Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In consolidated appeals, employer-petitioner Ichiban Japanese Steakhouse, Inc. appealed superior court orders upholding the determinations of the state Department of Labor (DOL) that employees-respondents Kymberly Rocheleau and Samantha Greaney were entitled to lost wages and attorney's fees because the employer's tip pooling arrangement violated RSA 279:26-b (2010) (amended 2012). When Rocheleau told the manager of the restaurant that she disagreed with the tip pooling agreement, the manager told her that if she failed to sign the agreement, she could not work at the restaurant. At Greaney's hearing, the employer's attorney conceded that if Greaney had not signed the tip pooling agreement, she would not have been hired as wait staff, but might have been employed in another position. Both employees left their jobs at the restaurant in 2011. Upon leaving their positions, each filed a wage claim with the DOL, seeking to recover lost wages. Finding no reversible error in the DOL's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ichiban Japanese Steakhouse, Inc. v. Rocheleau" on Justia Law

Petitioners the Strafford County Sheriff's Office and the Strafford County Board of Commissioners (collectively, the county), appealed an order of the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB), which found that the county committed an unfair labor practice by changing the terms and conditions of employment of Sheriff's Office employees during the period when respondent New England Police Benevolent Association, Local 295 (union), was seeking certification of a bargaining unit that included those employees. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Strafford County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Plaintiff James Conrad appealed a Superior Court order granting the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on grounds that they were entitled to sovereign, official, and qualified immunity. Plaintiff sued both defendants, New Hampshire Department of Safety (NHDS) and New Hampshire State Trooper Lieutenant Mark Myrdek, for false imprisonment, and against Myrdek for a violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2012), seeking damages for events that occurred on November 28, 2007. Plaintiff alleged defendants falsely imprisoned him and violated his civil rights when defendants tried to calm plaintiff down after he made disparaging remarks about his wife (who was leaving him), tried to resign his position with the Department, and threatened to commit suicide. The defendants cross-appealed, raising evidentiary issues. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's order. View "Conrad v. New Hampshire Department of Safety" on Justia Law

Petitioner Professional Fire Fighters of Hudson, IAFF Local 3154 (Union), appealed a New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) decision that found respondent Town of Hudson (Town), did not commit an unfair labor practice. When each of the four earlier CBAs expired, but before the parties entered into a successor agreement, the Town provided Union members with step increases, despite the absence of an evergreen clause in the expired CBA. After the 2006 CBA expired in 2009, the Town’s budget included monies sufficient to fund step increases for eligible Union members in each of the budget years 2010, 2011, and 2012. All Union members received step increases between July 2009 and August 2011. In August 2011, the Town informed the Union by letter that the Town would no longer pay wage increases, including step increases. In response to the letter, the Union filed a grievance pursuant to the procedures in the 2006 CBA. The matter ultimately proceeded to arbitration. The Town argued that it had a right not to pay the step increases because the 2006 CBA did not have an evergreen clause and, under the applicable state law, a public employer is not required to pay step increases after a CBA has expired. The Union contended that the Town was required to pay the step increases because there was a binding past practice of paying such increases during status quo periods. The arbitrator determined that a public employer may, but is not required to, refrain from paying step increases during the status quo period, and, “[t]herefore, if the employer chooses to fund and pay step increases it is capable, in concert with the Union, of creating a binding past practice.” The arbitrator found that the initiation of step increase payments following the expiration of the parties’ most recent collective bargaining agreement was the continuation of a past practice. Accordingly, the arbitrator concluded that the Town violated the 2006 CBA and past practice between the parties when it failed to pay in accordance with the step schedule, and ordered the Town to pay the increases that had accrued since August 2011. The Town failed to comply with the arbitrator’s award. The Union filed a complaint with the PELRB alleging that the Town’s failure to comply constituted an unfair labor practice. The PELRB ruled in favor of the Town and dismissed the Union's complaint. The Union appealed. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the PELRB's decision. View "Appeal of Professional Fire Fighters of Hudson, IAFF Local 3154" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Department of Administrative Services appealed a superior court order granting the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by petitioner William Bovaird, and denying the Department's motion. The New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) employed petitioner as an Operations Officer I, Labor Grade 20, until it laid him off in 2009. The Department then placed petitioner on its statewide reduction in force list (RIF List). At the time, Chapter 144:65, Laws 2009 (the 2009 Law) governed the rehiring of laid-off state employees. The Department used the RIF List to place qualified laid-off employees into state positions as they became vacant. After petitioner was laid off, a Supervisor III, Labor Grade 23 position became available. According to the Department, no laid-off employees on the RIF List were eligible for the Supervisor III position; therefore, the Department released the position back to DHHS to be filled by an open-recruitment process. Petitioner applied for, and was eventually hired to fill, the Supervisor III position. In August 2012, petitioner requested that the Department restore his previously accumulated and unused sick leave, his prior seniority date, and his leave accrual rates, and that it reinstate his longevity pay. The Department denied the request. Petitioner then filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to require the Department to recognize him as a "recalled employee," rather than as a new hire, and to award him his benefits. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On appeal, the parties disagreed about whether the petitioner was "recalled" or "rehired" into the Supervisor III position. Petitioner argued that, because he "returned to work performing his prior duties with the same employer," there was "no rational reason to find that he was not" recalled and, thus, entitled to the benefits of a recalled employee. The Department argued that petitioner was not recalled because there are "no facts in the record regarding recalling" the petitioner and because he was not hired into the same classification. The parties also disputed the trial court's interpretation of the 2009 Law. The Supreme Court agreed with the Department that petitioner was rehired and not recalled. To be recalled, petitioner would have had to return to a position in the same classification as the position he held prior to his lay off: Operations Officer I, Labor Grade 20, instead of Supervisor III, Labor Grade 23. With such differences, petitioner did not return to the same classification, and, therefore, he was not recalled. With regard to the 2009 Law, the Supreme Court surmised that if the legislature had disagreed with the Department's longstanding interpretation, it could have altered the language of the 2009 Law. Such a change did not occur. Therefore, under the 2009 Law, the Department was not required to rehire laid-off employees from the RIF List into promotions, even if the employees meet the minimum qualifications for the position. Petitioner contended the legislative history of the 2009 Law mandated the opposite conclusion. Because the Supreme Court determined that the 2009 Law did not require the Department to rehire laid-off employees into promotions, it also conclude that the trial court erred in determining that petitioner was entitled to his previously accumulated and unused sick leave, an adjustment of his seniority date, and the other aforementioned benefits. View "Bovaird v. New Hampshire Department of Administrative Services" on Justia Law

Petitioner Scott Anderson appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to respondents, the Executive Director of the New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS) and the State, and denying summary judgment to Anderson and three other petitioners. Anderson was a retired Plaistow police officer who was a member of the NHRS, and the only petitioner who appealed. After retiring, he worked part-time as a police officer in Plaistow, Atkinson, and Hampstead. When he retired, RSA 100-A:1, XXXIV provided that "[p]art-time," for the purposes of employing a NHRS retiree meant, "employment by an [NHRS] employer" of no more than "32 hours in a normal calendar week," or if the work hours in some weeks exceeded thirty-two hours, then no more than "1,300 hours in a calendar year." Anderson understood that provision "to mean [he] could work potentially up to 32 hours per week for Plaistow, up to 32 hours per week for Atkinson, and up to 32 hours per week for Hampstead." In 2012, the legislature amended RSA 100-A:1, XXXIV to provide that "[p]art-time," for the purposes of employing a NHRS retiree, "means employment during a calendar year by one or more employers of the retired member which shall not exceed 32 hours in each normal calendar week," or if the work hours in some weeks exceed thirty-two hours, then no more than 1,300 hours in a calendar year. In August 2012, Anderson and three other NHRS retirees petitioned for declaratory and injunctive relief. Anderson contended that to apply the 2012 amendment to him violated Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Specifically, he asserted that, as a result of the 2012 amendment, he would be "restored to service" under RSA 100-A:7 (2013) and, thus, lose his retirement benefits if he worked more than "[p]art-time" as defined in RSA 100-A:1, XXXIV. Under RSA 100-A:7, when a retiree is "restored to service," his "retirement allowance shall cease," and he "shall again become a member of the [NHRS] and . . . shall contribute" to that system. Anderson contended that the 2012 amendment substantially impaired his vested right because its effect is to restore him to service if he works more than thirty-two hours per week or 1,300 hours per year for any combination of NHRS employers, even if he did not work full-time hours for any single NHRS employer. Thereafter, the petitioners moved for summary judgment, and the State cross-moved for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in the State's favor, and Anderson's appeal followed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Anderson v. Executive Director, New Hampshire Retirement System" on Justia Law

Petitioner Gregory Malisos appealed a New Hampshire Retirement System board of trustees ruling that his legally separated spouse did not qualify for the medical subsidy benefit set forth in RSA 100-A:52, I (2013). The Supreme Court concluded that, in the absence of any limiting language in RSA 100-A:52 to the contrary, the legislature intended that an individual, although legally separated from a retiree, qualified as a spouse for purposes of eligibility for the medical subsidy benefit, until that individual's death or remarriage. "To conclude otherwise would add language to the retirement benefits statute that the legislature did not see fit to include. Had the legislature intended the term 'spouse' to exclude from retirement benefits a legally separated spouse, it could have said so. We conclude that the board erred as a matter of law." View "Petition of Gregory Malisos" on Justia Law

The Hillsborough County Nursing Home appealed the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board's (PELRB) decision finding that the County committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to participate in the arbitration of employment grievances filed by AFSCME, Local 2715. The union represented certain nursing home employees. The Supreme Court concluded after review that because a procedural challenge to arbitrability is a matter to be determined by the arbitrator in the first instance, the PELRB did not err in refusing to make a threshold determination as to the procedural arbitrability of the grievances in this case. Here, the County did not argue that the grievances at issue were not substantively arbitrable. Rather, its position was that the Union was procedurally defaulted because it failed to follow the CBA's grievance procedure. "[P]rocedural arbitrability issues are to be decided by the arbitrator; the assertion of such issues affords no basis for refusing to participate in arbitration. Accordingly, we hold that the PELRB did not err in determining that the County committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to arbitrate the grievances." View "Appeal of Hillsborough County Nursing Home" on Justia Law

Petitioner Wayne Kassotis appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his complaint, arising from the nonrenewal of his employment contract to remain as the Town of Fitzwilliam's Chief of Police. Petitioner filed a complaint against the Town seeking, among other things, reinstatement as Chief of Police, damages, costs, and attorney’s fees, for the Town’s alleged failure to comply with RSA 105:2-a, which provided procedural protections to appointed chiefs of police who are "dismiss[ed]." The Town moved to dismiss, arguing that, "[b]ecause the Petitioner was not dismissed, RSA 105:2-a does not apply, and he fails to state a claim for relief." The trial court granted the Town’s motion on the basis that "the provisions of RSA 105:2-a are inapplicable to the [Town’s] decision not to renew the employment contract." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kassotis v. Town of Fitzwilliam" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Eskeland began work at the New Hampshire Department of Fish and Game in 1990 and, accordingly, became a mandatory member of the New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS). On October 1, 2010, he retired from the Department of Fish and Game with twenty years and three months of creditable service, at which point he began receiving his service retirement pension. After he retired, a friend told the petitioner that he should have retired on a disability retirement allowance rather than on a service retirement allowance. As a result of this conversation, and three months after he retired, petitioner filed an application for accidental disability retirement based upon work-related injuries he sustained in 2002 and 2004. In December, 2011, the board accepted the hearings examiner's recommendation to deny the petitioner's application for accidental disability retirement. The recommendation was based upon a medical certification that the petitioner was not permanently incapacitated by a work-related injury because he had worked full-time, without accommodation, for six years following his most recently accepted workers' compensation injury. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, and the board referred the request to the hearings examiner. In reviewing the request for reconsideration, the hearings examiner became aware of a potential jurisdictional issue and notified petitioner that, because he "was a beneficiary when he applied for disability retirement, his membership appears to have terminated and the Board of Trustees appears to lack jurisdiction to award him a disability retirement." After a three-day hearing, the hearings examiner recommended that the board find that it did not have jurisdiction to grant accidental disability retirement benefits. The board accepted the recommendation. Finding no reversible error with the Board's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Petition of David Eskeland" on Justia Law