Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Deicy Urena Ortiz appealed a district court's denial of her motion to withdraw her plea and vacate her misdemeanor conviction. On appeal, she contended her plea was not knowing because the court did not advise her of its potential adverse immigration consequences. Defendant had been a lawful resident of the United States since 2002. In 2007, she was charged with the class A misdemeanor of shoplifting. She appeared before the district court and entered a plea of nolo contendere. She was not represented by counsel. Defendant signed a standard acknowledgment and waiver of rights form, which, at the time, contained no acknowledgment of the potential adverse immigration consequences of entering either a guilty or nolo plea. During the plea colloquy, the court did not advise Defendant that her plea could result in adverse immigration consequences. In 2011, the federal government commenced removal proceedings against Defendant, contending that her shoplifting conviction constituted "a crime involving moral turpitude," a deportable offense. In response, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her plea and vacate her conviction. In her motion, she argued that her plea was not “knowing” because: (1) the court failed to inform her "that a conviction could subject her to deportation"; and (2) she "was affirmatively misled (albeit innocently) [by the prosecutor] that there would be no such consequences." The State objected. Acknowledging that it did not advise Defendant of the possible immigration consequences of her plea, the court concluded that Defendant raised a "pure issue of law," and, therefore, there was "no need for a hearing on the factual basis for [her] request." The court was not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that "Padilla v. Kentucky" (130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)) supported her appeal. Accordingly, the court denied the motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because immigration consequences are collateral, the court’s failure here to advise Defendant of them did not render her nolo contendere plea unknowing. View "New Hampshire v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Robert Pelkey appealed a superior court’s decision that granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendant Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc., d/b/a Dan’s City Auto Body. In 2009, Plaintiff brought suit against his landlord and Defendant alleging Defendant towed his car pursuant to a parking policy at his apartment complex. At the time, Plaintiff was confined to bed due to a serious medical condition and did not realize that his car had been towed. Soon thereafter, he was admitted to the hospital for a procedure to amputate his left foot, during which he suffered a heart attack. Plaintiff’s attorney had learned that Defendant had possession of the car and had scheduled to sell it a public auction two days later. After the attorney informed Defendant that his client wished to arranged for the return of the vehicle, Defendant falsely told the attorney that the car had already been sold. Defendant later traded the car to a third party, but Plaintiff received no remuneration for his loss. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit alleging that Defendant violated: (1) the Consumer Protection Act; (2) RSA chapter 262(a statute permitting a towing company to place a lien on a vehicle for reasonable charges incident to towing and storage and prescribing the requirements for collection of those charges by selling the vehicle at auction); and (3) the common law duty of a bailee to exercise reasonable care while in possession of a bailor’s property. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that a provision of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempted Plaintiff’s claims. Finding that Plaintiff’s claims were not preempted, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Defendant and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pelkey v. Dan's City Used Cars, Inc." on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court's ruling that RSA chapter 100-C (Supp. 2011) (the Judicial Retirement Plan) violated Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Petitioner Raymond Cloutier was a retired probate court judge. Six intervenors were retired supreme, superior, probate and district court judges. Petitioner submitted a written request to the Board of Trustees of the New Hampshire Judicial Retirement Plan (board) asserting that his retirement allowance was erroneously calculated pursuant to RSA chapter 100-C, and that he was entitled to benefits under the retirement statutes that were in effect when he was appointed to be a judge. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment for the petitioners, concluding that the application of RSA chapter 100-C to judges who accepted their positions before its enactment results in impairment of contract rights in violation of the New Hampshire Constitution. However, the trial court rejected Petitioner's assertion that the ten percent and one percent salary increases authorized in 2003 and 2005 should be included in calculating their benefits under the prior retirement statutes. The State raised two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in ruling that RSA chapter 100-C violates Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution; and (2) in the event the trial court’s ruling was upheld, whether RSA chapter 100-C is unconstitutional only as applied to judges who met the service and age requirements for retirement as of January 1, 2005. Petitioners cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in ruling that the 2003 and 2005 salary raises are not properly included as "currently effective annual salary" when calculating their retirement benefits. Upon review, the Supreme Court was persuaded by the board’s position that salary adjustments were authorized for the limited purpose of compensating judges for their ten percent earnable compensation contribution required under the new retirement plan. The adjustments may not be characterized as "effective annual salary" for purposes of calculating benefits under the prior retirement statutes. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cloutier v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Defendant Glendon Hill appealed his conviction for aggravated felonious assault on the ground that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. At trial, the State elicited testimony from Defendant's young step-daughter that he subjected her to various types of sexual abuse. Her statements being the only evidence introduced by the State, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictments before putting on a defense, arguing that the mode of questioning was so suggestive that the State had failed "to provide a rational jury with proof beyond a reasonable doubt" that he committed the elements of the charged crimes. The trial court agreed that the direct examination of the child contained leading questions but denied the motion, reasoning that the child's testimony was sufficient to submit the matter to the jury. After calling a single witness to the stand, the defense rested. The jury convicted, and Defendant appealed without making any post-trial motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant did not preserve his challenge to the weight of the evidence. As such, the Court affirmed his conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Hill " on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Matton appealed a superior court order that denied his motion to preclude the State from seeking an extended term of incarceration under RSA 651:6 II(a). In 1998, Defendant was convicted of arson and sentenced to seven and one-half to fifteen years in state prison, all suspended, and five years of probation. In 1999, Defendant was found to have violated the terms of his probation and ordered to serve three and one-half to seven years in prison. In 2002, Defendant was convicted of assault by a prisoner and sentenced to prison for one and one-half to three years. In 2010, Defendant pled guilty to one count of second degree assault. The State, pursuant to a capped plea agreement, indicated its intent to request an extended term of incarceration under RSA 651:6, II(a) (2007) based upon Defendant's prior record. Defendant moved to preclude the application of RSA 651:6, II(a), arguing that he had only one qualifying prior conviction (that for assault by a prisoner) because his imprisonment on the arson charge resulted from a probation violation rather than from the original, suspended, sentence he received on the arson conviction. The superior court denied the motion, ruling that Defendant had served two terms of imprisonment within the meaning of the statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court correctly found that the statutory requirements were satisfied, and properly denied Defendant's motion to preclude. View "New Hampshire v. Matton " on Justia Law

Defendant Christina Smith appealed her conviction for driving while intoxicated. She argued the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the State failed to establish that the arresting officer had a reasonable suspicion that she had violated the law when he stopped her. Upon review of the district court record, the Supreme Court found the district court did not err in issuing its decision, and affirmed the court's ruling. View "New Hampshire v. Smith " on Justia Law

James McClammer, Jr., Trustee of the Profit Sharing Plan of the Connecticut Valley Environmental Services, Inc., appealed a superior court order that ruled in favor of Michael and Marie O'Hearne on the parties' crosspetitions to quiet title and for injunctive relief. The parties owned adjoining lots in the vicinity of the Little Sugar River in North Charlestown. Historically, both lots were part of a larger parcel bisected by the river, which generally ran in an east-west direction at that point. McClammer acquired title to his lot in 1999 from the estate of Louise Hinchliffe, who had acquired her title upon the intestate deaths, in 1944 and 1957, of the grantees of a 1929 deed. The property description in McClammer’s deed was identical to the description in the 1929 deed. The dispute in this case arose when McClammer began removing trees from the strip of land lying to the north of several monuments and to the south of the river. The O'Hearnes filed a petition to enjoin McClammer from trespassing on their land, asserting that the parties' common boundary was established by the monuments. McClammer, in turn, filed his own petition to quiet title, claiming that his title ran either to the "so-called thread or center of the river," or to its low water mark on "the south side of [its] main northerly channel." McClammer later amended his petition, asserting that his title extended to the high water mark on the northern bank of the river, and included a 0.15 acre piece of land to the north of the river where, he claimed, the "mill spot" referenced in a 1790 deed was located. In their answers to McClammer’s petition and amended petition, the O'Hearnes claimed not only that they had record title to the areas in dispute, but that they had also acquired title by adverse possession and the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The trial court consolidated the matters, and following a trial on the merits, ruled in favor of the O'Hearnes. McClammer moved for reconsideration, arguing that the trial court had improperly raised the statute of limitations sua sponte. Additionally, he challenged the trial court's rulings on the merits, arguing that it had erroneously found that the O'Hearne chain of title referenced the monuments, that it improperly construed the relevant deeds, and that it ignored other evidence inconsistent with a finding of adverse possession. The trial court denied the motion, and McClammer timely appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "[t]o the extent the trial court incorrectly found that the O'Hearne chain of title referenced the monuments, this finding cannot have affected the outcome of the case since the trial court's findings and rulings relative to Hinchliffe's acquiescence in the boundary are supported by the record and compel the result reached by the trial court." View "O'Hearne v. McClammer, Jr." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals from a decision of the New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (board), Petitioner Timothy Alexander appealed the Board's affirmance of his dismissal from employment with the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the State appealed the board's reinstatement of William Harris to his employment with HHS. In 2009, Alexander and Harris were involved in the restraint of a resident at the Sununu Youth Services Center (SYSC). Alexander was employed as a Youth Counselor III and Harris was a full-time probationary employee, Youth Counselor I (Trainee). A Center report noted that the resident responded rudely when questioned whether the had permission to sit somewhere other than his assigned table. When told to move, the resident responded "disrespectfully," an altercation ensued. An investigation of the incident resulted in Alexander and Harris losing their jobs for using "excessive force" against the resident. Alexander and Harris appealed their dismissals to the Board. Alexander argued that: (1) the board unlawfully upheld his dismissal on a different factual basis from that stated in his termination letter; (2) the facts found by the board do not warrant termination; (3) he should be reinstated because SYSC failed to comply with the personnel rules; and (4) he is at least entitled to a new hearing because the board violated several statutes and, along with SYSC, violated his rights to due process. The Supreme Court did not "share Alexander's interpretation of the Board's decision." The Court affirmed Alexander's dismissal. As to Harris, the Court concluded the Board should not have "interfered" with HHS's exercise of discretion in terminating Harris's employment. The Court reversed the Board's decision as to Harris. View "Appeal of Alexander" on Justia Law

Intervener Parade Residence Hotel, LLC appealed a superior court order that vacated and remanded a decision of the Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) of the City of Portsmouth that upheld the City Planning Board's approval of Parade's application to amend its previously approved site plan. Parade's property abuts Plaintiff Harborside Associates, LP's property. In 2008, the Board approved Parade's application to construct a five-story building that included a hotel, restaurant and retail space. Parade began construction in 2009. The City adopted a new zoning ordinance later that year to become effective in 2010. The terms of the new ordinance changed those that were in effect when Parade was granted its site plan. When Parade applied for an amendment to its site plan, Harborside objected. Following a hearing, the Board approved the application without requiring Parade to comply with the new ordinance. Harborside appealed to the ZBA, who subsequently denied Harborside's objection. Harborside appealed, and the superior court vacated the ZBA's decision, finding that Parade presented a "major change" in its site plan requiring compliance with the changed ordinance. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err in arriving at its decision, and affirmed. View "Harborside Associates, L.P. v. City of Portsmouth" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration (DRA) appealed a superior court order that reversed its decision assessing a real estate transfer tax against Petitioners Say Pease, LLC and Say Pease IV, LLC. Two International Group, LLC (TIG) is a real estate holding company. It owned a ground lease on property near Pease International Tradeport that it wanted to use to secure a mortgage loan. To obtain the loan, TIG’s prospective lender required that TIG, and all of its members, be "single purpose bankruptcy remote entities." To comply with the lender’s requirement, the members of Say Pease formed Say Pease IV, a new limited liability company (LLC) with the same members. Say Pease IV’s LLC agreement provides that it was "formed for the sole purpose of being a Managing Member and Member of [TIG]" and was not authorized "to engage in any other activity[,] business or undertaking so long as [TIG] shall be indebted under any mortgage or other securitized loan." Say Pease’s interest in TIG was transferred to Say Pease IV, and Say Pease IV replaced Say Pease as TIG’s managing member. As a result of these transactions, Say Pease IV owned a 47.5% interest in TIG as a sole purpose remote bankruptcy entity, Say Pease held no interest in TIG, and TIG obtained the loan. Based upon this transfer, DRA issued notices assessing the real estate transfer tax against Say Pease and Say Pease IV. After appealing unsuccessfully through DRA’s administrative appeal process, Say Pease and Say Pease IV appealed to the superior court. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court reversed DRA's order, ruling that the transfer at issue was not a "[c]ontractual transfer," RSA 78-B:1-a, II (2003), and, therefore, the real estate transfer tax did not apply. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the parties did not employ a business entity as a shield for an otherwise taxable exchange of value for an interest in property. Instead, those that executed Say Pease IV’s LLC agreement sought to maintain TIG’s original ownership while placing it in a suitable financing vehicle; the promises exchanged related to the creation of the financing vehicle, Say Pease IV, not the subsequent property transfer. Thus, the substance of the transaction here failed to create a bargained-for exchange because there was no "exchange of money, or other property and services, or property or services valued in money for an interest in real estate." View "Say Pease IV, LLC v. New Hampshire Dept. of Rev. Admin. " on Justia Law