Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants Sedo, Inc. ad its founder, president and sole shareholder Goran Lucic, appealed a district court ruling that held both the company and Mr. Lucic liable to Plaitiff Holloway Automotive Group d/b/a Holloway Motor Cars of Manchester for breach of contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's enforcement of a liquidated damages provision in the parties' contract, but concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to "pierce the corporate veil." Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's award against Lucic as well as the award of attorney's fees. View "Holloway Automotive Group v. Lucic" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ellen St. Louis appealed the decision of the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES) Appellate Board (board) that denied her claim for unemployment benefits. Early 2009, Petitioner received a disciplinary notice stating that her conduct was not in line with company policy because she appeared to be asleep at work and was argumentative when her trainer instructed her regarding her faulty soldering work. Subsequently, Petitioner informed a human resources representative that she was having difficulties breathing and that she was depressed. The human resources representative recommended she take medical leave. Petitioner claims that when she returned to work she could no longer perform soldering work because the fumes caused headaches, and caused her to shake, cough, and have difficulty breathing. The record indicated that she never provided Insight Technology with any medical records or doctor's instructions regarding her breathing problems or opinions regarding her inability to do soldering work. Petitioner was ultimately terminated for poor work performance. She applied for unemployment benefits but was denied. After an unsuccessful appeal to the Board, Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found that the record supported the determination that Petitioner was terminated for misconduct, and that there was no error in the Board's decision. View "Appeal of Ellen St. Louis " on Justia Law

Petitioners Residents of Green View Drive appealed a superior court order that: (1) found no "occasion" to lay out Green View Drive as a class V public highway; (2) partially granted and partially denied the petition to quiet title filed by The Ledges Golf Links, Inc. (The Ledges) against Defendant Claire Crowley; and (3) ruled that Ms. Crowley was responsible for the continued maintenance of Green View Drive and could recover road maintenance costs from the Residents. Green View Drive is located in Loudon and provides access to a portion of the golf course operated by The Ledges and to homes owned by the Residents. The Town classified Green View Drive as a private roadway. In 1997, before Green View Drive was built, the golf course property, then owned by Ms. Crowley and her husband William, was sold to the Loudon Country Club, Inc. In December 1999, the country club sold the golf course property to The Ledges. At some point, while constructing Green View Drive, Mr. Crowley mistakenly located a portion of the road on golf course property. As a result, he entered into a settlement agreement with The Ledges and others to resolve this issue. The settlement agreement provided that Mr. Crowley would "grant to the Ledges an easement for the Ledges to have use of [Green View Drive] for all golf course purposes." After Mr. Crowley died, Ms. Crowley petitioned the Town’s board of selectmen to accept Green View Drive as a town road. Her petition was denied. Ms. Crowley again petitioned the Town to accept Green View Drive as a public road; the Residents joined in this request. The Town denied the petition. The trial court construed August 2000 and September 2001 agreements as granting The Ledges an easement to use Green View Drive for the purpose of golf cart travel. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed portions of the superior court's order, finding that the court erred in finding the road was part of the golf course's "infrastructure." Furthermore, the Supreme Court vacated that portion of the superior court's order pertaining to the maintenance of the road. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Crowley v. Town of Loudon" on Justia Law

Defendant Town of Madison Planning Board appealed and Plaintiffs Thomas and Margaret Ettinger cross-appealed a superior court's decision which held that a private session of the Board violated the state's Right-to-Know Law (RTK) and denied Plaintiffs' request for attorney fees. In June 2009, the Pomeroy Limited Partnership (Pomeroy) received conditional approval from the Board to convert the buildings on its property to a condominium ownership form and to convey part of the property to the Nature Conservancy. In January 2010, Plaintiffs, whose property abuts the Pomeroy property, requested a public hearing to allow them to challenge the approval of the condominium plan. The Board scheduled a public hearing for March 3, 2010, to consider whether to grant final approval of the Pomeroy application. Plaintiffs' attorney appeared at that hearing. At the scheduled time of the hearing, the Board went into a private session for thirty minutes in which they read emails from the Board's attorney, a memorandum that summarized legal advice and letters from Plaintiffs' attorney. The Board then reopened the hearing and then after hearing Plaintiffs' attorney on the matter, granted final approval of the Pomeroy application. Plaintiffs sued alleging the Board violated the RTK law. The superior court agreed that the private session violated the RTK law, but refused to invalidate the Board's approval of the Pomeroy application. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that while the Board's written communications from its counsel may be protected from disclosure under the RTK law, the meeting itself need not have been closed to the public. Further, the Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' attorney fees: "[w]e cannot find that … the Board should have known that the nonpublic session violated the Right-to-Know Law" to therefore entitle them to fees. View "Ettinger v. Town of Madison Planning Board " on Justia Law

Petitioners Thomas Morrissey, Dorothy Sears, Reginald Rogers, John Quimby, Michael O’Donnell, Jonathan Chamberlain, Patricia Reynolds, Richard and Barbara Sanders, Margaret Russell, and Robert and Judith Dupuis, appealed a superior court order that granted motions to dismiss filed by Respondents New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services and New Hampshire Fish and Game Department (collectively referred to as the State), and Town of Lyme (Town). Post Pond is in Lyme, held in trust by the State for public use. Petitioners own properties with frontage on Post Pond and the west side of the Clay Brook wetlands. The Town owns property on the east side of the Clay Brook wetlands as well as a contiguous parcel with frontage on Post Pond, which consists of a recreation area. In May 2009, Petitioners filed a petition in equity and writ of mandamus alleging that the Town's removal of beaver dams in the Pond that controlled the natural mean high water mark adversely affected their properties and disrupted the entire Clay Brook wetlands ecosystem. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioners' writ allegations were insufficient to state a claim for taking or nuisance against the Town, and that the trial court did not err in dismissing their claims. Further, the Court concluded that Petitioners failed to plead a claim entitling them to declaratory relief. View "Morrissey v. Town of Lyme" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Salvatore Rabbia appealed a superior court order that ordered $37,000 held in escrow be dispersed to Intervenor Automotive Finance Corporation instead of to him. Plaintiff was a principal in the corporate Defendant Harvard Auto Sales (d/b/a "Hitcars.com"). The company was in the business of salvaging motor parts; Automotive Finance Corporation and Plaintiff were two of Harvard Motors' creditors. AFC financed Harvard's purchase of inventory. Plaintiff was involved in a long-standing dispute with Harvard. The issue before the Supreme Court invovled Plaintff's and AFC's competing claims to funds Harvard gave to their counsel to hold in escrow in the summer of 2008 while settlement discussions with Plaintiff were ongoing. Upon careful review of the superior court record, the Supreme Court concluded that a "transfer" occurred when the Court affirmed an earlier trial court decision requiring disbursement of the escrowed funds to Plaintiff. As a result, Plaintiff acquired both legal and equitable title to the escrowed funds, entitling him to take them free of any perfected security interest AFC may have had in them. The Court reversed the superior court decision with respect to release of the funds to AFC. The Court affirmed the superior court with respect to all other matters in this case. View "Rabbia v. Rocha" on Justia Law

Petitioner Premium Research Services appealed a superior court's dismissal of its petition brought under the state Right-to-Know Law for disclosure of documents relating to disbursements from the second injury fund. Petitioner sought information so that it could know whether a carrier reported reimbursement to the National Council on Compensation Insurers. If reimbursements were reported, then the Council would reduce an employer's insurance premium. Petitioner sought to monitor the reimbursement process to ensure employers were not being overcharged for workers' compensation insurance. Petitioner filed its petition against the Department of Labor for disclosure of the documents. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the documents sought were exempt from disclosure under the plain meaning of the RTK law. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of Petitioner's petition. View "Premium Research Svcs. v. New Hampshire Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Hayes appealed a superior court order that denied his petition to enjoin a sheriff's sale and found a prejudgment attachment by Appellee Southern New Hampshire Medical Center (SNHMC or Hospital) valid and executable. In 2006, Appellant's wife Karen was admitted to the SNMHC for medical treatment stemming from alcoholism. SNHMC filed suit in superior court against Appellant for his wife's unpaid medical bills. At the same time, the hospital petitioned to attach a portion of the couple's real estate owned as a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. During the pendancy of the attachment proceedings, the Hayses divorced. Under the terms of their separation agreement, each was responsible for their own medical expenses not covered by insurance. Mrs. Hayes quitclaimed her interest in the real estate. Shortly thereafter, she died. SNHMC obtained a limited probate administration in order to proceed with the sheriff's sale of the properties. The trial court found that Mrs. Hayes' interests in the subject properties remained valid and that SNHMC was entitled to execute its judgment against them. On appeal, Appellant contended that, because Mrs. Hayes quitclaimed her interest in the property prior to entry of final judgment against her, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it failed to find that her death terminated SNHMC’s prejudgment attachment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that SNHMC’s prejudgment attachment was obtained and recorded during Mrs. Hayes' lifetime and while she held the property jointly with her husband. As such the hospital's judgment remained valid. The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the hospital. View "Hayes v. So. New Hampshire Medical Ctr" on Justia Law

Respondents New Hampshire Department of Corrections and Liberty Mutual Insurance Copmany (Insurer) appealed the decision of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) that Petitioner Michael Whitaker (Claimant) was entitled to ongoing temporary total disability indemnity benefits. Claimant first filed a workers’ compensation claim in January 2008, alleging that he suffered emotional injuries in 2007 because of harassment and retaliation at his DOC job. The insurer denied the claim on the ground that Claimant’s injuries were not causally related to his employment. In 2009, the CAB ruled in Claimant’s favor, awarding him benefits from the date he was deemed unable to work, through "at least" October 20, 2008, the date of the initial hearing before a department of labor hearing officer. The insurer did not appeal the CAB’s decision. In late 2009, Claimant sought to have his benefits increased to the higher temporary total disability rate when he was hospitalized for "[m]ajor depressive disorder, recurrent, severe, with psychotic features." The insurer denied this request on the ground that Claimant had failed to demonstrate that his hospitalization was related to his 2007 work injury. A department of labor hearing officer ruled in the insurer’s favor in January 2010; Claimant appealed to the CAB. The insurer argued that because Claimant had filed a claim with the New Hampshire Commission for Human Rights seeking damages for his allegedly wrongful discharge from the DOC, he waived his claim for increased benefits. The CAB was unpersuaded by Insurer's argument, and approved Claimant's claim. After unsuccessfully moving for reconsideration, Insurer appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon careful review of the CAB record, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding all of the issues the Insurer's raised on appeal unsupported by legal authority. View "Appeal of New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Petitioner Town of Newington appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to the State through the the Pease Development Authority (PDA) and the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES). Before land from the former Pease Air Force Base was deeded to the PDA, the United States Air Force engaged in a series of environmental impact analyses required by federal law. Following several iterations of environmental documents and deed restrictions, PDA accepted title to the Pease AFB land in three title transfers between 1999 and 2005. Shortly thereafter, the Town began the process of designating prime wetlands within its borders pursuant to state law. Six wetlands were located within the former Pease base. DES initially "approved" the Town's request, but later clarified that it "did not purport to 'approve' the legality of the Town's designation of prime wetlands located within PDA boundaries, nor would the agency have statutory authority to do so." Several months later, as part of a proposed construction project on PDA land to expand an existing office building, an alteration of terrain permit application was filed with DES. The Town rejected, asserting that it involved fill within 100 feet of wetlands that the Town had designated as "prime" and, therefore, required a wetlands permit. DES disagreed. After the Wetlands Council dismissed its appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the Town filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief in superior court. The trial court concluded that PDA was not required to comply with the Town’s prime wetlands designations and, therefore, granted PDA and DES’s motion for summary judgment. Upon careful consideration of the superior court records and the deeds of the wetlands in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the DES' reservation when first 'approving' the six wetlands within the PDA did not confer the Town with standing to challenge any subsequent development. As such, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment. View "Town of Newington v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law