Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners Jonathan Duchesne, Matthew Jajuga, and Michael Buckley, appealed a superior court decision denying their request for a declaratory judgment and an injunction to remove their names from the so-called "Laurie List." The petitioners were officers of the Manchester Police Department. In 2010, while off duty, petitioners were involved in an incident at a bar in Manchester. The incident was widely reported in the media, and the Manchester chief of police ordered a criminal and internal affairs investigation. Following the investigation, the chief found that the petitioners had violated several departmental policies, including a prohibition against the unnecessary use of force, and each officer was suspended for a period of time. Pursuant to protocol, the chief sent letters to the Hillsborough County Attorney's Office stating that petitioners had "engaged in conduct (excessive use of force) that may be subject to disclosure under [New Hampshire] v. Laurie." Consequently, the county attorney placed the petitioners' names on the "Laurie List," which the trial court described as "an informal list of police officers who have been identified as having potentially exculpatory evidence in their personnel files or otherwise." Pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the petitioners' union and the City of Manchester, the petitioners filed grievances regarding the discipline imposed by the chief. After a hearing, an arbitrator found that "the City of Manchester did not have just cause to take disciplinary action against [the petitioners] for actions taken or not taken" during the incident. As a result of this decision, petitioners were compensated for lost earnings and information regarding the incident was removed from their personnel files. While this process was occurring, the New Hampshire Attorney General's Office conducted an independent criminal investigation into the incident. Its final report concluded that the petitioners' conduct "was justified under New Hampshire law and no criminal charges are warranted." The chief again wrote to the then Hillsborough County Attorney, this time requesting that, pursuant to the arbitrator's award, petitioners be removed from the "Laurie List." The county attorney declined. Petitioners also asked the attorney general to direct the county attorney to remove the petitioners from the "Laurie List" which the attorney general also declined. After a hearing, the trial court denied petitioners relief. Although the "Laurie List" is not available to members of the public generally, placement on the list all but guarantees that information about the officers will be disclosed to trial courts and/or defendants or their counsel any time the officers testify in a criminal case, thus potentially affecting their reputations and professional standing with those with whom they work and interact on a regular basis. Here, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion and that petitioners were entitled to be removed from the "Laurie List." Therefore, to the extent that the petitioners' names appear on the "Laurie List" maintained by the Hillsborough County Attorney's Office, we hold that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in failing to order that their names be removed from said list. In light of this ruling, the Court did not address the other relief requested. View "Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney" on Justia Law

Petitioner New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS) appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) denying the NHRS’s petition to modify the composition of respondent Local 1984 (a bargaining unit represented by the State Employees’ Association (SEA)) to exclude from the unit certain supervisory positions. The NHRS filed its modification petition looking to exclude from the bargaining unit the Team Lead, Public Information Officer, and Controller positions on the grounds that circumstances had changed and that the positions were now supervisory within the meaning of RSA 273-A:8, II (Supp. 2014). The SEA objected to the petition to modify, arguing that the circumstances regarding those positions had not changed to a degree warranting modification of the bargaining unit and that the positions were not otherwise improperly included within the unit. Following an evidentiary hearing, a PELRB hearing officer denied the petition to modify the bargaining unit. Specifically NHRS argued that modification of the bargaining unit under the changed circumstances was mandated by RSA 273-A:8, II, which prohibited supervisors and the employees they supervise from belonging to the same bargaining unit. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the change in the contested positions to “supervisors-in-fact” constituted a material change in circumstances warranting modification of the unit. The Court reversed the PELRB and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Appeal of New Hampshire Retirement System" on Justia Law

Petitioner Brandon Kelly challenged a decision of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) denying his claim for workers' compensation benefits for severe injuries he sustained while driving between a job site and his place of employment. The CAB ruled that the injuries did not arise out of his employment as required by RSA 281-A:2, XI (2010). Petitioner was an employee of Advanced Sheet Metal in Hudson. His job involved traveling to job sites in a company truck. After working at a job site in Massachusetts, petitioner left for the company shop in Hudson where he intended to unload the truck. While driving, he fell asleep and hit a utility pole. As a result of the accident, his lower leg was amputated. Petitioner sought workers' compensation benefits. After respondent Arbella Insurance Company denied his claim, a hearing was held before the New Hampshire Department of Labor, which awarded benefits. Respondent appealed to the CAB, which, in a 2-1 decision, denied the petitioner's claim. The CAB found that it was undisputed that the petitioner was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the accident, and that the accident occurred because he fell asleep while driving. However, the CAB ruled that the injuries did not arise out of his employment. The CAB found that the injury was caused by a "mixed risk," and that petitioner failed to prove that "whatever abnormal weariness, if any, [he] might have been suffering that day was caused by his employment." Petitioner unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, then appealed the CAB's decision. In "Margeson," the New Hampshire Supreme Court instructed the CAB that, in all future cases, it should make a finding regarding the cause of the claimant's injury: if the cause is a neutral risk, the increased-risk test applied; if the cause was a non-neutral risk, the claimant must prove legal and medical causation under the "Steinberg I" test. In this case, after concluding that the injury-causing risk was a mixed risk, the CAB ruled that, to be compensated, petitioner had to prove that his weariness was work-induced, and that petitioner failed to do so. The Supreme Court did not agree with the CAB that petitioner had to prove work-induced weariness as a prerequisite to receiving compensation in this case. "There can be no question that the injurious effects of falling asleep were increased by the environment in which the petitioner found himself at the time he fell asleep behind the wheel of a moving truck. We have no difficulty concluding on this record, as a matter of law, that the petitioner's employment was 'a substantial contributing factor to the injury.'" View "Appeal of Brandon Kelly " on Justia Law

The State appealed a Superior Court’s ruling that legislative changes to the definition of "earnable compensation" applicable to members of the New Hampshire Retirement System violated the Contract Clauses of the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions. Plaintiffs and the intervenors cross-appealed the court’s rulings that members’ rights to retirement benefits do not vest until they accrue ten years of creditable service, and that members do not have vested rights to cost-of-living adjustments to their pensions. The New Hampshire Retirement System took no position on the legal issues raised in the appeal, but objected to the remedy sought by plaintiffs and the intervenors. After review of the parties' arguments, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling on "earnable compensation," and affirmed its ruling on cost-of-living adjustments. View "American Federation of Teachers v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

The State appealed a Superior Court ruling that legislative changes increasing the contribution rates paid by members of the New Hampshire Retirement System violated the Contract Clauses of the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions. Plaintiffs and the intervenors cross-appealed the court’s ruling that members’ rights to retirement benefits did not vest until they accrued ten years of creditable service. On appeal, the State argued (among other things) that the trial court erred by ruling that NHRS members had a contractual right to a fixed contribution rate. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that there was no indication that in enacting RSA 100-A:16 the legislature unmistakably intended to bind itself from prospectively changing the rate of NHRS member contributions to the retirement system. Because the Federal Constitution afforded plaintiffs no greater protection than did the State Constitution in these circumstances, the Court reached the same conclusion under the Federal Constitution as under the State Constitution. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the 2011 amendment to RSA 100-A:16, I(a) violated the Contract Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. View "Professional Fire Fighters of New Hampshire v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, employer-petitioner Ichiban Japanese Steakhouse, Inc. appealed superior court orders upholding the determinations of the state Department of Labor (DOL) that employees-respondents Kymberly Rocheleau and Samantha Greaney were entitled to lost wages and attorney's fees because the employer's tip pooling arrangement violated RSA 279:26-b (2010) (amended 2012). When Rocheleau told the manager of the restaurant that she disagreed with the tip pooling agreement, the manager told her that if she failed to sign the agreement, she could not work at the restaurant. At Greaney's hearing, the employer's attorney conceded that if Greaney had not signed the tip pooling agreement, she would not have been hired as wait staff, but might have been employed in another position. Both employees left their jobs at the restaurant in 2011. Upon leaving their positions, each filed a wage claim with the DOL, seeking to recover lost wages. Finding no reversible error in the DOL's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ichiban Japanese Steakhouse, Inc. v. Rocheleau" on Justia Law

Petitioners the Strafford County Sheriff's Office and the Strafford County Board of Commissioners (collectively, the county), appealed an order of the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB), which found that the county committed an unfair labor practice by changing the terms and conditions of employment of Sheriff's Office employees during the period when respondent New England Police Benevolent Association, Local 295 (union), was seeking certification of a bargaining unit that included those employees. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Strafford County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Plaintiff James Conrad appealed a Superior Court order granting the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on grounds that they were entitled to sovereign, official, and qualified immunity. Plaintiff sued both defendants, New Hampshire Department of Safety (NHDS) and New Hampshire State Trooper Lieutenant Mark Myrdek, for false imprisonment, and against Myrdek for a violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2012), seeking damages for events that occurred on November 28, 2007. Plaintiff alleged defendants falsely imprisoned him and violated his civil rights when defendants tried to calm plaintiff down after he made disparaging remarks about his wife (who was leaving him), tried to resign his position with the Department, and threatened to commit suicide. The defendants cross-appealed, raising evidentiary issues. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's order. View "Conrad v. New Hampshire Department of Safety" on Justia Law

Petitioner Professional Fire Fighters of Hudson, IAFF Local 3154 (Union), appealed a New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) decision that found respondent Town of Hudson (Town), did not commit an unfair labor practice. When each of the four earlier CBAs expired, but before the parties entered into a successor agreement, the Town provided Union members with step increases, despite the absence of an evergreen clause in the expired CBA. After the 2006 CBA expired in 2009, the Town’s budget included monies sufficient to fund step increases for eligible Union members in each of the budget years 2010, 2011, and 2012. All Union members received step increases between July 2009 and August 2011. In August 2011, the Town informed the Union by letter that the Town would no longer pay wage increases, including step increases. In response to the letter, the Union filed a grievance pursuant to the procedures in the 2006 CBA. The matter ultimately proceeded to arbitration. The Town argued that it had a right not to pay the step increases because the 2006 CBA did not have an evergreen clause and, under the applicable state law, a public employer is not required to pay step increases after a CBA has expired. The Union contended that the Town was required to pay the step increases because there was a binding past practice of paying such increases during status quo periods. The arbitrator determined that a public employer may, but is not required to, refrain from paying step increases during the status quo period, and, “[t]herefore, if the employer chooses to fund and pay step increases it is capable, in concert with the Union, of creating a binding past practice.” The arbitrator found that the initiation of step increase payments following the expiration of the parties’ most recent collective bargaining agreement was the continuation of a past practice. Accordingly, the arbitrator concluded that the Town violated the 2006 CBA and past practice between the parties when it failed to pay in accordance with the step schedule, and ordered the Town to pay the increases that had accrued since August 2011. The Town failed to comply with the arbitrator’s award. The Union filed a complaint with the PELRB alleging that the Town’s failure to comply constituted an unfair labor practice. The PELRB ruled in favor of the Town and dismissed the Union's complaint. The Union appealed. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the PELRB's decision. View "Appeal of Professional Fire Fighters of Hudson, IAFF Local 3154" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Department of Administrative Services appealed a superior court order granting the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by petitioner William Bovaird, and denying the Department's motion. The New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) employed petitioner as an Operations Officer I, Labor Grade 20, until it laid him off in 2009. The Department then placed petitioner on its statewide reduction in force list (RIF List). At the time, Chapter 144:65, Laws 2009 (the 2009 Law) governed the rehiring of laid-off state employees. The Department used the RIF List to place qualified laid-off employees into state positions as they became vacant. After petitioner was laid off, a Supervisor III, Labor Grade 23 position became available. According to the Department, no laid-off employees on the RIF List were eligible for the Supervisor III position; therefore, the Department released the position back to DHHS to be filled by an open-recruitment process. Petitioner applied for, and was eventually hired to fill, the Supervisor III position. In August 2012, petitioner requested that the Department restore his previously accumulated and unused sick leave, his prior seniority date, and his leave accrual rates, and that it reinstate his longevity pay. The Department denied the request. Petitioner then filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to require the Department to recognize him as a "recalled employee," rather than as a new hire, and to award him his benefits. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On appeal, the parties disagreed about whether the petitioner was "recalled" or "rehired" into the Supervisor III position. Petitioner argued that, because he "returned to work performing his prior duties with the same employer," there was "no rational reason to find that he was not" recalled and, thus, entitled to the benefits of a recalled employee. The Department argued that petitioner was not recalled because there are "no facts in the record regarding recalling" the petitioner and because he was not hired into the same classification. The parties also disputed the trial court's interpretation of the 2009 Law. The Supreme Court agreed with the Department that petitioner was rehired and not recalled. To be recalled, petitioner would have had to return to a position in the same classification as the position he held prior to his lay off: Operations Officer I, Labor Grade 20, instead of Supervisor III, Labor Grade 23. With such differences, petitioner did not return to the same classification, and, therefore, he was not recalled. With regard to the 2009 Law, the Supreme Court surmised that if the legislature had disagreed with the Department's longstanding interpretation, it could have altered the language of the 2009 Law. Such a change did not occur. Therefore, under the 2009 Law, the Department was not required to rehire laid-off employees from the RIF List into promotions, even if the employees meet the minimum qualifications for the position. Petitioner contended the legislative history of the 2009 Law mandated the opposite conclusion. Because the Supreme Court determined that the 2009 Law did not require the Department to rehire laid-off employees into promotions, it also conclude that the trial court erred in determining that petitioner was entitled to his previously accumulated and unused sick leave, an adjustment of his seniority date, and the other aforementioned benefits. View "Bovaird v. New Hampshire Department of Administrative Services" on Justia Law