Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Paul McDonald appealed his conviction by a jury of first-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in permitting the State to present certain lay opinion testimony, declining to give his requested self-defense jury instruction, and prohibiting the defense from referring to the aggravated felonious sexual assault statute in its closing argument. Finding that the trial court did not err in its decisions in Defendant's case, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. View "New Hampshire v. McDonald " on Justia Law

Defendant Dickens Etinenne appealed his conviction for the first degree murder of Larry Lemieux. On appeal, he argued that the superior court erred by: (1) incorrectly defining the elements of self-defense or defense of another in its jury instructions; (2) permitting hearsay testimony; (3) failing to order a new trial based upon perjured testimony of a State’s witness and the State’s failure to disclose exculpatory information; and (4) failing to order the State to immunize a witness for the purpose of ascertaining the extent of his perjured testimony. Upon careful consideration of each of Defendant's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err in its decisions. The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Etienne" on Justia Law

Petitioner Christopher Ruel, a licensed real estate appraiser, appealed a superior court order that remanded his case to the New Hampshire Real Estate Appraiser Board for a new disciplinary hearing. In the spring of 2007, Kenneth Frederick hired Petitioner to appraise his property in Kingston. The New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT) sought to take Frederick's property by eminent domain and Frederick used Petitioner's appraisal in negotiating a settlement with DOT. DOT performed its own appraisal and valued the property at approximately fifty thousand dollars less than did Petitioner. After finalizing the settlement, a DOT appraisal supervisor reviewed Petitioner's appraisal and filed a grievance against him with the Board. In April 2010, four members of the Board voted to order Petitioner to pay a $500 fine and attend two appraisal courses. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the superior court should have dismissed the Board proceedings against him because: (1) the DOT lacked standing to file the initial grievance and, therefore, the case should never have been heard; (2) the Board violated its governing statute by taking more than two years to dispose of his case; (3) the Board's delay materially prejudiced him; and (4) the Board's determination to continue with the hearing and render a final decision without a quorum violated his due process rights. Upon careful review of the Board's hearing record, the Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's arguments on appeal. View "Ruel v. New Hampshire Real Estate App. Bd. " on Justia Law

Petitioner Christopher Ruel, a licensed real estate appraiser, appealed a superior court order that remanded his case to the New Hampshire Real Estate Appraiser Board for a new disciplinary hearing. In the spring of 2007, Kenneth Frederick hired Petitioner to appraise his property in Kingston. The New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT) sought to take Frederick's property by eminent domain and Frederick used Petitioner's appraisal in negotiating a settlement with DOT. DOT performed its own appraisal and valued the property at approximately fifty thousand dollars less than did Petitioner. After finalizing the settlement, a DOT appraisal supervisor reviewed Petitioner's appraisal and filed a grievance against him with the Board. In April 2010, four members of the Board voted to order Petitioner to pay a $500 fine and attend two appraisal courses. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the superior court should have dismissed the Board proceedings against him because: (1) the DOT lacked standing to file the initial grievance and, therefore, the case should never have been heard; (2) the Board violated its governing statute by taking more than two years to dispose of his case; (3) the Board's delay materially prejudiced him; and (4) the Board's determination to continue with the hearing and render a final decision without a quorum violated his due process rights. Upon careful review of the Board's hearing record, the Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's arguments on appeal. View "Appeal of Letellier " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Hansa Consult of North America, LLC (HCNA), appealed an order of the Superior Court that dismissed its complaint against Defendant Hansaconsult Ingenieurgesellschaft, mbH. HCNA, an American company based in Portsmouth, and hansaconsult, a German company, are both involved in the business of detecting fuel leaks at airports. The two companies began their relationship on cooperative terms, having entered into a distribution agreement in 2001 that made HCNA the exclusive distributor of hansaconsult's products and services throughout the United States and Canada. That relationship broke down, however, and the parties terminated their agreement on December 31, 2005. In 2006, hansaconsult commenced litigation against HCNA in New Hampshire and Germany. After years of fruitless settlement efforts, in January 2009 hansaconsult again sued HCNA for breaching the 2001 distribution agreement, but this time only in Germany. Believing this lawsuit to violate its settlement agreement protocol (SPA), HCNA moved in superior court, in June 2009, to enjoin hansaconsult's German lawsuit and to enforce the SPA. Before the superior court responded to that motion, apparently out of concerns that the statute of limitations would run on its claims, HCNA filed its own lawsuit against hansaconsult in New Hampshire asserting the same claims it had brought as counterclaims in its original 2006 New Hampshire action. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of Plaintiff's misappropriation-based claims, but reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff's market representations-based claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Hansa Consult of North America, LLC v. hansaconsult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH " on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Smith appealed a superior court order that imposed previously suspended sentences for felony convictions. In February 2008, Defendant was charged with six class A misdemeanors. Subsequently, in March and April 2008, Defendant was indicted on six felony charges. In January 2010, Defendant pled guilty to the six misdemeanor charges and was sentenced to concurrent terms of six months in jail, these sentences also running concurrently with his felony sentences. On three of the felony charges, Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of between two and seven years at the state prison, with six months of the minimum and all of the maximum terms suspended for seven years. On the other three felony charges, Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of between two and five years at the state prison, all suspended for a period of five years from release from his stand-committed prison sentences. While incarcerated, Defedant attempted to contact a woman whom he was forbidden to contact under the terms of his misdemeanor sentence. Although the prison’s system blocked his call, the State moved to impose the suspended sentences of all six felony convictions, arguing that the attempted call violated the condition of good behavior in those sentences. The superior court agreed that the call violated the good behavior condition, and imposed six months of the minimum and one year of the maximum sentences leaving the other sentences suspended. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the evidence supported the superior court's decision and affirmed it. View "New Hampshire v. Smith " on Justia Law

Defendant, Robert Towle, appealed his conviction on four counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault and and four counts of criminal liability for the conduct of another all stemming from inappropriate and illegal contact between he and his wife with their minor son. On appeal, Defendant argued that the superior court erred by denying his motion to proceed pro se. Defendant believed his counsel and he had a conflict of interest because his counsel was a candidate for municipal office. In the middle of a pre-trial conference, Defendant asked, when the court gave the opportuity, to proceed pro se. The court denied this request, and Defendant "moved" to correct the court's understanding of his request. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the superior court indeed disregarded Defendant's constitutional right when he "knowingly, intelligently" and with "awareness of the dangers of self-representation" requested to represent himself. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Towle " on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher D'Errico appealed the recommendation of the Marital Master that granted a protection order to Plaintiff Linda Thompson. Plaintiff filed a domestic violence petition in April, 2011. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that almost every day Defendant sent Plaintiff text messages using "extraordinarily foul language." The court further found that Defendant told Plaintiff not to come near his house because he had a loaded shot gun, and that in the past Defendant was stopped by a family friend from putting his hands around Plaintiff's neck. The court concluded that Defendant's conduct constituted a present threat to Plaintiff's safety and issued a final order of protection. On appeal, Defendant argued that: (1) his non-threatening foul language is protected by the First Amendment; (2) there is no evidence to support Plaintiff's allegations against him; (3) the text messages might have been sent by a third party having access to his phone; (4) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of certain text messages; and (5) the evidence did not support the finding of a credible present threat to Plaintiff's safety. Finding no merit to any of the issues Defendant raised on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Master's final order. View "Thompson v. D'Errico " on Justia Law

Defendant Adam Mentus appealed his conviction on manslaughter charges. In 2008, he took a Lorcin handgun home to show his brother. In the car, he placed a full clip of ammuitio in the gun, and placed it in his pocket. Reaching in to move the gun from him pocket to underneath the car seat, it discharged, puncturing front-seat passenger Diedre Bydzyna's lung through the back of the seat. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred: (1) by providing him with only $1,200 of the $3,000 he requested to hire a firearms expert, and (2) by overruling his objection to the State's closing argument. At a hearing, the trial judge said, "[T]hese are hard economic times. I’m not going to just easily approve $3,000 for a firearms expert." Based upon this statement, Defendant argued the judge denied his “request solely because of concerns about the source of funding" and that this amounted to reversible error. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the denial of funds did not substantially prejudice him at trial. Furthermore, the Court found that the prosecutor made no impermissible statements. Accordingly, the Cout held that the trial judge's overruling of Defendant's objections was not an abuse of discretion, and affirmed his conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Mentus " on Justia Law

Defendant Jon French appealed a superior court order that suspended his deferred sentence. In 1996, Defendant pled guilty to two counts of felonious sexual assault. Deferral of Defendant's sentence was conditioned upon his compliance "with a structured, residential program with 24 hour per day supervision." In 2010, Defendant moved to terminate his deferred sentence. The court held a hearing, at which the State presented the testimony of a clinical consultant to Defendant's treatment facility, who had been providing services to Defendant since he was in high school. The expert testified that while Defendant had the "potential" to be a danger to himself or to society "[t]he real issue here [was] his impulse to drift off that ... course of treatment, to do things that he knows that should be considered to be inappropriate." The trial court issued an order suspending Defendant's deferred sentence for a period of seven years "subject to the terms and conditions set out in the original mittimus of 1996." On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's decision to suspend his sentence for an additional seven years violated his right to due process. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that under the language of the 1996 sentencing order the court retained only the authority to impose or terminate Defendant's deferred sentence. Thus, the court lacked authority to suspend sua sponte Defendant's deferred sentence. The Court reversed the superior court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. French " on Justia Law