Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Bruce Raybeck appealed a ruling that he was required to continue paying alimony to Petitioner Judith Raybeck. The parties divorced in 2005 after a forty-two year marriage. The divorce decree obligated Respondent to pay Petitioner alimony for ten years, in yearly installments, but would cease should she "cohabitate[...] with an unrelated adult male." Approximately three months before the January 2010 alimony payment was due, Petitioner moved out of her Laconia house and rented it to reduce her expenses. She moved into the upper level of a single family home in Plymouth owned by Paul Sansoucie, a man she had met through an online dating service. Sansoucie lived on the lower level and did not charge Petitioner for rent. She did, however, pay about $300 per month for food and often cooked for him. They also shared living space on the middle level of the house. When the respondent learned that the petitioner lived with another man, he stopped paying alimony. In response, Petitioner asked the family division to enforce the alimony agreement and require the respondent to resume his support payments. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court: "important is the extent of the personal relationship, including evidence of an intimate connection, how the people hold themselves out to others. . . Here too, the age of the couple may be relevant in weighing this factor; for older people, a sexual component to intimacy may not be as significant as it would be for younger couples. In addition, the shared use and enjoyment of personal property is an indication of cohabitation, such as common use of household rooms, appliances, furniture, vehicles, and whether one person maintains personal items, such as toiletries or clothing, at the residence of the other." Because the trial court did not have the benefit of the standard the Court articulated here for determining whether the relationship between Petitioner and Sansoucie amounted to cohabitation, it vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Judith Raybeck and Bruce Raybeck " on Justia Law

Respondent Jeannie Dube, appealed the final decree in the divorce action initiated by Petitioner Eric Dube. She argued that the Derry Family Division erred when it granted Eric a fault-based divorce. In addition, she challenged the trial court’s division of the parties’ property and its denial of her alimony request. Further, she contested the validity of the stipulated parenting plan. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: the record did not support the trial court’s implicit finding that Eric was “the innocent party” when testimony showed Eric committed adultery during the marriage; the record supported the trial court's finding that Jeannie did not need alimony; and the record supported the court's unequal division of the marital assets. The Court declined to address Jeannie's challenge to the parenting plan because she did not raise it at trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part the trial court's final decree. View "In the Matter of Eric J. Dube and Jeannie Dube " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Thomas Willey was convicted of one count of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal, he contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial or in the alternative, for further curative instructions to the jury. He also argued that the trial court sentenced him based upon improper considerations. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, but vacated his sentence: "[b]ecause [the Court could not] conclude either that the trial court 'clearly gave no weight' to the improper factors [the Court] identified, or that it would have imposed the same sentence but for any improper factors that it may have considered, [the Court] vacate[d] the defendant's sentence and remand[ed] for resentencing." View "New Hampshire v. Willey" on Justia Law

Pro se Plaintiff Robert Suprenant appealed a superior court order that dismissed his claims against Defendant Deborah Mulcrone under the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Defendant was the guardian ad litem for Plaintiff's son in a contested case between Plaintiff and the son's mother. Defendant was appointed to investigate how Plaintiff and his son's mother should divide parenting time and residential responsibility for their son. Defendant stated in her report that although it was "commendable" that Plaintiff had no criminal charges since 1994, his failure to disclose his prior charges was "troubling." Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant alleging those statements in her report were negligently made and breached an implied contract with Plaintiff to observe "reasonable standards of care and fair dealing." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant was entitled to absolute immunity for her acts. Accordingly, the Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's lawsuit. View " Suprenant v. Mulcrone " on Justia Law

Petitioner David Fischer appealed a superior court order on his motions for pretrial bail, claiming that the court delegated authority to Strafford County Community Corrections (SCCC), which is managed by the Respondent, Superintendent of the Strafford County House of Corrections, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The written order stated that bail was set at $50,000 cash "[t]o convert to PR if found accep[table] by SCCC – Whether Bail is Posted or Converted all conditions apply." A pretrial motion to amend bail was denied, stating from the bench "[the judge was] just not going to order [SCCC] to do something it is not inclined to do. I have the power, and I have the discretion to do that, but I'm not going to in this case. The bail remains as is." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bail orders at issue here reflected "a cooperative accommodation among" the judicial and executive branches and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. View "Fischer v. Superintendent, Strafford County House of Corrections " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Marc and Laurie Brown appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to Defendant Concord Group Insurance Company in their insurance coverage action. In 2005, Plaintiffs purchased a house from then-owner Michael Rogers. Two years later, they discovered water leaking into the house near a sliding glass door. They contacted Eugene Spencer, the person who built the house, to repair the problem. In 2009, Plaintiffs again observed water leaking into the house near the same sliding glass door. This time they contacted Daniel Lewis to repair the problem. Lewis later testified that damage was caused by leaks Spencer did not discover during his repair, but probably would have discovered had he removed all of the siding on the wall. The damage required extensive repair work. Concord Group insured Spencer. His policy did not cover "property damage" to his work "arising out of [his work] or any part of [his work]." Plaintiffs argued that the policy provided coverage because Spencer negligently repaired their house in 2007, and the damage in 2009 would not have occurred but for his negligence. Upon review of the policy in question, the Supreme Court concluded it was error for the trial court to grant Concord Group summary judgment because what caused the damage (either the 2003 or the 2007 work) was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the policy provided coverage in this case. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brown v. Concord Group Ins. Co. " on Justia Law

Petitioners Todd and Trent Bemis appealed a probate court order that dismissed their petition for guardianship over the person and estate of their step-father Dr. Raymond B. More than seven months after Dr. B left an assisted-living facility in Florida, Petitioners filed their petition for guardianship when Dr. B engaged in behavior the Supreme Court "assume[d] was evidence of his legal incapacity at that time." The petition contained no allegations about the doctor’s behavior, and Petitioners had no contact with him after he left Florida. Dr. B objected to a request for a psychological evaluation, and moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that it was "per se defective" because the guardianship statute requires that all evidence of a proposed ward's inability to care for himself "must have occurred within 6 months prior to the filing of the petition and at least one incidence of such behavior must have occurred within 20 days of the filing of the petition." After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition and denied the petitioners' motion for a psychiatric evaluation. The petitioners appealed both decisions. Finding that the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the doctor’s interest in freedom from an unwanted psychological examination outweighed the petitioners' interests in procuring evidence of his alleged incapacity, the Supreme Court affirmed the probate court's decision. View "In re Guardianship of Raymond B." on Justia Law

Defendant Roderick Davidson appealed his conviction by a jury on three counts of simple assault and one count of criminal mischief. He argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) denying his motions in limine to exclude evidence that he "controlled" the complainant; and (2) denying his request for a defense of property instruction. In October 2009, Defendant and the complainant lived together. Consistent with their habit of "br[eaking] up every other day," Defendant broke up with the complainant. They nonetheless drove home together, napped together for about three hours, and then went to dinner together at a restaurant. After dinner, during which they both consumed some alcohol, Defendant drove the couple home, where they began to argue about money. The complainant insisted that they talk, and in an attempt to do so, Defendant grabbed her and threw her into a wall. The complainant ended up on her back at the bottom of the stairs with Defendant above her, and that his hand made contact with her face. The following day, the complainant had a bruised eye, which she tried to conceal with makeup. After speaking with several people, she ultimately decided to go to the police. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts. However, the Court concluded the trial court erred in admitting "unlimited context" evidence as inherently prejudicial. In light of the Court's reversal of Defendant’s convictions for improperly admitted evidence, it did not reach Defendant’s jury instruction argument. View "New Hampshire v. Davidson" on Justia Law

Defendant Derrick DiMaggio appealed a superior court's denial of his motion for pretrial confinement credit for approximately 471 days he participated in the Grafton County Drug Court Sentencing Program. Finding there was no dispute that he was entitled credit for at least sixty-three of those days (for failing to comply with the Program’s rules), the Supreme Court was asked to review whether Defendant was entitled to credit for the days he was at liberty while participating in the Program. The Court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to pretrial confinement credit, and affirmed the superior court’s denial of his motion. View "New Hampshire v. DiMaggio" on Justia Law

Defendant Joshua Guild appealed his conviction on one count of felonious assault and one count of aggravated felonious assault (ASFA) involving the same minor victim. He contended that the superior court erred by: (1) violating New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 615 and RSA 632-A:6, IV (2007) by failing to sequester the minor victim’s mother; (2) erroneously denied his motion to disqualify a juror without first conducting a voir dire of the juror; and (3) erroneously denied his motion to dismiss the AFSA charge. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court held that when, in a criminal trial, a trial court has violated Rule 615 and RSA 626:6, IV by failing to sequester a witness, a new trial is in order unless the State proves that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying that rule to this case, the Court concluded that any presumption of prejudice was rebutted. Furthermore, because Defendant's conviction was supported by other substantial evidence, and because the evidence did not support a conclusion that the victim’s mother tailored her testimony to the victim’s testimony, the Court held that any error in failing to sequester the victim's mother was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. With regard to the denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss the AFSA charge, the Court found Defendant did not preserve the argument for the Supreme Court’s review. Defendant’s convictions were upheld. View "New Hampshire v. Guild" on Justia Law