Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Daniel Eaton appealed the denial of his motion for payment of legal fees, arguing that the Cheshire County Probate Court erred in finding that the imposition of a guardianship does not require the proposed ward to pay a good-faith petitioner's attorney's fees. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the probate court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the probate court's decision. View "In re Guardianship of Mary Louise Eaton " on Justia Law

Respondents the Commissioner of the New Hampshire Banking Department and the New Hampshire Banking Department (collectively, the Department), appealed an order of the Superior Court that permanently enjoined the Department from pursuing an administrative proceeding against Petitioner Jeffrey Frost on the ground that the Department lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioners Frost, Chretien/Tillinghast, LLC, and Frost Family, LLC, cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying their request for attorney’s fees. Frost is a member and designated manager of Chretien/Tillinghast, LLC (Chretien), and a member of Frost Family, LLC (Frost Family). Chretien and Frost Family (collectively, the LLCs) are New Hampshire limited liability companies organized for the purpose of real estate acquisition, holding, and development. The underlying dispute arose as the result of two seller-financed real estate transactions, one conducted by Frost Family and the other by Chretien. After both instances of seller-financing, Petitioner submitted a loan originator license application to the Department. At the time the administrative proceedings were initiated, the Department notified Petitioner that he could request a hearing with the Department. Petitioner did not file such a request. Instead, all Petitioners initiated a declaratory judgment proceeding in superior court, which included a request for a temporary restraining order. The petitioners contended that Respondents lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed against Frost and violated the State Constitution's prohibition against retrospective laws by seeking to impose a $25,000 fine for each alleged violation. After a hearing, the trial court granted the preliminary injunction, concluding that "[w]hile the [Department] may have jurisdiction over Frost because he is now a loan originator, it [could] take no action against him based on the September 2008 or the March 2009 transactions." Further, the trial court concluded that since the Department "may not impose any penalties on Frost," it did not need to consider the issue of the retrospective nature of the sanctions. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the Department lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Frost v. New Hampshire Banking Dept. " on Justia Law

The main issue on appeal was whether Defendant's statements to police during an interview were voluntary. A portion of the interview was videotaped. Paramedics were called to the home of Defendant Nicole Belonga when Defendant's twenty-one-month-old child was sick. The child was left in the care of Defendant's boyfriend David Kaley who was living with Defendant at the time. The child suffered a seizure and was admitted to the hospital. She was discovered to have serious brain injuries and later transported to a hospital in Boston with a pediatric intensive care unit. Nashua Police arrived at the hospital and requested Defendant give a statement to them at the station. At first she did not agree to go so that she might be with her daughter in Boston, but Defendant later acquiesced. Detectives made clear that Defendant was at the police station voluntarily, but in her pre-trial motion, Defendant argued that her statements to the detectives were involuntary and the admission of those statements at trial would violate her constitutional rights. After a hearing, the court denied her motion. Her statements were admitted at trial through the videotape and the testimony of the detectives. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's pre-trial motion: "the jury had before it overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The defendant’s description of the incidents in which she used physical force against her daughter closely correspond with the doctors' testimony. The defendant's testimony, together with the doctors' testimony, strongly supports the conclusion that the defendant was caring for her daughter when [the] injuries occurred. The defendant made several statements suggesting she had had used too much physical force against her daughter and that she did something wrong. Also, the defendant's general description of the events paints a picture of a person using unwarranted and dangerous physical force against a very young child. Accordingly, [the Court] concluded that the evidentiary errors at trial were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." View "New Hampshire v. Belonga " on Justia Law

Defendant Roscoe White appealed his convictions by jury of first degree murder and attempted first-degree assault. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress inculpatory statements he made to an informant. He asserted on appeal that the informant's questions about his pending drug charges violated his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, and that his statements about the shooting should have been excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree." He further argued that "[a]llowing the State to intentionally violate the constitutional rights of an accused in order to elicit incriminating statements is fundamentally unfair and violates due process." Finding that use of an informant does not constitute a per se constitutional violation, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of the statements Defendant made to the informant. View "New Hampshire v. White" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dana Chatman appealed a superior court order that dismissed his negligence claims against Defendant Paul Giampa, and his respondeat superior claim against Defendants Strafford County and the Strafford County Department of Corrections. Plaintiff was participating in a work program run by the Corrections Department, under the direct supervision of Giampa. Giampa directed Plaintiff and others to load numerous tables and chairs onto a trailer. The trailer was not yet hitched to another vehicle, and not situated on even ground. Giampa directed Plaintiff and the others to lift the trailer and hitch it to a pickup truck when a weld on the trailer jack/hitch failed, causing the trailer to fall on Plaintiff's left leg and ankle. Plaintiff sustained permanent injury to his leg and ankle. The trial court agreed with the defendants that the plaintiff's claims did not fall within the scope of RSA 507-B:2 because the truck and trailer were not being "operated" at the time of the loading/hitching, and declined to find that RSA 507-B:2 was unconstitutional. Upon review, the Supreme held "that the entire range of activities inherent in the loading and unloading process must be considered to determine whether a vehicle was being operated" and that "[o]peration includes participation in loading and unloading activities." The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Chatman v. Strafford County" on Justia Law

In 1989, Richard Cormier conveyed property to CF Realty Trust by warranty deed, and CF Realty Trust recorded the conveyance in the registry of deeds shortly thereafter. In 1993, CF Realty Trust and Plaintiff C F Investments both filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Pursuant to a proposed plan of reorganization, CF Investments succeeded to all of CF Realty Trust's assets, including the property, and the bankruptcy court entered a final decree approving the proposed plan in 1995. However, C F Investments never recorded its interest in the Property in the registry of deeds. Notwithstanding the bankruptcy plan, CF Realty Trust continued to conduct real estate business after 1995. In 2002, Robert Fuller, acting as trustee of CF Realty Trust, conveyed the property to himself as an individual and duly recorded the transaction in the registry of deeds. He then borrowed $219,000, secured by a mortgage on the property, from First Eastern Mortgage Corporation, and First Eastern recorded its interest. First Eastern then assigned its interest to Defendant Option One Mortgage Corp, and Option One duly recorded. In 2008, counsel for CF Investments notified defendant Option One of its competing claim to the Property, alleging that Fuller had acquired title to it unlawfully and had no authority to borrow money against it. In June 2008, Defendant Wells Fargo notified CF Investments of its intent to conduct a foreclosure sale of the property because Fuller had defaulted on his promissory note. CF Investments brought this action in superior court to enjoin the foreclosure sale, arguing that CF Realty Trust did not own the property at the time of its purported conveyance, that such conveyance was therefore invalid, and that consequently Fuller could not lawfully have granted a mortgage to First Eastern. The trial court disagreed, concluding that First Eastern was protected as a bona fide purchaser without notice of CF Investments' claims. After a bench trial, the Superior Court ruled in favor of Option One and Wells Fargo, concluding that the claim of First Eastern had priority over CF Investments' claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "C F Investments, Inc. v. Option One Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

Respondent Hollis Education Association, NEA-New Hampshire, appealed a decision of the public employee labor relations board (PELRB) which sustained an unfair labor practice complaint filed by Petitioner Hollis School Board which ruled that speech-language pathologists and occupational therapists employed by the school district were not members of the bargaining unit represented by the Association. The recognition clause in the collective bargaining agreement defined members of the bargaining unit as "[c]ertified full-time teachers, librarians and guidance counsellors who actively teach at least 50% of their time in the Hollis School District and are employed by said district." The recognition clause did not specifically refer to speech-language pathologists or occupational therapists. Nonetheless, the Association argued that the term "certified teacher" was "broad enough to include speech-pathologists and occupational therapists." It maintains that "[s]ince both job titles teach and are certified, they should fall within . . . the recognition clause." Upon review, the Supreme Court fund that by its plain language, the term "certified full-time teachers" does not include speech-language pathologists or occupational therapists: "neither an employer nor a union can 'avoid the need to satisfy the statutory requisites for adding [a] position to the bargaining unit' by simply treating certain positions as though they were included within the bargaining unit." The Court affirmed the PELRB decision. View "Appeal of Hollis Education Association, NEA-New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Respondent Erica Blizzard appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS) that suspended her boating privileges. Carrying two passengers, Respondent piloted a motorboat on Lake Winnipesaukee. There was almost no visibility due to dark and inclement weather conditions. As the respondent later told investigators, she was unable to see the bow of her boat. She was operating the boat at eighteen to twenty miles per hour, unsure of her location or depth, when the boat collided with an island. The collision killed one passenger and seriously injured the respondent and the second passenger. As a result of the collision, the respondent was charged with boating while intoxicated and negligent homicide. A jury found her guilty of negligent homicide, but not guilty of boating while intoxicated. Respondent argued on appeal: (1) whether DOS lacked the authority to suspend boat-operation privileges because it has failed to promulgate associated regulations; (2) whether RSA 270-E:17 delegated legislative authority in violation of Part I, Article 37 of the State Constitution; and (3) whether the hearing notice complied with Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution. Finding the DOS had the requisite authority to suspend Respondent's boating privileges, the Supreme Court affirmed the Department's decision. View "Appeal of Erica Blizzard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Steven Ford appealed a superior court's order that dismissed his negligence claims against Defendants the Town of Windham and the New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT). In late 2008 the vehicle in which Plaintiff was a passenger was struck by another vehicle in Windham. A severe ice storm had caused a power outage that had rendered the street and crossing lights at the intersection where the accident occurred inoperable. Several hours before the accident, both the Town and DOT had received notice that the lights were inoperable because of the storm. The accident caused Plaintiff to suffer severe injuries. He sued for negligence. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing they owed Plaintiff no duty to warn of any hazardous condition that might have existed because of the ice storm. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's negligence claims. View "Ford v. Town of Windham" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jason and Jennifer Antosz appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant Doree Allain. Defendant owned property in Epping. In early 2008 the Town's fire department was called to Defendant's house because of a fire caused by the home's hot water heater. Jason Antosz was a volunteer firefighter with the Epping Fire Department who responded to the call. As he arrived on the scene, he walked down the home's driveway which was covered with packed snow and ice. He slipped and fell and was seriously injured. Plaintiffs sued Defendant for negligence, alleging the driveway was in an unsafe and unreasonable condition. Defendant argued that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the "Fireman's Rule." Finding that the Fireman's Rule only applied to paid firefighters, the Supreme Court overruled the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Antosz v. Allain " on Justia Law