Articles Posted in Personal Injury

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In 2013, 15-year-old Sophia Christen attended a carnival operated by defendant Fiesta Shows, Inc. in a fenced-in area of the Ocean State Job Lot parking lot. After Sophia and her friends shared cotton candy, they began searching for a bathroom to wash their sticky hands; the carnival lacked public facilities with running water. The girls decided to leave the carnival and search for a bathroom. Although there were two nearby restaurants located on the same side of Manchester Road as the carnival, the girls decided to cross Manchester Road to go to a Burger King. At the intersection of the Ocean State access road and Manchester Road, the girls found that the pedestrian crossing signal was inoperative, but they decided to cross the road without the walk signal. While crossing the road, Sophia was struck by a vehicle and suffered fatal injuries. Fiesta had contacted the Derry Police Department to arrange for the presence of officers to provide “general public safety” at the carnival. Unlike organizers of other large events in Derry, Fiesta did not instruct the officers to engage in traffic control, pedestrian assistance, or other similar duties. One day after the accident, at the suggestion of the Derry Police Department, Fiesta arranged for additional police coverage to direct traffic and assist with pedestrian crossing on Manchester Road. Two days after the accident, two Fiesta employees reported to a Derry police officer investigating the signal that “they crossed the crosswalk regularly and had never seen the pedestrian crossing signal activate.” Plaintiff Elaine Christen, as administrator of Sophia’s estate, brought a wrongful death action against Fiesta, claiming negligence and also alleging that Fiesta’s conduct was wanton and reckless, entitling her to enhanced compensatory damages. Fiesta successfully moved for summary judgment, asserting that it violated no duty of care owed to Sophia. Plaintiff appealed, but finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Christen v. Fiesta Shows, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendant Arch Specialty Insurance Company (Arch) appealed multiple superior court orders granting summary judgment to defendants Triage Staffing, Inc. (Triage), Exeter Hospital, Inc. (Exeter), and American Healthcare Services Association (AHSA) on their petitions for declaratory judgment, and denying Arch’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that Arch was required to defend and indemnify Triage, Exeter, and AHSA, pursuant to two insurance policies that Arch issued to Triage, for claims asserted against the defendants by patients of Exeter who contracted Hepatitis C (Exeter Patients). On appeal, Arch argued the trial court erred in finding inapplicable certain exclusions found in the insurance policies and in determining that the claims involved multiple occurrences under the policies. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Triage and Exeter regarding Arch’s duty to defend and indemnify them pursuant to the general liability coverage forms; the Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Exeter regarding Arch’s duty to defend and indemnify it pursuant to the umbrella coverage forms; reversed in part and vacated in part the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Triage regarding Arch’s duty to defend and indemnify it pursuant to the umbrella coverage forms, and remanded all matters to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company v. American Healthcare Services Association" on Justia Law

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This case arose from an accident at a pond owned by the defendant, the Town of Chester, where Christopher Kurowski suffered injuries after being struck by a person using a rope swing attached to a tree on the shore. Plaintiff, Jay Kurowski, as father and next friend of his minor son, Christopher, appealed a superior court order dismissing his negligence and intentional tort claims against the Town, as barred by the recreational use immunity statutes. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the Town was entitled to immunity under RSA 212:34, and affirmed. View "Kurowski v. Town of Chester" on Justia Law

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Petitioner-claimant Jason Malo appealed a Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) decision reducing the rate at which his indemnity benefits were paid from the temporary total disability rate to the diminished earning capacity rate. On appeal, he argued that the CAB erred by: (1) finding that his physical condition had improved since he sustained the original, compensable, work-related injury; (2) determining that the change in his physical condition affected his earning capacity; and (3) failing to make specific findings of fact and rulings of law sufficient to allow meaningful appellate review. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Jason Malo" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs William Weaver (individually and as administrator of the estate of his wife, Marceline Weaver) and James Sousa, appealed superior court decisions granting summary judgment in favor of defendants the Town of Pelham (Town), Pelham Police Chief Joseph Roark, Pelham Police Officer Derek Gioia (collectively, the Pelham defendants), and Woody’s Auto Repair & Towing, Inc. This case stemmed from an automobile accident allegedly caused by Randall Stewart, the owner and driver of a vehicle that collided with plaintiffs. With respect to the Pelham defendants, the superior court concluded they were not immune from suit under RSA chapter 507-B (2010) or under the common law, they were entitled to summary judgment because of the lack of evidence that they proximately caused the motor vehicle collision that resulted in the plaintiffs’ injuries. After review of that decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence that the Pelham defendants proximately caused the accident. Accordingly, the Court did not address the Pelham defendants’ cross-appeal on immunity. With regard to Woody's, the superior court granted summary judgment, concluding that: (1) because Stewart’s vehicle had been towed the night before the collision pursuant to RSA 262:32 (2014), rather than impounded pursuant to RSA 262:40 (2014), Woody’s was not required to obtain authorization from the police or a court prior to releasing the vehicle the next day to its owner; (2) Woody’s could not be liable for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle because of the lack of evidence that a Woody’s employee knew, or should have known, that the owner was impaired when he picked up his vehicle from impound; and (3) given the absence of evidence demonstrating that Woody’s breached a duty owed to plaintiffs, it was not liable for negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed that judgment too. View "Weaver v. Stewart" on Justia Law