Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In September, 2009, counsel for the Hampton Police Association wrote to the Town of Hamptonâs Manager requesting copies of invoices from all attorneys who gave advice to or otherwise represented the Town in a grievance and arbitration matter. The Association sought the invoices under the state âRight-to-Knowâ law. The next day, the Town Manager advised the Association that invoices from its attorneys contained confidential detailed billing narratives that were privileged information, and not subject to the Right-to-Know law. Understanding this, the Association replied to the Town Manager, suggesting the Town hand over the invoices with all the privileged information redacted. The Association sought information relating to the amounts of money the Town spent on counsel, not the information in the narratives. The Town still refused to produce the invoices, and the Association took the Town to court. Town counsel provided the trial court with the invoices for an in camera review. The court ordered the release of the invoices, and ordered the Town to make the copies. The Town objected to all the âextra work,â and the trial court amended its order to require the Town and its outside counsel to compile a list of the invoices with the general subject matter of the matters billed, and the total prices paid. The Town maintained that discussing the narratives even in a general sense, still constituted privileged information. The court denied the Town any relief from compiling the list, and the Town appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it required the Town to create an entirely new document to provide the Association with the information it sought. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings, ordering that the Town should produce the invoices with privileged information redacted.

The decedent Timothy Donovan died in 2009. His will provided that his intangible personal property, such as bank accounts and stocks, be devided and bequeathed to his family. The will specifically excluded the decedentâs shares in Optimum Manufacturing Company. Two months before he died, the decedent sold all of his Optimum stock. Subsequently, the family filed suit seeking to have the proceeds from the sale of the Optimum stock passed to his family in accordance with his will. The trial court found that the decedent adeemed the stock, so it did not pass to the family as intangible property. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court, finding that neither the Optimum stock nor the proceeds from the sale passed to the family.

After a jury trial in the Superior Court, Defendant Joseph Michaud was convicted of four counts of felonious sexual assault. On appeal he argued that the trial court erred in denying his request for a âlesser-included offense instructionâ to the jury on simple assault. Because of testimony presented at trial, Defendant argued that the evidence required the court to give the lesser-included instruction. The Supreme court disagreed with Defendantâs analysis, finding that the elements of simple assault are not contained within the felony. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision denying Defendantâs request for an instruction on simple assault.

Defendant Michael Moncada appealed his conviction on three counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault, ten counts of felonious sexual assault and one count of bail jumping stemming from inappropriate contact he had with his girlfriendâs thirteen year-old daughter. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred by finding him competent to stand trial, and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him. The trial court heard testimony from two experts who both agreed that Defendant had âcertain cognitive defects.â But both did not agree whether Defendant was competent to stand trial. The State offered testimony of an ex-girlfriend of Defendant, who testified that she had seen Defendant reading the newspaper, and that he wrote her numerous letters when he served time in prison. Given all the evidence on the competency issue, the Supreme court found it âcannot conclude that no reasonable trier of fact could have found as the trial court did.â The Court affirmed the trial courtâs ruling on the competency issue, and also found that evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his conviction.

Petitioners ATV Watch and Andrew Walters brought suit against Respondent New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT) seeking the disclosure of agency documents under the stateâs âRight-to-Knowâ act. Walters is the director of ATV Watch. He wrote to the commissioner of the DOT regarding a recent inquiry related to the Federal Highway Administration, asking for clarification on the federal law that governed use of rails trails within the state. The DOT responded that it would keep Walters informed of any new developments from the talks the state had with the federal government. Walters sent the DOT an email in April, 2007, asking again for information on use of the trails. In November, the DOT responded to another email request from Walters, indicating that there was no new information. On November 21, Walters sent an email to the DOT criticizing the Department for being unresponsive to his requests, and alleging that the Department was withholding documents. The Department responded that it had complied with state law by responding to Waltersâ requests. Petitioners filed suit in January, 2008, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, fees, costs and sanctions for what it felt was the DOTs withholding documents. At the hearing, the DOT indicated it had given Walters all records it could, with the exception of certain documents redacted or withheld on the basis of a privilege or exemption. Following the hearing, the DOT provided the court under seal the unredacted copies of the withheld documents, along with an index of those materials for the courtâs review. The court issued its order on the merits, finding that most of the documents were properly redacted or withheld as privileged. The court denied the Petitionersâ motion for reconsideration. Interpreting New Hampshireâs âRight-To-Knowâ law, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtâs ruling. The Court found from the record that Petitioners lacked sufficient reasons to overcome the asserted privileged documents, and therefore were not entitled to the relief they sought.

Following a jury trial, Defendant Walter Hutchinson, Jr. was convicted of first-degree murder for the killing of his former girlfriend Kimberly Ernest. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence on âcausationâ of Ernestâs death. On October 8, 1991, a jury found Defendant guilty of attempted murder for beating and strangling Ernest. In the attack, she sustained severe brain damage. Ernestâs family chose to treat her only with comfort measures. She died from her injuries. The State brought murder charges against the defendant. Defendant sought to have the charges against him thrown out, and appealed the trial courtâs denial of his motion to dismiss. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove he caused Ernestâs death. He did not contest that his actions caused her permanent brain injury; rather, Defendant argues that the risks to Ernestâs health as a result of his actions did not establish the necessary element of legal causation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the juryâs finding that Defendantâs conduct caused Ernestâs death beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision to deny Defendant his motion to dismiss.

On June 7, 2006, Insured Kelly left his car for service at a repair shop owned and operated by his parents. The shop loaned Kelly a car while his was being serviced. The next day, Kelly was involved in a collision with Martin Morasse. Subsequently Morasse and his wife brought suit against Kelly, alleging among other things, negligence. At the time of the accident, Kelly had a personal automobile insurance policy with Progressive Northern Insurance Company with liability limits of $100,000 per person. The shop had a garage insurance policy issued by Argonaut Insurance Company with limits of $25,000 and $750,000, depending on the circumstances. Argonaut investigated the accident and concluded Kellyâs use of the loaned car was personal, and he was not a scheduled driver on their policy. It concluded it would only provide a defense to Kelly under the $25,000 limit set forth in its âAdditional Garage Limitationsâ endorsement. Argonaut identified Progressive as the primary insurer and contended that Progressive was obligated to defend and indemnify Kelly in the Morasse lawsuit. Progressive sued Argonaut asserting that Argonaut must defend and indemnify Kelly under its $750,000 policy limit. Both insurers moved for summary judgment. The trial court concluded Argonaut was obligated to provide liability coverage under its policy up to $750,000. The court also ruled that Progressive must pay its pro rata share of defense costs. Argonaut appealed. The Supreme Court noted that â[a]s we have never addressed the precise issue of allocation of defense costs between a primary insurer and excess insurer, and the trial court relied upon authority from other jurisdictions to support its ruling, we cannot say that the law in this area is settled.â Accordingly, the Court declined to find error in the trial courtâs decision, and affirmed its summary judgment on behalf of Progressive.

Petitioner 1808 Corporation appeals the decision of the Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) which denied it expanded use of its building under a âspecial exception.â Petitioner owns a lot in New Ipswich on which there are two structures: a one-story building and a two-story building of office and storage space. In 1998, Petitioner requested a special exception to the Townâs zoning ordinance to allow an office building in an area zoned as âVillage District II.â At a May, 1998 meeting, the ZBA granted the special exception. In January, 2008, Petitioner applied to the ZBA for a site plan review. Petitioner wanted to use the two-story building under the special exception as all-office space, testifying that the storage area was no longer needed. At a May, 2009 hearing, the ZBA voted to defer a ruling on Petitionerâs site plan for âno more than 180 daysâ while Petitioner sought ZBA approvals. Petitioner appealed this decision, challenging the need for another ZBA approval. After a public hearing, the ZBA denied Petitionerâs request. Petitioner appealed the ZBAâs denial to the trial court; the trial court upheld the ZBAâs decision. In its appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argues that it did not need additional ZBA approvals since its storage space was within the scope of the 1998 special exception. The Court found that the record submitted for its review supported the ZBAâs determination. The Court affirmed the trial courtâs decision and upheld the determinations of the ZBA requiring Petitioner to seek additional approvals before proceeding with its plan to expand its office space.