Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners Raymond and Pamela Choquette filed separate petitions against respondents Phillippe Roy (P.E. Roy), individually and as trustee of the Roy Family Trust, Jason Roy and Thomas and Kelly Robichaud. Consolidated case related to the transfer of, use o and access to certain parcels of land originally owned by petitioners and currently owned by respondents. Petitioners appealed, and respondents cross-appealed the superior court's order resolving the dispute. Because the trial court found that P.E. Roy had no right to maintain a road that access the parcels in question, the court did not reach the issue of whether P.E. Roy's specific acts of maintenance interfered with the rights of petitioners or other users of the easement. The Supreme Court, therefore, held only that the trial court erred in ruling that P.E. Roy did not have the right and duty to maintain the easement over "Sugar Shack" Right of Way. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling on this issue and remanded for further proceedings as the trial court might deem warranted, including, if necessary, determination of whether P.E. Roy's actions interfered with the rights of the petitioners or other users of the easement. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Choquette v. Roy" on Justia Law

Defendants, Keith McNamara, Shirley Benton, and Jerel Benton, appealed: (1) a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, Richard and Mary Murray, on their claim that the defendants breached the implied warranty of workmanlike quality; (2) a Superior Court order denying their motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim; and (3) a Superior Court order finding that the defendants violated the CPA when they built the plaintiffs' home with latent structural defects that caused mold growth. Defendants argued that, because plaintiffs' claim was exempt from the CPA, the trial court erred by denying their motion to dismiss. Defendants added that the trial court erred by denying their motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the plaintiffs breach of implied warranty claim. There is no dispute that the transaction at issue here is the defendants alleged construction of the house with latent structural defects, not any representations that the defendants made to others during or after construction. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, finding that because the house was completed in 2004 and was purchased by the plaintiffs five years later and the allegedly wrongful transaction occurred more than three years before the plaintiffs "knew or reasonably should have known" of it, the construction of the house was an exempt transaction pursuant to RSA 358-A:3, IV-a and that plaintiffs' CPA claim should have been dismissed. Thus, the Court reversed the trial court's ruling on the CPA claim. However, the Court was not persuaded that defendants were insulated from liability on the breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike quality claim. Because the Court reversed the trial court's judgment on the CPA claim, defendants failed to show that they were prejudiced with respect to the breach of warranty claim. View "Murray v. McNamara" on Justia Law

In this declaratory judgment proceeding, respondents, David and Joanne Hodges, appealed a Superior Court order ruling that they must contribute to the maintenance and repair of an easement they hold over property owned by the petitioner, Village Green Condominium Association (Village Green). The Hodgeses objected, arguing: (1) that the plain language of the easement deed "addressed the issue of maintenance and improvement of the right of way" and "gave [them] the affirmative right, but not the corresponding obligation, to improve and maintain the right of way;" (2) Village Green's claim was barred by waiver and laches; and (3) because Village Green "never made any demand upon [them] to contribute to the cost of the maintenance and improvement of the right of way," and because they "did nothing to maintain, repair or improve the easement," the course of dealing of the parties was such that they are under no obligation to contribute to the easement's maintenance and repair. Following the trial court's ruling, the parties entered into a settlement agreement regarding the nature and extent of the Hodgeses' contribution obligation. In the agreement, the parties acknowledged that the Hodgeses intended to appeal the trial court's ruling as to their obligation to contribute to easement maintenance and repair, and established an agreed-upon procedure for determining the past and future maintenance obligations should the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirm the trial court's ruling. This appeal followed. The Supreme Court, finding no reversible error, affirmed. View "Village Green Condo. Ass'n v. Hodges" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Dean and Suzanne Ingram appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to defendants Michael Drouin and Drouin Builders, Inc. on plaintiffs' claims for damages. The dispute arose over the sale of a house in Laconia. Drouin Builders originally purchased the property on which the house was built, and Michael Drouin lived there prior to selling the property to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contended that the didn't notice any problems with the house until several years had passed since the sale of the house. Plaintiffs then brought a write seeking damages against defendants for failing to "properly construct" the house. Defendants countered that an eight-year statute of limitations had passed, and plaintiffs' claims were therefore barred. The trial court agreed, and plaintiffs appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ingram v. Drouin" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cogswell Farm Condominium Association filed a declaratory judgment action with respect to two exclusions in insurance policies issued by respondents Tower Group, Inc. and Acadia Insurance Company. The trial court held that the two exclusions at issue precluded coverage for petitioner's underlying lawsuit against Lemery Building Company, Inc. In 2009, Cogswell sued Lemery and others, alleging negligence, breach of contract, and negligent supervision in the construction of 24 residential condominium units. Cogswell asserted that the "weather barrier" components of the units – including the water/ice shield, flashing, siding, and vapor barrier – were defectively constructed and resulted in damage to the units due to water leaks. Because the units were sold at different times and the policies were in effect during two different time periods, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in holding that one policy exclusion served as a bar for coverage for each unit after it was sold. Furthermore, the Court found that the other exclusion was subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in granting respondents summary judgment with respect to that exclusion. The trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cogswell Farm Condominium Ass'n v. Tower Group, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a four-unit condominium located on Boston Avenue in Hampton, known as the Boston Four Condominium. Each unit was a free-standing residential building. The four units are arranged in a rectangle; units 7 and 9 are adjacent to one another bordering Boston Avenue, and units 7R and 9R are rear units located behind units 7 and 9 respectively. In addition to the residential buildings, the condominium also includes certain property around the four units that the declaration designates as either “common area” or “limited common area.” Common area is property in which each unit owner has “an equal one-fourth (25%) undivided interest.” In the mid-2000s, the unit owners had several disagreements relating to the operation of the condominium. The issues included allocation of costs relating to the units’ connection to new sewer lines, the propriety of additions made to units 7R and 9R, and use of the common area. Pursuant to a clause in the declaration requiring the arbitration of disputes between and/or among unit owners, the parties submitted their dispute to a neutral arbitrator. Respondent Richard Holt filed a petition in superior court seeking to confirm the arbitrator's decision. Petitioners Gary and Katherine Keer and Frederick Guthrie filed a separate action appealing the arbitrator's decision. The trial court consolidated the two actions, held no hearing, granted Holt's petition and denied the Keers' and Guthrie's petitions. The court then confirmed the arbitrator’s award and “required [all parties] to comply with its terms.” On August 28, 2012, the condominium association recorded an amendment to the declaration and bylaws (2012 amendment). This amendment changed the designation of certain condominium property from common area to limited common area, to the benefit of units 7R and 9R, and to the detriment of the remaining units. In response to the amendment, the Keers filed a “Motion to Bring Forward to Enforce the Court Order/Contempt” with the trial court. In the motion, the Keers alleged numerous violations of the arbitrator’s 2009 decision. The trial court denied this motion. In April 2013, the condominium association recorded another amendment to the condominium instruments. This amendment inserted language into the declaration providing that written consent of three-fourths of the unit owners is sufficient to waive certain restrictive covenants. The amendment also inserted language into the bylaws that specifically allows condominium association meetings to take place if three-fourths of the unit owners attend. In May 2013, the Keers filed a “Motion for Contempt/Enforce the Court Orders” with the trial court. Among other things, the Keers alleged that the 2012 amendment violated the terms of the Condominium Act. The Keers also alleged that both amendments to the declaration were not legally effective because they had not been signed by a majority of the owners. The trial court denied the Keers’ motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the 2012 amendment was unlawful. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court either misconstrued the nature of the Keers’ request, or that it simply failed to address their statutory claims: the trial court erred when it stated that the Keers were only challenging "the court’s past decisions regarding the Condominium rules," and when it failed to address the Keers’ statutory argument. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s ruling on the Keers’ motion for contempt and remanded the case for further consideration. View "Holt v. Keer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs George Maroun, Sr. and Edith Maroun filed a petition seeking to enjoin defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company from foreclosing on property owned by Mrs. Maroun. The Superior Court denied plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion and granted the bank’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs appealed, and after careful consideration of the Superior Court record, the Supreme Court affirmed its decision. View "Maroun, Sr. v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company" on Justia Law

The respondents, Shared Towers VA, LLC and NH Note Investment, LLC, appealed, and petitioner Joseph Turner, individually and as trustee of the Routes 3 and 25 Nominee Trust, cross-appealed, Superior Court orders after a bench trial on petitioner’s petition for a preliminary injunction enjoining a foreclosure sale and for damages and reasonable attorney’s fees. The parties’ dispute stemmed from a commercial construction loan agreement and promissory note secured by a mortgage, pursuant to which petitioner was loaned $450,000 at 13% interest per annum to build a home. Respondents argued the trial court erred when it: (1) determined that they would be unjustly enriched if the court required the petitioner to pay the amounts he owed under the note from November 2009 until April 2011; (2) applied the petitioner’s $450,000 lump sum payment to principal; (3) excluded evidence of the petitioner’s experience with similar loans; (4) ruled that, because the promissory note failed to contain a "clear statement in writing" of the charges owed, as required by RSA 399-B:2 (2006), respondents could not collect a $22,500 delinquency charge on the petitioner’s lump sum payment of principal; and (5) denied the respondents’ request for attorney’s fees and costs. Petitioner argued that the trial court erroneously concluded that respondents’ actions did not violate the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded: contrary to the trial court’s decision, petitioner’s obligation to make the payments was not tolled. Because the loan agreement and note remained viable, it was error for the trial court to have afforded the petitioner a remedy under an unjust enrichment theory. The trial court made its decision with regard to the payment of $450,000 in connection with its conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to a remedy under an unjust enrichment theory. Because the Supreme Court could not determine how the trial court would have ruled upon this issue had it not considered relief under that equitable theory, and because, given the nature of the parties’ arguments, resolving this issue requires fact finding that must be done by the trial court in the first instance, it vacated that part of its order and remanded for further proceedings. In light of the trial court’s errors with regard to the attorney’s fees and costs claimed by respondents, the Supreme Court vacated the order denying them, and remanded for consideration of respondents’ request for fees and costs. The Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s rejection of petitioner’s CPA claim. View "Turner v. Shared Towers VA, LLC" on Justia Law

At the time of her death, decedent Muriel Mills she owned property in Manchester. She had granted a "home equity conversion mortgage" on the property to Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corporation. The mortgage deed was recorded at the Hillsborough County Registry of Deeds. The terms of the mortgage included a statutory power of sale that allowed Financial Freedom to foreclose upon the property under certain enumerated circumstances, including the death of the borrower. The terms also provided that the "Borrower shall have no personal liability for payment of the debt secured by this Security Instrument" and that the "Lender may enforce the debt only through the sale of the Property." Petitioner was appointed executor of the estate. By letter, counsel for petitioner notified Financial Freedom of the decedent's death and of the opening of the administration of her estate. Counsel also requested the current balance due on the mortgage debt as well as any information regarding "any assignment of the mortgage." Thereafter, Financial Freedom did not file notice of a claim or present a demand to the petitioner pursuant to RSA 556:1, :3 (2007). Later that year, counsel for Financial Freedom sent a letter to the estate explaining that she had been instructed to foreclose on the mortgage in the name of respondent under the power of sale contained in the mortgage. The letter also informed the estate that the note had been accelerated and the entire balance was "due and payable forthwith," and included the total amount of the balance due on the debt. In response, petitioner's counsel wrote to Financial Freedom claiming that it, "or any of its related entities, abandoned any interest[] that it may have had in the property" because it failed to file a claim within six months after the grant of administration of the estate. The next month, the mortgage was assigned to respondent and thereafter recorded at the Hillsborough County Registry of Deeds. Petitioner then filed a petition to quiet title in the circuit court, asserting that Financial Freedom had "waived, lost, or abandoned any interest that it would have had in the property" and, therefore, the circuit court could issue an order quieting title to the property so that the beneficiary named in the decedent's will could receive the property. Financial Freedom appeared at the hearing and moved to dismiss the quiet title action. The trial court ruled in Financial Freedom's favor, and petitioner appealed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision to dismiss, the Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal. View "In re Estate of Muriel R. Mills " on Justia Law

Petitioners Daryl and Marcy Dembiec appealed a superior court order dismissing their petition for equitable relief. In October 2011, petitioners obtained a permit from the respondent, the Town of Holderness to construct a single family home. Before the permit was issued, the only structure on the property was a two-story boathouse with living quarters on the second floor. In April 2012, when construction of the home was substantially completed, the Town's compliance officer advised the petitioners that he would not issue a certificate of compliance for their new home because the existing boathouse contained a dwelling unit, and the applicable zoning ordinance allowed two dwellings on a lot only when they are in the same structure, such as in a duplex. The compliance officer informed petitioners that, before he could issue a certificate of compliance, they would need either to obtain a variance or remove "all plumbing" from the boathouse. Petitioners then applied to the zoning board of adjustment for an equitable waiver from the ordinance. Two intervenors objected to the petitioners' request. The board originally granted the waiver, but on rehearing, denied it. Petitioners later sought a variance. The board denied their application. The superior court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitioners' municipal estoppel claim because they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Petitioners argued that the trial court had jurisdiction over their claim because they were not required to first raise it before the zoning board of adjustment. The Supreme Court was persuaded that appealing the compliance officer's decision to the zoning board would have been useless because the zoning board lacked the authority to grant the requested relief. Thus, exhaustion is not required. "The plain language of the pertinent statutes does not confer general equitable jurisdiction upon a zoning board. Nor could the zoning board have granted any relief to the petitioners under the applicable statutes or the Town's ordinance because their new home violated the ordinance, and they failed to meet the requirements for either a variance or an equitable waiver from dimensional requirements. Under those circumstances, we conclude that further pursuit of administrative remedies would have been futile, and, therefore, exhaustion of remedies is not required." Accordingly, petitioners' assertion of a municipal estoppel claim for the first time in the trial court was not barred by the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. The superior court's decision was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Dembiec v. Town of Holderness" on Justia Law