Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in New Hampshire Supreme Court
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Defendant Bradford Dalton was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI)-third offense, following a bench trial. He appealed his convictions based on his contention the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Dalton" on Justia Law

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The Estate of Richard Wilber appealed appeals a probate court decision allowing the Estate of Josephine Wilber to claim a statutory share under RSA 560:10 (2007) of certain real property named in his will. Finding that the lower court erred in allowing the claim, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "In re Estate of Richard B. Wilber" on Justia Law

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Respondent City of Concord appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to petitioner Granite State Management & Resources (GSMR), and denying summary judgment to the City, based upon a finding that GSMR is a charitable organization eligible for a tax exemption under RSA 72:23, V (2012) for tax years 2008 and 2009. The trial court found that “there [could] be no serious dispute that the fundamental purpose of GSMR is to service educational loans” and that its only assets “likely to generate income are the loan servicing assets.” GSMR derived income from origination fees paid by borrowers, loan servicing and origination fees paid by institutions, and interest stemming from the education loans that GSMR administered. It used its income to pay expenses, for uncollectible loans and collection expenses, to fund loan default reserves, to "provide student[s], parent[s], and institution[s] information and counseling, . . . to pay for new educational loan related activities and services,” and to market its services. In 2008 and 2009, GSMR serviced approximately $2.5 billion in loans, earned a substantial net profit, maintained investments, and retained a surplus. The Supreme Court disagreed with the City that by virtue of servicing other lenders' loans GSMY was categorically ineligible for a charitable tax exemption, and affirmed the trial court with respect to denying the City's motion. The Court found genuine issues of material facts with regard to GMSR's motion, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Granite State Management & Resources v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

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Petitioners Bilden Properties, LLC and TD Bank, N.A. appealed and respondents S. Gerald and Gail Birin cross-appealed a superior court order finding, among other things, that the petitioners were bona fide purchasers for value, who acquired interests in the subject property without notice of the Birins’ mortgage on it. The Supreme Court concluded petitioners purchased the subject property subject to the Birins’ mortgage, upholding the trial court’s decision to the extent that it allowed the Birins to foreclose. To the extent that the trial court granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the Birins from foreclosing, the Court vacated that permanent injunction. Additionally, the Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that petitioners’ interests were equitably subrogated up to the amount paid to discharge the mortgages held by Southern New Hampshire Bank. View "Bilden Properties, LLC v. Birin" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Thomas Phillips appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) decision denying him recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Law. The CAB ruled that petitioner was not entitled to benefits because he had failed to timely notify his employers, Norman and Diane Crocker, of his claim. Furthermore, the CAB ruled that petitioner was not entitled to benefits because, unbeknownst to the Crockers, he was intoxicated at the time of his injury. In 2006, petitioner and his wife lived in a trailer that they rented from the Crockers. As part of the lease agreement, the petitioner performed yard work and minor home repairs for the Crockers in exchange for a rent reduction. Mr. Crocker asked petitioner to remove a tree branch that was growing near the Crockers’ house. The next day, petitioner fell from a ladder while cutting the branch with a chainsaw. As a result of the fall, petitioner was rendered a quadriplegic. Petitioner filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, identifying the Crockers as his employer. The Crockers were insured under a homeowner’s insurance policy issued by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm) that included workers’ compensation coverage for domestic employees. State Farm denied petitioner workers’ compensation benefits. The New Hampshire Department of Labor (DOL) Hearing Officer determined that petitioner was entitled to benefits. State Farm appealed to the CAB. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings: (1) the CAB misapplied the governing New Hampshire case law to the petitioner’s claim; (2) petitioner’s claim was not time barred; and (3) a factual question remained whether petitioner's injury was caused in whole or in part by his intoxication. View "Appeal of Thomas Phillips" on Justia Law

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Respondent Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC d/b/a FairPoint Communications – NNE (FairPoint), appealed two orders of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (PUC). Petitioners are all “competitive local exchange carriers.” The PUC ordered Verizon New Hampshire to stop imposing “carrier common line charges” upon certain telephone calls that did not require the use of Verizon’s common line. The PUC found that Verizon did not provide switched access service in connection with these calls. Under the plain language of Verizon’s access tariff, the Supreme Court concluded that Verizon was allowed to impose a “carrier common line access charge” (CCL charge) upon “each aspect of switched access service,” and that “common line access” is only one component of switched access service. It was undisputed that Verizon provided other aspects of switched access service with respect to the calls at issue. Following the Supreme Court's decision, the PUC reopened the proceeding and ordered FairPoint, which had purchased Verizon’s New Hampshire assets, to modify the Tariff to clarify that it could “charge CCL only when a FairPoint common line is used in the provision of switched access services.” Ultimately, the PUC approved in part, and rejected in part, tariff revisions that FairPoint submitted. The PUC approved FairPoint’s revision of the CCL charge, but rejected FairPoint’s proposal to increase the rate of an interconnection charge under the Tariff. The PUC granted the petitioners’ motion to dismiss the portion of the docket related to the interconnection charge. FairPoint unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of both orders, and this appeal followed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

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Police searched defendant's vehicle and found a .40 caliber semi-automatic pistol adjacent to a loaded magazine in the vehicle's glove compartment. The pistol did not have a cartridge in the chamber or a magazine in the magazine well. The State charged the defendant with a class A misdemeanor for "knowingly carry[ing] a loaded pistol . . . in a vehicle without a valid license . . . ." Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that "[t]he firearm at issue was not loaded and therefore no license was required and no crime was committed." The trial court found RSA 159:4 "potentially ambiguous" and transferred the question to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the definition of a ‘loaded pistol or revolver' [under RSA 159:4 (2002)] did not encompass a firearm with no cartridge in the firearm, and no magazine in the magazine well, or with a loaded magazine located next to it and easily accessible. View "New Hampshire v. Dor" on Justia Law

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Defendant Michael Noucas appealed his conviction as an accomplice for armed robbery. He argued that the evidence presented against him was insufficient to sustain the conviction. He also argued multiple errors at trial warranted dismissal of the charges. Finding the evidence sufficient and no errors, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Noucas" on Justia Law

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Defendant Wayne Dorrance appealed his conviction for second degree assault on a police officer. He argued the evidence presented against him was insufficient to sustain the charges. After review, the Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction and affirmed it. View "New Hampshire v. Dorrance" on Justia Law

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At issue before the Supreme Court was an Asset Purchase Agreement. Portsmouth Regional Hospital was sold to the Hospital Corporation of America. A dispute arose over the meaning of certain terms and clauses in the purchase agreement. The Foundation for Seacoast Health sought to "repurchase" the hospital's tangible assets under certain conditions. The dispute arose when the Foundation sought to assert that right. The Foundation appealed the trial court’s determination that the clause under dispute in this case was intended to give the Foundation a right to purchase the Hospital only in the event of a sale to a third party. The Foundation argued that because of this error, the trial court also erred by failing to: (1) order specific performance of the Foundation’s contractual right to purchase the Hospital; (2) award monetary damages for the defendants’ material breach; and (3) award attorney’s fees for the remedy proceeding. Upon review of the contract in question, the Supreme Court affirmed all but the trial court’s attorney’s fee award. View "Foundation for Seacoast Health v. Hospital Corporation of America" on Justia Law