Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose over a deed transferring a one-half interest in a farm from a mother to her son, Peter, without consideration, while she was alive. After the mother’s death, her estate, left to four children in equal shares, was inventoried; the contested property was listed as belonging to Peter due to the earlier transfer. David, another son and a beneficiary, objected, claiming that the mother lacked capacity and was unduly influenced when she executed the deed. The estate administrator declined to pursue the claim, believing litigation costs would outweigh the benefit. David then initiated a separate action to invalidate the deed and impose a constructive trust, seeking to restore the property interest to the estate.The 6th Circuit Court–Concord Probate Division held a trial and ruled in favor of David, finding that Peter had unduly influenced the mother and that she lacked capacity at the time of the transfer. The probate court invalidated the deed, deferred ruling on the constructive trust, and awarded attorney’s fees to David. Peter’s motion for reconsideration was denied. He appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court and subsequently moved in probate court to vacate all orders for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the probate court declined to address the motion, noting the issue was already raised on appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the probate court lacked statutory subject matter jurisdiction over David’s claims. The court found that the claims, concerning an inter vivos property transfer, did not have the direct connection to estate administration or distribution required for probate court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the probate court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice. View "Allen v. Allen" on Justia Law

A property in Hollis was owned by a trust with Wisarat Manutsom as trustee. The trustee, often traveling abroad, provided various mailing addresses—including in California, Manchester (New Hampshire), and later Maine—as well as an email address, to the town for tax-related correspondence. Mark Copp was authorized to act for the trust and provided his Manchester address. Over several years, the town sent multiple certified mail notices regarding unpaid property taxes and impending tax liens and deeds to these addresses; some were signed for and received, but several were returned as undeliverable. The town also communicated about the delinquent taxes by email. In 2019, after more undelivered certified mailings and no payment for 2016 taxes, the town executed a tax deed transferring ownership to itself, then sent post-deed notices by regular mail and, years later, by certified mail and email.The plaintiff sued in the Superior Court, alleging the town’s notice regarding the 2016 and 2018 tax liens and the 2016 tax deed was constitutionally deficient under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the town, finding the notice sufficient. The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied, and she appealed.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo. It held that the town’s failure to take additional reasonable steps—such as emailing notice—after certified notices of the impending 2016 tax deed were returned undelivered, and before executing the deed, violated the plaintiff’s due process rights. The court also found the town’s notice of the 2016 tax lien insufficient because it relied on an address that had repeatedly failed. However, notice of the 2018 tax lien, sent to both Manchester and Maine addresses, was deemed sufficient. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Manutsom v. Town of Hollis" on Justia Law

The case concerns a property dispute in Hampstead, New Hampshire, where the owners of a non-conforming lakefront cottage sought a special exception from the zoning ordinance to add a second story to their seasonal residence. Because their lot is smaller than what the ordinance requires and lacks sufficient frontage, any alteration required a special exception from the Town’s Zoning Board of Adjustment. The owners applied for the exception, and after a hearing where they described their plans but did not address how their proposal met the ordinance’s criteria, the Zoning Board granted the exception. The petitioner, an abutter whose property faces the cottage across the road, objected that the addition would block her lake view and decrease her property value, and she introduced photographic evidence.After the Zoning Board of Adjustment granted the exception without making specific written findings, the petitioner requested a rehearing, which was denied. She then appealed to the New Hampshire Housing Appeals Board, arguing that the applicants failed to demonstrate compliance with the special exception criteria, specifically the requirement that the project not diminish surrounding property values. The Housing Appeals Board affirmed the Zoning Board’s decision, concluding that it was not unreasonable or unlawful.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and held that the applicants did not meet their burden of proof to show their addition would not diminish surrounding property values, as required by the zoning ordinance. The court found that the evidence presented by the applicants was insufficient, and the Zoning Board’s implicit finding to the contrary was not supported by the record. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the Housing Appeals Board’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to reverse the Zoning Board’s grant of the special exception. View "Appeal of Murray" on Justia Law

A seller owned a twelve-unit apartment complex and entered into a written contract to sell the property to a buyer for $1.3 million, with a closing date set on or before November 30, 2021. The contract contained a financing contingency requiring the buyer to provide written proof of financing or inability to obtain financing by November 26, 2021, stating that “time is of the essence.” After the buyer’s bank conditionally approved financing, but anticipated a delay in the appraisal, the buyer informed the seller and attempted to extend the financing deadline. While the seller did not sign proposed written extensions, both parties continued to communicate about closing logistics, including scheduling a closing in December. On December 3, the seller terminated the contract, expressing unwillingness to proceed with the sale.The Superior Court of Hillsborough County denied the seller’s motion for partial summary judgment, rejecting the argument that the buyer’s failure to meet the financing deadline constituted a breach entitling the seller to terminate. The court also denied the seller’s motions in limine to exclude evidence of oral communications and closing agent emails. After a jury trial, the jury found the buyer had not materially breached the contract, that the parties had agreed to extend the closing, and that the seller had materially breached. The trial court then awarded specific performance, ordering the sale to proceed.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed. The court held that the seller’s conduct after the missed financing deadline raised a material factual dispute about whether the seller waived its right to declare a default. The court also found that the trial court properly admitted evidence of oral communications and that the longstanding presumption favoring specific performance in land sale contracts applied, even where the buyer was an investor. The trial court’s judgment was affirmed. View "J&C Properties v. Rayster Realty" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on neighboring parcels of land in Moultonborough, New Hampshire, near Lake Winnipesaukee. The plaintiff owns Lot 3, which abuts Park Lane, and the defendant is a nonprofit club that owns nearby roadways, paths, and a lakefront beach area reserved for its members. Both parties’ properties originated from a 1959 subdivision, with subsequent conveyances and subdivisions altering the land’s configuration. The plaintiff asserted that Lot 3 retained rights to use the defendant’s roadways and beach area, either through implied or prescriptive easement, based on prior deeds and historical use by Lot 3’s owners.The Superior Court for Carroll County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. It determined that Lot 3 was not part of a common scheme of development that would entitle it to membership benefits in the club, including the use of the roadways and beach. The trial court found no express or implied easements in the relevant chain of title for Lot 3 and concluded that the plaintiff had not shown twenty years of adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted use necessary to establish a prescriptive easement. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and applied de novo review to the legal questions. The court held that Lot 3, by virtue of the deed referencing the 1972 subdivision plan showing Park Lane and Far Echo Road as boundaries, has an implied easement as a matter of law to use those roadways. However, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment regarding claims to use other roadways and the Lot 200 beach area, finding no implied or prescriptive easement rights for Lot 3. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Martin v. Far Echo Harbor Club" on Justia Law

Twenty-three landowners brought suit against Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC and Caulder Construction, LLC, alleging nuisance due to noise, environmental, and safety concerns from a shooting range established on Caulder’s property in Woodstock, New Hampshire. Gold Bess registered as an LLC and leased land from Caulder, constructing the range and opening it to the public in October 2020. Prior to its opening, the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services notified the defendants of alleged violations of state wetlands and terrain alteration statutes. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to add noise-related nuisance claims after Woodstock enacted a noise ordinance in April 2021.The Grafton County Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs’ noise-related nuisance claims, finding the shooting range immune under RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2, which provide protection from civil liability related to noise for shooting ranges compliant with noise ordinances in effect when the range was established, constructed, or began operations. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and rejected their argument that alleged environmental law violations precluded immunity under RSA chapter 159-B. The court also granted summary judgment for the defendants on constitutional equal protection claims, and subsequently allowed the plaintiffs to voluntarily discontinue their remaining claims.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory interpretation of RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2 de novo. It held that these statutes require compliance only with noise ordinances, not with other laws such as wetlands or terrain alteration statutes. The court further determined that the shooting range “began operations” prior to the enactment of Woodstock’s noise ordinance, thereby qualifying for immunity from noise-related legal claims under the statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Martell v. Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a cul-de-sac constructed by the plaintiff in Laconia in the late 1980s. The plaintiff indicated on a 1987 subdivision plan that the cul-de-sac would be built and deeded to the City, and lots were sold based on that plan. However, the cul-de-sac was never formally deeded to the City, though the City maintained it until 2019, and it has been used by the public and public services since its construction. In 2019, the plaintiff sought to remove the cul-de-sac and replace it with a hammerhead turnaround, but the planning board denied this request.After the planning board’s denial, the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, which found that the cul-de-sac had never been accepted by the City and remained private property. Subsequently, intervenors petitioned the City Council to lay out the cul-de-sac as a public highway under New Hampshire law. The City Council approved the layout, and the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court. Both sides moved for summary judgment on whether there was “occasion” to lay out the road as a public highway. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the intervenors, finding that the plaintiff had dedicated the cul-de-sac for public use and that the public interest outweighed the plaintiff’s private interest.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The Court held that the plaintiff’s dedication of the cul-de-sac created a public easement and vested the public with a right to accept the road, limiting the plaintiff’s rights to use the property in ways that would interfere with public use. The Court also found that the public interest in the cul-de-sac outweighed both the plaintiff’s private interest and the burden on the City, thus satisfying the statutory “occasion” requirement for laying out a public highway. The judgment in favor of the intervenors was affirmed. View "Taylor Community v. City of Laconia" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, property owners in New Hampshire, challenged the administration of the Statewide Education Property Tax (SWEPT), arguing that it violated the state constitution by allowing property-wealthy towns to retain excess funds and by setting negative local education tax rates in certain unincorporated places. They sought a permanent injunction to discontinue this funding scheme, claiming it resulted in disproportionate tax rates.The Superior Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, finding that allowing communities to retain excess SWEPT funds and setting negative local education tax rates violated Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution. The court enjoined the state from permitting these practices and treated its order as a final decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It concluded that the legislature's decision to allow communities to retain excess SWEPT funds was an exercise of its spending power and did not violate the constitution. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's ruling on this issue. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that setting negative local education tax rates in certain unincorporated places violated Part II, Article 5, and affirmed this part of the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's injunction remedy, stating that resolving the constitutional issue of setting negative local tax rates is the responsibility of the other branches of government. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision. View "Rand v. State" on Justia Law

In December 2020, Raymond Felts' wife was struck and injured by a motor vehicle while walking across North Main Street in Rochester within a painted crosswalk that lacked warning signs or signals. She later died from her injuries. Felts, individually and as executor of his wife's estate, filed a lawsuit in January 2022, alleging negligence and violation of RSA 231:90-:92 by the City of Rochester for failing to design, monitor, and maintain the crosswalk safely, including the absence of warning signs or signals. The City moved to dismiss the claims, arguing limited liability under RSA 231:92 for injuries arising from the construction, maintenance, or repair of public highways.The Superior Court partially granted and denied the City's motion to dismiss. The court ruled that "highway" under RSA 231:92 includes crosswalks but not pedestrian warning signs or signals, thus dismissing the negligence claim related to the crosswalk itself but allowing the claim regarding the City's failure to install warning signs or signals to proceed. The City moved for reconsideration, which was denied, leading to this interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo, focusing on statutory interpretation. The court concluded that "highways" under RSA 231:92 includes pedestrian warning signs, crossing signals, and other traffic controls. The court reasoned that the statutory language and legislative intent support a broad interpretation of "highways" to include these elements, which are integral to the safe use of public roads. Consequently, the court vacated the trial court's ruling that RSA 231:92 does not apply to the plaintiff's claim regarding the City's failure to install pedestrian warning signs and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Felts v. City of Rochester" on Justia Law

The case involves improvements made by Robin and Phyllis Gelinas to their condominium unit, which expanded into the limited common area. Plaintiffs Anthony and Rosemarie Moda and Anthony and Olga Alba sued the defendants, Fernwood at Winnipesaukee Condominium Association and the Gelinases, seeking a declaratory judgment, costs and attorney’s fees, and a permanent injunction. The plaintiffs appealed, and the defendants cross-appealed, a decision of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion, and denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants. The plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s conclusion that provisions of the Fernwood declaration of condominium waived the requirements of RSA 356-B:19, I concerning the assignment and reassignment of limited common area.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the trial court erred in its interpretation. The court found that the Fernwood declaration did not expressly provide a waiver from the requirement of RSA 356-B:19, I. The court concluded that the Gelinases' expansion into the limited common area required compliance with RSA 356-B:19, I, which necessitates the consent of all adversely affected unit owners. The court also disagreed with the trial court's finding that all unit owners were adversely affected as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire vacated the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney’s fees to the defendants, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Moda v. Fernwood at Winnipesaukee Condo. Ass'n" on Justia Law