Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The petitioner, Aspen Contracting NE, LLC (Aspen), appealed the decisions of the Administrative Hearing Committee (Committee) and the Appeal Tribunal for the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES), as both were sustained by the DES Appellate Board, finding the claimants to be employees and Aspen to be an employer in New Hampshire subject to RSA chapter 282-A. Upon review of the Committee's and the Appeal Tribunal's administrative records, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Aspen Contracting NE, LLC" on Justia Law

This was an interlocutory appeal from a Superior Court order that certified a class represented by the plaintiff, Karen L. Lawrence, consisting of "all individuals who purchased Marlboro Lights cigarettes in New Hampshire from January 1, 1995, until the date of trial." The superior court transferred a single question for the Supreme Court's review: :Did the Superior Court err in its application of New Hampshire law when it granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification?" The Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative and reversed the trial court’s certification order. View "Lawrence v. Philip Morris USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Casey B. Moore appealed a decision of the appeal tribunal (tribunal), as affirmed by the appellate board, of the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES) finding him ineligible for unemployment benefits because he voluntarily left his job without good cause. Moore began working as an arborist in 2008 for Guillemette Tree Services (GTS), a small business owned by Ken Guillemette. He worked part-time at a rate of $31.25 per hour, sometimes getting paid as an employee of GTS and sometimes as an independent contractor. Moore and Guillemette had a dispute about when Moore would be paid for work he had previously performed. The following Saturday, Moore met with Guillemette to collect his wages, which Guillemette paid partially by cash and partially by check. He also issued Moore a written warning for failing to show up at work on the previous day. Moore, however, claimed he was unaware that he had been required to work that day. The next Monday, Moore arrived at Guillemette’s house early in the morning to begin that day’s work. Before they started work, however, Moore told Guillemette that he wanted to "finish our conversation from Saturday," and stated that he wished to continue working for GTS as a subcontractor for $51.25 per hour. Guillemette expressed frustration and said, "I’ll have to think about it." He then asked Moore, "So what’s going on for today?" Moore responded that he would work as soon as Guillemette hired him as a subcontractor. Moore then left, and there was no further contact between them. In this case, the Supreme Court found that Moore’s own testimony established that he voluntarily quit working for GTS, and that Moore presented no evidence to support his claim that Guillemette fired him: "to the contrary, Moore admitted that Guillemette was 'frustrated' and 'all ticked off' when faced with the choice of either acceding to Moore’s request for a significant pay raise or losing him as an employee altogether." View "Appeal of Moore" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was the appeal of a circuit court order which found Respondent John P. Nicholson (Father), to be $28,556, plus interest, in arrears on child support obligations to Petitioner, Kimberly J. Nicholson (Mother). In April 2011, the Mother filed a motion for contempt arguing, among other things, that the Father had unilaterally reduced the amount of support when their oldest child graduated from high school in May 2007 and that he has paid no support at all since April 16, 2009. The Father objected and argued that the final decree entitled him to reduce his child support payments as each child became emancipated because the decree states that child support "shall continue until the children reach the age of 18 or graduates [sic] from high school, whichever shall last occur." He argued that "[t]he parties understood this to mean that the child support would be reduced by $82.00 as each child graduated from high school or reached age 18 years, whichever was later." The Father also argued that the Mother had agreed to this reduction. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "pursuant to the plain language of the SO, in calculating the support arrearage, the trial court was obligated to retrospectively recalculate child support as of the dates upon which each of the two older children became emancipated. That the parents failed to obtain a court order modifying the support obligation when each child’s status changed is of no consequence; RSA 458:35-c permits the trial court’s order to specify differently, and it did so." View "In the Matter of Nicholson" on Justia Law

The respondents, Malborn Realty Trust and its trustee, Daniel Osborn, appealed a superior court order that enjoined Osborn from occupying property in Atkinson because he lacked an occupancy permit and that imposed a civil penalty for this violation. Petitioner Town of Atkinson cross-appealed the trial court’s failure to award it attorney’s fees. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s issuance of the injunction, modified its imposition of civil penalties, reversed its denial of attorney’s fees, and remanded. View "Town of Atkinson v. Malborn Realty Trust" on Justia Law

In this declaratory judgment proceeding, the defendant, Citizens Insurance Company of America, appealed a superior court order which ruled in favor of the plaintiff, The Barking Dog, Ltd., which operates a dog kennel and grooming business at several locations in New Hampshire. The court ruled that an insurance policy issued by the defendant provided coverage for damage to the plaintiff’s septic system and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $20,000, the agreed upon damage amount. The court also ruled that the defendant was not prejudiced by the plaintiff’s failure to disclose its expert’s report in a timely manner or its failure to disclose its expert’s curriculum vitae and, accordingly, permitted the plaintiff’s expert to testify at trial. The defendant argued that both rulings were error. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "The Barking Dog, Ltd. v. Citizens Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law

Defendant Josiah Davies appealed a district court order that partially denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his conviction. Defendant was charged with two counts of false imprisonment and one count of simple assault following a single incident of alleged domestic violence. On June 1, 2009, he appeared pro se for arraignment on the three class A misdemeanor charges. Prior to his arraignment, he spoke with the prosecutor regarding a potential plea agreement. During this discussion, Defendant indicated his intention to plead guilty, and then signed the acknowledgement and waiver of rights form that the prosecutor provided him. At this time, he was nineteen years old and had a GED and some technical college experience. The scheduled arraignment then went forward as a plea hearing. On appeal, Defendant argued that he did not enter a valid guilty plea because he was not advised of the essential elements of the simple assault charge. He contended, therefore, that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent as required by Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion, and no violation of his constitutional rights, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions to deny Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. View "New Hampshire v. Davies" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial in Superior Court Defendant, Bryan Alwardt was convicted of second degree assault and criminal restraint based on accomplice liability principles. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to dismiss the assault charge due to insufficient evidence; (2) failing to dismiss the criminal restraint charge as against the weight of the evidence; (3) not ordering disclosure of all of the victim’s counseling records; and (4) prohibiting cross-examination of the victim regarding certain drugs found in her boyfriend’s apartment. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Alwardt" on Justia Law

D.B. appealed the Manchester Family Division's finding of delinquency based on misdemeanor sexual assault. D.B. was accused of inappropriately touching and subsequently threatening the female complainant while the two rode home on the school bus. On appeal, D.B. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the complainant’s direct testimony indicated that D.B. put his hand down her shirt and touched her breasts. She further stated that the he put his hand down her pants and “ran it” down to her ankle. This evidence failed to describe in what way the juvenile overcame her with the actual application of physical force. Nor did the surveillance video from the bus support the State’s position. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to charge D.B. with misdemeanor sexual assault within the meaning of RSA 632-A:2, I(a). The Family Division's judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re D.B. " on Justia Law

Appellant Rose Marie Wall (Mother) appealed a circuit court's ruling that diemissed her petition to find Appellee Christian Poulin (Father) in contempt of a court order. The parties stipulated to payments towards their two children's college expenses. The parties could not agree on the amount of expenses Father would pay for the younger daughter's college expenses, and accordingly, he made no payments. Mother subsequently sought to hold Father in contempt of the divorce decree for failing to pay. On appeal, Mother argued that the trial court erred in ruling "that it did not have the authority to enforce the [college expense] provision in the parties' [divorce decree]" because the provision "clearly provide[s] that each parent [will] contribute to the children's college expenses to the extent each party is financially able after financial aid, scholarships and any children's savings are considered." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the decree indeed ordered the parties to contribute to their children's college expenses, and that the trial court erred in determining it could not enforce that provision of the divorce decree. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Poulin" on Justia Law