Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Julie Shelton, trustee of the Elizabeth M. Tamposi Trusts (the EMT trusts), appealed a "lengthy and detailed" order of the Hillsborough County Probate Court that dismissed the complaint filed by: (1) Shelton, in her capacity as trustee of the EMT Trusts; and Elizabeth M. Tamposi. Shelton argued that the trial court erred in: (1) construing the governing trust instrument; (2) ruling that, by filing the complaint, Elizabeth Tamposi violated the in terrorem clause; (3) ordering Shelton to pay the attorneys' fees "of both the Respondents and the voluntary Intervenors"; and (4) removing Shelton from her position as trustee. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the lower court's decision, and affirmed with respect to all issues raised by Petitioner. View "Shelton v. Tamposi" on Justia Law

Respondent Nahla Abounaja appealed a district court order that awarded petitioner Myla Randall, $18,000 in damages because of the respondent's willful failure to provide heat to the petitioner's apartment for eighteen days. Petitioner rented an apartment from the respondent in Rochester. At some point before March 23, 2011, petitioner complained to the city's plumbing and health inspector that her apartment lacked heat. An inspector came to the premises and discovered that there was no heat in the petitioner's master bedroom because neither the radiator nor the electric heater worked. The inspector called respondent about this issue and met with her two days later. The inspector then sent a letter to the respondent about this problem, giving her fourteen days to remedy it. The respondent did not respond to the letter, nor did she return the inspector's subsequent telephone calls. Petitioner then filed suit on April 12, and the trial court issued a temporary order requiring respondent "to immediately restore and maintain all utility services" to the petitioner's apartment. Following the hearing on the petition, the trial court found that the respondent was aware that the heating units did not work and that she failed to have them repaired until April 18, and that her actions were willful. In her brief, respondent argued that her conduct was not "wil[l]ful" because she did not cause the petitioner's apartment to lack heat in the first instance. She argued that, at most, she merely "allow[ed]" the heating service to be interrupted; she did not "cause" the interruption itself. Her merely "negligent omission" did not constitute a willful act. Based upon the evidence at trial, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court reasonably found that the respondent's failure to have the units repaired was intentional, and, therefore, willful. However, because the trial court committed plain error when it awarded the petitioner $1,000 per day for at least some days that the respondent's violation of RSA 540-A:3, I, the Court vacated $17,000 of the damage award and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court was tasked with determining whether respondent willfully violated RSA 540-A:3, I after April 12, and, if so, the court was instructed to award petitioner $1,000 per day for each day that the respondent's violation continued. View "Randall v. Abounaja" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Thompson appealed his conviction of driving while intoxicated (DWI) for which he was sentenced to enhanced penalties for a third offense. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in sentencing him for a third DWI because the State failed to submit evidence of his two prior convictions in its case-in-chief. Finding no merit to Defendant's argument, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant Thavone Souksamrane appealed his convictions for criminal threatening and being a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in permitting the State to question him about the veracity of other witnesses. The State conceded that the questioning in this case was improper. However, because of the "overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt," the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Souksamrane" on Justia Law

Defendant Alan Lathrop appealed his conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI). On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in finding that Alderberry Lane in Moultonborough, where the accident took place that ultimately resulted in his arrest, was a "way" (and therefore not open for public use) for purposes of the DWI statute; because only members, guests and a loose category of invitees are permitted to use the road, it is not "open." After review of the statutory authority, the Supreme Court rejected Defendant's contention: " it would be contrary to legislative intent to construe the statute to provide that a private road in a lakeside community that is used by residents…. Is a DWI-free zone." The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Lathrop" on Justia Law

Defendant Peter Gibbs appealed his convictions on two counts of criminal restraint and one count of being an armed career criminal. On appeal, Defendant argued that: (1) his right against double jeopardy was violated when he was twice convicted of a single criminal restraint; (2) his right to effective assistance of counsel was violated; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of being an armed career criminal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the facts of this case demonstrated that the victim was continuously confined from the time he was tied in the basement until the point at which he was able to free himself and, therefore, the defendant engaged in only one episode of criminal restraint. Accordingly, one of the two criminal restraint convictions and sentences must be vacated. The Court vacated one count of Defendant's conviction, but affirmed in all other respects. View "New Hampshire v. Gibbs, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant Cory Furgal appealed his conviction of second-degree murder. At trial, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel asked the trial court to instruct the jury that defendant was entitled to use deadly force against the victim for self-defense. The State objected, arguing that the language of "the statute" and case law did not support the defendant's requested instruction. Defendant objected to the instructions the trial court ultimately used, outside the presence of the jury. But the trial court explained that it did not include defendant's "in-concert" instruction because it was not consistent with the language of "the statute." The Supreme Court was not satisfied that defendant's request was inconsistent with statutory law. However, based on the entirety of the instruction, the Court concluded that a reasonable juror would have understood whether the victim, acting alone or in concert with others, was about to use unlawful deadly force against defendant. View "New Hampshire v. Furgal" on Justia Law

Defendant Elliott Bell appealed a superior court decision to deny his motion to suppress evidence that he possessed less than one ounce of "ecstasy." Defendant argued that he was unlawfully seized under the State and Federal Constitutions when the arresting officer said the officers would be “on their way” as soon as the defendant produced identification. He contended that the trial court erred in concluding the police had the requisite reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity, and that the evidence obtained following the seizure must be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. Finding no merit to Defendant's arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "New Hampshire v. Bell" on Justia Law

Respondent Joan M. appealed a family division order that terminated her co-guardianship over minor Matthew L. filed by Mary S., Matthew's biological mother and co-guardian. The parties were in a serious relationship from 2004 to 2008. In 2006, Mary became pregnant and gave birth to Matthew in 2007. At that time, the parties petitioned the court to appoint them as co-guardians. In early 2008, however, Mary ended her relationship with Joan and subsequently petitioned the court to terminate Joan's co-guardianship. The motion was denied in late 2009. In 2010, Mary filed a new motion to terminate. While proceedings were pending, the Supreme Court had decided "In re Guardianship of Reena D." (163 N.H. 107 (2011)). The parties agreed that "Reena D." applied to the 2010 motion to terminate guardianship. The trial court ultimately granted termination of Joan's guardianship, and she subsequently appealed. Finding no error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Guardianship of Matthew L." on Justia Law

Petitioner David Ellis appealed a superior court order that rescinded a non-compete agreement and ordered partial restitution as a remedy. Respondents Candia Trailers and Snow Equipment, Inc. and its principals Jeffrey and Suzanne Goff, cross-appealed the rescission of the non-compete agreement. Ellis signed an asset purchase agreement (APA), non-compete agreement (NCA) and an inventory purchase agreement (IPA) in relation to the sale of Precision Truck, a business the Goffs owned. The Goffs executed the NCA with regard to Ellis' operation of Precision Truck to remain in effect for seven years. However, the NCA could end sooner if Ellis breached terms of the IPA. One of the terms of the IPA was that Ellis would pay for Precision Truck's inventory by June 1, 2007. Within weeks of signing the NCA, Goff began competing with Precision Truck. Ellis thereafter failed to purchase all of Precision Truck's inventory by June 1, 2007. Ellis subsequently sued for breach of contract and violation of the Consumer Protection Act. The trial court found the NCA, IPA and APA as three separate agreements, each with its own terms and remedies for breach, and that Ellis breached the IPA and Goff breached the NCA. Both parties argued that the trial court abused its discretion when rescinding the NCA and awarding partial restitution to Ellis. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in determining that the three agreements were severable, and as such, the NCA could not be rescinded without rescinding the IPA and the APA too. Accordingly, the Court reversed the restitution award and remanded to the trial court for a determination of what remedies were available. View "Ellis v. Candia Trailers & Snow Equipment, Inc." on Justia Law