Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Judith McGann was terminated as superintendent of Petitioner School Administrative Unit #44 (SAU). During the evidentiary portion of the SAU Board's termination hearing, SAU called an expert witness. Ms. McGann requested access to the expert's file. The moderator of the hearing denied Ms. McGann's request. Following the hearing, the Board voted to terminate Ms. McGann. On appeal to the Board of Education, Ms. McGann argued that the SAU violated her due process rights by denying her access to the expert's records. The Board ordered SAU to produce the expert's work file, and recommended that the SAU's decision be vacated and remanded for a new hearing. The SAU sought review of the State Board of Education's decision ordering it to produce the expert's file. The Supreme Court noted that due process requirements for binding administrative procedures are quite different from those binding judicial procedures. The Court did not find that the SAU Board violated Ms. McGann's constitutional due process rights in the course of the termination hearing. The Court found that the Board gave Ms. McGann "extensive opportunity" to meaningfully cross-examine the expert despite not having his file. The Court dismissed Ms. McGann's appeal, reversed the Board's order to produce the expert's file, and affirmed the SAU's decision to terminate Ms. McGann's employment as superintendent.

Petitioner Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford) appealed orders of the Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) that denied it recovery from the State Special Fund for Second Injuries for injuries to Claire Hamel and John Rygiel. Ms. Hamel worked as an assembly person for a motor manufacturing company. She was temporarily disabled for psychiatric reasons. She continued to work until her second injury for degenerative disc disease. Mr. Rygiel worked as a truck driver for a mobile MRI unit. Mr. Rygiel had Type II diabetes that required medication. Mr. Rygiel sustained an employment-related injury to his wrist. In both Ms. Hamel and Mr. Rygiel's cases, Hartford applied for and was denied reimbursement from the second injury fund. Hartford appealed both the Hamel and Rygiel decisions by CAB. The issue from both cases centered on whether state law allowed the CAB to consider an employee's past job performance as evidence that his or her preexisting impairment would not be a hindrance to obtaining employment if that employee became unemployed. The Supreme Court concluded that the employee's ability to perform his or her existing job is not determinative of whether the preexisting impairment was a hindrance to obtaining employment. The Court found that the CAB erroneously relied on the employee's ability when it denied Hartford's claims for reimbursement. Accordingly, the Court vacated the CAB's decisions in both the Hamel and Rygiel cases and remanded the cases for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Darlene Gray appealed an order of the Superior Court that dismissed her complaint against Defendant Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company. In 2003, Plaintiff and her sister, in their capacity as trustees of the Ocean Estates Realty Trust, received a quitclaim deed from the Triple P Ranch Realty Trust. Ocean Estates paid $80,000 for the parcel and recorded the deed. Later that year, Ocean Estates conveyed a warranty deed for the land to Plaintiff. At the time she received the deed, Plaintiff obtained a construction loan, granted a mortgage, and purchased title insurance from Commonwealth. The title insurance provided $328,000 in coverage against a title defect. In 2006, Plaintiff learned that Triple P Ranch Realty Trust never acquired title to the property and that the State legally owned it. The land was appraised at $15,000, and the insurer paid the mortgage lender the amount of the appraisal. Plaintiff sued Commonwealth for breach of contract, arguing that Commonwealth's policy should reimburse her for all expenses she incurred prior to learning of the title defect. When the Superior Court denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, she appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court found that trial court properly determined the measure of damages for Plaintiff's claim. Without finding errors in the trial court's findings of fact, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision dismissing Plaintiff's complaint.

Defendant James Mello appealed his conviction on four counts of delivering child pornography. On appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued that the Superior Court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence derived from a search warrant issued by the district court which authorized a search for information held by his Internet service provider. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the district court exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction by issuing the warrant. Furthermore, he argued that the warrant violated his state and federal constitutional rights. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not exceed its jurisdiction, and that Defendant had no expectation of privacy in the Internet information. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

In July 2009, a grand jury indicted Defendant Richard MacDonald on one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault for having sex with a person whom he knew to be âmentally defective.â At trial, Defendant filed a motion seeking in camera review of the victimâs medical and mental health records. The State did not object. The court received over two thousand pages of the victimâs medical records. The court assumed without review, that the records were probably relevant, and allowed the documents to be produced âfor Counselâs eyes only.â The State objected to the courtâs lack-of-review, arguing that the point of in camera review was for the court to decide which documents were appropriate. Defendant objected, and the State applied for a writ of certiorari to compel the trial court to determine the disclosure of the appropriate records. The Supreme Court granted the writ, and held that the lower courtâs failure to review the records was an error. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for an in camera review of the medical records.

Petitioners Daniel and Lisa B. appealed the decision of the New Hampshire State Board of Education (Board) that upheld a thirty-four day suspension imposed on their daughter Keelin B. Keelin opened an email account under another studentâs name, and then sent sexually suggestive, lewd and threatening email messages to the principal of her school and one teacher. When the deception was discovered, the Board âsentencedâ Keelin to a thirty-four day suspension. Keelinâs parents appealed to the School Board, but the Board upheld the suspension. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Keelinâs âsentenceâ exceeded the Boardâs maximum allowable suspension under these kinds of circumstances. The Court reduced Keelinâs suspension to twenty days, but affirmed the Boardâs decision in all other respects.

Petitioner Richard Lister appealed the recommendation of the Family Division Master that modified his child support obligations, and that refused to grant him credit for Social Security benefits received by his adult son. The son lives with his mother, Marianne Lister, and receives Supplemental Social Security (SSI) income of approximately $450 per month. As a disabled adult, the son is eligible for child support so long as he remains dependent. The sonâs SSI is reduced by the amount of child support he receives. In 2010, Mrs. Lister requested an increase in child support from Mr. Lister. At that time, Mr. Lister argued that he should receive a dollar for dollar credit for the sonâs SSI benefits when considering how much more he should be obliged to pay. The case Mr. Lister relied on to make his âcreditâ argument depended on the parentâs status as either retired or disabled. In this case, the son receives SSI benefits because of his own disability. The family division modified the child support obligation and refused to give Mr. Lister âcreditâ in the amount of his sonâs SSI benefits. On appeal, Mr. Lister argues that the family division made a mistake in reaching its decision to modify his support obligation. The Supreme Court agreed with the family divisionâs analysis of Mr. Listerâs case, and affirmed the divisionâs decision.

Defendant Marilyn Demond-Surace appealed her conviction on two counts of vehicular assault. Defendantâs convictions stem from a 2005 motor vehicle accident that killed two people. The trial court granted Defendantâs motion to exclude all evidence related to blood alcohol tests because those tests were taken without Defendantâs consent, but denied Defendantâs motion to preclude the State from introducing evidence regarding her alcohol consumption. During the motion hearing the State said it did not have any witnesses that would testify to Defendantâs impairment. In ruling on the motions, the court said, âas far as the jury is going to know, [Defendant] was sober.â On appeal, Defendantâs arguments largely focused on the courtâs order to the State to âstay away from impairment.â Defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial for statements made by the State in its closing argument on the impairment issue. The Supreme Court found that â[i]n allowing evidence that the Defendant consumed alcohol despite having excluded all evidence that the Defendant was impaired by alcohol, the court made a distinction unsupported by our case law.â The Court reversed the lower court and remanded Defendantâs case for a new trial.

Defendant Todd Peters appealed his convictions on first-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his motions in limine to introduce evidence of alternative perpetrators, and to exclude phone record evidence at trial. On review of the lower courtâs record, the Supreme Court concluded that even if the trial court erred in these respects, the State met its burden of proving that these errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision, and upheld Defendantâs convictions.

Plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company evicted Defendants James and Catherine Kevlik from their home. The Bank claimed it owned the property because it purchased it at a foreclosure auction in June, 2009. The Kevliks appeared at the eviction hearing and challenged the Bankâs claim that it had purchased the property. They said they attended the auction, and no one but the auctioneer showed up. The Kevliks tried to move the trial court to dismiss the case because the Bank couldnât prove it owned their property. The Bankâs attorney conceded that the documents he brought to prove the Bank owned the Kevliksâ home were not certified copies of official records. The Supreme Court concluded that the Bank could not prove it owned the property, and reversed the trial courtâs decision to grant judgment to the Bank.