Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following a jury trial in Superior Court, Defendant Dianna Saunders appealed her convictions for being an accomplice to first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, theft by unauthorized taking, and theft by misapplication of property. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred when it: (1) instructed the jury that where a case involves both direct and circumstantial evidence, the evidence does not have to exclude all rational conclusions other than the defendant’s guilt; (2) found that the defendant consented to a general rather than a limited search of her home; and (3) did not address the constitutionality of the warrant to search the home. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Saunders" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kenneth Heinrich appealed the final decree entered by the circuit court in his divorce from Respondent Dorothy Heinrich. He argued that the trial court erred when it determined that his lump sum workers’ compensation settlement was property subject to equitable distribution. Alternatively, he contended that the trial court’s division of this award is inequitable. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of Kenneth Heinrich & Dorothy Heinrich" on Justia Law

Respondent Veronica Goudreau (mother) appealed a circuit court order which granted a request by Petitioners Maurice and Gisele Lemieux, parents and next friendd of Andrew Lemieux (father) to change the name of the mother and father's child. Father and mother conceived while both were still in high school. According to Mother, Father reacted negatively to the pregnancy and told her she was crazy for wanting to keep the child. Mother had a boy, naming him Alexander Bailey Goudreau. Almost immediately after the child's birth, the petitioners filed a parenting petition and an ex parte motion for parenting time with Alexander. The motion contended that "[father] ha[d] been adjusting emotionally to the reality of being a father at the age of 15, and [wa]s prepared, through the assistance of his parents, to accept responsibility and parent his child." The court granted the motion. When Alexander was approximately fourteen months old, as the parties prepared for a hearing on a final parenting plan, the petitioners filed a petition to change Alexander's full name from Alexander Bailey Goudreau to Alexander Bailey Lemieux. At a hearing on the petition, mother testified that she had carried Alexander for nine months, loved him very much, and "deserve[d] just as much as [father] to have [Alexander] have [her] name." Father testified that he was conflicted about becoming a father, but that he was "very satisfied with the road [he] chose, really getting to know [his] son." After the hearing, the court granted the petition in part, ordering that the child's name be changed from Alexander Bailey Goudreau to Alexander Goudreau Lemieux. Mother appealed the trial court's decision. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Name Change of Alexander Goudreau" on Justia Law

Respondent Meagan Carter (Mother), appealed a Family Division decision that awarded primary parenting responsibility of her minor child (Daughter) jointly to the petitioner, Matthew Bordalo (Father), and the intervenors, John and Karen Bordalo, the Father's parents. Finding no "substantial" relationship between the child and her grandparents, the Supreme Court concluded that the first of four factors in the "Broderick" test were not met. The Court further concluded that the trial court's order awarding joint custody did not meet the fourth Broderick criterion either. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Matthew Bordalo and Meagan Carter" on Justia Law

Respondent Grant E. Woolsey appealed Family Division order modifying his child support obligation to the petitioner, Nancy E. Woolsey. Respondent is a self-employed truck driver, and the issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in calculating Respondent's income when the petitioner questioned many of the business deductions petitioner took to reach the income figure used to calculate the support obligation. The court found "that the [r]espondent's claims of financial hardship [were] not credible." The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's use of petitioner's gross income from his business in order to calculate his child support obligation. Finding that the deductions were ordinary and reasonable deductions for the operation of his business, the Supreme Court remanded the case for recalculation of petitioner's support obligations. View "In the Matter of Nancy E. Woolsey and Grant E. Woolsey" on Justia Law

In this petition for original jurisdiction, defendants Southern New Hampshire Medical Center (SNHMC) and Bernard Bettencourt, Jr., D.O., sought review of a superior court's decision that three provisions of the statute governing medical injury screening panels (RSA 519-B:8-:10 (2007)), violated the Separation of Powers Clause of the State Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that in so ruling, the trial court erred. Nonetheless, the Court affirmed portions of the trial court's decision on alternative grounds. View "Petition of Southern New Hampshire Medical Center" on Justia Law

Defendant John Brooks appealed his conviction following a jury trial for capital murder involving solicitation, capital murder in the course of a kidnapping, first degree murder (as an accomplice), and conspiracy to commit capital murder, in connection with the death of Jack Reid, Sr. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) permitting the State to authenticate documents by use of affidavits, rather than live testimony, in violation of his rights under the State and Federal Constitutions; (2) permitting an FBI agent to testify that the defendant's account may have been untruthful; (3) permitting the State to introduce a new opinion from the medical examiner during the trial; (4) failing to instruct the jury that it must determine the "predominating cause" of death, pursuant to "State v. Seymour;" (5) failing to instruct the jury that the solicitation variant of capital murder requires a finding that the defendant acted for his personal pecuniary gain; and (6) failing to instruct the jury that the kidnapping variant of capital murder requires a finding that the defendant intended to confine Reid to commit a crime other than murder. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Respondent Town of Moultonborough (Town) appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) which granted a petition for certification filed by the petitioner, New England Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NEPBA). In June 2010, the NEPBA filed a petition for certification of a proposed collective bargaining unit to be composed of "[a]ll sworn and non-sworn employees of the Town of Moultonborough Police Department excluding the Chief of Police." The proposed bargaining unit contained fourteen employees in seven different positions. The Town objected to the petition on the basis that RSA 273-A:8, I (2010) (amended 2011) requires a minimum of ten employees to form a bargaining unit, and that this requirement was not met because several of the positions were not statutorily eligible for inclusion. The Town argued that the executive assistant, communication specialist, and prosecutor positions, and a probationary employee lacked a "shared community of interest" with the remaining members of the proposed unit. The Town also argued that the executive assistant was a confidential employee, see RSA 273-A:1, IX(c) (2010), and that the sergeant and corporal positions were supervisory positions, see RSA 273-A:8, II (2010). Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the PELRB as to its inclusion of the sergeants and corporal in the bargaining unit, and affirmed the remainder of its determinations. The Court made no ruling on the eligibility of the bargaining unit after exclusion of the sergeant and corporal positions. View "Appeal of Town of Moultonborough" on Justia Law

Defendant Jonathan Charest appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court following his conviction by a jury for being a felon in possession of a firearm. After the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the felon-in-possession charge, the trial court asked the jury to issue a special verdict on whether it unanimously found that the defendant possessed, rather than controlled or owned, a firearm. The jury answered "yes." The trial court sentenced the defendant to three to six years' imprisonment. The court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of three years under RSA 651:2, II-g, which applies "[i]f a person is convicted of a felony, an element of which is the possession . . . of a deadly weapon, and the deadly weapon is a firearm." At sentencing, the trial judge explained to the defendant, "You were just sentenced to the minimum. . . . I don't have any discretion . . . to do anything other than to sentence you . . . to . . . those terms." The defendant did not appeal his conviction, but argued that the trial court erred when it imposed the minimum mandatory sentence under RSA 651:2, II-g because: (1) the offense he was charged with, RSA 159:3, I, did not have as an element the possession of a firearm in a manner that rendered it a deadly weapon under RSA 625:11, V; and (2) the jury did not find that he possessed a deadly weapon within the meaning of RSA 625:11, V. Because the defendant did not make these arguments before the trial court, he invoked the plain error rule, which allowed the Supreme Court to correct errors not raised before the trial court. Because the trial court erroneously failed to exercise the discretion afforded to it at sentencing, the Court found that the error affected the integrity and fairness of the judicial proceedings. Accordingly, Defendant's sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. View "New Hampshire v. Charest" on Justia Law

Defendant Calvin Dunn, III appealed a superior court order that denied his motion to vacate the imposition of a suspended sentence. In 2006, defendant pled guilty to one count of accomplice to burglary and one count of tampering with witnesses. Under the plea agreement, he was sentenced to two concurrent prison terms of three and one-half to seven years, suspended for five years on the condition of his good behavior. On May 11, 2010, the Laconia District Court found defendant guilty of two counts of simple assault and one count of criminal threatening in connection with a physical altercation that occurred in 2009. Defendant appealed to the superior court for a jury trial. Later in May, the State filed a motion to impose the 2006 suspended sentence, alleging that the physical altercation constituted a violation of the good behavior requirement. The defendant requested that the hearing on the motion to impose be deferred until final disposition of the pending criminal trial. The State objected, and the court denied defendant's request. On July 6, 2011, defendant was tried by a jury on the charges stemming from the 2009 altercation. At trial, he argued that his actions were justified by self-defense. The jury acquitted him of all the charges. On July 21, defendant filed a motion to vacate the imposition of his sentence for the 2006 convictions. He argued that his actions in the 2009 altercation were justified by self-defense, as evidenced by the jury's acquittal on those charges, and, thus, he did not violate the good behavior requirement of his 2006 suspended sentence. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Dunn" on Justia Law