Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Laconia Patrolman Association appealed a Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) finding that respondent the Laconia Police Commission did not commit certain unfair labor practices. The matter stemmed from negotiations the parties engaged in with regard to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that expired in June, 2010. As a tentative agreement was presented to the Laconia City Council for approval, the city manager said she could no longer support the tentative agreement. The Association filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the Commission violated state law when it failed to ensure that the city council voted on cost items in the CBA within thirty days of presentation. It further alleged that the Council interfered with the negotiations of the CBA, and that the Commission's acquiescence to the Council's interference amounted to a failure to bargain in good faith. The PELRB ruled that the Council's failure to vote was not an unfair labor practice, and that claims that the Council improperly interfered with the Commission's bargaining power could not be brought against the commission: the record was insufficient to establish the Council improperly usurped the Commission's authority. Upon review of the PELRB ruling on appeal by the Association, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding no unfair labor practices. View "Appeal of Laconia Patrolman Association" on Justia Law

Respondent Town of Moultonborough (Town) appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) which granted a petition for certification filed by the petitioner, New England Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NEPBA). In June 2010, the NEPBA filed a petition for certification of a proposed collective bargaining unit to be composed of "[a]ll sworn and non-sworn employees of the Town of Moultonborough Police Department excluding the Chief of Police." The proposed bargaining unit contained fourteen employees in seven different positions. The Town objected to the petition on the basis that RSA 273-A:8, I (2010) (amended 2011) requires a minimum of ten employees to form a bargaining unit, and that this requirement was not met because several of the positions were not statutorily eligible for inclusion. The Town argued that the executive assistant, communication specialist, and prosecutor positions, and a probationary employee lacked a "shared community of interest" with the remaining members of the proposed unit. The Town also argued that the executive assistant was a confidential employee, see RSA 273-A:1, IX(c) (2010), and that the sergeant and corporal positions were supervisory positions, see RSA 273-A:8, II (2010). Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the PELRB as to its inclusion of the sergeants and corporal in the bargaining unit, and affirmed the remainder of its determinations. The Court made no ruling on the eligibility of the bargaining unit after exclusion of the sergeant and corporal positions. View "Appeal of Town of Moultonborough" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Aspen Contracting NE, LLC (Aspen), appealed the decisions of the Administrative Hearing Committee (Committee) and the Appeal Tribunal for the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES), as both were sustained by the DES Appellate Board, finding the claimants to be employees and Aspen to be an employer in New Hampshire subject to RSA chapter 282-A. Upon review of the Committee's and the Appeal Tribunal's administrative records, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Aspen Contracting NE, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner Casey B. Moore appealed a decision of the appeal tribunal (tribunal), as affirmed by the appellate board, of the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES) finding him ineligible for unemployment benefits because he voluntarily left his job without good cause. Moore began working as an arborist in 2008 for Guillemette Tree Services (GTS), a small business owned by Ken Guillemette. He worked part-time at a rate of $31.25 per hour, sometimes getting paid as an employee of GTS and sometimes as an independent contractor. Moore and Guillemette had a dispute about when Moore would be paid for work he had previously performed. The following Saturday, Moore met with Guillemette to collect his wages, which Guillemette paid partially by cash and partially by check. He also issued Moore a written warning for failing to show up at work on the previous day. Moore, however, claimed he was unaware that he had been required to work that day. The next Monday, Moore arrived at Guillemette’s house early in the morning to begin that day’s work. Before they started work, however, Moore told Guillemette that he wanted to "finish our conversation from Saturday," and stated that he wished to continue working for GTS as a subcontractor for $51.25 per hour. Guillemette expressed frustration and said, "I’ll have to think about it." He then asked Moore, "So what’s going on for today?" Moore responded that he would work as soon as Guillemette hired him as a subcontractor. Moore then left, and there was no further contact between them. In this case, the Supreme Court found that Moore’s own testimony established that he voluntarily quit working for GTS, and that Moore presented no evidence to support his claim that Guillemette fired him: "to the contrary, Moore admitted that Guillemette was 'frustrated' and 'all ticked off' when faced with the choice of either acceding to Moore’s request for a significant pay raise or losing him as an employee altogether." View "Appeal of Moore" on Justia Law

Petitioners Professional Fire Fighters of Wolfeboro, IAFF Local 3708, president of the union and several firefighters appealed a superior court order that dismissed their suit against Respondent Town of Wolfeboro. The suit arose from the parties' negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Union had ever been certified by the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) as a bargaining unit. In July 2010, the parties met and agreed on ground rules governing the conduct of their future negotiations, including that "[a]fter October 1, 2010, either party [could] request mediation of the outstanding issues." Shortly thereafter, however, the negotiations broke down. At an August 2010 meeting, the Town's Board of Selectmen voted to rescind its recognition of the Union. The petitioners filed a verified petition for an ex parte temporary restraining order against the Town and requested temporary and permanent injunctive relief. After a hearing, the trial court granted the petitioners' requested temporary restraining order, and scheduled the matter for further hearing. The Town moved to dismiss the entire proceeding. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Town's motion and vacated its temporary restraining order. The petitioners unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the portion of RSA 31:3 which grants municipalities the right to recognize unions and enter into collective bargaining agreements was superseded by the enactment of the PELRA, and, therefore, the Town had no authority to recognize the non-PELRB-certified Union. Accordingly, the agreement, as well as the subsequent agreements, were ultra vires contracts and wholly void. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision to dismiss Petitioners' case. View "Professional Fire Fighters of Wolfeboro, IAFF Local 3708 v. Town of Wolfeboro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Susan Jeffery appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant City of Nashua on her wrongful discharge and breach of contract claims. Plaintiff worked for the City since 1977 in the payroll department. She became the City's risk manager in 1998. n 2004, Plaintiff became concerned that her direct supervisor, Maureen Lemieux, did not understand the budgetary process because "she wanted to level fund the health line items" in the City’s 2005 fiscal year budget. Plaintiff raised her concerns with Lemieux "dozens of times," but Lemieux responded that "she was comfortable with her numbers." In April 2005, the City discovered that the health insurance line item was underfunded. Consequently, the Board of Aldermen convened an ad hoc health care budget committee to investigate the circumstances leading up to the shortfall. Plaintiff alleged that between her two interviews with the committee, she was summoned to a meeting with the mayor, at which he asked her whether she, as department manager, should be held responsible for the budget shortfall. Plaintiff refused to accept responsibility, explaining that she had tried to prevent the error by raising her concerns with Lemieux and others. Further, Plaintiff alleged that on a separate occasion, the mayor suggested that they "all share the blame," but she refused his suggestion. Subsequently, Plaintiff started receiving poor performance evaluations and later received disciplinary actions. She would later be demoted. Shortly after her demotion, Plaintiff took a leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act; while still on leave, Plaintiff resigned her position, stating she wished to retire early. Three years after her resignation, Plaintiff sued the City alleging constructive discharge and breach of contract. Finding that Plaintiff's suit fell outside the statute of limitations, and that Plaintiff had no enforceable employment contract with the City, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment granted in favor of the City. View "Jeffery v. City of Nashua " on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court's ruling that RSA chapter 100-C (Supp. 2011) (the Judicial Retirement Plan) violated Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Petitioner Raymond Cloutier was a retired probate court judge. Six intervenors were retired supreme, superior, probate and district court judges. Petitioner submitted a written request to the Board of Trustees of the New Hampshire Judicial Retirement Plan (board) asserting that his retirement allowance was erroneously calculated pursuant to RSA chapter 100-C, and that he was entitled to benefits under the retirement statutes that were in effect when he was appointed to be a judge. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment for the petitioners, concluding that the application of RSA chapter 100-C to judges who accepted their positions before its enactment results in impairment of contract rights in violation of the New Hampshire Constitution. However, the trial court rejected Petitioner's assertion that the ten percent and one percent salary increases authorized in 2003 and 2005 should be included in calculating their benefits under the prior retirement statutes. The State raised two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in ruling that RSA chapter 100-C violates Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution; and (2) in the event the trial court’s ruling was upheld, whether RSA chapter 100-C is unconstitutional only as applied to judges who met the service and age requirements for retirement as of January 1, 2005. Petitioners cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in ruling that the 2003 and 2005 salary raises are not properly included as "currently effective annual salary" when calculating their retirement benefits. Upon review, the Supreme Court was persuaded by the board’s position that salary adjustments were authorized for the limited purpose of compensating judges for their ten percent earnable compensation contribution required under the new retirement plan. The adjustments may not be characterized as "effective annual salary" for purposes of calculating benefits under the prior retirement statutes. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cloutier v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals from a decision of the New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (board), Petitioner Timothy Alexander appealed the Board's affirmance of his dismissal from employment with the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the State appealed the board's reinstatement of William Harris to his employment with HHS. In 2009, Alexander and Harris were involved in the restraint of a resident at the Sununu Youth Services Center (SYSC). Alexander was employed as a Youth Counselor III and Harris was a full-time probationary employee, Youth Counselor I (Trainee). A Center report noted that the resident responded rudely when questioned whether the had permission to sit somewhere other than his assigned table. When told to move, the resident responded "disrespectfully," an altercation ensued. An investigation of the incident resulted in Alexander and Harris losing their jobs for using "excessive force" against the resident. Alexander and Harris appealed their dismissals to the Board. Alexander argued that: (1) the board unlawfully upheld his dismissal on a different factual basis from that stated in his termination letter; (2) the facts found by the board do not warrant termination; (3) he should be reinstated because SYSC failed to comply with the personnel rules; and (4) he is at least entitled to a new hearing because the board violated several statutes and, along with SYSC, violated his rights to due process. The Supreme Court did not "share Alexander's interpretation of the Board's decision." The Court affirmed Alexander's dismissal. As to Harris, the Court concluded the Board should not have "interfered" with HHS's exercise of discretion in terminating Harris's employment. The Court reversed the Board's decision as to Harris. View "Appeal of Alexander" on Justia Law

Respondent Hollis Education Association, NEA-New Hampshire, appealed a decision of the public employee labor relations board (PELRB) which sustained an unfair labor practice complaint filed by Petitioner Hollis School Board which ruled that speech-language pathologists and occupational therapists employed by the school district were not members of the bargaining unit represented by the Association. The recognition clause in the collective bargaining agreement defined members of the bargaining unit as "[c]ertified full-time teachers, librarians and guidance counsellors who actively teach at least 50% of their time in the Hollis School District and are employed by said district." The recognition clause did not specifically refer to speech-language pathologists or occupational therapists. Nonetheless, the Association argued that the term "certified teacher" was "broad enough to include speech-pathologists and occupational therapists." It maintains that "[s]ince both job titles teach and are certified, they should fall within . . . the recognition clause." Upon review, the Supreme Court fund that by its plain language, the term "certified full-time teachers" does not include speech-language pathologists or occupational therapists: "neither an employer nor a union can 'avoid the need to satisfy the statutory requisites for adding [a] position to the bargaining unit' by simply treating certain positions as though they were included within the bargaining unit." The Court affirmed the PELRB decision. View "Appeal of Hollis Education Association, NEA-New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Respondent A&J Beverage Distribution, Inc. appealed decisions of the Department of Labor (DOL) brought under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act by Petitioner Kevin Perrier. Petitioner worked for A&J as a truck driver. When he first started working, Petitioner did not participate in the company health plan. When premiums increased, Petitioner opted out of the plan. In 2009, rates decreased, and Petitioner claimed he was not informed of the decrease. When he sought information on the plan at that time, the company refused to give it to him. Petitioner notified the company that he had contacted the federal Department of Labor to learn more about his rights under ERISA with regard to notification of the company health plan. A&J then gave Petitioner the requested information, but shortly thereafter, he was terminated. The New Hampshire DOL hearing officer ruled that Petitioner "sustained his burden of proof to show that he was discharged in retaliation for having exercised his legitimate rights under the law." On appeal, A&J asserted preemption: that the whistleblower claim was preempted by ERISA. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the DOL's decision: "while the petitioner correctly notes that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over actions... his whistleblower claim is not such an action. ... [the Court] reject[ed] the petitioner's argument that DOL had jurisdiction over the petitioner's ERISA claim." View "Appeal of A&J Beverage Distribution, Inc. " on Justia Law