnership and The Nature Conservancy (TNC), on the petitioners’ petition for declaratory judgment. The parties owned real property on or around Silver Lake in Madison. The Ettingers owned the servient estate identified on Madison Tax Map 121 as Lot 4; the original dominant estate, Lot 160, was separated from Lot 4 by lots owned parties not named in this litigation. There was no dispute that Lot 160 had an easement to use "Winter Road Extension." In 2010, Pomeroy Limited conveyed 31.63 acres of its property to TNC. The conveyance included land that comprised most of Lot 161 and a portion of Lot 160. Pomeroy Limited retained a 7.4-acre parcel that included the physical terminus of Winter Road Extension. The deed to TNC conveyed the "right of way over Winter Road Extension" and a "right of way over the remaining land of [Pomeroy Limited]." The deed to TNC also stated that the 31.63 acres conveyed are "not to be considered a separate lot of record," but were to "merge with the abutting land of [TNC]." The reference to "the abutting land" owned by TNC referred to TNC's nature preserve, known as Ossipee Pine Barrens Preserve. Following the conveyance, the Ettingers filed suit claiming the easement conveyed to TNC could benefit only Lot 160, and could not benefit Lot 161 or any of the rest of TNC's land with which Lots 160 and 161 have merged. The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this case was the interpretation of the deeds in Lot 160's chain of title. After review, the Court was unable to rely upon the language of the language of the 1930 deed that created the Winter Road Extension easement. The Court found that language was ambiguous. To the extent that the trial court relied solely upon the language of the 1930 deed to determine the intent of the parties creating the easement, it erred. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ettinger v. Pomeroy Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

Defendant Eugene Roe appealed circuit court decision awarding plaintiffs Leigh Mae Friedline and Zebadiah Kellogg-Roe a writ of possession. In 1959, the defendant purchased property in Greenville. In 1971, he conveyed the property to Brookwood Ecology Center, Inc. Brookwood reconveyed the house and barn on the property to defendant in 1999. In 2004, defendant conveyed the house and barn to his son, plaintiff Kellogg-Roe. In 2009, Kellogg-Roe transferred a twenty percent interest in the buildings to Friedline. That same year, Kellogg-Roe gave Friedline a power of attorney to act as his agent. Defendant has lived on the property since he purchased it. In 2012, Friedline served him with an eviction notice, ordering him to vacate the premises within thirty days. Although the eviction notice stated that the buildings were owned by both Kellogg-Roe and Friedline, only Friedline signed the notice. When defendant did not vacate the premises, plaintiffs filed a landlord and tenant writ. Following a hearing, the district division awarded plaintiffs a writ of possession. On appeal, defendant argued that he properly asserted a plea of title and, consequently, the district division erred by not transferring the case to superior court. He further argued that the court exceeded its jurisdiction by ruling on the issues raised in his plea of title. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the district division had jurisdiction in this case. Rather than providing defendant with the opportunity to enter his action in superior court, the district division held a hearing during which it addressed, among other issues, the merits of his claim to a life estate in the property. Because jurisdiction to resolve questions of title and matters of equity lies with the superior court, the Supreme Court concluded the district division erred by ruling on this claim. Consequently, the Court vacated the district division’s order. View "Friedline v. Roe" on Justia Law

Defendant City of Portsmouth (City), appeals a jury verdict awarding $128,111 as just compensation for the defendant’s taking by eminent domain of easement rights in property of plaintiff Houston Holdings, LLC. Defendant challenged the Superior Court’s ruling on a motion in limine and the Superior Court’s denial of a motion to set aside the verdict. Finding no error in the Superior Court's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Houston Holdings, LLC v. City of Portsmouth" on Justia Law

Respondents Steven and Philomena Landrigan appealed a Superior Court order finding that they unlawfully subdivided their property and granting petitioner Town of Newbury's request for injunctive relief and the imposition of a $2,000 fine. Respondents argued that the trial court erred in finding that their conduct and that of their predecessors had merged two non-conforming parcels into a single lot. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Town of Newbury v. Landrigan" on Justia Law

Petitioners Bilden Properties, LLC and TD Bank, N.A. appealed and respondents S. Gerald and Gail Birin cross-appealed a superior court order finding, among other things, that the petitioners were bona fide purchasers for value, who acquired interests in the subject property without notice of the Birins’ mortgage on it. The Supreme Court concluded petitioners purchased the subject property subject to the Birins’ mortgage, upholding the trial court’s decision to the extent that it allowed the Birins to foreclose. To the extent that the trial court granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the Birins from foreclosing, the Court vacated that permanent injunction. Additionally, the Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that petitioners’ interests were equitably subrogated up to the amount paid to discharge the mortgages held by Southern New Hampshire Bank. View "Bilden Properties, LLC v. Birin" on Justia Law