Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant New Hampshire Division for Children, Yought and Families (DCYF) appealed a superior court order that it pay Plaintiff Chase Home for Children over $3 million. The dispute concerned rates the DCYF paid to the Chase home for fiscal years 2004 through 2006 pursuant to Provider Service Agreements the home had with DCYF. Due to state budget cuts, DCYF notified its contracted service providers like Chase that it would be unable to increase rates. The service providers asked DCYF to reconsider, claiming that the then-current rates were inconsistent with the agency's own rules. A hearing panel established that DCYF underpaid the service providers. The providers requested the panel order DCYF to pay them, but the panel ruled it lacked authority to do so. The providers appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the legislature specifically authorized the courts to enter a monetary judgment against the State when it breaches a contract: "to hold otherwise would require [the Court] to ignore these legislative directives and to permit a State agency to disregard its contractual obligations. Such a result finds no support in New Hampshire law." The Court therefore affirmed the hearing panel's conclusion and ordered DCYF to pay the service providers for the underpayments. View "Chase Home for Children v. New Hampshire Div. for Children, Youth and Fam." on Justia Law

Defendants Robin Colburn and Ronald and Richard Tennant appealed a superior court order that denied their motion to dismiss this action by Plaintiffs Richard and Cheryl Fellows and Benjamin Bellerose. Plaintiffs were successors-in-interest to property once owned by Defendants' parents. The property was subject to a 1996 lead paint abatement order. Defendants' parents sold the property to Jesus and Eileen Guzman who were not aware of the abatement order when they sold the property to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then brought suit upon discovery of the abatement order. Defendants argued that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over them because despite being administrators of their parents' estate, none of the Defendants actually lived in New Hampshire. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs failed to plead facts suffiient to justify the court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over Defendants as either successor trustees or beneficiaries. Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not plead facts sufficient for the court to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's judgment. View "Fellows v. Colburn" on Justia Law

Defendant Ivonne Hernandez was convicted by a jury for second degree murder, second degree assault and reckless conduct. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress statements she made to the police.On the evening of May 1, 2008, a drunken dispute between Defendant and four others ended when Defendant "turned her car around and drove directly towards the group." At trial, one witness testified that Defendant then revved her engine and accelerated towards the group. One attempted to jump out of the way, but the car hit her knee, causing a minor injury. The car also struck and severely injured another. Defendant argued at trial that the statement she gave to police recounting her version of events was involuntary and should have been suppressed. In this case, the Supreme Court found that the evidence supported the conclusion that Defendant's statements were the product of a free and unconstrained choice. "Based upon this evidence, [the court could not] say that the trial court's determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's finding that Defendant’s statements were voluntary. View "New Hampshire v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Soto appealed his conviction for being an accomplice to first degree murder. Defendant's conviction arose out of the fatal shooting of Aaron Kay in 2007. A man named Bill threatened Roney White's young cousins with a knife at a 7-Eleven store close to Roney's home. In retaliation, Roney tried to run over Bill and his companions with his car. Bill and another person then attacked Roney with a baseball bat. Defendant and his brother Sergio, met up with Roney and several of his companions, smoked marijuana, and settled on a plan to find Roney’s attackers and confront them. After one of the group confirmed that Defendant had brought a gun, the six men set out to find Roney's attackers. A short time later, they found a group of people whom they suspected had been involved in Roney's attack gathered near a dumpster. After driving past the group once or twice, they parked their car around the corner and discussed who would do the shooting. They settled on Roney's cousin as the shooter. Defendant then wiped the gun with his shirt, racked the slide to cock it, and handed it to the would-be shooter who left with a mask on, and shot Kay in the leg and abdomen. The men drove away. Kay later died from his wounds. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court should have instructed the jury to consider whether the defendant acted under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance caused by extreme provocation, thereby reducing his criminal liability from murder to manslaughter. The Supreme Court "never treated provocation manslaughter ...as a true 'defense' under the Criminal Code ...and we decline to do so today." The Court concluded that the undisputed facts culminating in Kar’s death revealed "no evidence upon which a provocation instruction was warranted." The Court concluded the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury, and upheld Defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Soto" on Justia Law

Defendant William Ploof appealed a superior court order that committed him to the custody of the state Department of Corrections as a sexually violent predator. He argued on appeal that on its face, the statute under which he was committed violated his right to procedural due process, the state constitution's separation of powers provision, and his right to equal protection. Following a seven-day trial, the jury unanimously found that Defendant was a sexually violent predator and the trial court entered an order committing him to the custody of the department of corrections for a period of five years. Upon careful review of the process by which the state commits persons as a sexually violent predator, the governing statute and the pertinent case law, the Supreme Court remained unpersuaded by Defendant's arguments, and affirmed the superior court order. View "New Hampshire v. Ploof " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Horace King was convicted on two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his supplemental motion for in camera review of the victim's medical and counseling records. The trial court found that Defendant "failed to articulate how the requested medical records would be material to his defense." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's record did not support its conclusion that the records were not material to Defendant's defense: "Defendant presented specific arguments to carry his burden... [the victim's] prior false allegation of sexual assault, her 'tendency to lie,' and the potential effects her ADD and ODD medical and counseling records may have on her competency as a witness." The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Gingras was convicted of reckless conduct, criminal threatening and criminal mischief following a jury trial in superior court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, he challenged only the criminal threatening and reckless conduct convictions, arguing the trial court erred in its jury instructions as to those charges, and that the court failed to give his proposed self-defense instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that reversal was warranted due to the trial court's failure to give a complete jury instruction pertaining to the definition of "deadly force" on his self-defense claim. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for a new trial. View "New Hampshire v. Gingras" on Justia Law

Defendant Nicholas Gardner pled guilty to driving while intoxicated (DWI). On the date of the offense, he was nineteen years old. As part of his sentence, Defendant requested that his driver's license be revoked for twelve months but that he be allowed to seek suspension of six months of the revocation period provided he entered an impaired driver intervention program within 45 days of his conviction. The court denied Defendant's request, ruling that it did not have the authority to impose such a sentence. Upon careful review of the applicable legislative and legal authority, the Supreme Court agreed that the trial court did not have the requisite authority to impose Defendant's proposed sentence, and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Gardner" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Montenegro appealed a superior court order that denied his petition under the Right-to-Know Law requesting disclosure of information pertaining to certain surveillance equipment and procedures of Respondent City of Dover. Petitioner sought information on: (1) the precise locations of the City’s surveillance equipment; (2) the recording capabilities for each piece of equipment; (3) the specific time periods each piece of equipment is operational; (4) the retention time for any recordings; and (5) the job titles of those who monitor the recordings. The City denied his request on the basis that "it would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions." In addition, the City stated that "disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law." The superior court found that the City had sustained its burden of justifying withholding the the information. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that information on the City's surveillance equipment was exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. As such, the Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Petitioner's requests. View "Montenegro v. City of Dover " on Justia Law

Defendant New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS) appealed a superior court decision that ordered it to disclose certain retiree benefit records requested by Plaintiff Union Leader Corporation under the state Right-to-Know Law. A Union Leader reporter requested that NHRS provide a list of retirement system members who received the highest annual pension payments for the 2009 calendar year. NHRS denied the request, but offered to provide a list of all state annuities ranked from highest to lowest. Union Leader thereafter filed suit requesting the list. On appeal, NHRS argued that the trial court erred in: (1) concluding that the plain language of the Right-to-Know Law (RSA 91-A:4, I-a) required disclosure of the requested records; (2) finding RSA 91-A:4, I-a unambiguous and therefore failing to consult legislative history; (3) failing to recognize the privacy interest at stake in disclosing retirees' names and annuity amounts; and (4) failing to assess the public's interest in disclosure and balance it against NHRS's interest in nondisclosure and the retirees' privacy interests. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that RSA 91-A:4, I-a did not compel disclosure of the records at issue, but that the records were subject to disclosure under the general mandate of RSA 91-A:4 and Article 8 of the state constitution. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision ordering disclosure of the records in Union Leader's request. View "Union Leader Corp. v. New Hampshire Retirement Sys. " on Justia Law