Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Christina Deyeso appealed a superior court order that denied her petition for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and awarded summary judgment in favor of respondent Jules Cavadi, permitting the forced sale of Deyeso's home. Deyeso and Stephen Barnes have three children together but never married. Deyeso is currently married to Keith Walsh, with whom she lives in Stratham at a home that she purchased in 1997. Cavadi held a 1991 judgment against Barnes. In September 2004, in a common-law "reach and apply" action, he sued Barnes and Deyeso in a Massachusetts trial court, alleging that Barnes paid for certain real estate held in Deyeso's name in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, including the Stratham property. A Massachusetts superior court found that Barnes had an equitable interest in the Property valued at $94,854, thus entitling Cavadi to an equitable lien on the Property in that amount. After accounting for mortgages on the property, the equity value remaining in the Property was $72,373.41. Deyeso appealed the Massachusetts trial court's decision to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, which upheld the portion of the trial court's order declaring Barnes's interest in the Property to be $94,854. Cavadi then obtained an order in Massachusetts allowing a public auction of the Property to recover the amount of Barnes's interest. Deyeso claimed that both she and her husband were entitled to homestead protection under RSA 480:1 (Supp. 2012), which, given the prior mortgages, would leave no equity for Cavadi in the event of a forced sale. The trial court then ruled in favor of Deyeso, concluding that, although her husband could claim the homestead protection due to his lack of ownership, her homestead interest prevailed over Cavadi's equitable lien. Cavadi then moved for reconsideration, and the the trial court eventually granted Cavadi's motion, concluding that, Deyeso's "conduct in this case amounts to fraudulent behavior" and, therefore, permitted the court to use "its equitable powers to negate [her] homestead exemption." Upon review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed: "assuming, however, that Deyeso accepted the money from Barnes with the knowledge that he sought to avoid satisfying his debt to Cavadi, RSA 480:1 protects her homestead interest in the Property. . . . We therefore agree with Deyeso that, in the absence of a showing of fraud, deception, or other misconduct in the procurement of the funds used to purchase, invest in, or improve a homestead, the statutory homestead exemption applies ñ even when a judgment debtor's funds are so used with the intent of hindering or avoiding a creditor's legitimate claims." View "Deyeso v. Cavadi" on Justia Law

Respondent Cheryl C. appealed a circuit court order that granted a special petition to terminate her guardianship over her grandchildren Raven G. and Salem G. filed by the children's biological mother, petitioner Jessica B. Following a hearing in January 2008, at which both parents appeared and testified, the court found that respondent had established by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the temporary guardianship was in the best interests of both children because their parents, petitioner and Stacey G., engaged in domestic violence and in the illegal use of controlled drugs while the children were in their care. The court ordered that the temporary guardianship would remain in effect until petitioner and Stacey G. complied with a number of conditions to "demonstrate[] that they are responsible enough to act as parents." In May 2008, after another hearing, the court found that neither the petitioner nor Stacey G. was complying with the conditions imposed by the court. The court made the guardianship permanent and provided for supervised contact between the children and their parents at respondent's discretion. Petitioner was subsequently incarcerated for several months as a result of a criminal conviction and then released on probation. In January 2010, she filed a motion seeking appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL). A GAL was appointed, and the parties worked out an agreement allowing gradually increased contact between petitioner and the children. In February 2011, petitioner moved to terminate the guardianship, asserting that she had complied with all of the conditions set forth by the court in January 2008. Respondent objected to terminating the guardianship. Stacey G. also opposed termination, but argued that he should be given unrestricted and unsupervised time with the children. The court held a hearing; petitioner admitted that she had not complied with a January 2008 order but argued that the court should permit her to integrate the children into her life rather than continue the artificial relationship imposed by the guardianship. The GAL testified that he believed it would be in the best interests of the children to terminate the guardianship gradually. The respondent and Stacey G. took issue with the GAL's recommendation, arguing that he had limited contact with the children and was biased. The respondent's expert witness concluded that both children had been physically and sexually abused by petitioner and opined that forcing the children to spend time with their mother would be emotionally devastating for them and recommended that any such contact be supervised by a professional. Upon review of the issue of whether the guardianship should have been continued, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court applied an erroneous burden of proof, and therefore vacated its order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re guardianship of Raven G." on Justia Law

Defendant Todd Leavitt appealed his convictions by jury on two counts of simple assault on a police officer. In 2010, the defendant called 9-1-1 and told the dispatcher that he was suicidal and needed an ambulance. Because the defendant said he was uninjured, the dispatcher sent the police to his residence. The defendant became agitated when the police arrived instead of an ambulance, "screaming and shouting" and asserting that he did not want them to be there. The police offered to drive him to the hospital, but he refused, and he began walking in the direction of the hospital. The police then decided to take him into protective custody, and, in the ensuing struggle, he kicked Officer Nicholas Alden in the leg. He again kicked Officer Alden after they arrived at the hospital. The defendant was indicted on two counts of simple assault. The charging documents were worded identically in every respect except as to the "Charge ID" number and the designation as either "Count 1" or "Count 2." The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the jury could not "differentiate what evidence goes to which [indictment]," in violation of double jeopardy principles. The trial court denied his motion and, after a trial, a jury returned guilty verdicts on both indictments. The Supreme Court agreed with the State that defendant's convictions did not violate the federal Double Jeopardy Clause, and affirmed defendant's convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Leavitt" on Justia Law

The State appealed superior court orders that granted motions of defendant David McLeod to preclude certain expert testimony and to suppress an audio-recording of a one-party telephonic interception. This "cold" case arose from a fire that occurred at an apartment building in 1989. The fire began in the second floor apartment of Sandra Walker. Walker and several other occupants of the building were unharmed by the fire; however, four members of a family living in the building died of smoke inhalation. In 2010, the State's Cold Case Unit reinvestigated the fire. Prior to the initiation of the new investigation, Walker died and some of the evidence related to the fire was lost or destroyed. The Cold Case Unit hired two experts from the United States Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau (ATF) to review the case. Upon review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the Confrontation Clause is not violated when an expert testifies regarding his or her independent judgment, even if that judgment was based upon inadmissible testimonial hearsay. Therefore, the State's experts' testimony should not have been excluded in this case. With regard to the audio recording, the Court concluded that the State obtained the intercepted information lawfully under RSA 570-A:2, II(d): there was no dispute that the State was investigating, that the party recorded consented to the intercept, and that another orally authorized the intercept based upon reasonable suspicion that evidence of criminal conduct would be derived from the intercept. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's suppression order. View "New Hampshire v. McLeod" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, defendant Daniel Matton, was found guilty on two charges: assault by a prisoner as a class A felony and assault by a prisoner as a class B felony. On appeal, he argued that the Trial Court erred when it refused to give: (1) a mutual combat instruction on the class B felony charge; and (2) a "special" jury instruction that the prior convictions of several of the State's witnesses were relevant to their credibility. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Matton" on Justia Law

Defendant Brendan Bisbee appealed his convictions by jury on five counts of perjury. In 2011, a grand jury returned indictments that charged defendant committed perjury when he testified before the grand jury, on or about March 6, 2009, that: (1) "Kristin Ruggiero had never been to the state of Tennessee"; (2) "he could not remember if he had picked up Kristin Ruggiero at the Oakland [California] Airport on March 20, 2008"; (3) "a police officer did not come to 13 Pinewood Road during the evening of May 4, 2008"; and (4) "Kristin Ruggiero had not used his cell phone to call 679-2225 during the evening of May 4, 2008." Three more indictments charged that defendant committed perjury when he testified in the criminal trial of "State v. Ruggiero," Docket No. 09-S-1290-1302, on or about April 27, 2010, that: (1) "he could not remember if he had picked up Kristin Ruggiero at the Oakland Airport on March 20, 2008"; (2) "a police officer did not come to 13 Pinewood Road during the evening of May 4, 2008"; and (3) "he could not remember if he or Kristin Ruggiero had used his cell phone to call 679-2225 during the evening of May 4, 2008." On appeal, defendant argued that the Superior Court erred in: (1) denying his motion to dismiss the indictments as insufficient; and (2) denying his request for a mistrial following the prosecutor's closing argument. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Bisbee" on Justia Law

Defendant Allen Mercier appealed a superior court decision to deny his motion to suppress evidence that led to his convictions in a jury-waived trial for disobeying a police officer and driving while certified as a habitual offender. In 2011, a state trooper observed a pickup truck, driven by the defendant, with a partially shattered rear window. Based upon his observations of the window, the trooper pulled the vehicle over, leading to the defendant's arrest. The State argued that the police had reasonable suspicion of a violation of RSA 266:58 (2004), and the trial court agreed, that the defendant's truck was not "equipped with safety glass" because the rear window was so "severely fragmented into small pieces . . . that visibility through that window was impossible." Upon review of the statute at issue here, and the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed with Defendant's argument that his vehicle was indeed equipped with safety glass as defined by RSA 259:94. "The statute's specific references to 'glass so treated or combined with other materials' and 'ordinary sheet glass or plate glass' suggest that the legislature was concerned with the composition of the glass used in vehicles rather than its condition once installed. The fact that a panel of safety glass is cracked or otherwise damaged does not mean that it is no longer safety glass." The Supreme Court concluded that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was operating his vehicle in violation of RSA 266:58. Accordingly, the Court reversed the denial of his motion to suppress. View "New Hampshire v. Mercier" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Gribble appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, attempted murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, witness tampering, and conspiracy to commit burglary. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to suppress; (2) denied his motions for a change of venue; and (3) instructed the jury concerning insanity. Finding these arguments to be without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Gribble" on Justia Law

A "substantial number" of post-arrest co-conspirator statements were improperly admitted in the trial of Defendant Hector Rodriguez. He was accused of burglary, conspiracy to commit burglary, first degree assault, accomplice to first degree assault, and conspiracy to commit first degree assault. Following his conviction, the superior court acknowledged its error and attempted to remedy it by vacating the burglary conviction and one of the first degree assault convictions (the one based on the theory that the defendant acted as a principal in the commission of the assault), while allowing the remaining three convictions to stand. Because, after its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the improperly admitted evidence constituted harmless error with respect only to defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit burglary, the Court affirmed that conviction, but reversed his convictions on the accomplice and conspiracy first degree assault charges and remanded the case for a new trial on those charges. View "New Hampshire v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff The Sunapee Difference, LLC appealed: (1) a superior court order that granted summary judgment to the State on Sunapee’s claims for breach of contract, equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, reformation, and inverse condemnation; and (2) an order partially granting the State's motion to dismiss Sunapee's inverse condemnation claim. The State appealed the superior court's order that ruled Sunapee had standing to bring a reformation claim. The matter arose from a management proposal and lease authorized by the New Hampshire legislature with regard to a ski area at Mount Sunapee State Park. The Capital Budget Overview Committee approved the Lease; a month later, the State produced a map and property description with the metes and bounds of the leasehold area. Sunapee discovered that the northern and western leasehold boundaries described in the Lease were not coterminous with those of the state park. At some time during the lease period, Sunapee had proposed expanding the ski area to the east. Sunapee obtained options to buy privately-owned land bordering the western boundary of the state park. Because the leasehold and state park boundaries were not described as coterminous in the Lease, this land could not be used for expansion without including buffer land in the leasehold. Accordingly, Sunapee requested that the State approve inclusion of the buffer land in an amendment to the Lease. Based upon the State's assurances that it favored the western expansion plan as long as Sunapee satisfied certain conditions, Sunapee exercised the purchase options for $2.1 million. A new governor was elected during the pendency of Sunapee's expansion plans. The new governor strongly opposed Sunapee's plans for expansion. The Governor refused to bring the proposed expansion before the Executive Council. Sunapee subsequently sued the State for damages or alternatively, mandamus relief, alleging breach of contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court: (1) found that there were issues of material facts with regard to breach of contract, estoppel and inverse condemnation, and reversed the trial court with respect to those claims; (2) found that Sunapee had standing to bring the reformation claim; and (3) affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment with regard to the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Sunapee Difference, LLC v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law