Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Scott Anderson appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to respondents, the Executive Director of the New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS) and the State, and denying summary judgment to Anderson and three other petitioners. Anderson was a retired Plaistow police officer who was a member of the NHRS, and the only petitioner who appealed. After retiring, he worked part-time as a police officer in Plaistow, Atkinson, and Hampstead. When he retired, RSA 100-A:1, XXXIV provided that "[p]art-time," for the purposes of employing a NHRS retiree meant, "employment by an [NHRS] employer" of no more than "32 hours in a normal calendar week," or if the work hours in some weeks exceeded thirty-two hours, then no more than "1,300 hours in a calendar year." Anderson understood that provision "to mean [he] could work potentially up to 32 hours per week for Plaistow, up to 32 hours per week for Atkinson, and up to 32 hours per week for Hampstead." In 2012, the legislature amended RSA 100-A:1, XXXIV to provide that "[p]art-time," for the purposes of employing a NHRS retiree, "means employment during a calendar year by one or more employers of the retired member which shall not exceed 32 hours in each normal calendar week," or if the work hours in some weeks exceed thirty-two hours, then no more than 1,300 hours in a calendar year. In August 2012, Anderson and three other NHRS retirees petitioned for declaratory and injunctive relief. Anderson contended that to apply the 2012 amendment to him violated Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Specifically, he asserted that, as a result of the 2012 amendment, he would be "restored to service" under RSA 100-A:7 (2013) and, thus, lose his retirement benefits if he worked more than "[p]art-time" as defined in RSA 100-A:1, XXXIV. Under RSA 100-A:7, when a retiree is "restored to service," his "retirement allowance shall cease," and he "shall again become a member of the [NHRS] and . . . shall contribute" to that system. Anderson contended that the 2012 amendment substantially impaired his vested right because its effect is to restore him to service if he works more than thirty-two hours per week or 1,300 hours per year for any combination of NHRS employers, even if he did not work full-time hours for any single NHRS employer. Thereafter, the petitioners moved for summary judgment, and the State cross-moved for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in the State's favor, and Anderson's appeal followed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Anderson v. Executive Director, New Hampshire Retirement System" on Justia Law

The Hillsborough County Nursing Home appealed the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board's (PELRB) decision finding that the County committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to participate in the arbitration of employment grievances filed by AFSCME, Local 2715. The union represented certain nursing home employees. The Supreme Court concluded after review that because a procedural challenge to arbitrability is a matter to be determined by the arbitrator in the first instance, the PELRB did not err in refusing to make a threshold determination as to the procedural arbitrability of the grievances in this case. Here, the County did not argue that the grievances at issue were not substantively arbitrable. Rather, its position was that the Union was procedurally defaulted because it failed to follow the CBA's grievance procedure. "[P]rocedural arbitrability issues are to be decided by the arbitrator; the assertion of such issues affords no basis for refusing to participate in arbitration. Accordingly, we hold that the PELRB did not err in determining that the County committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to arbitrate the grievances." View "Appeal of Hillsborough County Nursing Home" on Justia Law

Petitioner Gregory Malisos appealed a New Hampshire Retirement System board of trustees ruling that his legally separated spouse did not qualify for the medical subsidy benefit set forth in RSA 100-A:52, I (2013). The Supreme Court concluded that, in the absence of any limiting language in RSA 100-A:52 to the contrary, the legislature intended that an individual, although legally separated from a retiree, qualified as a spouse for purposes of eligibility for the medical subsidy benefit, until that individual's death or remarriage. "To conclude otherwise would add language to the retirement benefits statute that the legislature did not see fit to include. Had the legislature intended the term 'spouse' to exclude from retirement benefits a legally separated spouse, it could have said so. We conclude that the board erred as a matter of law." View "Petition of Gregory Malisos" on Justia Law

Petitioner Wayne Kassotis appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his complaint, arising from the nonrenewal of his employment contract to remain as the Town of Fitzwilliam's Chief of Police. Petitioner filed a complaint against the Town seeking, among other things, reinstatement as Chief of Police, damages, costs, and attorney’s fees, for the Town’s alleged failure to comply with RSA 105:2-a, which provided procedural protections to appointed chiefs of police who are "dismiss[ed]." The Town moved to dismiss, arguing that, "[b]ecause the Petitioner was not dismissed, RSA 105:2-a does not apply, and he fails to state a claim for relief." The trial court granted the Town’s motion on the basis that "the provisions of RSA 105:2-a are inapplicable to the [Town’s] decision not to renew the employment contract." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kassotis v. Town of Fitzwilliam" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Eskeland began work at the New Hampshire Department of Fish and Game in 1990 and, accordingly, became a mandatory member of the New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS). On October 1, 2010, he retired from the Department of Fish and Game with twenty years and three months of creditable service, at which point he began receiving his service retirement pension. After he retired, a friend told the petitioner that he should have retired on a disability retirement allowance rather than on a service retirement allowance. As a result of this conversation, and three months after he retired, petitioner filed an application for accidental disability retirement based upon work-related injuries he sustained in 2002 and 2004. In December, 2011, the board accepted the hearings examiner's recommendation to deny the petitioner's application for accidental disability retirement. The recommendation was based upon a medical certification that the petitioner was not permanently incapacitated by a work-related injury because he had worked full-time, without accommodation, for six years following his most recently accepted workers' compensation injury. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, and the board referred the request to the hearings examiner. In reviewing the request for reconsideration, the hearings examiner became aware of a potential jurisdictional issue and notified petitioner that, because he "was a beneficiary when he applied for disability retirement, his membership appears to have terminated and the Board of Trustees appears to lack jurisdiction to award him a disability retirement." After a three-day hearing, the hearings examiner recommended that the board find that it did not have jurisdiction to grant accidental disability retirement benefits. The board accepted the recommendation. Finding no reversible error with the Board's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Petition of David Eskeland" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Carrier petitioned the Supreme Court to review a New Hampshire Retirement System Board (NHRS) of Trustees ruling that as fire chief for Hampstead, he was required to be a member of NHRS. Petitioner worked in Londonderry as a full-time firefighter and later as the town’s fire chief. While working in Londonderry, petitioner was enrolled in the NHRS. He retired from his Londonderry position in July 2007, and began receiving retirement benefits. In January 2009, petitioner became the full-time fire chief for Hampstead. However, he did not re-enroll in the NHRS. Instead, he received both his NHRS retirement benefits and his Hampstead fire chief salary. In February 2010, the NHRS notified the petitioner that his Hampstead employment was subject to NHRS mandatory enrollment. Petitioner retired from his Hampstead position in May 2010. Petitioner appealed the February 2010 decision with the board. The board determined that, because petitioner collected his benefits while still employed full-time by Hampstead, he was overpaid pension benefits and medical subsidy benefits. The board ordered petitioner restored to service and required that those amounts be recouped from his future benefit payments. Although petitioner moved for reconsideration, his motion was denied. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Petition of Michael Carrier" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lawrence Leeds appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to defendant BAE Systems (BAE) in his wrongful discharge action. Leeds worked at-will for BAE as a quality control inspector from 2001 until his discharge in April 2009. In 2009, BAE discharged Leeds for violating the company’s standards of conduct as a result of two separate incidents at the company’s Hudson facility. Leeds was involved in an altercation with another employee. He defended his actions as "self-defense," and argued on appeal that the trial court should have allowed a jury to determine whether public policy would have encouraged his conduct. After examining all material facts in the light most favorable to him, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in ruling that Leeds could not show that public policy grounds justified his actions. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.View "Leeds v. BAE Systems" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES) Appellate Board (board) appealed a decision that respondent Norman Coulombe was an employee of petitioner, Niadni, Inc. (d/b/a Indian Head Resort Motel) who was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. Coulombe appeared as a musical entertainer at the resort in both solo and group performances beginning in approximately 1980. He also performed at other venues but testified that he performed at the resort nearly three hundred times in the last two years that he worked there. The resort and Coulombe negotiated a pay rate for Coulombe’s services, and he was paid weekly for his performances. He provided his own instruments and selected the songs he would play in his performances, though the resort asked him to perform new material prior to the end of his relationship with the resort. He reported that his last booking with the resort was in the summer of 2012, after which the relationship terminated. He subsequently filed for unemployment benefits with DES. Finding none of the Resort's arguments persuasive to reverse the Appellate Board's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Niadni, Inc. d/b/a Indian Head Resort Motel" on Justia Law

The Town of North Hampton appealed the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board's (PELRB) finding that the Town engaged in unfair labor practices in dealing with respondent North Hampton Professional Fire Fighters, Local 3211, IAFF (Union). The CBA contained wage scales for firefighters and lieutenants, respectively, each consisting of five steps. It provided that "[m]ovement through [the] steps is dependent on achieving certain professional certifications." During bargaining over the CBA, the Union submitted a wage proposal that provided for, among other things, a "[s]tipend for paramedic level EMT [that] will be 5% over actual step (base pay) whether hired as or a current employee has received the certification." The Town rejected the proposal and the parties put the paramedic program issue on hold. The Town remained interested in a paramedic program, however, and the Union informed the Town in June 2011 that it was willing to resume negotiations over the program. The Town responded that a vacancy on the selectboard was delaying the process. Nevertheless, in August 2011, the Town adopted a paramedic program that was not produced through bargaining with the Union. The program established a wage schedule and conditions of employment similar to those previously proposed by the Union and rejected by the Town. On appeal, the Town argued that the PELRB erred in: (1) finding that the Town was required to bargain over its paramedic program when the adoption of that program was within the Town’s "managerial prerogative"; (2) finding that the Town had previously created a paramedic program; (3) finding that the Town was required to bargain over the wages, hours, and working conditions of a position before the parties agreed to, and the PELRB ordered, the inclusion of that position in a bargaining unit; and (4) finding, on insufficient evidence, that the Town violated its duty to bargain and/or was motivated by anti-union animus. The Supreme Court concluded the Town failed to demonstrate that the PELRB made an erroneous ruling of law or to demonstrate, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, that its order was unjust or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court declined to set aside the PELRB’s decision. View "Appeal of Town of North Hampton " on Justia Law

Respondent Town of Brookline appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB), based upon stipulated facts and exhibits, which found that the Town engaged in an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the petitioner, AFSCME, Council 93 (Union). On appeal, the Town argued that the PELRB erred by ruling that the Town had a duty to bargain with the Union even though the bargaining unit in question, originally certified in 2001, currently contains fewer than ten employees. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Town of Brookline" on Justia Law