Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal of a superior court order denying the State's request to compel Defendant Gary E. Marchand, to undergo a psychological evaluation by the State's expert. There were two issues presented to the Court: (1) does the right against self-incrimination prevent the State from compelling a defendant to undergo a psychological or psychiatric examination when he raises an insanity defense; and (2) if such examinations may be compelled, what procedures should trial courts use when ordering them? The Court answered the first question in the negative, and provide a procedural framework for courts to follow. Accordingly, the Court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Marchand" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal of a superior court order that denied a motion to dismiss filed by the Town of Sugar Hill (Town). The superior court transferred the following issue for the Court's review: Whether RSA 76:16 requires all landowners to sign and certify their applications for abatement, in whichever form such applications take; that they have a "good faith basis and the facts in the application are true" before they may appeal any assessment decision of a municipality to the superior court or to the BTLA [Board of Tax and Land Appeals], especially when the facts show a knowing and purposeful choice not to sign said application. Upon review of the facts and record of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that, although the Town lawfully denied the petitioner's application based upon its lack of signature and certification, the superior court may nevertheless review the Town's denial to determine whether review by the Town on the merits is appropriate in the circumstances. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Henderson Holdings at Sugar Hill, LLC v. Town of Sugar Hill" on Justia Law

Petitioners Professional Fire Fighters of Wolfeboro, IAFF Local 3708, president of the union and several firefighters appealed a superior court order that dismissed their suit against Respondent Town of Wolfeboro. The suit arose from the parties' negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Union had ever been certified by the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) as a bargaining unit. In July 2010, the parties met and agreed on ground rules governing the conduct of their future negotiations, including that "[a]fter October 1, 2010, either party [could] request mediation of the outstanding issues." Shortly thereafter, however, the negotiations broke down. At an August 2010 meeting, the Town's Board of Selectmen voted to rescind its recognition of the Union. The petitioners filed a verified petition for an ex parte temporary restraining order against the Town and requested temporary and permanent injunctive relief. After a hearing, the trial court granted the petitioners' requested temporary restraining order, and scheduled the matter for further hearing. The Town moved to dismiss the entire proceeding. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Town's motion and vacated its temporary restraining order. The petitioners unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the portion of RSA 31:3 which grants municipalities the right to recognize unions and enter into collective bargaining agreements was superseded by the enactment of the PELRA, and, therefore, the Town had no authority to recognize the non-PELRB-certified Union. Accordingly, the agreement, as well as the subsequent agreements, were ultra vires contracts and wholly void. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision to dismiss Petitioners' case. View "Professional Fire Fighters of Wolfeboro, IAFF Local 3708 v. Town of Wolfeboro" on Justia Law

Petitioner Tracy Walbridge appealed a superior court order that denied her petition to establish her homestead right exempt from the mortgage held by Respondents the Estate of Raymond Beaudoin, Jr. and its co-administrators Steven Beaudoin and Raymond Beaudoin, III. Petitioner owned property in Rochester that she purchased with her then-husband. At that time, it was undeveloped land. Petitioner executed a mortgage on the property and released her homestead rights to that property. Allegedly unbeknownst to Petitioner, her husband executed a mortgage deed and promissory note on the property in favor of the decedent Raymond Beaudoin once a home was built there. The mortgage on the property did not list it as part of the homestead of the mortgagor. Petitioner and her husband divorced, and pursuant to the divorce decree, she was awarded all right, title and interest in the property. The property was foreclosed upon. Petitioner filed a petition to establish that her homestead right to the property was exempt from Respondents' mortgage. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found that her homestead right in the property was not established until she actually, physically occupied it. She contended that her "obvious intention of present and immediate occupancy of the home . . . followed by [her] actual occupancy within a reasonable time, was equivalent to actual occupancy." The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court. View "Walbridge v. The Estate of Raymond A. Beaudoin, Jr." on Justia Law

Appellant Pasquale Franchi appealed a superior court order that denied his motion in limine to preclude certain expert testimony. This case arose from an eminent domain proceeding. There was no dispute that there was a taking of Appellant's property, and that he was entitled to compensation. Rather, Appellant contended that certain errors made both before and at trial required the Supreme Court's review of the compensation he was due. Several of Appellant's challenges pertained to testimony of the State's expert, a certified commercial property appraiser. Appellant moved in limine to exclude the appraiser's testimony, arguing that pursuant to New Hampshire's rules of procedure, the second of the appraiser's reports was irrelevant and did not meet the threshold of reliability. Upon review of the issues Appellant raised on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court made no errors in its holding, and accordingly affirmed. View "New Hampshire Department of Transportation v. Franchi" on Justia Law

Defendant William Town was convicted after a jury trial of one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault which occurred sometime between 1990 and 1992. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude a juror and by allowing the victim to testify about certain statements Defendant made. Furthermore, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after testimony suggestive of uncharged acts of sexual misconduct and by providing a deadlock jury instruction after twice learning of the jury's split. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed with regard to the disqualification of a juror, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Town" on Justia Law

Petitioner Merriam Farm, Inc. appealed a superior court's decision to uphold the denial of its application for a building permit by the zoning board of adjustment (ZBA) of the Town of Surry. In 2009, Merriam Farm applied for a permit to construct a single-family home on a three-acre parcel of land. Under the Town's zoning ordinance, 200 feet of frontage on a public street was required to build. The ZBA determined that the frontage to the property had been closed since 1971 "subject to gates and bars for the purpose of preventing development in this area." Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the ZBA's nor the superior court's order to deny the building permit, and accordingly affirmed those decisions. View "Merriam Farm, Inc. v. Town of Surry" on Justia Law

Respondent Steven Regan (father) appealed an order recommended by a Marital Master (and approved by the circuit court) that among other things: (1) declined to modify his obligations to carry life insurance and pay half of his minor daughter's uninsured medical expenses even though paying these amounts reduced his monthly income below the statutory self-support reserve; and (2) required him to exchange custody of his daughter at a police station, rather than at the parties' homes. Although the court found that the father's reduction in income required reducing his child support obligation, it found "no basis to modify" the father's obligation to pay for half of his daughter's orthodontic expenses, and similarly declined to reduce the amount of life insurance he was obliged to carry. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that payment of the daughter's uninsured medical expenses necessarily reduced the father's income below the self-support reserve and therefore, the trial court's order insofar as it required such payments, erred by ordering the father pay. With regard to the life insurance, because the parties stipulated that the payments were not child support, the trial court "sustainably exercised" its discretion in finding that the monthly insurance payment would not unduly burden the father's ability to support himself. Furthermore, with regard to the custody exchange: the Court concluded that making the exchange at a police station was in the daughter's best interest. View "In the Matter of Susan J. Regan and Steven S. Regan" on Justia Law

Respondent City of Concord appealed a superior court order that denied it summary judgment in favor of Petitioner EnergyNorth National Gas (d/b/a National Grid NH, or "National Grid"). The City argued that the trial court erroneously determined that RSA 231:185 (2009) and RSA 236:11 (2009) preempted the City's ordinance authorizing it to charge certain roadway fees. The issue between the parties arose from National Grid's desire to excavate certain streets to install, maintain or replace its underground pipes that delivered natural gas. The fees covered damage for damages arising from the excavation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that granting summary judgment in favor of National Grid was in error. The City argued that its roadway fees are consistent with the pertinent statutes because they "cover[ ] maintenance costs to repair the roadway after it has been initially patched, which [are] used to restore the excavated roadway to the condition that existed prior to the excavation." The Court was not persuaded that when the legislature enacted the statutes at issue, it made any assumption or finding, implied or otherwise, as to whether repaving a paved excavated roadway restored the roadway's original life expectancy. The Court was thus left with a factual dispute whether patching an excavated roadway with new pavement diminished or restored its original life expectancy. Because of that "genuine issue of material fact," the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court from an interlocutory transfer without ruling from the superior court on the following question: "Does the Due Process Clause of the New Hampshire Constitution (Part I, Articles 2 and 15) or the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution require the appointment of counsel for an indigent parent from whom the State seeks to take custody of a minor child based on allegations of neglect or abuse?" Parents Larry and Sonia M. were served with petitions by which the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) sought custody of their two minor children C.M and A.M. DCYF alleged that the parents were neglecting their children by failing to provide a safe and sanitary home and adequate supervision and by exposing them to domestic violence in the form of threatening and intimidating behaviors by the father. An adjudicatory hearing was held at which the parents were represented by appointed counsel. The court issued an order maintaining legal custody of the children with DCYF and directing the parents to undertake certain measures before the children might be safely returned to them. Each parent filed an appeal to superior court contending that without appointed counsel, their protected liberty interest in raising their children was threatened. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that while due process did not require that counsel be appointed for indigent parents in every proceeding (such as the proceeding at issue in this case), a determination of whether appointed counsel is necessary to adequately reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation should be made on a case-by-case basis in the first instance by the trial court. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the superior court to make that determination. View "In re C.M." on Justia Law