Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, the Estate of June M. Day (Estate) and Byron and Stephanie Day, appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment to Respondent Hanover Insurance Company, arguing Hanover's consent to settle a claim by Petitioners with the insurer of a third party tortfeasor did not preclude Hanover from contesting its liability to provide the Estate underinsured motorist coverage under its insurance contract with the Estate's decedent. In 2007, June Day was fatally injured in a motor vehicle accident. At the time of the accident, Day's vehicle was insured under an automobile liability policy and a personal umbrella policy issued by Hanover, and both policies provided underinsured motorist coverage. Following the accident, Petitioners made a claim against the third party's insurance company's policy. Hanover agreed that Petitioners could accept the settlement offered "while reserving [Hanover's] right to continue the investigation into liability in this matter," and noting that Hanover had "neither accepted nor denied liability." Petitioners accepted payment and executed a release to the third party and her insurance company. Thereafter Petitioners took the position that, by consenting to the settlement, Hanover was precluded from contesting that Petitioners were "legally entitled to recover" damages from the third party. Ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court rejected Petitioners' position and dismissed the action. Petitioners filed an objection arguing that the court had "misunderstood the essence of the petition." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that "the record supports the trial court's ruling regarding the litigation strategy the petitioners pursued below. . . . insofar as the petitioners complain that Hanover failed to exercise good faith in that it delayed investigating and processing their claim, we note that the petitioners at all times had it within their power under the terms of the policy to address this problem by demanding arbitration of its underinsured motorist claim against Hanover, or, alternatively, by filing a breach of contract action in court." View "Estate of June M. Day v. Hanover Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Defendant Diego Duran appealed his conviction by a jury on one count of being a felon in possession of a deadly weapon. He argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because there was insufficient evidence both that he possessed the weapon and that the weapon was a deadly weapon. In 2009, Defendant, who was an inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison, was showering when another inmate was seen placing a suspicious object in Defendant's shoe. Prison officials asked to see Defendant's shoes, but Defendant ignored the request. In the bathroom, prison officials observed the other inmate throw the item from the shoe into the toilet and then asked the Defendant to flush the toilet. The official ordered Defendant not to flush the toilet, but Defendant flushed anyway. Officials retrieved the object, and "[b]ased upon his eleven years of experience, [the official] determined that the object was likely a 'shank.'" Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision and upheld Defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Duran" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in superior court Defendant Christopher Guay was convicted of three counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), and one count of felonious sexual assault (FSA). On appeal he argued that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to grant his request for a mistrial; (2) failing to dismiss one of the three AFSA counts; and (3) denying him access to all of the victim’s medical and counseling records. The victim was Defendant's biological daughter, who was allegedly assaulted twice in 2008. At trial, Defendant testified in his own defense. During testimony, immediately after he stated that listening to the victim's accusations against him was "heartbreaking," the victim shouted out from the back of the courtroom, "You’re such a freakin’ liar." The trial court denied Defendant’s request for a mistrial but twice issued curative instructions to the jury. The jury found Defendant guilty on all three counts of AFSA and one count of FSA. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant was convicted based upon insufficient evidence of guilt, and "to allow the defendant's conviction to stand would seriously affect the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings." The Court reversed the trial court's decision as it pertained to one AFSA charge. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Guay" on Justia Law

Defendants Scott and Christina Lees appealed a trial court decision that found in favor of Plaintiff Stephen Wyle on his claim of negligent misrepresentation. In 2002, Defendants purchased a two-unit apartment building. Defendants wished to expand the building, and approached a contractor to add a third apartment to the back of the property. Conditional approval for the site plan was granted in November 2003 and final approval was obtained in January 2004. However, Defendants did not obtain the proper permits prior to building or occupying the unit. As a result, the town's building inspector never inspected the unit. The Lees again hired the contractor both to complete a second addition to the property. Defendants again failed to secure the necessary building permits. After the completion of construction, town officials visited the property a number of times in 2006 and 2007. The town informed Defendants that "[s]ave for acceptable field changes[,] the site plan requirements have been satisfied." Defendants listed the property for sale in 2007. After entering into the agreement, Plaintiff had a comprehensive home inspection performed and sent a list of specific concerns regarding the property to Defendants. The concerns were either remedied by the Defendants or waived by Plaintiff prior to closing. Approximately six weeks after closing, the entire property was inspected by the town building inspector and fire chief which revealed numerous building and life safety code violations. Plaintiff was ordered not to occupy the unit until he corrected the violations and made the site compliant with site plan regulations. After correcting the violations, Plaintiff then brought a single claim against Defendants for negligent misrepresentation. Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court issued an order awarding damages to the Plaintiff. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the evidence at trial established that Defendants negligently misrepresented that the premises were licensed for immediate occupancy and that they had obtained all the necessary permits. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial record supported the decision in favor of Plaintiff, and the grant of damages. View "Wyle v. Lees" on Justia Law

Respondents Ravenna Investment Associates and its successor-in-interest, Access Road, LLC (collectively referred to as Ravenna), appealed a superior court order following a bench trial which granted a petition for injunctive and declaratory relief filed by Petitioner Appletree Mall Associates, LLC (Appletree), ordering Ravenna to restore two fifteen-foot drainage easements allowing water to discharge from Appletree’s site to Route 102 in Londonderry. Appletree sought a declaration that, as owner of 'Lot 2,' it was entitled to drainage easements over Lots 6, 7 and 10, and an order requiring Ravenna to remove any obstructions to those easements. In its order, the trial court found that Ravenna’s development of Lots 6, 7 and 10 unreasonably interfered with Appletree’s alleged drainage easements. Specifically, the court found that Ravenna impermissibly relocated the easements unilaterally by routing the water over a different part of its land, instead of within the bounds of Appletree’s easements. Under all of these circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded in its review of the matter that the plain language of Appletree's 1984 deed, together with the circumstances surrounding it, did not express an affirmative intent to create new drainage easements on Lots 7 and 10 for the benefit of Lot 2. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Appletree Mall Associates, LLC v. Ravenna Investment Associates " on Justia Law

Petitioners David, James and Carolyn Austin and Robert Guinto appealed a superior court order that denied their petition to quiet title and ruling that Respondents Lester and Sophie Silver had a deeded right-of-way over the petitioners' lot. On appeal, Petitioners argued that the trial court erred when it determined that certain deeds were ambiguous. They contended that based upon the plain language of the deeds at issue, Respondents never obtained a right-of-way to cross their land. Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s determination based upon the language of the pertinent deeds as well as its factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the relevant conveyances, Respondents had a deeded right-of-way over Petitioner's lots. View "Austin v. Silver" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dana Chatman appealed a superior court decision that dismissed his lawsuit against Defendants James Brady and the Lee Country Fair brought pursuant to RSA 651:70 (2007), an immunity statute. In May 2007, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to felony operating a vehicle while certified as a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced him to one year in the Strafford County House of Corrections, with all but fourteen days to be served on administrative home confinement. As a condition of his release, he was required to wear a monitoring bracelet. Because he could not afford the daily fee associated with the bracelet, he was required to work to cover its costs. On or about September 9, 2007, Plaintiff’s work assignment was to help clean up the grounds at the site of defendant Lee Country Fair, assisting in loading tables and chairs onto a trailer owned by Defendant Brady. While the loaded trailer was being hitched to the truck, a weld on the trailer hitch failed causing the trailer to fall on the plaintiff’s leg. Plaintiff sued alleging that Brady was negligent and that Lee Country Fair was vicariously liable for that negligence. He alleged that Brady knew or should have known that loading the trailer prior to hitching it to the truck would cause excessive stress to the trailer hitch and welds, and that maneuvering the fully loaded trailer to the truck while on soft, uneven ground was unreasonably dangerous. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that RSA 651:70 did not afford Defendants immunity under the facts alleged in this case, and therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s lawsuit. View "Chatman v. Brady " on Justia Law

Defendant-Tenant Wendy Wilson appealed a district court ruling that she breached her lease with Plaintiff Nashua Housing Authority. She rented an apartment in a public housing development. The lease provided that tenants "shall not engage in any drug related criminal activity on or off NHA property." Breach of that clause is cause for eviction from the leased unit. After reading a newspaper article about Defendant's arrest, the landlord sent her an eviction notice and subsequently brought a possessory action against Defendant for breach of the lease. At the eviction proceeding, the landlord introduced three criminal drug complaints that alleged Defendant "unlawfully dispensed and sold a certain narcotic drug, to wit: morphine." Defendant contended on appeal that the criminal complaints were not sufficient to prove she breached her lease. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the criminal complaints were not sufficient to prove that Defendant had actually engaged in the alleged activity. As such, the Court reversed the eviction court's decision to the contrary. View "Nashua Housing Authority v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lorraine Tessier appealed a superior court order that granted Defendants' Regina Rockefeller and Nixon Peabody, LLP's motion to dismiss. The plaintiff is the wife of Thomas Tessier, an attorney who practiced at the law firm of Christy & Tessier in Manchester. Dr. Frederick Jakobiec hired Attorney Tessier to handle certain estate matters on his behalf. Attorney Rockefeller, an attorney employed by Nixon Peabody, and acting on behalf of Dr. Jakobiec, accused Attorney Tessier of misusing and converting substantial assets of the Jakobiec family to his own use. Plaintiff alleged that Attorney Rockefeller met with Attorney Tessier on numerous occasions and threatened him demanding an immediate return of the misappropriated assets. Attorney Rockefeller stated to Attorney Tessier that if he repaid the money no further action would be taken against him. Plaintiff alleged that over the next two years, Defendants "stripped" her and her husband of their individual and joint interests in all of their tangible assets. And despite a settlement agreement, and without notice to her or her husband, Defendants reported Attorney Tessier’s actions the attorney discipline office, and others. In addition, Dr. Jakobiec hired an attorney to bring suit against Attorney Tessier and to foreclose on the mortgage that was the subject of the settlement agreement. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered severe emotional and physical distress requiring hospitalization. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed part of the trial court's decision, and affirmed part. The Court found there was sufficient facts pled to support multiple causes of action Plaintiff brought in her original lawsuit. The Court found that the trial court was correct in dismissing Plaintiff's allegations of abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tessier v. Rockefeller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Yvette Bouffard appealed a trial court's denial of her request for a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to uninsured motorist (UM) insurance coverage under her umbrella insurance policy issued by Defendant State Farm Fire & Casualty Company. Plaintiff was injured in 2006 from a car accident. She recovered $250,000 from the other party's insurer and her UM coverage under her personal automobile policy. Because her damages exceeded this sum, Plaintiff sought UM coverage under her umbrella policy. State Farm denied the claim because UM coverage was rejected on her original insurance application. The trial court found that Plaintiff authorized her husband to go to the insurance agency to purchase insurance for both of them, and that because the husband did not elect UM coverage, Plaintiff ratified his decision when she failed to object after reviewing the application in the car or after the policy arrived in the mail. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record supported the trial court's conclusion that the husband acted as Plaintiff's agent in rejecting UM coverage and affirmed the court's decision to deny Plaintiff declaratory relief. View "Bouffard v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law