Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Officer John Gantert appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to defendants the City of Rochester, the Rochester Police Department, and the Rochester Police Commission, on plaintiff’s claims of tortious interference with prospective advantageous business relations, violations of his procedural due process rights, and damage to his reputation. All of his claims stemmed from defendants’ alleged wrongful placement of plaintiff on a so-called “Laurie List” without affording him sufficient procedural due process. After review, the Supreme Court found that the procedures afforded to plaintiff in this case were adequate. As such, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Gantert v. City of Rochester" on Justia Law

Petitioner Raymond Cover appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board order denying his request for reinstatement to his former part-time position with the respondent, the New Hampshire Liquor Commission (Commission). Cover was a part-time employee of the Commission. In late May 2013, he sustained a work-related injury. The Commission sent him workers’ compensation forms on June 5 and warned him that he faced termination if he did not provide medical documentation by June 14 to justify his absence from work. On June 6, Cover gave the forms to his physician, who submitted them to the Commission on June 17, three days after the Commission’s deadline. Cover acknowledged that he did not submit any medical documentation to the Commission by June 14. On June 13, the Commission’s insurance carrier denied Cover’s workers’ compensation claim, stating that it had not received medical documentation concerning his injury. On June 17, the Commission terminated Cover’s employment. The board based its denial upon New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Lab 504.05(b)(3), which stated that part-time employees were ineligible for reinstatement under the Workers’ Compensation Law. On appeal, Cover argued that Lab 504.05(b)(3) conflicted with RSA 281-A:25-a and was therefore invalid. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the plain language of RSA 281-A:25-a supported Cover’s argument that the right of reinstatement extended to part-time employees. "By stripping part-time employees of the right to reinstatement provided by RSA 281-A:25-a, the rule cannot be characterized as a rule that merely 'fill[s] in the details to effectuate the purpose of the statute.' Rather, the rule impermissibly modifies the statute and is therefore invalid." The Court vacated the board’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Raymond Cover" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Nichole Wilkins and Beverly Mulcahey sued their former employer, Fred Fuller Oil Company, Inc. (Fuller Oil), for sexual harassment and retaliation. Plaintiffs also sued Frederick J. Fuller, an employee of Fuller Oil, individually Prior to trial, defendant sought to prohibit plaintiffs from asserting claims against him under RSA chapter 354-A in his individual capacity. The district court thereafter informed the parties that it would not allow plaintiffs to assert such claims. Subsequently, Fuller Oil filed for bankruptcy protection and, therefore, the case against Fuller Oil was stayed; the case was reopened as to claims against defendant. Because the questions of whether an employee could recover damages from another employee for aiding and abetting sexual harassment or for retaliation under RSA chapter 354-A concerned unresolved issues of New Hampshire law, the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire certified two questions of New Hampshire law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court: (1) whether sections 354-A:2 and 354-A:7 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes imposed individual employee liability for aiding and abetting discrimination in the workplace; and (2) whether section 354-A:19 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes imposed individual employee liability for retaliation in the workplace. The New Hampshire Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative. View "U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Fred Fuller Oil Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner City of Concord appealed a New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) decision that a grievance filed by respondent, the Concord Police Supervisor[s’] Association (Union), and a retired bargaining unit member was arbitrable pursuant to the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The City and the Union were parties to a CBA that expired on December 31, 2012. Lieutenant Paul Leger retired on January 31, 2013, while negotiations for a successor CBA were ongoing. Negotiations for the successor CBA culminated in an agreement signed on December 19, 2013, nearly eleven months after Leger retired. In March 2014, more than a year after Leger retired, he and the Union filed a grievance with the City because he did not receive the cost of living wage adjustment effective January 1, 2013. The City denied the grievance, and the Union subsequently demanded arbitration. Finding no reversible error in the PELRB's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of City of Concord " on Justia Law

Respondents Marco Dorfsman and the University of New Hampshire Chapter of the American Association of University Professors (Union), appealed a superior court order granting the petition for declaratory relief filed by petitioners the University System of New Hampshire Board of Trustees and the University of New Hampshire (collectively, UNH). The superior court vacated the arbitrator’s decision that UNH had violated its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Union by terminating Dorfsman’s employment for engaging in an act of “moral turpitude.” Dorfsman was an Associate Professor and the Chair of the Language, Literature, and Culture Department at UNH. In December of that year, he intentionally lowered the evaluations that students had given a certain lecturer by erasing markings on the evaluations; if the highest ranking had been given, he entered a different and lower rating. In May 2013, UNH terminated Dorfsman’s employment for this conduct, which UNH determined constituted an act of “moral turpitude” within the meaning of the CBA. Dorfsman and the Union grieved his termination, and, pursuant to the CBA, the parties submitted to binding arbitration to resolve that grievance. On appeal, respondents argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review the arbitrator’s decision, the issues were not ripe for judicial review, and the arbitrator did not exceed his authority when he found that UNH lacked just cause to terminate Dorfsman’s employment. Respondents did not challenge the arbitrator’s finding that Dorfsman’s conduct constituted “moral turpitude” within the meaning of the CBA. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "University System of New Hampshire Board of Trustees v. Dorfsman" on Justia Law

Petitioners Jonathan Duchesne, Matthew Jajuga, and Michael Buckley, appealed a superior court decision denying their request for a declaratory judgment and an injunction to remove their names from the so-called "Laurie List." The petitioners were officers of the Manchester Police Department. In 2010, while off duty, petitioners were involved in an incident at a bar in Manchester. The incident was widely reported in the media, and the Manchester chief of police ordered a criminal and internal affairs investigation. Following the investigation, the chief found that the petitioners had violated several departmental policies, including a prohibition against the unnecessary use of force, and each officer was suspended for a period of time. Pursuant to protocol, the chief sent letters to the Hillsborough County Attorney's Office stating that petitioners had "engaged in conduct (excessive use of force) that may be subject to disclosure under [New Hampshire] v. Laurie." Consequently, the county attorney placed the petitioners' names on the "Laurie List," which the trial court described as "an informal list of police officers who have been identified as having potentially exculpatory evidence in their personnel files or otherwise." Pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the petitioners' union and the City of Manchester, the petitioners filed grievances regarding the discipline imposed by the chief. After a hearing, an arbitrator found that "the City of Manchester did not have just cause to take disciplinary action against [the petitioners] for actions taken or not taken" during the incident. As a result of this decision, petitioners were compensated for lost earnings and information regarding the incident was removed from their personnel files. While this process was occurring, the New Hampshire Attorney General's Office conducted an independent criminal investigation into the incident. Its final report concluded that the petitioners' conduct "was justified under New Hampshire law and no criminal charges are warranted." The chief again wrote to the then Hillsborough County Attorney, this time requesting that, pursuant to the arbitrator's award, petitioners be removed from the "Laurie List." The county attorney declined. Petitioners also asked the attorney general to direct the county attorney to remove the petitioners from the "Laurie List" which the attorney general also declined. After a hearing, the trial court denied petitioners relief. Although the "Laurie List" is not available to members of the public generally, placement on the list all but guarantees that information about the officers will be disclosed to trial courts and/or defendants or their counsel any time the officers testify in a criminal case, thus potentially affecting their reputations and professional standing with those with whom they work and interact on a regular basis. Here, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion and that petitioners were entitled to be removed from the "Laurie List." Therefore, to the extent that the petitioners' names appear on the "Laurie List" maintained by the Hillsborough County Attorney's Office, we hold that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in failing to order that their names be removed from said list. In light of this ruling, the Court did not address the other relief requested. View "Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney" on Justia Law

Petitioner New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS) appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) denying the NHRS’s petition to modify the composition of respondent Local 1984 (a bargaining unit represented by the State Employees’ Association (SEA)) to exclude from the unit certain supervisory positions. The NHRS filed its modification petition looking to exclude from the bargaining unit the Team Lead, Public Information Officer, and Controller positions on the grounds that circumstances had changed and that the positions were now supervisory within the meaning of RSA 273-A:8, II (Supp. 2014). The SEA objected to the petition to modify, arguing that the circumstances regarding those positions had not changed to a degree warranting modification of the bargaining unit and that the positions were not otherwise improperly included within the unit. Following an evidentiary hearing, a PELRB hearing officer denied the petition to modify the bargaining unit. Specifically NHRS argued that modification of the bargaining unit under the changed circumstances was mandated by RSA 273-A:8, II, which prohibited supervisors and the employees they supervise from belonging to the same bargaining unit. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the change in the contested positions to “supervisors-in-fact” constituted a material change in circumstances warranting modification of the unit. The Court reversed the PELRB and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Appeal of New Hampshire Retirement System" on Justia Law

Petitioner Brandon Kelly challenged a decision of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) denying his claim for workers' compensation benefits for severe injuries he sustained while driving between a job site and his place of employment. The CAB ruled that the injuries did not arise out of his employment as required by RSA 281-A:2, XI (2010). Petitioner was an employee of Advanced Sheet Metal in Hudson. His job involved traveling to job sites in a company truck. After working at a job site in Massachusetts, petitioner left for the company shop in Hudson where he intended to unload the truck. While driving, he fell asleep and hit a utility pole. As a result of the accident, his lower leg was amputated. Petitioner sought workers' compensation benefits. After respondent Arbella Insurance Company denied his claim, a hearing was held before the New Hampshire Department of Labor, which awarded benefits. Respondent appealed to the CAB, which, in a 2-1 decision, denied the petitioner's claim. The CAB found that it was undisputed that the petitioner was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the accident, and that the accident occurred because he fell asleep while driving. However, the CAB ruled that the injuries did not arise out of his employment. The CAB found that the injury was caused by a "mixed risk," and that petitioner failed to prove that "whatever abnormal weariness, if any, [he] might have been suffering that day was caused by his employment." Petitioner unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, then appealed the CAB's decision. In "Margeson," the New Hampshire Supreme Court instructed the CAB that, in all future cases, it should make a finding regarding the cause of the claimant's injury: if the cause is a neutral risk, the increased-risk test applied; if the cause was a non-neutral risk, the claimant must prove legal and medical causation under the "Steinberg I" test. In this case, after concluding that the injury-causing risk was a mixed risk, the CAB ruled that, to be compensated, petitioner had to prove that his weariness was work-induced, and that petitioner failed to do so. The Supreme Court did not agree with the CAB that petitioner had to prove work-induced weariness as a prerequisite to receiving compensation in this case. "There can be no question that the injurious effects of falling asleep were increased by the environment in which the petitioner found himself at the time he fell asleep behind the wheel of a moving truck. We have no difficulty concluding on this record, as a matter of law, that the petitioner's employment was 'a substantial contributing factor to the injury.'" View "Appeal of Brandon Kelly " on Justia Law

The State appealed a Superior Court’s ruling that legislative changes to the definition of "earnable compensation" applicable to members of the New Hampshire Retirement System violated the Contract Clauses of the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions. Plaintiffs and the intervenors cross-appealed the court’s rulings that members’ rights to retirement benefits do not vest until they accrue ten years of creditable service, and that members do not have vested rights to cost-of-living adjustments to their pensions. The New Hampshire Retirement System took no position on the legal issues raised in the appeal, but objected to the remedy sought by plaintiffs and the intervenors. After review of the parties' arguments, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling on "earnable compensation," and affirmed its ruling on cost-of-living adjustments. View "American Federation of Teachers v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

The State appealed a Superior Court ruling that legislative changes increasing the contribution rates paid by members of the New Hampshire Retirement System violated the Contract Clauses of the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions. Plaintiffs and the intervenors cross-appealed the court’s ruling that members’ rights to retirement benefits did not vest until they accrued ten years of creditable service. On appeal, the State argued (among other things) that the trial court erred by ruling that NHRS members had a contractual right to a fixed contribution rate. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that there was no indication that in enacting RSA 100-A:16 the legislature unmistakably intended to bind itself from prospectively changing the rate of NHRS member contributions to the retirement system. Because the Federal Constitution afforded plaintiffs no greater protection than did the State Constitution in these circumstances, the Court reached the same conclusion under the Federal Constitution as under the State Constitution. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the 2011 amendment to RSA 100-A:16, I(a) violated the Contract Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. View "Professional Fire Fighters of New Hampshire v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law